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Abstract	
	
This	 thesis	 considers	what	 it	means	 to	 be	 and	belong	 as	Afghan	 in	Delhi	 today.	 It	
argues	 that	 Afghan	 belonging	 in	 Delhi	must	 be	 understood	 as	 inherently	multiple	
and	 articulated	 at	 different	 scales,	 and	 that	 this	 multiplicity	 must	 be	 further	
considered	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 varying	 influence	 of	 different	 conceptions	 of	
belonging	 in	 migrants’	 everyday	 life.	 Chapters	 one	 and	 two	 present	 the	 thesis’	
methodological	 and	 theoretical	 framework,	 bringing	 together	 anthropological	
research	 on	 Afghanistan	 with	 work	 on	 personhood,	 ontology,	 and	 ethics.	 The	
subsequent	four	ethnographic	chapters	explore	ideas	of	Afghan	belonging	in	Delhi	at	
the	scales	of	state,	individual,	and	community.	To	frame	the	argument,	chapter	three	
presents	the	state	scale	understanding	of	Afghan	migrants	as	individuals	belonging	
to	 an	 Afghan	 community	 rooted	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 Afghanistan,	 whose	 story	 of	
migration	determines	the	legality	of	their	presence	in	Delhi.	Chapters	four	and	five	
turn	 to	 the	 individual	 scale	 to	 respectively	 demonstrate	 how	 complex	 and	 varied	
trajectories	 of	movement	 belie	 facile	 categorization	 of	migrants	 as	 legal	 or	 illegal,	
and	how	they	shape	and	reflect	Afghan	migrants’	diverse	affective	and	material	ties	
to	 the	city.	Chapter	six	depicts	how	this	diversity	 is	also	articulated	at	 the	scale	of	
community	 through	 a	 comparison	 of	 two	 Afghan	 communities	 in	 the	 city.	 The	
ethnography	 illustrates	how	despite	 the	 fact	 that	Afghan	migrants	 conceive	of	and	
express	multiple	ways	of	being	and	belonging	in	Delhi,	how	they	inhabit	the	city	is	
contingent	on	 their	 access	 to	 financial	 and	 social	 resources,	 and	 thus	 indicative	of	
wider	issues	of	belonging	and	urban	citizenship	in	Delhi	today.	While	contributing	to	
the	study	of	Afghan	migration	and	urban	life	in	India,	the	thesis	also	adds	to	broader	
discussions	 of	 personhood	 and	 relatedness	 by	 bringing	 together	 insights	 from	
anthropological	research	on	ontology,	ethics,	and	morality.	
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1. Introduction	
Bring	forward	those	who	understand	language,	if	they	exist!	
The	stranger	in	the	city	has	much	to	say.1	
	
This	Persian	verse,	penned	 in	Delhi	at	 the	turn	of	 the	nineteenth	century	by	Mirza	
Ghalib,	the	poet	laureate	of	the	last	Mughal	emperor,	serves	as	an	appropriate	start	
to	this	thesis	about	strangers	in	the	city,	about	Afghan	migrants	living	in	Delhi.	The	
research	question	driving	the	thesis	is:	what	does	it	mean	to	be	an	Afghan	in	Delhi	
and	how	do	Afghans	belong	in	the	city?	Over	the	course	of	the	ethnographic	chapters,	
the	 thesis	 argues	 that	 the	 response	 to	 this	 question	 must	 be	 understood	 as	 a	
multiple,	 that	 are	many	meanings	of	being	Afghan	 in	Delhi	 and	numerous	ways	 in	
which	Afghans	can	be	understood	to	belong,	or	not	belong,	in	the	city.	In	recognizing	
this	 fact,	 this	 research	 does	 not	 just	 argue	 for	 incalculable	 social	 complexity	 of	
Afghan	 belonging	 in	 Delhi.	 Rather,	 it	 suggests	 that	 the	 plurality	 ways	 of	 being	 or	
belonging	as	Afghan	 in	Delhi	can	be	meaningfully	considered	 through	attending	 to	
issues	of	scale.	Scale	is	used	in	two	senses,	as	discussed	in	chapter	two.	The	first	is	of	
different	 levels	 of	 ordering	 of	 knowledge,	 such	 as	 that	 of	 the	 state,	 individual	 or	
community,	 which	 each	 present	 different	 understandings	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	
Afghan	in	Delhi.	The	second	notion	of	scale	considered	in	the	thesis,	is	that	of	scale	
as	magnitude.	That	is,	the	study	attends	not	just	to	the	different	levels	at	which	ideas	
of	what	it	means	to	be	Afghan	in	Delhi	exist,	but	also	to	the	differential	and	variable	
bearing	of	these	ideas	on	migrants’	lives.	The	accounts	and	observations	presented	
in	 the	 thesis	 suggest	 that	 despite	 a	 plurality	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 Afghan	 migrants	
belong	 in	 the	city,	 the	context	within	which	 these	migrants	 find	 themselves	 is	one	
where	 not	 all	 forms	 of	 belonging	 are	 equally	 viable	 or	 recognized	 for	 all	 persons.	
Furthermore,	it	is	suggested	that	the	experiences	of	Afghan	migrants	reflect	broader	
issues	of	belonging	in	India	today.	In	this	vein,	the	thesis	holds	that	these	strangers	
in	the	city	of	Delhi	do	indeed	have	much	to	say.	
	 	
This	 thesis	 is	 distinct	 in	 that	 it	 presents	 ethnographic	 material	 on	 contemporary	
																																																								
1	This	is	my	own	translation	of	Ghalib’s	verse:	“ ﯾاﺮﮔ ﺪмروﺎﯿﺑﻨدراد ܢۚﺘﻔﮔ یﺎډٔݵܥ ﺮСﺷ ﺐмﺮﻏ /ﮯﻧاد ںﺎﺑز دﻮﺑ ﺎﺠ ”.	
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Afghan	migration	in	India,	an	issue	on	which	little	prior	research	exits.	It	also	adds	to	
research	on	personhood	and	identity	in	South	Asia.	While	anthropological	research	
has	presented	various	forms	of	personhood	across	the	region	as	unique	to	particular	
groups	 or	 areas,	 the	 thesis	 considers	 these	 different	 ideas	 of	 how	 people	 are	
constituted	and	connected	to	others	as	general	forms	of	human	relatedness	that	can	
operate	 contemporaneously	 to	 inform	 individuals’	 understandings	 of	 their	 selves.	
This	 approach	 to	 the	 ethnographic	material	 is	 shaped	 by	 current	 anthropological	
theory	 on	 ontology	 and	 ethics	 and	 morality,	 and	 is	 discussed	 in	 more	 detail	 in	
chapter	two	as	part	of	the	theoretical	 framework	of	the	thesis.	 In	the	remainder	of	
this	 introduction,	 I	 discuss	 the	 context	 of	 the	 project,	 how	 it	 was	 developed	 and	
carried	out	methodologically,	and	the	general	structure	of	the	thesis.	
1.1 On	Methodologies	and	Questions	
The	 poet	 Abdul	 Qadir	 Bedil,	 an	 Afghan	 migrant	 living	 sixteenth	 century	 in	 Delhi	
whose	tomb	features	in	chapter	five,	is	celebrated	in	India	and	considered	one	of	the	
national	poets	of	Afghanistan.	Bedil	writes	 that	 “There	are	no	 true	barriers	 in	 this	
playground	of	life;	the	foot	which	falls	asleep	along	the	path	also	charts	the	course.”2	
While	my	translation	does	not	capture	the	multi‐layered	complexity	of	Bedil’s	style,	
what	is	suggested	is	that	even	what	one	might	perceive	as	an	obstacle	in	one’s	path,	
can	 be	 integral	 in	 shaping	 the	 route	 one	 takes.	 Indeed,	 as	 I	 explain	 below,	 the	
decision	 to	 conduct	 a	 year	 of	 fieldwork	 in	 Delhi	was	 abrupt	 and	 unexpected,	 and	
initially	 felt	 like	 an	 obstacle	 to	 the	 kind	 of	 research	 I	 had	 planned	 to	 conduct.	
However,	 this	 decision	 ultimately	 led	 to	 a	 more	 nuanced	 project	 by	 requiring	
methodological	change	and	revision	of	my	research	questions.	
Doing	Fieldwork	in	the	City	
I	 had	 initially	 intended	 to	 conduct	 fieldwork	 in	 Afghanistan	 with	 the	 aim	 of	
providing	 a	 different	 narrative	 to	 anthropological	 literature	 that	 argues	 for	 the	
impossibility	 of	 social	 cohesion	 among	 Afghans	 due	 to	 a	 ‘moral	 incoherence’	 of	
Afghan	 identity	 (see	 Edwards	 1996,	 Barfield	 2005).	 I	 intended	 to	 explore	 how	
inhabitants	of	Kabul’s	hereditary	musician	quarter	–	the	Kucheye	Kharabat	–	strived	
																																																								
2	Personal	translation	of:	“  ﮓﻨﺳ ﺎﻣ ﻩر رد ﺎﭘ باﻮﺧ /راﺪﺸР ܢۚﻌﻣ ѱﮕﻧﻻﻮﺠﺑ ﺖﺴпﻧ ﮯۏﺋﺎﺣ ﯽﻣ ںﺎﺸɲﺪﺷﺎﺑ ”.	
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to	 live	 in	 hambastagi	 (solidarity)	 and	 with	 hamdardi3	(sympathy).	 I	 envisioned	
exploring	the	“everyday	cosmopolitanism”	(Bayat	2010)	of	an	urban	neighbourhood	
in	 Afghanistan	 through	 attending	 to	 the	 role	 of	 emotion	 and	 the	 affective	 modes	
through	 which	 community	 is	 formed,	 using	 a	 subject‐	 and	 object‐oriented	
ethnographic	 approach	 to	 describe	 both	 the	 discursive	 and	 relational	 nature	 of	
persons	in	the	neighbourhood.	
	
When	circumstances	resulted	in	my	having	to	unexpectedly	change	field	site	shortly	
before	 departing	 for	 research,	 however,	 the	 decision	 to	 conduct	 research	 in	 Delhi	
seemed	natural	on	two	counts.	Delhi	is	a	city	I	have	grown	up	with	and	where	I	had	an	
network	 of	 family,	 friends,	 and	 colleagues.	 It	 is	 also	 a	 city	 with	 an	 estimated	
population	 of	 10‐20,0004	people	 from	 Afghanistan,	 with	 whom	 almost	 no	 prior	
research	 had	 been	 conducted	 (for	 exceptions	 see	 Baujard	 2008).	 I	 had	 naïvely	
assumed	 my	 neighbourhood	 study	 from	 Kabul	 could	 easily	 be	 transferred	 to	 an	
Afghan	 neighbourhood	 in	 Delhi.	 I	 was	 not	 prepared	 for	 the	 different	 dynamics	 of	
conducting	research	among	the	largely	refugee	population	of	Afghans	living	in	the	city.	
	
It	 became	 apparent	 early	 during	 fieldwork	 that	 the	 set	 of	 questions	 and	
methodologies	I	came	prepared	with	were	ill	suited	to	the	context	of	Delhi.	Where	I	
had	set	out	to	understand	community	through	cooperation,	I	was	faced	with	a	group	
of	 people	 only	 displaying	 ephemeral	 moments	 of	 what	 I	 initially	 thought	 of	 as	
‘community’,	 seemingly	 marked	 more	 by	 fracture,	 suspicion,	 and	 competition.	
Where	 I	had	envisioned	arriving	at	 individuals	 through	groups,	 I	was	 faced	with	a	
multitude	 of	 individuals	 who	 formed	 groups	 only	 occasionally	 and	 with	 caution.	
Navigating	Delhi	as	a	field	site	was	bewildering.	Afghans	were	spread	across	the	city,	
and	attempts	at	narrowing	research	to	a	group	or	a	place	seemed	to	 lead	to	dead‐
ends.	 I	 tried	 to	 find	 contacts	 in	 Delhi	 via	 acquaintances	 in	 Afghanistan,	 but	while	
many	 recounted	 fond	 memories	 of	 holidays	 or	 medical	 trips,	 none	 of	 my	 friends	
knew	any	Afghans	currently	residing	in	the	city.	I	 imagined	that,	as	 in	Afghanistan,	
																																																								
3	These	 two	 concepts	 are	 Dari	 (Afghan	 Persian)	 words	 used	 to	 describe	 the	 basis	 on	 which	
community	 is	 built	 and	 can	 be	 respectively	 translated	 as	 ‘solidarity’	 and	 ‘empathy’.	 They	
communicate	 an	 idea	 of	 reciprocity	 whereby	 one	 shares	 in	 the	 emotions	 of	 others	 through	 both	
speech	 and	 action	 in	 order	 to	 show	 compassion	 to	 others	 and	 have	 others	 act	 similarly	 toward	
oneself	with	the	aim	of	creating	warmth	and	closeness	(Anwari	2002:8381‐8393;	Yousofi	2011).	
4	There	are	no	official	 statistics	on	 the	number	of	Afghan	migrants	 in	Delhi.	These	are	 the	range	of	
figures	cited	by	those	I	met	in	the	field.	
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my	interest	in	music	as	a	novice	rubab5	player	and	in	poetry	might	facilitate	meeting	
Afghans	 in	Delhi	 and	becoming	part	 of	 a	 network.	 This	was	 unfortunately	 not	 the	
case	either.	At	the	time,	this	felt	like	an	unforeseen	obstacle,	like	the	benumbed	foot	
Bedil	mentions,	hindering	the	research	I	thought	I	should	be	conducting.	
	
Compounding	my	 concern	was	 the	 knowledge	 I	 had	 to	 hit	 the	 ground	 running	 in	
Delhi.	 I	 did	 not	 have	 pre‐existing	 contacts	 among	 Delhi’s	 Afghan	 community	 and	
only	had	a	 faint	 idea	of	 the	areas	Afghans	 lived	and	 frequented	based	on	personal	
experience	in	the	city	and	stories	of	friends	in	Afghanistan.	I	thus	began	fieldwork	by	
casting	a	wide	net	to	get	an	understanding	of	the	Afghan	community	in	Delhi	and	the	
wider	context	within	which	it	was	situated.		From	an	informal	survey,	I	compiled	a	
short	 list	 of	 different	 contexts	 through	which	 I	would	 be	 able	 to	 establish	 contact	
with	people	from	Afghanistan,	and	divided	the	contexts	into	two	categories:	formal	
institutions	 and	 informal	 environments	 (see	 lists	 below).	 Naturally,	 there	 were	
spaces	of	 overlap	between	 the	 two	 categories,	 but	 I	 hoped	 that	 through	 exploring	
these	 contexts	 and	 places,	 I	 could	 eventually	 determine	 which	 networks	 or	
communities	 I	 could	 access	 and	 then	 narrow	 my	 focus	 on	 one	 particular	 group.	
Aside	 from	Afghan‐specific	contexts,	 I	also	 tried	 to	use	my	own	network	 in	Delhi’s	
music	 and	 arts	 community.	 Over	 the	 first	 couple	 of	months,	 however,	 rather	 than	
being	able	to	narrow	down	the	contexts	for	research,	the	list	only	seemed	to	expand.		
	
Formal	Contexts	 Informal	Environments	
Hospitals	 Institutional	Waiting	Rooms	
Foreigner	Regional	Registration	Offices	 Restaurants	
UNHCR	Offices	&	Implementing	Partners	 Market	Places/Shopping	Malls	
Afghanistan	Embassy	 Public	Gatherings	
Indian	Council	for	Cultural	Relations	 Music	Community	
University	Language	Departments	 University	Events/	Student	Groups	
Shrines/Mosques,	Religious	Events	
	
The	expansion	of	the	list	was	in	some	ways	a	result	of	my	becoming	more	aware	of	
the	institutions	and	offices	with	which	different	kinds	of	Afghan	migrants	interacted,	
but	 also	 heightened	 my	 realization	 of	 how	 limited	 my	 access	 to	 these	 various	
																																																								
5	The	rubab	is	an	Afghan	lute,	also	played	in	other	parts	of	Central	and	South	Asia.	
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networks	and	institutions	would	be.	The	idea	that	I	would	be	able	to	pare	down	from	
an	initially	broad	survey	was	premised	on	an	assumption	that	there	were	extensive,	
organized,	and	open	Afghan	networks	in	Delhi	that	I	could	observe	or	connect	with.	
While	 there	definitely	were	some	Afghan	networks,	 like	 the	 transnational	Pashtun	
moneylender	 network,	 discussed	 in	 chapters	 five	 and	 six,	 or	 the	 Afghan	 Sikh	
network,	discussed	 in	chapter	three,	 these	were	 inaccessible	 to	me	for	most	of	 the	
time	I	was	in	Delhi.	This	was	partially	due	to	the	fact	both	networks	were	relatively	
closed,	 but	 also	 because	 of	 the	 limited	 time	 during	 which	 fieldwork	 had	 to	 be	
conducted.	 After	 twelve	 months	 in	 the	 field,	 I	 had	 started	 to	 build	 stronger	
relationships	with	some	members	of	the	Pashtun	moneylender	community	and	had	
there	been	more	time	to	conduct	fieldwork,	these	might	have	afforded	more	access	
and	understanding	of	the	community.	
	
The	 constant	 obstacles	 to	 connecting	with	 groups	or	 organizations	 resulted	 in	my	
having	to	continuously	seek	out	new	or	different	avenues	for	meeting	people.	Within	
the	first	three	months	of	 fieldwork,	I	 found	most	Afghans	I	encountered	in	the	city	
did	not	generally	consider	themselves	part	of	a	cohesive	wider	Afghan	community	in	
Delhi,	and	instead	tended	to	associate	within	small,	tight‐knit	groups	of	a	handful	of	
friends,	joining	with	other	people	from	Afghanistan	perhaps	briefly	for	trade	or	for	
religious	or	cultural	events.	People	were	apprehensive	of	others	outside	their	small	
groups,	 particularly	 of	 other	 people	 from	 Afghanistan.	 The	 apprehension	 and	
suspicion	of	unknown	people	meant	that	individuals	did	not	interact	in	an	open	way	
in	 public	 and	 avoided	 strangers,	 making	 it	 difficult	 to	 initiate	 or	 hold	 extended	
conversation	 in	 public	 places	 in	many	 of	 the	 contexts	 listed	 above.	 Of	 course,	 the	
degree	of	avoidance	depended	on	a	number	of	factors	including	among	others:	the	
kind	of	migrant	 I	was	 speaking	 to,	 how	 long	 the	person	had	been	 in	Delhi,	 or	 the	
individual’s	social	and	economic	status.	
	
Attitudes	of	suspicion	also	meant	that	most	people	did	not	want	to	be	recorded	and	I	
was	generally	unable	to	take	notes	or	photographs	in	public	areas.	Ultimately,	I	did	
use	 some	 audio‐visual	 methods,	 but	 relied	 mostly	 on	 notes	 and	 recordings	 from	
individual,	in‐depth	interviews.	The	interview	became	the	main	tool	through	which	I	
carried	out	fieldwork,	as	I	could	not	assume	that	the	person	would	be	interested	or	
able	 to	meet	 again.	Often,	when	 I	was	able	 to	begin	 conversations	or	meet	people	
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through	contacts,	it	was	usually	made	clear	to	me	that	the	relationship	was	limited	
to	that	particular	conversation	or	that	particular	space.	This	was	the	case	even	with	
people	whom	I	developed	close	relationships	in	the	field	and	whose	stories	feature	
prominently	in	this	thesis.	I	was	only	ever	able	to	visit	three	people	at	their	homes6.	
In	two	cases,	the	primary	reason	we	met	at	home	was	to	avoid	the	gaze	of	others	and	
the	possible	implications	this	might	have.	
	
Such	 situational	 constraints	 necessitated	 a	 shift	 in	methodology	 where	 instead	 of	
forming	a	routine	to	observe	daily	life	within	a	specific	neighbourhood,	community,	
or	 network,	 I	was	 compelled	 to	maintain	 a	wide	 range	 of	 contacts	 across	 various	
neighbourhoods,	 organizations,	 and	 social	 groups,	 and	 routinely	maintain	 contact	
through	 phone	 calls	 or	 personal	 visits	 in	 order	 to	 seize	 any	 opportunity	 for	
observation,	 meeting	 new	 people,	 conducting	 individual	 interviews,	 or	 attending	
and	 observing	 events.	 Individual	 interviews	 would	 often	 raise	 new	 questions	 or	
connections	that	I	would	have	to	follow	up	on	in	different	parts	of	the	city	or,	in	one	
case,	 the	 country.	 I	 developed	 a	 system	 of	 pursuing	 any	 and	 every	 possible	 lead	
when	and	as	 it	 arose,	and	created	a	diary	 to	complement	 field	notes,	with	which	 I	
could	chart	 connections	between	persons	or	events	and	 the	various	 individuals	or	
research	themes	they	might	be	connected	to.	
	
Aside	 from	 interviews	with	 Afghan	migrants,	 observing	 social	 dynamics	 in	 public	
spaces	 frequented	 by	Afghans,	 and	 attending	Afghan	 religious	 and	 social	 events,	 I	
also	interviewed	individuals	working	across	a	spectrum	of	institutions	engaged	with	
or	 connected	 to	 Afghans	 in	 the	 city.	 I	 observed	 events	 held	 by	 some	 of	 these	
institutions,	 and	 developed	 and	 maintained	 a	 network	 of	 contacts	 with	 people	
working	 on	 migration,	 refugee,	 and	 public	 citizenship	 issues	 across	 the	 media,	
humanitarian,	and	arts	communities	 in	Delhi.	This	methodological	shift	 to	working	
through	a	diffuse	set	of	networks	and	focusing	on	individuals	is	perhaps	indicative	of	
the	context	of	conducting	fieldwork	in	the	setting	of	a	megacity	like	Delhi,	where	the	
fluidity	 of	 urban	 life	 can	 encourage	 and	 entrench	 individual	 isolation	 while	 also	
presenting	 people	 with	 a	 vast	 array	 for	 potential	 forms	 of	 interaction	 and	
association	with	others	(see	Barth	1983;	Simmel	2002;	Hannerz	1980).	
																																																								
6	As	 I	mention	 in	 chapter	 four,	 Afghan	migrants	 I	met	might	 not	 have	wanted	 to	meet	me	 in	 their	
home	 for	 several	 reasons,	 including	 the	 inability	 to	 ensure	 the	 customary	 segregation	of	 space	 for	
entertaining	outside	male	guess.	
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Coming	to	the	Research	Question	
As	mentioned	above,	my	initial	question	of	how	people	strive	to	live	with	hamdardi	
and	hambastagi	quickly	proved	to	not	be	the	correct	question	to	ask	in	Delhi;	people	
did	 not	 want	 to	 talk	 about	 it.	 During	my	 first	 month	 of	 fieldwork,	 I	 met	 a	 young	
Afghan	 naanwai	 (baker)	 in	 the	 south	 Delhi	 neighbourhood	 of	 Lajpat	 Nagar,	
discussed	in	chapter	six.	Upon	discovering	I	was	a	US	citizen,	he	asked	incredulously	
why	 I	would	choose	 to	 live	 in	Delhi.	 In	response	 to	my	explanation,	describing	my	
research	focus	on	emotion	and	community,	he	laughed	heartily	and	exclaimed:	
“You	 won’t	 find	 that	 here!	 There’s	 no	 cooperation	 (hamkari),	 no	 empathy	
(hamdardi)	 here!	Only	 chicanery	 	(duzdi),	 lies	 (drogh),	 and	 deception	 (fareb).	
That’s	just	how	these	Afghans	are!”	
While	 perhaps	 a	 tactic	 to	 deflect	 my	 conversation,	 his	 sentiments	 were	 echoed	
consistently	throughout	the	many	discussions	I	would	have	over	the	next	year.	
	
Indeed,	as	mentioned	earlier,	I	spent	an	early	period	of	my	research	trying	to	make	
inroads	into	an	‘Afghan	community’	I	was	never	able	to	find.	I	would	question	people	
about	community,	about	poets	and	musicians,	about	gatherings	or	events,	only	to	be	
told	some	version	of	 “that	doesn’t	exist	here”	 (eenja	paida	na	mesha).	People	were	
more	interested	in	talking	about	their	own	stories	of	migration	and	struggle.	In	the	
thick	of	fieldwork,	I	perceived	this	situation	as	an	obstacle	to	the	research	I	wanted	
to	 do	 on	 emotions,	 community,	 and	 intersubjectivity.	 Half	 way	 through	 the	 year,	
realizing	my	attempts	at	finding	a	community	were	not	bearing	fruit,	I	took	stock	of	
the	information	gathered	and	determined	I	was	constantly	moving	through	the	same	
areas	to	meet	people	and	subsequently	began	asking	questions	on	what	constitutes	
an	Afghan	neighbourhood	in	Delhi,	what	kinds	of	relationships	are	created	within	it,	
and	 how	 do	 people	 relate	 to	 it?	 The	 topic	 of	 the	 city	 had	 also	 been	 repeated	 in	
conversations	 and	 interviews	 I	 had	 been	 conducting	with	 Afghans,	 and	 seemed	 a	
potentially	productive	avenue.	Even	though	I	again	hit	a	limit	in	that	the	spaces	I	was	
looking	at	were	public	areas	where	people	had	very	limited	interactions,	taking	this	
route	 opened	 up	my	 focus	 to	 approach	 anyone	 (shopkeepers,	workmen,	 loiterers,	
etc.)	 in	 the	 areas	 considered	 as	 Afghan	 neighbourhoods	 in	 the	 city,	 providing	me	
with	a	range	of	material	on	Indian	perceptions	of	Afghans	and	vice	versa.	
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By	the	end	of	the	year,	when	I	was	to	return	from	the	field,	 I	 felt	a	combination	of	
relief	and	fear.	I	knew	I	had	amassed	a	significant	amount	of	information	for	analysis,	
but	 the	nature	of	 the	 information	 troubled	me.	Going	 through	notes	and	replaying	
conversations	 and	 experiences	 in	 my	 head,	 I	 could	 not	 immediately	 perceive	 a	
singular	 thread	around	which	to	structure	an	argument	about	what	constituted	an	
Afghan	 neighbourhood	 or	 place	 in	 Delhi.	 There	were	 examples	 of	 people	 desiring	
community	 as	 well	 as	 shunning	 it,	 stories	 of	 belonging	 in	 the	 city	 and	 stories	 of	
isolation,	 and	 so	 on.	 In	 thinking	 through	 the	 material	 and	 trying	 to	 mould	 the	
material	to	speak	to	issues	of	migration	and	refugee	status,	I	began	to	see	how	my	
initial	 theoretical	 interest	 in	 emotions	 and	 affect	 were	 present	 in	 the	 individual	
stories	and	 field	notes	 I	had	gathered	over	 the	year	 in	Delhi.	 Instead	of	 seeking	 to	
schematize	 the	 material	 uniformly,	 I	 began	 to	 appreciate	 the	 multiplicity	 of	
orientations	presented	toward	place,	emotion,	and	personal	experience	of	migration	
in	the	variegated	stories,	and	the	differing	intersections	of	individuals	with	various	
networks	 and	 institutions	 represented.	 It	 became	 clear	 that	 the	 information	 I	 had	
collected	spoke	to	individuals’	social	relations	and	the	practices	they	engaged	in	as	a	
fact	 of	 being	 in	 Delhi,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 relations	 and	 practices	
connected	migrants	 to	 a	 “simultaneity”	 (Levitt	 and	Glick	 Schiller	 2004)	 of	 groups,	
places,	 etc.	 that	 included	 and	 exceeded	 an	 ethnic	 or	 national	 frame	 and	 involved	
both	 cooperation	 and	 non‐cooperation.	 Naturally,	 this	 made	 the	 positing	 of	 any	
definitive	notion	of	Afghan	‘community’	or	‘identity’	in	Delhi	problematic	and	forced	
me	to	consider	how	to	theoretically	approach	community	and	multiplicity.	
	 	
To	 return	 to	Bedil’s	 verse	quoted	earlier,	 the	obstacle	 I	 thought	 I	had	 faced	 in	not	
being	 able	 to	 find	 the	 kind	 of	 social	 cohesion	 and	 cooperation	 among	 Afghans	 in	
Delhi	 that	 I	 had	 expected,	 led	me	 through	 a	 process	which	 revealed	 a	 flaw	 in	my	
initial	orientation	to	fieldwork.	It	dawned	on	me	that	while	I	had	intended	to	counter	
the	 particular	 focus	 of	 research	 on	 the	 impossibility	 of	 Afghan	 identity	 described	
earlier,	 I	 had	 not	 successfully	 broken	 away	 from	 the	 premises	 structuring	 it.	 To	
favour	cooperation	over	 fracturedness,	 to	 reject	ethno‐religious	division	and	 focus	
instead	solely	on	humanistic	or	nationalistic	notions	of	being	Afghan,	was	in	essence	
adhering	 to	 the	 very	 either/or	 binaries	 I	 found	 problematic.	 The	 material	 I	 had	
collected	 contended	 instead	 with	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 situation	 that	 includes	 but	
exceeds	these	binaries.	
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Asking	what	it	means	to	be	Afghan	in	Delhi	and	how	do	Afghans	belong	in	the	city	
requires	exploring	the	diverse	relationships	people	from	Afghanistan	have	with	and	
in	Delhi.	This	research	is	an	ethnographic	examination	of	individuals	in	a	situation	of	
movement	 and	 how	 they	 understand	 and	 create	 ways	 of	 belonging	 that	 can	 be	
inherently	multiple.	 In	presenting	the	thesis	 in	this	way,	 I	do	not	 intend	to	divorce	
ideas	of	place,	people,	and	social	life	completely	from	one	another,	but	instead	allow	
for	fluidity	in	their	connections	to	come	through	from	the	ethnographic	material.	
1.2 Thesis	Structure	
Following	 this	 chapter,	 the	 thesis	 is	 divided	 into	 an	 additional	 five	 chapters	 and	 a	
short	 conclusion.	 Chapter	 two	 continues	 the	 contextualization	 of	 the	 project	 by	
addressing	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 of	 the	 thesis	 and	 its	 place	 within	 wider	
anthropological	 studies	 on	 personhood	 and	 migration.	 The	 next	 four	 ethnographic	
chapters	 look	 specifically	 at	 Afghans	 living	 in	 Delhi	 today.	 Chapter	 three	 describes	
how	Afghan	migrants	in	Delhi	are	understood	to	belong	in	Delhi	at	the	level	of	state	
discourse,	 and	 chapters	 four	 through	 six	 explore	 Afghan	 migrants’	 trajectories	 of	
movement	and	ways	of	belonging	in	Delhi	at	the	level	of	individuals	and	communities.	
The	 conclusion	 returns	 to	 the	 question	 of	 Afghan	 belonging	 in	 Delhi	 in	 light	 of	 the	
previous	chapters	and	considers	broader	issues	raised	by	the	research	material.	
	
To	provide	a	theoretical	context	for	the	thesis,	chapter	two	begins	with	a	discussion	
of	 how	 Afghans	 in	 Delhi	 are	 an	 appropriate	 group	 to	 consider	 questions	 within	
scholarship	 on	 Afghanistan,	 particularly	 research	 on	 Afghan	 identity	 and	 how	 it	
handles	 issues	of	multiplicity,	and	on	personhood	in	South	Asia	more	broadly.	 It	 is	
suggested	 that	 the	 questions	 raised	 by	 anthropological	 scholarship	 in	 the	 region	
urge	us	 to	 think	 through	questions	of	multiplicity	 and	 scale	both	ethnographically	
and	theoretically.	In	this	vein,	the	chapter	turns	to	recent	anthropological	theoretical	
work	 on	 ontology	 and	 on	 morality,	 as	 two	 areas	 of	 research	 that	 respectively	
address	multiplicity	at	the	 level	of	social	ordering	of	knowledge	and	at	the	 level	of	
individual	 experience.	 The	 chapter	 suggests	 such	 multiplicity	 can	 be	 considered	
ethnographically	through	considerations	of	scale	as	both	epistemological	levels	and	
as	social	impact.	
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The	third	chapter	examines	the	subject	of	the	Afghan	migrant	in	Delhi	as	envisaged	
at	the	state	scale,	where	Afghan	migrants’	being	and	belonging	in	Delhi	is	considered	
in	 terms	of	 legal	 and	 illegal	 presence	within	 the	 state.	 The	 chapter	 focuses	on	 the	
category	of	the	Afghan	refugee,	against	which	other	forms	of	Afghan	identity	in	Delhi	
are	shaped.	Through	tracing	 the	dynamics	of	 the	Afghan	refugee	 label,	 the	chapter	
illustrates	how,	at	 the	state	scale,	Afghan	migrants	are	not	considered	to	belong	 in	
the	city,	and	how	their	being	in	Delhi	is	understood	in	terms	of	being	foreign	bodies	
at	the	end	point	of	a	unidirectional	vector	of	movement	from	Afghanistan	to	India.	
Afghan	migrants	are	considered	to	belong	 in	the	territory	of	Afghanistan,	 to	which	
they	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 emotionally	 oriented	 and	 physically	 grounded,	 both	 as	
individuals	and	as	a	community.	By	drawing	on	the	United	Nations	High	Commission	
for	Refugees’	(UNHCR)	engagement	with	refugees	and	ethnographic	examples	from	
the	Afghan	Sikh	refugee	community,	the	chapter	illustrates	a	gap	between	the	state‐
level	conceptions	and	refugees’	lived	experience	in	Delhi.	
	
Chapters	four	through	six	explore	this	gap	to	argue	that	the	state	scale	conception	of	
what	it	means	to	be	Afghan	in	Delhi	is	one	among	a	plurality	of	understandings,	but	
that	migrants’	access	to	financial	or	social	resources	affect	the	degree	to	which	the	
state	 scale	understanding	 shapes	 their	 experience	of	being	and	belonging	 the	 city.	
Chapters	four	and	five	attend	to	the	scale	of	individuals,	focusing	respectively	on	(i)	
what	it	means	to	be	Afghan	in	Delhi,	and	(ii)	how	Afghans	belong	in	the	city.	Chapter	
four	explores	 the	 story	of	 three	men’s	migration	 to	 India	 to	 illustrate	 the	multiple	
trajectories	of	movement	that	place	Afghan	migrants	 in	Delhi	and	connect	 them	to	
the	city	in	different	ways.	Chapter	five	builds	on	this	understanding	to	explore	how	
these	different	paths	to	Delhi	are	reflected	in	migrants’	differing	perceptions	of	the	
city	as	a	place	where	they	belong,	attending	specifically	 to	migrants’	 linguistic	and	
historic	ties	to	the	city.	The	chapter	illustrates	how	Afghan	migrants	in	the	city	not	
only	understand	 their	belonging	 in	Delhi	 in	different	ways,	but	 that	belonging	and	
not	 belonging	 are	 not	 always	 mutually	 exclusive.	 The	 final	 ethnographic	 chapter	
turns	 briefly	 to	 problematize	 the	 question	 of	 Afghan	 community,	 exploring	 two	
different	kinds	of	Afghan	community	in	Delhi	and	how	they	are	shaped	in	relation	to	
state	scale	conceptions	of	what	it	means	to	be	Afghan	in	India.	
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Chapters	 five	 and	 six	 also	 both	 attend	 to	 the	 question	 of	 scale	 as	 impact.	 They	
demonstrate	how,	despite	 the	variety	of	 forms	of	belong	 in	Delhi	 illustrated	at	 the	
different	scales	of	 the	state,	 individual,	and	community,	migrants	without	 financial	
or	social	resources	are	less	able	to	maintain	ways	of	belonging	outside	conceptions	
at	the	state	scale.	The	conclusion	builds	on	this	observation	through	a	reflection	of	
the	material	presented	in	the	four	ethnographic	chapters	and	a	consideration	of	how	
the	 ethnographic	 material	 and	 its	 analysis	 relate	 to	 questions	 of	 citizenship	 and	
belonging	in	India	today.	
1.3 Sukhanhaye	Guftani	(Words	to	Say)	
The	verse	quoted	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter	explains	that	the	stranger	in	the	
city	has	something	of	worth	to	say7,	if	only	there	were	those	to	comprehend!	I	am	
fortunate	 and	 grateful	 for	 those	 who	 will	 read	 and,	 hopefully,	 understand	 my	
words,	but	before	moving	to	the	theoretical	and	ethnographic	material,	I	too	have	
some	 (further)	 words	 to	 say.	 I	 am	 aware	 this	 thesis	 could	 have	 materialized	
differently.	In	particular,	there	are	two	interlinked	factors	that	affected	my	access	
to	 individuals	 and	 institutions,	 which	 under	 different	 circumstances	 might	 have	
changed	 the	 methodology	 described	 above	 and	 perhaps	 even	 the	 focus	 of	 my	
research.	 The	 first	 pertains	 to	 bureaucracy	 and	 the	 second	 to	 time;	 I	will	 briefly	
consider	these	factors	below.	
	
The	Indian	governmental	bureaucracy	is	 infamous	and	one	I	have	been	acquainted	
with	since	childhood.	Shortly	before	fieldwork,	I	had	applied	for	an	Overseas	Citizen	
of	 India	 (OCI)	 card	 thinking	 I	would	make	 several	 trips	 between	Kabul	 and	Delhi.	
The	 OCI	 is	 a	 life‐long	 visa	 available	 to	 former	 Indian	 citizens,	 their	 children,	 or	
grandchildren.	 It	 would	 have	 been	more	 practical	 than	 the	 long‐term	 tourist	 visa	
that	 I	 initially	 had,	 where	 stays	 in	 the	 country	 are	 limited	 to	 a	 maximum	 of	 six	
months	with	a	mandatory	two‐month	break	between	visits.	Upon	deciding	to	change	
fieldsite	to	Delhi,	it	seemed	like	a	wise	choice	to	have	applied	for	the	OCI.	I	would	not	
have	 been	 allowed	 to	 conduct	 research	 in	 India	 on	my	 tourist	 visa	 or	 stay	 in	 the	
country	for	the	full	twelve	months,	and	applying	for	an	Indian	research	visa	would	
																																																								
7	The	Persian	“sukhanhaye	guftani	darad”	lends	itself	to	be	read	either	as	“something	valuable	to	say”	
or	“much	to	say”,	both	are	accurate	and	I	have	used	the	latter	in	translating	the	verse	at	the	beginning	
of	the	chapter	and	the	former	meaning	for	the	subtitle	here.	
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have	required	engaging	in	a	laborious,	time‐consuming	process	that	can	easily	take	
over	a	year	with	little	guarantee	of	being	awarded	a	visa.	
	
According	to	governmental	guidance	at	the	time	of	my	OCI	application,	the	process	
would	take	no	more	than	three	weeks.	However,	it	took	me	six	months	to	receive	the	
OCI,	during	the	last	part	of	which	I	travelled	to	India,	in	early	2012,	to	directly	follow	
up	with	 bureaucrats	 at	 various	 governmental	 offices	 in	 Delhi.	 I	 would	merely	 get	
transferred	 to	 other	 offices	 to	 enquire	 why	 my	 application	 was	 stalled,	 and	 was	
never	given	any	reason	for	the	delay	 in	processing	my	OCI	application.	The	official	
communication	 I	 received	requesting	additional	documentation	 for	my	application	
made	clear	the	Home	Ministry	was	specifically	concerned	about	the	Afghanistan	visa	
stamps	 in	my	US	passport	and	the	 fact	 I	had	held	an	Indian	passport	 issued	 in	the	
Middle	East	even	though	I	was	born	in	the	US8.	I	did	not	fit	their	idea	of	how	people	
move	and	belong.	Despite	 furnishing	a	notarized	affidavit	 explaining	 this	 situation	
and	the	dates	and	purposes	of	travel	to	every	country	on	every	passport	I	had	ever	
held	 and	 running	 between	 multiple	 ministries	 in	 Delhi,	 I	 could	 not	 move	 my	
application	 forward	 until	 I	 communicated	 with	 the	 Counsel	 General	 in	 Houston	
through	a	personal	connection.	My	application	was	approved	within	a	week,	though	
I	 was	 required	 to	 return	 to	 the	 US	 to	 receive	 the	 OCI	 stamp	 in	my	 passport.	 The	
experience,	gave	me	a	taste	of	the	Indian	governmental	bureaucracy	most	Afghans	in	
Delhi	face	every	six	to	twelve	months	(discussed	in	chapter	three).	
	
While	the	OCI	allowed	me	to	live	in	India,	access	the	national	archives,	and	conduct	
research,	 the	 intricacies	 of	 the	 law	 prevented	 me	 from	 establishing	 an	 official	
relationship	with	 an	 academic	 institution	without	 a	 research	 or	 student	 visa.	 This	
was	 only	 a	marginal	 hindrance	 in	meeting	Afghan	 university	 students,	 as	 I	 did	 so	
informally.	It	did,	however,	work	against	me	in	one	case,	when	the	Indian	Council	for	
Cultural	Relations	(ICCR),	the	organization	bringing	many	Afghan	students	to	India,	
refused	 to	 meet	 with	 me	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 my	 not	 being	 affiliated	 with	 an	 Indian	
institution.	 The	 ICCR	 is	 responsible	 for	 many	 cultural	 and	 scholastic	 exchanges	
																																																								
8	I	was	born	to	Indian	parents	and	was	initially	on	my	mother’s	passport	and	did	not	receive	my	own	
passport	until	the	age	of	five,	when	we	were	living	in	Kuwait.	My	last	valid	Indian	passport	was	issued	
to	me	in	Muscat,	Oman	where	I	 lived	till	 the	age	of	16.	Born	 in	the	US,	 I	have	also	always	had	a	US	
passport.	I	legally	held	both	passports	till	the	age	of	16,	when	my	Indian	passport	expired.		
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between	India	and	Afghanistan	and	could	have	granted	me	access	to	different	kinds	
of	migrants	from	those	I	ultimately	collaborated	with.	
	
Another	bureaucracy	I	had	to	contend	with	was	that	of	the	UNHCR,	which	was	a	very	
important	 part	 of	 the	 lives	 of	 many	 I	 did	 research	 with,	 but	 from	 which	 I	 was	
categorically	 excluded	 (as	 I	 explain	 in	 chapter	 three).	 In	 her	 reflection	 on	 the	
experience	of	conducting	anthropological	research	among	the	Burmese	and	Afghan	
refugee	 community	 in	Delhi	 in	 2001,	 Julie	 Baujard	 (2005)	 describes	 how	 she	was	
able	to	procure	an	internship	with	the	UNHCR	Delhi	office,	via	a	family	connection,	
to	 conduct	 her	 research.	 Though	 Baujard	 acknowledges	 the	 difficulties	 an	 official	
association	with	the	UNHCR	posed	with	regard	to	gaining	refugees’	confidence,	she	
also	 acknowledges	 that	 it	 allowed	 her	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 workings	 of	 the	
organization	and	access	to	information	she	would	not	have	been	privy	to	otherwise	
since	 the	 UNHCR,	 due	 to	 its	 precarious	 situation	 in	 India,	 maintains	 “a	 certain	
suspicion	toward	people	outside	[of	the	organization]	who	observe	–	and	critique	–	
its	 actions”	 (130).	 This	 suspicion	 was	 an	 obstacle	 that	 I	 was	 partially	 able	 to	
overcome	through	repeated	personal	interaction	with	personnel	of	the	UNHCR	and	
its	implementing	partners	in	Delhi.	
	
Another	factor	affecting	my	research	was	timing.	I	use	timing	in	two	senses:	firstly	to	
speak	about	the	particular	historical	moment	in	which	I	conducted	research	and	its	
implications	 on	 the	 kind	 of	 migrants	 I	 worked	 with,	 and	 secondly	 as	 the	 actual	
timeframe	of	the	research	itself.	In	the	first	instance,	to	reference	Baujard	again,	she	
indicates	it	was	significantly	easier	for	her	to	develop	relationships	with	the	Afghan	
refugees	who	were	 just	arriving	 in	Delhi	 than	with	the	Burmese	refugees	who	had	
spent	a	significant	amount	of	time	in	the	city	and	were	disillusioned	with	the	UNHCR,	
agitating	for	resettlement,	and	“never	ceased	to	consider	[her],	sometimes	explicitly,	
as	a	UNHCR	spy”	(131).	Most	of	the	Afghan	refugees	I	encountered	in	2012	were	in	a	
situation	similar	to	Baujard’s	Burmese	informants	in	that	they	had	spent	six	or	more	
years	 in	Delhi	as	refugees.	 I	was	generally	avoided	on	the	assumption	that	 I	was	a	
new	Afghan	 refugee,	 though	 sometimes	 the	 difficulty	 of	 placing	me	 as	 a	 Dari	 and	
Urdu	speaking	ethnic	Pashtun	of	Indian	origin	with	US	citizenship	also	complicated	
people’s	 willingness	 to	 relate	 to	 me.	 This	 was	 only	 ever	 really	 a	 problem	 in	 two	
instances:	once	when	I	tried	to	interview	an	Afghan	Sikh	leader	who	told	me	“I	don’t	
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understand	where	you’re	 from	and	what	you	want,”	and	another	 time	when	 I	was	
accused	 of	 being	 a	 UNHCR	 spy	 at	 a	 meeting	 of	 the	 Afghan	 Refugee	 Solidarity	
Committee	(discussed	in	chapter	six).	
	
The	 second	aspect	 in	which	 time	was	a	 factor	 in	 the	 type	of	 research	 I	was	able	 to	
conduct,	was	 that	 of	 the	 research	 time	 frame.	Under	 the	 specific	 program	of	 study,	
only	a	consecutive	12	months	was	available	for	field	research,	during	which	I	was	able	
to	collect	an	extensive	amount	of	information.	However,	it	was	not	till	my	last	month	
in	Delhi,	after	becoming	a	regular	presence	in	markets,	restaurants,	UNHCR	meetings,	
etc.	 for	 a	 year,	 that	 people	 began	 to	 recognize	 me	 and	 approach	 me	 of	 their	 own	
accord.	I	cannot	know	with	certainty,	but	I	assume	that	had	I	been	able	to	return	and	
spend	more	 time	 in	Delhi,	 this	kind	of	recognition	might	have	afforded	an	ability	 to	
develop	different	kinds	of	relationships	with	people	that	could	in	turn	offer	additional	
or	alternative	perspectives	on	migrants’	lives	to	complement	and	enrich	the	material	
in	this	thesis.	In	particular,	additional	time	to	conduct	fieldwork	might	have	granted	
me	more	opportunity	to	continue	meeting	and	develop	trusting	relationships	within	
the	Afghan	Sikh	and	Pashtun	trader	communities,	as	already	discussed.	
	
I	mention	these	various	factors	and	their	impact	on	the	kind	of	research	I	was	able	to	
do	not	to	detract	in	any	way	from	the	material	presented	in	the	thesis,	but	rather	to	
express	 the	 limits	of	 this	 research	and	an	awareness	 that	 the	access	 I	 garnered	 to	
people	 and	 institutions	 represents	 a	 slice	 of	 a	 larger	 Afghan	migrant	 presence	 in	
Delhi	and	India	in	general.	With	some	exceptions,	this	thesis	draws	largely	from	the	
experiences	of	individuals	claiming	or	holding	refugee	status	and	with	moderate	to	
low	access	to	financial	resources.	In	this	sense,	the	stories	do	not	speak	to	“migrant	
experience”	as	a	monolith,	but	rather	to	part	of	a	variegated	experience	of	migration	
within	the	context	of	present‐day	Delhi.	It	is	with	this	in	mind,	that	the	thesis	attends	
to	Afghan	migrants	in	Delhi	as	people	in	a	process	of	movement.	
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2. Situating	the	Research	
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 consider	how	research	with	Afghan	migrants	 in	Delhi	 serves	as	an	
appropriate	 arena	 for	 investigating	 issues	 raised	 within	 the	 anthropological	
scholarship	on	Afghanistan	and	on	South	Asia.	I	describe	how	research	in	these	areas	
raises	 questions	 requiring	 sensitivity	 to	 multiplicity	 and	 scale,	 and	 theoretically	
situate	my	research	through	considering	how	anthropological	discussions	on	ontology	
and	morality	offer	conceptual	and	methodological	tools	to	address	such	questions.	
2.1 Afghan	Migration	and	India	
While	 extensive	 research	 has	 been	 conducted	 on	 Afghan	 migration	 to	 Iran	 and	
Pakistan,	relatively	little	attention	has	been	paid	to	Afghan	migration	to	India.	This	
fact	might	be	connected	to	the	significantly	smaller	population	of	Afghan	refugees	in	
India.	Though	much	of	the	ethnographic	material	presented	in	this	thesis	 is	drawn	
from	the	experience	of	Afghan	refugees	in	Delhi,	Afghan	migration	to	India	is	varied,	
as	 discussed	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 and	 follows	 historic	 patterns	 of	 movement	 of	
peoples	 within	 the	 region,	 as	 discussed	 in	 chapters	 four	 and	 six.	 This	 constant	
movement	 of	 people	 has	meant	 the	 contemporary	 states	 of	 India	 and	Afghanistan	
share	 enduring	 historic	 ties	 through	 trade,	 the	 arts,	 religion,	 etc.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	
situate	 the	 thesis	 in	 current	 research	 on	 Afghan	migration,	 and	 consider	 how	 the	
study	of	Afghan	migration	in	Delhi	contributes	to	both	the	study	of	Afghanistan	and	
South	Asia	more	broadly.	
Afghan	Migration	Studies	
This	 thesis	 follows	 contemporary	 trends	 in	 research	 on	 Afghans	 and	 Afghanistan	
that	moves	beyond	the	national	framework	for	studying	Afghan	society	to	examine	
how	 individuals	 navigate	 social	 relationships	 at	 local,	 regional,	 and	 global	 scales	
(Green	and	Arabzadah	2013;	Marsden	2009a;	Marsden	and	Hopkins	2011;	Oeppen	
2010).	By	nature	of	 its	ethnographic	 focus,	 the	 thesis	draws	on	and	contributes	 to	
literature	 on	 Afghan	 migration,	 which,	 over	 the	 last	 decade,	 has	 taken	 a	 more	
nuanced	 approach	 to	 Afghan	 transnational	movements	 beyond	 themes	 of	 conflict	
and	ethno‐religious	identity	(cf.	Centlivres	1988;	Edwards	1986).		
	 24
	
Current	research	on	Afghan	migration	has	been	shaped	chiefly	through	Alessandro	
Monsutti’s	work	on	Hazara9	migration.	Taking	on	board	the	work	of	Marcus	(1995)	
and	 Appadurai	 (1986b,	 1991),	 Monsutti	 has	 carried	 out	 multi‐sited	 ethnography	
with	Hazaras	moving	between	Afghanistan,	Pakistan,	 Iran,	Europe	and	Oceania.	He	
has	focused	on	the	different	networks	through	which	Hazaras	move,	pointing	to	the	
various	forms	of	kinship	underlying	and	produced	through	these	networks	(2004b,	
2005a)	 and	 their	 historical	 foundations	 (Gehrig	 and	 Monsutti	 2003;	 Monsutti	
2010a).	 His	 ethnographic	 accounts	 reveal	 how	 the	 line	 between	 voluntary	 and	
involuntary	migration	is	not	always	clear	and	that,	for	the	Hazara,	migration	can	be	
understood	 as	 a	 coming	 of	 age	 rite	 as	 much	 as	 a	 result	 of	 economic	 or	 political	
necessity	 (2004a,	 2004b).	 In	 this	 way,	 Monsutti’s	 work	 echoes	 research	 on	 the	
general	 unsuitability	 of	 the	 refugee/migrant	 dichotomy	 in	 capturing	 the	 reality	 of	
Afghan	refugees	(Hanifi	2000;	Kronenfeld	2008;	Novak	2007b).	
	
The	study	of	Afghan	migrants	in	Delhi	contributes	to	research	on	Afghan	migration	
in	 two	 distinct	 ways.	 Firstly,	 research	 on	 Afghan	 migration	 has	 largely	 revolved	
around	Afghan	migrants	living	in	Pakistan	(Centlivres	and	Centlivres‐Demont	1988;	
Novak	2007a),	Iran	(Adelkhah	and	Olszewska	2007;	Tober	2007),	or	North	America,	
Western	Europe,	and	Oceania	(Baily	2005,	1010;	Centlivres	and	Centlivres‐Demont	
2000;	Edwards	1994;	Oeppen	2010;	Monsutti	2009).	This	thesis	fills	in	a	gap	in	the	
literature	 by	 addressing	 contemporary	 Afghan	 migration	 in	 India,	 on	 which	 little	
research	 has	 been	 conducted10.	While	 not	 a	major	 focus	 of	 the	 thesis,	 the	 Afghan	
Sikh	experience	of	migration	to	India	in	particular,	as	discussed	in	chapter	three,	is	
an	issue	on	which	no	in‐depth	ethnographic	research	exists.	
	
Studies	of	broader	Sikh	migration	have	focused	primarily	on	populations	migrating	
from	 India	 to	 North	 America	 (Basran	 and	 Bolaria	 2003;	 Tatla	 1996),	 the	 United	
Kingdom	(Singh	and	Tatla	2006),	Australia	 (Dusenbery	2008),	and	more	recently	
in	Southeast	Asia	(Baharuddin	and	Kaur	2011),	the	former	Soviet	Union	(Marsden	
2014,	 2015),	 and	 Latin	 America	 (Kahlon	 2012).	 These	 studies	 acknowledge	 the	
heterogeneity	 of	 Sikh	 identities	 and	 diasporic	 experience,	 but	 generally	 propose	
																																																								
9	The	Hazara	are	an	ethnic	minority	spread	across	Iran,	Afghanistan,	and	Pakistan.	
10	Baujard’s	(2008)	doctoral	thesis	on	refugee	identity	in	Delhi	considers	Afghan	refugees’	conditions	
in	a	cursory	manner	within	the	context	of	the	wider	refugee	population	of	Delhi.	
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Sikhs	around	the	world	are	oriented	toward	India,	or	more	specifically	toward	the	
region	 of	 Punjab,	 in	 cultivating	 a	 global	 shared	 aesthetic	 and	 history,	 forms	 of	
visual	 representation,	 and	 modes	 of	 knowledge	 production	 (Axel	 2001;	 Hawley	
2013;	Tatla	1999).	
	
The	 experience	 of	 Afghan	 Sikhs,	 as	 discussed	 in	 this	 thesis,	 confirms	 the	
heterogeneity	 of	 Sikh	 migrant	 experience,	 but	 complicates	 the	 idea	 of	 Sikhs	 as	 a	
diasporic	community	with	origins	in	India.	 	Indeed,	while	several	historical	studies	
on	 regional	 trade	 have	 remarked	 on	 the	 local	 integration	 of	 Afghan	 Sikhs,	 they	
connect	 these	populations	 to	historically	mobile	 traders	stemming	from	Sindh	and	
Punjab	 and	 travelling	 along	 trade	 routes	 to	 Central	 Asia	 and	 beyond	 that	 endure	
today	 (Hanifi	 2011;	 Markovits	 2000).	 While	 many	 Afghan	 Sikh	 and	 Hindu	
communities	do	come	from	these	trading	castes,	as	discussed	in	chapter	three,	there	
are	also	non‐trading	castes	among	the	Afghan	Sikhs	that	are	considered	decedents	of	
the	Kabul	Shahis	 (an	Afghan	Hindu	kingdom)	and	other	pre‐Islamic	 inhabitants	of	
Afghanistan	who	were	not	 converted	 to	 Islam	(Katib	1993).	 In	either	case,	Afghan	
Sikhs	 generally	 consider	 themselves	 indigenous	 to	 Afghanistan	 with	 religious	
connections	to	India	(Emadi	2013).	Looking	at	how	Afghan	Sikhs	belong	in	the	city	
thus	 requires	 looking	 at	 the	 community	 as	 a	 Sikh	 diasporic	 group	 within	 India,	
where	India’s	status	of	‘homeland’	is	not	necessarily	a	given.	
	
The	 second	way	 this	 research	adds	 to	 scholarship	on	Afghan	migration	 is	 through	
exploring	Afghan	migrant	experiences	beyond	an	ethnic	or	national	frame.	Naturally,	
the	place	of	national	or	ethnic	identity	in	individuals’	understandings	of	their	selves	
is	not	denied.	However,	in	illustrating	how	individuals	understand	belonging	beyond	
these	 frames,	 the	 material	 from	 my	 research	 in	 Delhi	 provides	 a	 comparison	 to	
ethnographic	 accounts	 of	 Afghan	migrants	 in	 Iran	 and	 Pakistan	where	 ethnic	 and	
national	 identity	 are	 shown	 to	 be	 maintained	 through	 remittances,	 gifts,	 etc.	
(Monsutti	 2004a,	 2005b,	 2010b),	 or	 created	 through	 shared	 experience	 of	
marginalization,	 racism,	 or	 economic	 hardship	 (Olszewska	 2013;	 Rostami‐Povey	
2007a,	 2007b).	 While	 shared	 experience	 does	 serve	 as	 one	 vehicle	 for	 coming	
together	as	Afghan	nationals,	as	illustrated	in	chapter	six,	Afghan	migrants	in	Delhi	
also	 contemporaneously	 articulate	 belonging	 beyond	 a	 national	 framework	 at	 the	
scale	 of	 the	 individual	 (discussed	 in	 chapters	 four	 and	 five)	 and	 of	 community	
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(discussed	in	chapter	six)	through	ideas	of	shared	language,	history,	and	culture	that	
reflect	the	continuous	movement	of	people	through	the	region.	As	discussed	later	in	
this	chapter	and	the	ethnographic	chapters	below,	these	different	ways	of	belonging	
cultivated	at	different	scales	are	not	parallel	or	equal	in	their	multiplicity,	but	rather	
are	affected	by	and	respond	to	notions	of	being	Afghan	envisaged	at	the	scale	of	the	
state,	impacting	individual	Afghan	migrants’	lives	differentially.	
Afghan‐Indian	Migration	
Contemporary	 Afghan	 migration	 in	 India	 must	 be	 appreciated	 within	 a	 longer	
history	 of	 movement	 and	 exchange	 in	 the	 region.	 Ideas	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	
Afghan	 have	 played	 out	 across	 the	 region	 through	 various	 vehicles	 including	
language,	power,	religion,	and	the	arts	(see	Bruijn	and	Busch	2014;	Markovits	et	al	
2003;	 Thompson	 2011),	 and	 this	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 enduring	 connectedness	 of	
peoples	and	places	spanning	the	region,	as	well	as	through	attempts	to	disentangle	
and	separate	these	connections	as	part	of	a	politics	of	national	states	(see	discussion	
of	 the	 Bagh‐e	Bedil	 in	 chapter	 five)	 that	 have	 risen	 in	 the	 region.	 Asking	 what	 it	
means	to	be	and	belong	as	an	Afghan	in	Delhi	must	thus	entail	an	appreciation	of	the	
multiplicity	of	meanings	of	being	Afghan	and	 the	diversity	of	ways	 through	which	
belonging	is	felt.	
	
To	speak	of	Afghanistan	and	India	is	to	speak	of	nation	states	that	have	taken	their	
current	geographic	shape	over	the	last	century.	Prior	to	the	modern	period,	however,	
the	 political	 landscape	 of	 the	 region	 has	 witnessed	 constant	 flux	 under	 empires	
ranging	 from	Anatolia	 through	 the	Bay	of	Bengal.	 It	 is	not	within	 the	scope	of	 this	
thesis	to	consider	the	breadth	of	ancient	and	medieval	history	of	the	region,	but	it	is	
important	to	note	that	since	the	conquests	of	Mahmud	of	Ghazni	at	the	turn	of	the	
eleventh	 century	 through	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Mughal	 Empire	 in	 the	 mid	 nineteenth	
century,	the	projects	of	the	various	empires	and	kingdoms	spanning	the	region	led	
to	the	development	of	what	Wink	(1997)	has	termed	‘a	world	on	the	move’,	wherein	
places	 and	 communities	 across	 Central	 and	 South	 Asia	 came	 to	 creatively	 locate	
their	 “senses	 of	 history	 and	 memory	 of	 belonging	 and	 home”	 within	 a	
‘Gedächtnisraum’	which	was	as	much	 territorial	as	 ideational	 (Green	2012:xi).	 It	 is	
within	this	space,	among	Afghan	courts	and	settlements	of	India,	that	the	meaning	of	
the	term	‘Afghan’	began	to	take	shape.	
	 27
	
With	the	decline	of	the	Afghan	Lodi	and	Sur	dynasties	–	the	last	Pashtun	dynasties	of	
Delhi	 –	 and	 the	 marginalization	 and	 incorporation	 of	 Pashtuns	 into	 the	 Mughal	
Empire,	the	Indo‐Afghan	community	began	to	develop	its	sense	of	historical	identity	
(see	also	CA	Bayly	1989	and	Nichols	2008).	Where	the	term	‘Afghan’	had	previously	
been	used	by	particular	ruling	dynasties	in	India	to	differentiate	their	specific	tribe	
from	 other	 Pashtun	 tribes,	waning	 Pashtun	 power	 allowed	 for	 an	 emphasis	 to	 be	
placed	 on	 common	 ancestry	 as	 a	means	 to	 unite	 the	 different	 Indo‐Afghan	 tribes	
(see	 discussion	 on	 the	 Makhzan‐e	 Afghan	 in	 chapter	 four).	 Confusion	 persisted,	
however,	in	that	Afghan	tribes	had	followed	regional	political	protocol	of	cementing	
authority	 through	 identification	with	Sufi	 lineages	 that	 transcended	kin	and	ethnic	
identities.	 It	 is	 partially	 through	 the	 geographical	 network	 of	 such	 lineages,	 and	
through	 patronizing	 and	 visiting	 the	 Sufi	 saints	 and	 shrines	 connected	 to	 these	
lineages,	that	Pashtuns	and	Mughals	could	both	gain	political	legitimacy	from	Herat	
to	the	Deccan	(Green	2012).	Early	Indo‐Afghan	ethno‐genealogical	works	attempted	
to	address	this	confusion	through	a	tribalizing	of	Sufi	saints	in	India.	However,	with	
the	rise	of	Ahmad	Shah	Durrani	in	the	late	eighteenth	century	and	the	formation	of	
the	Afghan	state,	linguistic	belonging	came	to	replace	religious	affiliation,	and	Pashto	
language	was	promoted	as	a	marker	of	Afghan	belonging	and	affiliation	even	among	
Afghans	in	India	(Green	2008).	
	
Indeed,	language	was	one	of	the	mediums	through	which	the	Afghan	state	sought	to	
exert	its	identity	as	distinct	from	Iran	and	(British)	India.	To	do	so	was,	however,	no	
straightforward	task.	Written	Pashto	developed	within	a	Persian	language	template	
framed	by	the	Mughal	Empire	and	developed	in	print	under	British	Indian	military	
bureaucracy	(Hanifi	2013)	and	the	majority	of	historic	Pashto	texts	were	located	in	
libraries	across	India.	Similarly,	Persian	texts	celebrating	the	Afghans	existed	only	in	
the	works	of	the	early‐modern	Afghan	diaspora	in	India.	The	designation	of	Dari	as	
the	other	official	language	of	Afghanistan	entailed	an	orientation	toward	the	“Indian	
school”	 (sabk‐e	hindi)	 rather	 than	 Iranian	style	of	Persian	and	 thus	an	orientation	
towards	Indian	Persian	poets	such	as	Bedil	or	Amir	Khusro	(Green	and	Arabzadah	
2013).	
	
	 28
The	entanglement	of	language	was	of	course	mirrored	in	an	entanglement	of	peoples.	
Under	Mughal	rule,	Muslim,	Hindu,	and	Sikh	merchant	communities	from	India	were	
brought	 to	 Afghanistan,	 as	 operators	 along	 the	 financial	 networks	 connecting	
Afghanistan	 to	 the	 networks	 of	 the	 Silk	 Road	 and	 Indian	 Ocean.	 This	 ‘Hindki’	
community	 was,	 with	 time,	 integrated	 into	 Afghan	 society	 and	 state	 structures	
(Hanifi	 2011).	 Of	 course,	 Hindus	 and	 Sikhs	 were	 not	 modern	 imports	 into	
Afghanistan,	which	had	been	ruled	by	Afghan	Hindu	kingdoms	prior	to	the	arrival	of	
Islam	and	witnessed	frequent	changes	of	power	between	Afghan	and	Sikh	dynastic	
rule	along	 the	current	Afghanistan‐Pakistan	border.	 Indians	were	also	 imported	 in	
Afghanistan	 as	 part	 of	 the	 state‐building	 exercise.	 Musicians	 from	 what	 is	 now	
Pakistani	Punjab	were	 imported	by	Sher	Ali	Khan	 in	 the	 late	1800s	and	would	be	
instrumental	 in	 developing	 Afghan	 national	 music	 within	 the	 rubric	 of	 the	
Hindustani	music	tradition	in	the	early	twentieth	Century	(Baily	1988;	Madadi	1996;	
Sarmast	 2004).	 Interestingly,	 while	 Persian	 would	 not	 be	 listed	 as	 an	 official	
language	 of	 the	 new	 Indian	 state,	 the	 continuing	 expertise	 of	 Indian	 Muslims	 in	
Persian	meant	the	budding	state	of	Afghanistan	would	have	to	import	a	significant	
number	 of	 teachers	 from	 India	 to	 teach	 Persian	 in	 Afghanistan	 (Green	 and	
Arabzadah	2013).	The	drivers	of	Afghan	state	modernization,	 rulers	Habibullah	(r.	
1901‐1919),	 Amanullah	 (r.	 1919‐1929),	 and	 Nadir	 Shah	 (r.	 1929‐1933)	 were	 not	
only	 fluent	 in	 Urdu,	 but	 patronized	 the	 exchange	 of	 knowledge	 between	 Indian	
Muslims	and	young	Afghan	modernists	through	engagement	with	what	Green	(2011,	
2013)	has	termed	the	“Indian	Urdusphere.”	
	
This	movement	of	people	and	connection	of	language	persists	today	not	just	through	
claims	 to	 common	 poets	 and	 saints,	 but	 also	 to	 legendary	 Bollywood	 singers	 and	
actors	such	as	Mohammad	Rafi	or	Shahrukh	Khan.	While	Persian	has	receded	from	
the	public	 sphere	 in	 contemporary	 India	 (Dudney	2015),	Urdu	 is	widely	heard	on	
the	streets	of	Kabul	and	many	Afghans	are	at	least	familiar	if	not	competent	in	Urdu	
due	to	exposure	of	print	and	electronic	media	 from	Pakistan	and	India	(Green	and	
Arabzadah	2013).	Likewise,	during	my	fieldwork	in	Delhi,	Dari	and	Pashto	could	be	
heard	in	almost	any	Delhi	neighbourhood	between	October	and	April	and	“Afghani”	
style	 clothing	was	en	vogue	 among	young	Muslim	men	 in	 certain	neighbourhoods.	
While	contemporary	circulation	of	people	from	Afghanistan,	outside	of	refugee	flows,	
has	been	addressed	in	the	context	of	Iran	(Adelkhah	and	Olszewska	2007),	Pakistan,	
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and	the	Gulf	(Nichols	2008),	there	is	no	concrete	study	of	present‐day	movements	of	
people	between	Afghanistan	and	India.	This	issue	is	addressed	in	chapters	four	and	
five,	which	attend	to	the	movements	of	Afghan	migrants	in	Delhi	and	how	they	effect	
and	 are	 shaped	 by	 linguistic	 and	 historical	 connections	 between	 Afghanistan	 and	
India.	
	
By	 asserting	 the	 continuity	 of	 such	 historical	 connections	 between	 the	 regions	 of	
present‐day	Afghanistan	and	India,	 this	 thesis	does	not	seek	to	 ignore	or	minimise	
the	 context	of	 conflict	 in	Afghanistan	 that	has	 shaped	migration	 to	 India	 since	 the	
late	 1970s.	 Bentz	 (2013)	 suggests	 that	 contemporary	 flows	 of	 refugees	 from	
Afghanistan	to	India	can	be	considered	in	two	waves:	(i)	those	who	migrated	in	the	
1980s	 following	 the	 1978	 Saur	 Revolution11	in	 Afghanistan	 and	 the	 1979	 Soviet	
invasion	of	the	country,	and	(ii)	those	who	fled	in	the	1990s	following	the	outbreak	
of	civil	war	Afghanistan	in	1992	and	the	subsequent	establishment	of	Taliban	rule	in	
1996.	Building	on	my	own	fieldwork	and	the	work	of	 Julie	Baujard	(2008,	2012),	 I	
would	 suggest	 a	 third	 wave	 of	 migration	 from	 Afghanistan	 to	 India	 might	 be	
considered	as	 starting	 in	 the	mid‐2000s	as	 a	 result	 of	deteriorating	economic	 and	
political	 conditions	 in	post‐Taliban	Afghanistan.	Following	Kunz	 (1973),	one	 could	
think	 of	 these	 three	 groups	 as	 “distinct	 ‘vintages’…	 different	 in	 character,	
background	and	avowed	political	faith”	(137).		
	
Compared	to	those	who	fled	to	Iran	and	Pakistan,	the	Afghan	refugees	who	came	to	
Delhi	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 1990s	 were	 predominantly	 urban	 elites	 who	 already	
possessed	 requisite	 travel	 documents	 and	 had	 the	 wherewithal	 to	 purchase	
expensive	 tickets	 for	 air	 travel	 to	 India.	 Bentz	 (2013)	 suggests	 that	 whereas	 the	
majority	 of	 Afghan	 elites	 entering	 India	 as	 refugees	 in	 the	 1980s	 were	 ethnic	
Pashtun	 political	 exiles,	 those	 arriving	 in	 the	 1990s	 included	 non‐Pashtun	 elites	
connected	to	the	Northern	Alliance	in	Afghanistan	as	well	as	a	significant	number	of	
non‐elite	Hindu	 and	 Sikh	 Afghans	 (this	 community	 is	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 three).	
Afghan	migrants	arriving	in	Delhi	since	the	mid‐2000s	present	an	ethnically	diverse	
group	and	fit	a	varied	socio‐economic	profile,	as	discussed	in	chapters	three	through	
																																																								
11The	 Saur	 revolution	 brought	 the	 People’s	 Democratic	 Party	 of	 Afghanistan	 (PDPA)	 to	 power	 in	
Afghanistan	and	led	to	a	series	of	events	that	ultimately	culminated	in	the	1979	Soviet	invasion.	As	a	
result	of	political	 conflict	 starting	with	 the	 revolution,	 it	 is	estimated	 that	up	 to	 five	million	people	
fled	Afghanistan	during	the	1980s	and	90s,	with	the	majority	going	to	Iran	and	Pakistan	(Bentz	2013).	
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six.	 While	 it	 is	 still	 the	 case	 that	 migration	 to	 India	 requires	 leveraging	 financial	
resources	 to	 arrange	 for	 air	 travel	 and	 visas,	 the	 recent	 introduction	 of	 easily	
obtainable	and	renewable	medical	 tourist	visas	 to	 India	 for	citizens	of	Afghanistan	
has	 made	 the	 option	 of	 migration	 to	 India	 available	 to	 many	 outside	 the	 urban	
upper‐classes	(see	also	Baujard	2012).	
	
Almost	 all	 of	 the	 migrants	 whom	 I	 met	 and	 worked	 with	 were	 part	 of	 the	 third	
‘vintage’	 mentioned	 above,	 and	 many	 of	 them	 had	 sought	 asylum	 in	 India	 after	
having	already	been	refugees	in	Pakistan	or	Iran	in	the	80s	or	90s.	Through	a	contact	
in	the	Delhi	music	community,	however,	I	was	able	to	meet	one	refugee,	Zabihullah,	
who	had	come	to	Delhi	in	the	1980s	as	a	young	man	in	his	20s	and	had	still	not	been	
resettled.	 He	 agreed	 to	 meet	 me	 just	 once	 and	 refused	 to	 speak	 of	 his	 personal	
situation.	 He	 spoke	 fondly	 of	 the	 “earlier	 migrants”	 (muhajireene	qabli)	 in	 Delhi,	
whom	 he	 described	 as	 urbane	 and	 cultured	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 new	 (jadeed)	
migrants	whom	he	considered	to	be	either	unrefined	financial	opportunists	seeking	
an	easy	route	to	resettlement	in	the	west	(gharb),	or	hedonistic	(ayyash)	young	men	
only	interested	in	“discos”.	
	
As	 with	 other	 Afghan	 migrants	 I	 met	 in	 Delhi,	 migration	 ‘vintage’	 presented	
Zabihullah	with	 a	way	 to	 assume	 the	 social	 class	 or	 political	 background	 of	 other	
people	from	Afghanistan	and	situate	them	vis‐à‐vis	himself.	However,	it	was	not	the	
only	factor	that	served	to	distinguish	different	Afghan	migrants	from	one	another.	As	
discussed	 in	 chapter	 three,	 migrants	 in	 Delhi	 generally	 distinguished	 themselves	
according	 to	whether	 or	 not	 they	were	 refugees,	 indirectly	making	 a	 claim	 to	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 their	 being	 in	 Delhi.	 Their	 various	 considerations	 and	 practices	 of	
being	and	belonging	in	the	city,	discussed	in	chapters	four	and	five,	further	illustrate	
a	complex	reality	of	trans‐border	migration	as	simultaneously	shaped	by	the	current	
context	of	conflict	in	Afghanistan	while	also	building	on	older	patterns	of	movement	
of	people	between	India	and	Afghanistan.	
Migration	and	the	City	
The	 historical	 connection	 between	 India	 and	 Afghanistan	 created	 through	 the	
constant	movement	of	peoples	is	illustrative	on	the	one	hand	of	how	ideas	of	what	it	
means	 to	 be	 Afghan	 in	 the	 region	 have	 been	 fluid	 over	 the	 long‐term,	 even	 if	
	 31
contextually	 specific12 .	 Rather	 than	 representative	 of	 a	 ‘moral	 incoherence’	
(Edwards	1996)	of	Afghan	identity,	this	malleability	has	been	both	productive	and	a	
product	 of	 identity	 claims	 within	 changing	 political	 and	 historical	 circumstances.	
The	 interconnectedness	 of	 people	 and	 places	 as	 just	 discussed	 points	 to	 how	 the	
place	 of	 Afghans	 in	 India	 can	 be	 found	 in	 history,	 language,	 memory,	 music,	 and	
religion,	and	thus	within	and	outside	the	constructs	of	national	belonging.	However,	
even	 though	 contemporary	 Afghan	 migration	 to	 India	 might	 build	 upon	 more	
ancient	patterns	of	movement	between	the	countries,	migration	always	takes	place	
within	 particular	 structural	 conditions,	 power	 relations,	 and	 socio‐economic	
contexts	(Levitt	2011),	and	observing	migration	is	to	also	observe	this	context.		
	
Exploring	what	it	means	to	be	and	belong	as	Afghan	in	Delhi	today,	thus	also	speaks	
to	 the	 contemporary	 urban	 context	 in	 India.	 Despite	 the	 recent	 spatial	 turn	 in	
research	on	South	Asia,	where	scholarship	has	approached	the	city	and	its	spaces	as	
a	context	to	understand	wider	processes	of	governmentality	(Chandavarkar	2009),	
national	belonging	and	citizenship	(Desai	and	Sanyal	2012;	Simpson	2006),	and	the	
impact	 of	 economic	 liberalization	 and	 globalization	 (De	 Neve	 and	 Donner	 2006),	
little	attention	has	been	given	to	the	space	of	the	city	as	a	lens	to	examine	migration	
in	India13.	While	research	has	considered	the	legal	framework	for	refugees	in	India	
(Ananthachari	 2003)	 and	 conditions	 of	 refugees	 and	 internally	 displaced	 peoples	
within	 national	 contexts	 in	 India	 and	 across	 South	 Asia	 (Chari	 et	al	 2003;	 Oberoi	
2006),	the	study	of	South	Asian	migration	has	until	recently	largely	focused	on	post‐
colonial	movement	of	people	out	of	India	rather	than	intra‐regional	urban	migration	
(see	Bruslé	and	Varrel	2012	on	recent	developments	toward	this	frame	of	research).	
This	 thesis	 thus	 adds	 to	 scholarship	 on	migration	within	 South	 Asia	 by	 exploring	
how	 Afghan	migrants	 live	 in	 the	 city	 and	 how	 their	 experience	 both	 reflects	 and	
shapes	the	city.	
	
Since	 the	 1990s,	 research	 interest	 in	 urban	 India	 has	 risen	 concomitantly	 with	
India’s	economic	liberalization	and	integration	into	global	markets.	This	period	has	
																																																								
12	For	example,	as	Hanifi	(2013)	describes,	the	terms	‘Afghan’,	‘Pashtun’,	and	‘Pathan’	have	been	used	
interchangeably,	but	also	in	distinction	to	one	another.	Where	Hanifi	posits	the	possibility	of	discrete	
categorization	based	on	the	words’	origins	in	different	contexts	and	their	differential	relationships	to	
Pashto	language,	I	believe	one	must	work	with	them	as	categories	that	have	been	and	are	specific	in	
context	but	overlapping	more	generally.	
13	A	notable	exception	is	Sanyal’s	(2009,	2014)	work	on	post‐partition	refugees	in	Calcutta.	
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witnessed	 increasing	 demographic,	 political,	 and	 economic	 importance	 of	 cities	
(Lama‐Rewal	and	Zérah	2011)	and	prompted	Chatterjee	 (2004)	 to	 famously	ask	 if	
“Indian	 cities	 [are]	 becoming	 bourgeois	 at	 last”?	 An	 affirmative	 answer	 has	 been	
provided	 by	 scholarship	 outlining	 the	 development	 of	 the	middle	 class	 consumer	
citizen	as	 the	object	of	 the	new	national	vision	of	economic	development	 in	which	
economic	 inequality	 underpins	 access	 to	 the	 city	 and	 to	 citizenship	 (Deshpande	
1993;	Drèze	and	Sen	2013;	Gupta	2009).	Recognizing	the	policing	of	modern	visions	
of	 the	 city,	 others	 present	 the	 city	 as	 also	 providing	 a	 site	 for	 “deep	 democracy”	
(Appadurai	 2001)	 where	 inhabitants	 can	 come	 together	 through	 grassroots	
organising	at	community	or	interest‐group	levels	to	contest	national	imaginaries	of	
belonging,	 playing	 out	 the	 “dramas	 of	 citizenship”	 (Holston	 and	 Appadurai	
1996:200).	
	
The	city	government	in	Delhi,	aspiring	to	the	title	of	a	global	city,	has	undertaken	a	
remodelling	of	the	built	environment	in	a	bid	to	attract	transnational	capital,	human	
resources,	etc.	In	one	way,	the	remodelling	of	the	city	has	transformed	how	people	
can	move	through	the	city	and	relate	to	it.	Despite	the	city’s	development	of	spaces	
for	 increased	 social	 interaction	 in	 the	 form	 of	 malls	 and	 markets,	 ethnographic	
research	on	affective	modes	of	being	 in	Delhi	demonstrates	 increasing	segregation	
and	 division	 along	 connected	 boundaries	 of	 socio‐economic	 class,	 religion,	 and	
ethnicity	(Butcher	2010,	2011).	Another	aspect	of	this	transformation	has	been	the	
clearing	of	so‐called	illegal	settlements	across	the	city.	Sundaram	(2010)	has	argued	
such	settlements	are	 ‘pirate’	sites	 that	contest	 the	modernist	vision	of	 the	city	and	
that	their	creation	as	sites	of	concern	represents	a	growing	sense	of	urban	disorder	
in	 the	 post‐liberalization	 Delhi.	 Research	 on	 the	 legal	 and	 social	 context	 of	
settlement	 eviction,	 however,	 illustrates	 how	 the	 process	 of	 eviction	 from	 illegal	
urban	 settlements	 creates	 narratives	 of	 citizenship	 in	 the	 city	 that	 exclude	 those	
who	cannot	participate	 in	 its	consumption,	entrenching	spatial	 illegality	of	 income	
poverty	(Bhan	2014;	Bhan	and	Shivanand	2013).	
	
In	exploring	how	Afghan	migrants	belong	in	Delhi,	this	thesis	affords	another	insight	
into	 these	 issues	 of	 urban	 citizenship.	 Of	 course,	 at	 the	 state	 scale	 (discussed	 in	
chapter	three)	Afghan	migrants	in	Delhi	are	not	seen	to	hold	rights	to	belong	in	the	
city	either	as	accepted	refugees	or	irregular	migrants.	As	McNevin	(2011)	explains,	
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irregular	 migrants	 are	 conceived	 relative	 to	 particular	 legal	 constructions	 of	
citizenship,	so	 that	 their	 legal	designation	 is	heuristic	of	conceptions	of	citizenship	
against	which	they	come	into	being.	This	point	is	addressed	particularly	in	chapters	
three	and	 four	 in	exploring	 the	construction	of	 the	category	of	 the	Afghan	refugee	
and	 the	 experience	 of	 becoming	 a	 refugee.	However,	 even	 though	migrants	might	
not	 possess	 legal	 citizenship	 rights,	 they	 are	 often	 engaged	 in	 practices	 that	
substitute	and	sometimes	even	allow	for	acquiring	citizenship	(Sadiq	2010).	In	this	
vein,	based	on	ethnographic	work	with	Indian	migrants	in	the	United	Arab	Emirates,	
Vora	(2013)	demonstrates	how	citizenship	does	not	exist	solely	within	a	binary	of	
either	 possessing	 or	 not	 possessing	 legal	 membership	 in	 the	 state.	 Rather,	 those	
excluded	from	legal	membership	can	also	enact	citizenship‐like	affects	and	actions.	
These	 actions	 that	 highlight	 the	 exclusion	 of	 non‐citizens,	 serve	 not	 only	 to	 give	
meaning	to	ideas	of	citizenship,	but	also	reflect	the	particular	contextual	dynamics	of	
citizenship.	The	conclusion	of	 this	 thesis	 returns	 to	 this	point	 to	 consider	how	 the	
ethnographic	 material	 presented	 speaks	 not	 just	 to	 the	 experience	 of	 Afghan	
migrants	in	Delhi	but	also	more	generally	to	urban	citizenship	in	the	context	of	Delhi.	
2.2 Individual	and	Society	in	Afghanistan	and	South	Asia	
As	a	thesis	on	Afghans	in	Delhi,	my	research	takes	to	heart	Oeppen	and	Schlenkhoff’s	
(2010)	statement	 that	currently	 “every	aspect	of	Afghan	 life	 is	under‐researched…	
[and]	there	is	a	need	to	move	beyond	colonial	understandings…	and	consider	what	it	
means	to	be	Afghan	in	the	twenty‐first	century”	(6‐7).	I	also	draw	on	anthropological	
research	 on	 India	 that	 asserts	 social	 scientists	 must	 “live	 with	 a	 destruction	 of	
certainty	 as	 the	 only	 condition	 for	 the	 production	 of	 knowledge	 about	 Indian	
society”	(Das	1995:54)	and	develop	a	“multiplicity	of	anthropologies	appropriate	to	
the	diversity	of	 social	 forms	and	contexts	 [in	 India]”	 (Appadurai	1986a:759).	With	
this	 in	 mind,	 I	 begin	 below	 by	 outlining	 the	 ‘colonial	 understandings’	 present	 in	
research	on	Afghanistan	and	 the	 resultant	 reification	of	notions	of	 tribe,	 ethnicity,	
and	religion	 in	Afghanistan	studies.	 I	 then	consider	the	 literature	within	a	broader	
context	 of	 work	 on	 relatedness	 in	 South	 Asia	 and	 return	 to	 ethnographic	 studies	
from	Afghanistan	to	consider	how	they	can	also	be	seen	to	present	a	complex	picture	
of	Afghan	society	that	necessitates	sensitivity	to	questions	of	multiplicity	and	scale.	
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The	perspective	of	early	colonial	works	on	Afghanistan,	such	as	that	of	Bellew	(1891)	
or	Elphinstone	(1915),	was	shaped	by	 imperial	policy	aimed	primarily	at	grasping	
the	 political	 and	 social	 organization	 of	 Pashtun	 tribes.	 This	 interest	 in	 tribal	
organization	stemmed	from	a	need	to	understand	the	Afghan	state	ruled	by	Pashtun	
dynasties,	 as	well	 as	 to	 assist	 in	 state	 administration	 of	 Pashtun	 tribes	within	 the	
empire.	 Access	 to	 territories	 in	 Afghanistan	 was	 limited	 to	 official	 diplomatic	
missions	or	military	incursions,	and	much	of	what	was	known	about	Afghan	society	
was	 via	 informants	 from	 Pashtun	 tribes	 along	 what	 is	 now	 considered	 the	
Afghanistan‐Pakistan	 border.	 Early	 ethnographic	 accounts	 more	 aptly	 represent	
writers’	 perceptions	 of	 their	 own	 society	 (Anderson	 1991;	 Banerjee	 2000)	 and	 a	
captivation	with	Afghans	both	as	an	 ‘other’	resistant	 to	colonial	power,	but	also	as	
representative	 of	 ideas	 of	 a	 “Western	male	 romantic	 ideal”	 by	 virtue	 of	 this	 very	
resistance	(Rubin	2002:3).	This	colonial,	romanticized	image	of	Afghanistan	as	home	
of	 warrior	 tribes	 resisting	 change	 remains	 with	 us	 today	 in	 popular	 media	
depictions	of	Afghans	and	Afghanistan	as	“wild	and	uncivilized,	…	backward	and	raw,	
or	…	romantic	and	pure”	(Schadl	2007:100).	While	colonial	accounts’	inaccuracy	and	
exoticization	 is	easily	criticized,	what	 is	of	 interest	here	 is	 the	trend	of	 imperial	or	
state‐interests	 in	 shaping	 research	 on	 Afghanistan,	 directly	 or	 indirectly,	 with	 a	
focus	more	on	corporate	groups	and	their	organization,	resulting	in	a	reification	of	
and	emphasis	on	ethnic	and	religious	group	identity	as	a	heuristic	for	understanding	
society	in	Afghanistan	(see	also	introduction	of	Marsden	and	Hopkins	2011).	
	
The	 nation	 state	 and	 questions	 surrounding	 it	 have	 remained	 a	 key	 frame	 for	
scholarship	on	Afghanistan,	but	there	is	a	difference	in	emphasis	and	consideration	
between	literature	preceding	the	1979	Soviet	invasion	of	the	country	and	research	
conducted	 thereafter.	 Relative	 internal	 stability	 and	 heavy	 political	 and	 financial	
investment	 by	 Soviet‐14	and	 Western‐bloc	 countries	 facilitated	 a	 blossoming	 of	
research	on	Afghanistan	in	the	1960s	and	70s.	This	research	primarily	addresses	the	
effect	 of	 state	 and	 market	 modernization	 on	 traditional	 social	 organization.	 It	
depicts	various	shared	aspects	of	social	organization	across	groups	 in	 the	country,	
such	 as	 the	 role	 of	 Melanesian‐style	 big	 men,	 models	 of	 exchange	 in	 maintaining	
intra‐tribal	 relations,	 and	 women’s	 roles	 in	 social	 organization,	 and	 how	 these	
																																																								
14	I	have	not	consulted	Soviet	anthropological	literature	on	Afghanistan,	as	I	do	not	read	Russian,	and	
have	only	consulted	anthropological	literature	on	Afghanistan	in	Dari,	English,	French,	or	German.	
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modes	 of	 social	 organization	were	 changing	 as	 a	 result	 of	 economic	 and	 political	
consolidation	of	the	state	(Anderson	1978;	Barfield	1981;	Canfield	1971;	Jones	1974;	
Tapper	 199115).	 As	 a	 whole,	 society	 in	 Afghanistan	 is	 presented	 as	 rural,	 inward	
looking,	non‐cooperative	outside	the	kin‐group,	and	based	on	segmentary	 lineages	
where	 patrilineal	 descent	 is	 the	 primary	 principle	 underlying	 all	 social	 grouping,	
though	regional	and	inter‐tribal	variation	is	acknowledged	(Dupree	1973).	
	
Pre‐1979	scholarship	on	Afghanistan	is	generally	focused	on	social	groups	and	their	
organization	 rather	 than	 individual	 experience.	With	 the	 exception	 of	 the	work	 of	
Fredrik	Barth	(discussed	below),	this	body	of	research	is	not	immediately	concerned	
with	 the	 bases	 of	 ethnic	 identity,	 but	 instead	 assumes	 ethnicity	 and	 tribe	 are	
coterminous.	More	importance	is	laid	on	kinship	rules	and	terminologies	and	on	the	
political	and	economic	structures	within	tribal	groups.	Religion	appears	of	 interest	
in	this	scholarship	only	to	the	extent	that	 it	serves	as	an	 ideological	base	for	tribal	
social	 structures	 (cf.	 Canfield	 1971).	 While	 ethical	 concerns	 are	 raised	 about	 the	
implications	of	social	change	for	individuals	who	stand	to	lose	access	to	resources	or	
security,	the	main	interest	of	the	literature	is	on	how	external	forces	of	the	state	or	
economy	affect	 tribal	 social	 structures.	 	Human	action	 and	 identity	 in	Afghanistan	
are	 assumed	 to	 be	 almost	 entirely	 structurally	 determined	 and	 little	 attention	 is	
given	 to	 how	 people	 themselves	 understand	 social	 organization	 and	 experience	
social	change	(cf.	Jones	1974).			
	
The	 interest	 in	political	 economy	and	group	organization	 continues	 in	 scholarship	
on	 Afghanistan	 after	 the	 1979	 Soviet	 invasion.	 Research	 interest	 shifts,	 however,	
from	 a	 concern	 with	 social	 consequences	 of	 state	 building	 to	 the	 possibility	 and	
conditions	for	state	building.	This	shift	in	research	interest	can	perhaps	be	explained	
through	 the	 fact	 Afghanistan	 appeared	 to	 transition	 rapidly,	 and	 somewhat	
unexpectedly	 for	 some,	 into	 political	 fragmentation.	 Between	 the	 1979	 Soviet	 and	
2001	US	invasions,	insecurity	in	Afghanistan	meant	the	little	research	conducted	in‐
country	was	carried	out	in	rural	areas	(Orywal	1982;	Rao	1988)	and	the	majority	of	
writing	 on	 the	 country	 took	 the	 form	 of	 analysis	 conducted	 from	 abroad	 (Digard	
1988;	Shahrani	and	Canfield	1984)	or	of	research	with	Afghans	 in	exile	(Anderson	
																																																								
15	While	this	study	was	published	in	1991,	it	 is	based	on	research	conducted	in	the	early	1970s.	 	In	
the	 introduction,	 Tapper	 states	 she	 wishes	 to	 depict	 the	 findings	 from	 that	 period	 to	 provide	 a	
snapshot	of	the	social	processes	as	they	were	playing	out	prior	to	1979.	
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and	Dupree	1990;	Edwards	1996).	Following	the	2001	US	invasion,	possibilities	for	
conducting	 research	 in	 Afghanistan	 have	 increased,	 though	 lack	 of	 funding	 and	
steadily	mounting	insecurity	have	limited	the	type,	geographic	scope,	and	length	of	
research	 possible	 (Oeppen	 and	 Schlenkhoff	 2010).	 Additionally,	 the	 post‐2001	
context	 has	 seen	 a	 proliferation	 of	 research	 that	 is	 policy‐related,	 strengthening	
research	 focus	 on	 the	 causes	 for	 social	 fragmentation	 and	 the	 feasibility	 of	
developing	a	stable	state	(Dorronsoro	2007;	Giustozzi	2007a,	2007b).	
	
Post‐1979	 scholarship	 on	 Afghanistan	 takes	 a	 more	 symbolic	 and	 functionalist	
analytical	 approach	 to	 culture	 in	 Afghanistan	 as	 a	 means	 to	 explain	 political	
developments,	and	is	concerned	with	the	reasons	and	nature	of	resistance	to	soviet	
rule	 (Shahrani	 1984),	 the	 lack	 of	 unity	 within	 the	 resistance	 (Roy	 1986),	 the	
appearance	 of	 the	 Taliban	 (Maley	 1998),	 and	 the	 inability	 of	 the	 Afghan	 state	 to	
establish	hegemony	of	political	 authority	 (Dorronsoro	2000;	Giustozzi	2010).	This	
research	questions	the	viability	of	Afghanistan	as	a	state	(Christensen	1988;	Newell	
1986;	Roy	1998),	and	in	discussing	the	inability	of	the	resistance,	the	Taliban,	or	the	
post‐2001	 government	 to	 establish	 broad‐based	 political	 authority	 in	 the	 country,	
the	literature	cites	a	range	of	internal	and	external	factors,	including	the	urban‐rural	
divide	(Dorronsoro	2007),	the	politicization	of	religion	through	exile	and	foreign	aid	
(Roy	1998),	 the	 ethnicization	of	politics	 (Glatzer	1998a;	Newell	1986;	Dorronsoro	
2007),	 and	 most	 importantly	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 ideological	 basis	 for	 state	 authority	
(Giustozzi	2007b).	 	It	is	argued	that	this	ideological	deficit	is	in	part	due	to	the	fact	
the	dominant	moral	 frameworks	 that	 locate	 the	political	 in	Afghanistan,	 i.e.	 Islam,	
honour16,	 and	 state,	 are	discursively	 incongruous	and	 internally	 inconsistent.	 	The	
impossibility	 of	 determining	 a	 consistent	 ideology	 of	 meaning	 within	 and	 among	
these	 frameworks,	 it	 is	 suggested,	 renders	 the	development	of	any	moral	basis	 for	
cooperation	among	groups	in	the	country	highly	unlikely	if	not	impossible	(Barfield	
2005;	Christensen	1988;	Edwards	1996;	Giustozzi	2007a).	
	
As	 with	 pre‐1979	 literature,	 research	 after	 the	 Soviet	 invasion	 presents	 various	
frameworks	 for	 group	 identity,	 explained	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 ethnic	 or	 religious	
																																																								
16	The	literature	assumes	that	while	certain	differences	between	ethnic	groups	exist,	a	general	code	of	
honour	as	enshrined	in	the	concepts	of	Pashtunwali	are	shared	across	groups.	 	See	Steul	(1981)	on	
Pashtunwali.	 The	 reification	 of	 Pashtunwali	 itself	 is	 problematic.	 Barth’s	 (1969;	 1981)	 work	
demonstrates	that	while	Pashtun	groups	do	share	certain	values	as	part	of	a	Pashtun	identity,	 they	
are	not	operationalized	identically	or	consistently	across	groups.	
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belonging	 rather	 than	 tribal	 identity,	 assuming	 that	 group	 identity	 is	 the	 primary	
vehicle	 for	 social	 organization.	 Individual	 experience	 or	 questioning	 of	 identity	 is	
addressed	in	this	literature	only	through	exploring	the	ideological	terminology	that	
delineates	 the	 nature	 of	 persons	 and	 the	 boundaries	 for	 their	 action.	 Afghans	 are	
presented	 as	 rigidly	 beholden	 to	 tribal	 or	 Islamic	 norms,	 uncritically	 striving	 to	
maintain	 social	 order	 through	 their	 responsibility	 toward	 their	 social	 group	
(Anderson	1985;	Glatzer	1998b),	perpetuating,	sometimes	unintentionally,	enduring	
stereotypes	 of	 Afghans	 as	 honourable	 yet	 untrustworthy	 due	 to	 an	 irrational	
dedication	to	their	faith	or	tribe	(Pennell	1914;	Ewans	2002).	
	
In	 the	 case	 of	 writing	 on	 Afghans	 and	 Afghanistan,	 the	 interrelationship	 of	
knowledge	 production	 and	 national	 and	 regional	 power	 struggles	 has	 been	 well	
documented	(see	Marsden	and	Hopkins	2011;	Monsutti	2013;	Nichols	2008).	While	
the	questions	research	on	Afghanistan	has	asked	have	shifted	over	time,	the	area	of	
interest	 has	 largely	 remained	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 state	 and	 thus	 persisted	 in	
describing	and	understanding	 the	 functioning	and	 interaction	of	corporate	groups.	
This	 focus	 has	meant	 that	 group	 identity,	 whether	 tribal,	 ethnic,	 or	 religious,	 has	
generally	been	treated	as	natural	and	assumed	to	be	timeless	and	static	before	the	
advent	 of	 the	 modern	 nation‐state.	 Less	 attention	 has	 been	 given	 to	 individual	
engagement	 with	 questions	 of	 identity	 and	 change.	 Rather,	 the	 multiplicity	 of	
discursive	 frameworks	 for	 Afghan	 identity	 has	 been	 assumed	 to	 result	 in	
incoherence	at	the	national,	 local,	and	individual	 level.	As	discussed	further	below,	
however,	 this	same	ethnographic	material	 can	be	reconsidered	 from	a	perspective	
that	engages	with	multiplicity	and	 fluidity	 in	 identity	as	a	 social	 fact	 rather	 than	a	
heuristic	 for	 political	 conflict.	 In	 taking	 this	 perspective,	 this	 thesis	 follows	
contemporary	 research	on	Afghanistan	 that	pursues	 a	multi‐disciplinary	approach	
to	understand	society	in	Afghanistan,	exhibiting	reflexivity	and	an	awareness	of	the	
diverse	 connections	 among	 social	 processes	 on	 local,	 national	 and	 global	 scales	
(Green	and	Arabzadah	2013;	Oeppen	2010),	attending	 to	 the	role	of	 individuals	 in	
social	 processes	 (Harpviken	 2009;	 Marsden	 2009a;	 Monsutti	 2005b,	 2010a),	 and	
demonstrating	 how	 people	 actively	 engage	 in	 debate	 and	 critical	 thought	 about	
various	modes	of	identity	(Marsden	2009b;	Marsden	and	Hopkins	2011).	
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Relatedness	in	South	Asia	
In	 considering	 Afghan	 belonging	 beyond	 reified	 notions	 of	 ethnicity,	 religion,	 or	
tribe,	this	thesis	draws	on	anthropological	research	on	personhood	and	relatedness	
(Carsten	1995,	2000)	 to	 contribute	 to	broader	discussion	on	personhood	 in	South	
Asia.	 The	 concept	 of	 relatedness	 developed	 as	 a	 recognition	 of	 the	 need	 to	
understand	an	express	the	variety	of	local	processes	and	conceptions	through	which	
individuals	 are	 constituted	 as	persons	 and	 connected	 to	 one	 another,	which	 could	
not	be	done	through	traditional	kinship	studies’	emphasis	on	biological	descent	and	
Euro‐American	understandings	of	 the	 relationship	between	 individual	and	society.	
While	 the	 term	 ‘relatedness’	 has	 been	 criticized	 as	 being,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 so	
ambiguous	to	allow	for	the	recognition	of	any	social	relationship	as	relatedness	and	
thus	become	“analytically	vacuous”,	or	at	another	extreme	 to	merely	postpone	 the	
problems	 of	 traditional	 kinship	 studies	 through	 semantic	 obfuscation	 (Holý	
1996:168),	proponents	have	been	clear	in	demonstrating	that	identifying	local	ways	
of	thinking	through	persons	and	relatedness	entails	an	appreciation	of	the	multiple	
and	contingent	understandings	of	where	relatedness	begins	and	ends	within	a	given	
context	(Strathern	1996).	
	
Opening	 up	 of	 the	 study	 of	 kinship	 to	 descriptions	 “from	 the	 inside”	 (Carsten	
2004:45),	 has	 led	 to	 enquiry	 on	 how	 people	 understand	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 a	
person	 and	 the	 epistemological	 bases	 of	 these	 understandings.	 The	 scholarship	
demonstrates	how	relatedness	is	created	through	practices	and	discourses	relating	
to,	 among	 other	 things,	 the	 sharing	 and	 transformation	 of	 substance	 (Hutchinson	
2000),	experience	of	temporality	(Astuti	1995),	considerations	of	locality	(Lambert	
2000),	and	the	carrying	out	of	everyday	human	interaction	(Stafford	2000).	Persons	
thus	 come	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 sites	 of	 embedded	 relationships	 which	 at	 once	
establish	 their	 personhood	 and	 also	 connect	 them	 to	 others	 (Astuti	 1998;	 Howell	
1996;	 Povinelli	 2002;	 Strathern	 1988),	 and	 personhood	 is	 treated	 as	 an	 on‐going	
processes	 contingent	 on	 broader	 social	 developments	 (Haraway	 1991,	 Strathern	
1992,	1996),	 in	which	 individuals	are	 transformed	 through	 their	 interactions	with	
other	persons	and	things	outside	themselves	(Lambert	2000;	Hutchinson	2000).	
	
This	move	to	reconsider	kinship	through	the	study	of	persons	and	relatedness	has	
had	 particular	 salience	 in	 the	 Indian	 context	 where	 scholarship	 has	 sought	 to	
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complicate	 an	 emphasis	 on	 holism	 following	 Dumont’s	 (1980)	 work	 positing	
hierarchy	and	caste	as	 the	structuring	principles	 for	 Indian	society	(see	also	Parry	
1979	and	Srinivas	1962).	Itself	an	attempt	to	move	beyond	the	primacy	of	descent	in	
Indian	 kinship	 studies,	 Dumont’s	 approach	 was	 critiqued	 for	 applying	 Western	
dichotomies	 of	 individual	 and	 society	 not	 found	 in	 the	 local	 ethnographic	 context.	
Marriott’s	(1989)	“Indian	Ethnosocial”	approach	was	one	response,	which	suggested	
kinship	 in	South	Asia	 existed	within	 a	 context	of	 relations	 among	dividuals	 rather	
than	 individuals.	 Marriott	 stressed	 attending	 to	 local	 conceptions	 of	 persons	 to	
emphasize	“the	indivisibility	of	the	moral	and	the	biological	orders,	[and]	the	fluidity	
of	 biomoral	 substances”	 (Appadurai	 1986a:755)	 in	 South	 Asian	 societies.	 While	
anthropological	 scholarship	 on	 South	 Asia	 has	 taken	 a	 multitude	 of	 theoretical	
approaches	 (see	 Berger	 2012	 for	 an	 overview),	 literature	 on	 personhood	 in	 the	
region	has	expressed	the	complexity	and	plurality	of	concepts	of	the	person	across	
South	 Asia	 and	 their	mediation	 through,	 among	 other	 things,	 substance	 exchange	
(Busby	 1997,	 Osella	 &	 Osella	 1996),	 metaphysical	 categories	 (Kurin	 1984,	 1988),	
place	(Moore	1985,	Perin	1986),	age	(Lamb	2000),	and	the	various	interconnections	
among	 these	areas.	The	 literature	on	personhood	 from	South	Asia	has	encouraged	
ethnographic	analysis	to	seriously	consider	the	role	of	concepts	of	emotions,	bodies,	
and	objects	in	shaping	people	and	their	connection	to	others,	and	has	also	influenced	
analysis	of	the	ethnographic	material	presented	in	this	thesis.	
	
One	critique	of	South	Asian	scholarship	on	relatedness	has	been	connected	to	claims	
of	 representativeness.	That	 is,	while	 studies	on	various	 forms	of	personhood	have	
been	presented	as	typical	of	particular	categories	of	people,	such	as	Tamil	treatment	
of	 place	 as	 substance	 (Daniel	 1984)	 for	 example,	 such	 forms	 of	 relatedness	 are	
suggested	 to	 only	 exist	 or	 be	 practiced	 within	 the	 specific	 group	 with	 whom	
research	 was	 conducted	 (e.g.	 rural	 Sri	 Lankan	 Tamils)	 rather	 than	 indicative	 of	
forms	of	 relatedness	understood	within	 the	broader	category	(Clothey	1986).	This	
criticism	 might	 seem	 unfair,	 given	 ethnographic	 research	 is	 by	 its	 very	 nature	
situational	 and	 contingent	 (Rosaldo	 1993).	 However,	 it	 emphasizes	 the	 caution	
against	 romanticizing	 ideas	 of	 personhood	 (Strathern	 and	 Lambek	 1998)	 by	
attending	 to	 the	 social	 context	 that	 informs	 culturally‐bounded	 notions	 of	
personhood	 and	 relatedness,	 and	 through	 problematizing	 the	 dynamics	 between	
persons	and	groups	presented	by	those	with	whom	research	is	conducted.	
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A	second	critique	of	scholarship	on	relatedness	in	South	Asia	is	that	the	emphasis	on	
dividuals	 and	partability	has	overlooked	 the	 fact	people	 in	 South	Asia,	 like	people	
elsewhere,	do	see	themselves	as	individuals	while	also	relating	to	others	as	dividuals.	
It	is	argued	that	this	oversight	inadvertently	reproduces	outmoded	assumptions	that	
western	 notions	 of	 the	 person	 are	 somehow	 inherently	 different	 and	
incommensurate	 with	 those	 in	 India	 (Mokherjee	 2013;	 Rasmussen	 2008).	 This	
critique	echoes	anthropological	theory	on	the	self	that	demonstrates	individuals	can	
hold	 multiple,	 inconsistent,	 and	 incoherent	 notions	 of	 their	 self,	 while	
simultaneously	 considering	 and	 representing	 their	 self	 as	 whole,	 unitary,	 and	
consistent.	Anthropological	theory,	 it	 is	suggested,	must	take	this	fact	 into	account,	
moving	 past	 a	 dualist‐monist	 debate,	 and	 consider	 the	 significance	 of	 this	
phenomenon	 both	 contextually	 and	 comparatively	 across	 regions	 (Douglas	 1995;	
Ewing	1990;	Lambek	2013).	The	underlying	assumption	of	this	thesis	is	that	persons	
are	simultaneously	individuals	and	dividuals	and	that	various	forms	of	personhood	
recounted	 in	 anthropological	 research	 represent	 general	 human	ways	 of	 relating,	
and	 that	 this	 can	 be	 grasped	 through	 attending	 to	 the	 various	 ways	 people	 are	
constituted	as	persons	and	connected	to	others	around	them.	With	this	in	mind,	the	
thesis	endeavours	 to	understand	 the	multiplicity	of	 social	 relations	 through	which	
Afghans	in	Delhi	are	considered	to	belong	(or	not	belong)	in	the	city,	and	the	social	
significance	of	this	multiplicity.	
Personhood	and	Relatedness	in	Research	on	Afghanistan	
In	 exploring	 multiple	 ways	 Afghan	 migrants	 in	 Delhi	 are	 created	 as	 persons	 and	
connected	to	the	world	around	them,	including	but	not	limited	to	national	or	ethnic	
frameworks,	 this	 thesis	 follows	 historical	 and	 recent	 trends	 in	 ethnographic	
research	 that,	 contrary	 to	 the	 depictions	 of	 Afghan	 society	 referenced	 above,	
illustrate	a	dynamism	and	creativeness	in	social	organization	in	Afghanistan.	
	
As	 indicated	 above,	 pre‐1979	 ethnography	 sought	 to	 understand	 changes	 within	
tribal	 systems	 resulting	 from	development	 and	 expansion	 of	 the	 centralized	 state.	
While	this	assumes	social	organization	preceding	state	consolidation	was	static,	the	
very	documentation	of	change	suggests	that	meanings	and	forms	of	social	relations	
within	 tribes	 were	 anything	 but	 static,	 affected	 by	 economic	 and	 political	
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circumstances.	Nancy	Tapper’s	(1991)	work	on	a	Durrani	Pashtun	tribe	in	Northern	
Afghanistan,	 depicts	 how	 population	 increase,	 competition	 over	 farm‐land,	 and	
introduction	 of	 a	 cash	 economy	 disrupted	 traditional	 modes	 of	 exchange	 and	
inheritance,	 resulting	 in	 the	 social	 stratification	 of	 an	 otherwise	 egalitarian	 social	
group,	 the	 deterioration	 of	 agnatic	 relations,	 and	 the	 confusion	 of	 meanings	 in	 a	
complex	 system	 of	 marriage	 that	 negatively	 impacted	 women’s	 role	 in	 social	
organization.	 Barfield	 (1981)17	and	 Anderson’s	 (1978)	 respective	 research	 with	
ethnic	Arab	pastoralists	 in	northern	Afghanistan	and	Ghilzai	Pashtuns	 in	 southern	
Afghanistan,	 shows	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 cash‐based	 economy	 changed	 modes	 of	
production	 and	 created	 social	 stratification	 whereby	 richer	 clans	 or	 individuals	
obtained	 greater	 access	 to	 cash	 for	 investment	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 poorer	
counterparts.	 Among	 the	 Arabs,	 the	 near	 abandonment	 of	 migration	 for	 settled	
ranching	is	shown	to	have	divided	poorer	and	richer	clans,	with	the	former	reducing	
their	 dependence	 on	 and	 identification	 with	 the	 clan	 while	 peasantization	
entrenched	the	latter’s	ethnic	identity.	Similarly,	among	the	Ghilzai,	the	switch	from	
irrigation	to	dry	farming	and	the	consequent	change	in	labour	requirements	from	is	
demonstrated	 to	 have	 jeopardized	 the	 traditional	 structure	 of	 relations	 between	
khans	 and	 sharecropping	 tribesmen,	 engendered	 sharp	 economic	 inequality,	 and	
decreased	 tribal	 solidarity.	 Though	 these	 ethnographies	 assume	 a	 static	 tribal	
system	that	is	changing	in	response	to	state	modernization,	they	demonstrate	by	the	
very	fact	tribal	and	clan	identities	are	changing	that	the	category	of	tribe	or	clan	is	
not	 itself	 necessarily	 self‐evident	 or	 given,	 but	 rather	 constructed	 and	maintained	
(see	Sneath	2007	for	a	broader	critique	of	the	concept	of	‘tribe’).	
	
Similarly,	 post‐1979	 ethnography’s	 focus	 on	 ethnic	 identity	 to	 grasp	 the	 political	
situation	 Afghanistan	 treats	 ethnicity	 as	 a	 discrete	 category	 assumed	 to	 be	 of	
primacy	in	identity	construction	(Shahrani	and	Canfield	1984;	Digard	1988;	Orywal	
1986).	 The	 ethnographic	material	 presented,	 however,	 illustrates	 that	 rather	 than	
being	based	purely	on	descent	or	 lineage,	ethnic	groups	 in	Afghanistan	are	formed	
through	 a	multiplicity	 of	 processes	 such	 as	 shared	 regional,	 economic,	 or	 political	
history	 (Janata	1986),	 as	a	 result	of	 social	exclusion	 (Rao	1986,	1988),	or	 through	
external	 influence	 including	 academic	 research	 (Ovesen	 1986;	 R	 Tapper	 1988).	
																																																								
17	Barfield’s	work	reflects	a	wider	debate	at	the	time	on	integration	of	nomads	in	the	region	into	the	
state	(see	Tapper	1983).	
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Concepts	of	 ethnicity	 and	 religion	are	 shown	 to	 affect	one	another,	 and	 to	 also	be	
influenced	 by	 external	 political	 factors	 (Canfield	 1988;	 Roy	 1988;	 Tapper	 1988).	
Particularly,	with	 regard	 to	political	organization,	 ethnic	and	 religious	 identity	are	
shown	to	have	an	ambiguous	relationship,	where	they	are	sometimes	coeval	and,	at	
other	 times,	 predicated	 upon	 one	 another	 (Canfield	 1984,	 1988;	 Anderson	 1984).		
Both	 are	 depicted	 as	 moral	 categories	 essential	 to	 ideas	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	
Afghan	 and	 thus	 as	 categories	 deployed	 in	 political	 language	 (Anderson	 1984;	
Newell	1986;	Roy	1986).		Their	inherent	ambiguity,	thus	allows	for	the	possibility	of	
political	 cooperation,	 as	 in	 the	 case	of	 fighting	 foreign	 forces,	 but	 also	 for	 internal	
conflict	to	arise	over	differing	understandings	of	moral	authority	(Centlivres	1980;	
Roy	1988;	Shahrani	1984).	Again,	primacy	is	given	to	a	state‐level	perspective	where	
differences	in	concepts,	forms,	and	bases	of	ethnic	identity	are	depicted	as	part	of	a	
wider	pattern	 connecting	people	 through	a	 language	of	 common	origin	or	 culture,	
place,	 and	 religious	 affiliation	 (Tapper	 1988),	 but	 the	 ethnographic	 material	 also	
demonstrates	the	plasticity	of	ethnic	terminology,	its	application,	and	ascription.	
	
As	 mentioned	 above,	 Frederik	 Barth’s	 work	 on	 Pathans 18 	in	 Pakistan	 and	
Afghanistan	presents	a	different	view	of	Pashtun	society	 from	other	 studies	of	 the	
time.	 Barth	 (1959a,	 1969)	 provides	 a	 descriptive	 analysis	 of	 the	 socio‐political	
organization	 of	 Swat	 Pathans	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 ecological	 variation,	migration,	
and	 interaction	 with	 other	 groups	 has	 resulted	 in	 variations	 in	 organization	 and	
identity	 among	 Pathan	 groups.	 Barth’s	 attention	 to	 difference	 and	 variability	 is	 a	
result	 of	 his	 transactionalist	 approach,	 which	 focuses	 on	 individual	 social	 actors	
making	 choices	 based	 on	 personal	 economic	 and	 political	 gain.	 Contrary	 to	 the	
dominant	themes	in	scholarship	on	Afghanistan	at	the	time,	Barth’s	(1981)	research	
argues	 that	 migration	 both	 changes	 Pathan	 identity	 and	 also	 extends	 it	 to	 non‐
Pathans,	and	that	this	 is	possible	since,	among	the	Pathans,	political	allegiance	is	a	
																																																								
18	In	this	case,	‘Pathan’	can	be	interchanged	with	‘Pashtun’	as	a	term	used	mainly	by	the	British	Indian	
state	 and	 those	 living	under	 it.	Hanifi	 (2011)	discusses	 how	 “the	 variety	 of	 geographic,	 social,	 and	
political	 components,	 distinctions,	 and	 relations	 among	 the	 terms	 Afghan,	 Pashtun,	 and	 Pathan…	
[make	 it]	 neither	 accurate	 nor	 productive	 to	 impose	 neat	 and	 clear	 divisions	 among	 Afghans,	
Pashtuns,	 and	 Pathans”	 (22).	 The	 difficulty	 in	 isolating	 a	 definition	 for	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘Pathan’	 in	
historical	 records	 from	the	nineteenth	and	 twentieth	centuries	 is	also	discussed	by	Nichols	 (2008)	
and	Sherman	(2011).	Barth’s	(1969)	discussion	of	Pathan	identity	is	essentially	a	discussion	of	how	
this	 difference	 can	 exist	 with	 individuals	 still	 holding	 concrete	 identities	 of	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	
Pathan.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	 have	 used	 the	words	people	 I	worked	with	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 themselves	 or	
others,	 which	 generally	 were	 ‘Afghan’	 and	 ‘Pashtun’,	 and	 have	 strived	 to	 explain	 the	meanings	 in	
context.	
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matter	 of	 individual	 choice.	 Barth	 suggests	 that	 this	 ‘freedom	 of	 choice’	 among	
Pathans	where	“individuals	are	able	to	make	choices	in	terms	of	private	advantage	
and	personal	political	career…	resembles	that	of	Western	[sic]	societies”(1959a:2).	
	
Barth’s	 statement	 that	 the	 Pathans’	 freedom	 of	 choice	 “resembles”	 that	 of	
individuals	in	‘Western’	society	might	not	be	well	received	today	with	regard	to	its	
seeming	western‐centricism.	Yet,	considered	in	light	of	the	prevailing	research	at	the	
time,	it	appears	more	in	line	with	the	research	on	personhood	cited	above.	Barth	has,	
however,	 also	 been	 criticized	 for	 this	 view	 and	 for	 being	 reductionist	 and	 euro‐
centric	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 Swat	 Pathan	 society	 (Asad	 1972).	 His	 work	 on	 Swat	
Pathans	has	been	faulted	for	following	Dumont	in	effectively	“imposing	a	Brahmin’s	
eye‐view	of	the	world	on	entire	Hindu	society”	(Ahmed	1976:31)	and	conflating	the	
experience	of	Yusufzai	Pathans	in	a	particular	historical‐political	context	with	that	of	
Pathans	as	a	whole,	 ignoring	the	larger	religious‐cultural	patterns	connecting	Swat	
Pathans	and	their	 ideas	of	 the	person	to	the	wider	region	and	the	broader	Muslim	
world	(84‐5).	
	
Considering	Barth’s	work	 in	 light	 of	wider	 research	 on	personhood	 in	 South	Asia,	
however,	one	can	consider	both	his	perspective	and	those	of	his	critics	as	presenting	
differing	 visions	 of	 Pathan	 society	 that	 represent	 a	 contemporaneous	 plurality	 of	
how	the	relationship	between	group	and	individual	can	be	understood	in	a	society.	
Indeed,	 Barth’s	 work	 on	 Pathan	 identity	 has	 made	 critical	 contributions	 to	
anthropological	 discussions	 on	 ethnic	 identity,	 politics,	 and	 state‐formation.	 His	
focus	on	the	individual	as	well	as	the	group,	and	his	acknowledgement	of	complexity	
and	 variation	 in	 how	 individuals	 understand	 their	 place	 in	 Swat	 society,	 is	 being	
returned	 to	 by	 researchers	 in	 the	 region	 today	 in	 light	 of	 regional	 attempts	 to	
“theorize	 and	 develop	 a	 conceptual	 language	 to	 address	 issues	 important	 to	 the	
places	and	people	[studied],	[and]	to	ask	and	frame	questions	of	broader	historical	
and	societal	significance”	(Hopkins	and	Marsden	2013:3‐4).	
	
In	the	context	of	the	material	considered	in	this	thesis,	it	is	Barth’s	attention	to	social	
complexity	in	an	urban	context,	epitomized	in	his	ethnographic	work	in	Oman	that	is	
instructive.	Barth’s	(1983)	ethnographic	account	of	the	Omani	coastal	town	of	Sohar	
illustrates	how	in	this	cosmopolitan	urban	context,	individuals	are	ascribed	and	take	
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on	multiple	social	identities	that	connect	them	to	a	variety	of	social	groups	that	are	
differentially	connected	or	excluded	from	one	another.	Barth	depicts	this	complexity	
as	a	 fact	of	urban	 life	and	posits	 that	 an	examination	of	 the	ways	 in	which	people	
manage	 this	 complexity	 reveals	 underlying	 tensions	 and	 characteristics	 specific	 to	
the	social	context	of	urban	life.	
	
It	 is	 in	 this	 spirit	 that	 the	 thesis	 explores	Afghan	being	and	belonging	 in	Delhi.	As	
mentioned	 in	 the	 preceding	 chapter,	 the	 research	 question	 driving	 the	 thesis	was	
arrived	at	 through	thinking	through	the	plurality	of	experiences	and	sentiments	of	
belonging	 expressed	 by	 Afghan	 migrants	 I	 worked	 with	 in	 Delhi.	 Literature	 on	
Afghanistan	 and	 Afghans,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 reveals	 a	 similar	 plurality,	
encouraging	 consideration	 of	 the	 categories	 of	 group,	 individual,	 and	 nation,	 the	
varying	 and	 contradictory	 relations	 between	 them,	 and	 the	 implications	 or	
significance	 of	 this	 plurality.	 The	 ethnographic	 chapters	 in	 this	 thesis	 do	 this	 by	
problematizing	the	national	lens	in	framing	belonging	(chapters	three	through	six),	
complicating	 the	 idea	 of	 community	 as	 a	 given	 and	 primary	 unit	 of	 identification	
(chapters	six),	and	questioning	whether	multiple	or	contradictory	frames	of	identity	
necessarily	lead	to	‘incoherence’	(chapters	four	and	five).	The	thesis	reiterates	that	
Afghans	 can	hold	multiple	 ideas	of	 being	and	belonging,	 but	 suggests	 this	 is	not	 a	
trait	 particular	 to	 Afghans	 rather	 than	 part	 of	 the	 human	 condition.	 The	 question	
remains	 as	 to	 what	 the	 significance	 of	 this	 plurality	 is,	 what	 does	 it	 serve	 to	
recognize	it,	and	how	does	one	go	about	doing	so?	Within	the	context	of	this	thesis,	it	
is	 argued	 that	 significance	 of	 the	multiple	 ways	 Afghans	 belong	 in	 Delhi	 must	 be	
understood	with	regard	 to	scale.	 In	 the	next	section,	 I	discuss	more	concretely	 the	
theoretical	orientation	to	multiplicity	and	scale	taken	in	this	thesis.	
2.3 Thinking	through	Multiplicity	and	Scale	
The	 anthropological	 literature	 on	 Afghanistan	 and	 on	 personhood	 in	 South	 Asia	
presents	a	dilemma	of	categorization.	On	the	one	hand	ethnographic	research	must	
consider	the	existence	of	groups,	 tribes,	community,	nation,	etc.	 that	hold	meaning	
for	the	people	and	contexts	within	which	research	is	conducted.	On	the	other,	these	
categories	 are	 contingent	 formations	within	 a	multiplicity	 of	 possibilities	within	 a	
given	context.	Thus,	for	example,	while	the	deployment	of	a	discrete	ethnic	identity	
in	 political	 discourse	 may	 be	 explanatory	 of	 political	 events	 and	 situations,	 its	
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analysis	 as	 an	 ethnographic	 artefact	 yields	 it	 pliable	 and	 inconstant.	 The	 forgoing	
discussion	 has	 considered	 how	 anthropological	 research	 in	 the	 region	 has	
approached	 this	 multiplicity	 of	 categories	 from	 different	 perspectives,	 providing	
diverging	views	on	community,	individual,	and	the	relationship	between	them.	This	
thesis	takes	this	multiplicity	of	views	into	consideration	in	order	to	understand	what	
it	means	to	be	Afghan	in	Delhi	and	how	Afghans	belong	in	the	city.	In	developing	a	
theoretical	 approach	 to	 thinking	 through	 multiplicity	 within	 my	 own	 research,	 I	
have	turned	to	anthropological	work	on	ontology	and	morality.	
Ontological	Multiplicity	
Anthropology	has	perhaps	dealt	with	questions	of	ontology	ab	initio,	 but	 the	 recent	
‘ontological	 turn’	 within	 the	 discipline	 presents	 a	 constructive	 avenue	 of	 thinking	
through	multiplicity	in	how	persons	are	constituted.	Debate	is	on‐going	on	the	value	
of	this	turn.	Some	argue	it	presents	a	critical	approach	that	has	rejuvenated	the	field’s	
position	 to	 tackle	 the	 political	 (Hage	 2012),	 that	 it	 is	 a	 contemporary	 attempt	 at	
reworking	older	concepts	such	as	 ‘culture’	or	 ‘society’	(Carrithers	et	al	2010),	that	it	
dangerously	approaches	a	 former	essentialist	 stance	within	anthropology	 (Vigh	and	
Sausdal	 2014),	 or	 that	 despite	 presenting	 engaging	 ethnographic	 material	 its	
theoretical	manoeuvres	and	underlying	arguments	are	not	always	cogent	or	necessary	
(Heywood	2012;	Laidlaw	2012).	I	am	in	agreement	with	much	of	the	critique	of	the	
ontological	 turn,	 however,	 following	 Navaro‐Yashin’s	 advice	 to	 think	 “against	 the	
grain	of	‘ruination’	in	being	anti‐,	trans‐,	or	multi‐paradigmatic”	(2009:17),	I	proceed	
below	to	consider	how	this	turn	can	also	present	a	useful	perspective	to	think	through	
multiplicity.	In	particular,	it	provides	a	useful	avenue	to	think	of	persons	and	objects	
as	simultaneously	multiple	just	not	cognitively,	but	also	materially.	
	
Rather	than	a	unified	movement,	the	ontological	turn	presents	a	number	of	different	
strands	of	research	(for	an	overview	see	Scott	2007:3‐5).	The	different	approaches	
within	 the	 turn	 are	 represented	 by	 Henare	 et	al	 (2007)	 as	 sharing	 roots	 in	 the	
reflexive	turn	of	the	1980s	and	90s	and	cultivating	a	methodological	and	theoretical	
position	 to	 approach	 ethnographic	 artefacts	without	a	priori	 assumptions,	 to	 shift	
analytic	 focus	 from	 epistemology	 to	 ontology,	 and	 to	 thus	 create	 new	 analytical	
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concepts	 within	 the	 discipline19.	 Over	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 this	 scholarship	 has	
primarily	 theorized	 indigenous	 peoples’	 ontological	 schemata	 to	 various	 ends	
including,	 among	 others,	 considering	 the	 role	 of	 ontological	 differences	 in	 conflict	
(Povinelli	2002),	developing	comparative	typologies	from	different	regions	(Descola	
2012),	 and	 drawing	 attention	 to	 cognitive	 or	 epistemological	 implications	 of	
indigenous	ways	of	being	(Pedersen	2007;	Viveiros	de	Castro	2012).	
	
It	is	perhaps	the	perspectivist	approach	(Holbraad	and	Willerslev	2007;	Viveiros	de	
Castro	 2004)	 that	 garners	 both	 ire	 and	 appreciation	 for	 the	 ontological	 turn.	
Building	theoretically	on	Amerindian	ontology,	perspectivism	is	put	 forward	by	 its	
proponents	as	a	response	to	the	dualistic,	multicultural	anthropological	approach	in	
which	different	cultural	representations	are	considered	to	refer	to	a	unitary	natural	
world.	 Perspectivists	 seek	 to	 eliminate	 this	 distance	 between	 nature	 and	
representation,	 suggesting	 in	 effect	 that	 different	 representations	 are	
incommensurate	 not	 epistemologically	 but	 ontologically.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 it	 is	 not	
through	 multiple	 worldviews	 that	 a	 world	 is	 inhabited,	 but	 rather	 that	 people	
inhabit	multiple	worlds	which	they	know	through	a	consistent	manner	(Henare	et	al	
2007:7‐14).	 The	 move	 to	 collapse	 representation	 and	 nature	 is	 a	 political	 one.	
Viveiros	 de	 Castro	 acknowledges	 as	 much	 in	 setting	 the	 contours	 for	 this	
anthropological	approach	as	“(a)	a	theory	of	peoples’	ontological	autodetermination	
and	(b)	a	practice	of	the	permanent	decolonization	of	thought”	(2011:128).	This	is	in	
essence	advocating	a	position	for	taking	seriously	the	ontological	propositions	of	all	
‘peoples’,	 which	 in	 the	 case	 of	 most	 writing	 in	 the	 ontological	 turn	 are	 generally	
indigenous	peoples.	
	
One	 might	 question	 if	 this	 is	 not	 actually	 what	 researchers,	 like	 Evans‐Pritchard	
(1965),	Dumont	(1980),	or	Schneider	(1980)	for	example,	do	in	differing	ways?	The	
distinction	 lies	 in	 the	second	proposition	of	decolonization	of	 thought.	Viveiros	de	
Castro	 (2003)	 avers	 that	 the	 multicultural	 perspective	 instates	 an	 “ontological	
monarchy”	under	the	rubric	of	an	“epistemological	democracy”	by	placing:	
“the	anthropologist	and	the	native	on	an	equal	footing,	inasmuch	as	it	implies	
that	 the	 anthropologist’s	 knowledge	 of	 other	 cultures	 is	 itself	 culturally	
																																																								
19	Such	 as	 Holbraad’s	 (2012)	 concept	 of	 ontography	 as	 process	 of	 identifying	 emergent	 truth,	 or	
Viveiros	de	Castro’s	(2004)	work	on	perspectival	anthropology	and	radical	alterity.	
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mediated…	 this	 sense	 of	 equality	 is	 simply	 empirical	 or	 de	 facto,	 since	 it	
refers	 to	 the	 common	 (or	 generic)	 cultural	 condition	 of	 the	 anthropologist	
and	the	native.	However,	their	differently	constituted	relationships	with	their	
respective	 cultures…	 are	 such	 that	 this	 de	 facto	 sense	 of	 equality	 does	 not	
imply	an	equality	de	jure	–	that	is,	an	equality	with	regard	to	their	respective	
claims	 to	 knowledge.	 The	 anthropologist	 tends	 to	 have	 an	 epistemological	
advantage	 over	 the	 native.	 Their	 respective	 discourses	 are	 situated	 on	
different	 planes…	 much	 of	 what	 goes,	 or	 has	 gone,	 by	 the	 name	 of	
anthropology	turns	on	the	contrary	assumption	that	the	anthropologist	has	a	
privileged	grasp	of	the	reason	for	the	native’s	reasons	–	reasons	to	which	the	
native’s	reasonings	are	oblivious”	(2013:475‐6).	
By	 positing	 the	 ontological	 equivalence	 of	 the	 anthropologists	 and	 the	 ‘native’s’	
perspective,	 ethnographic	 perspectivism	 attempts	 to	 answer	 the	 problem	 of	
representation	–	an	 issue	at	 the	crux	of	debates	 in	scholarship	on	Afghanistan	and	
South	Asia	discussed	above	–	by	claiming	“de	jure”	equality	between	discourses.	
	
In	asserting	ontological	diversity,	perspectivists	draw	attention	to	the	multiplicity	of	
materiality	 that	 differs	 from	 and	 complements	 considerations	 within	
anthropological	 work	 on	 ethics	 and	 morality	 (discussed	 further	 below).	 The	
simultaneous	multiplicity	of	the	material	world	that	the	ontological	turn	recognizes	
is	 of	 benefit	 when	 considering	 the	 personhood	 of	 Afghan	 migrants	 in	 Delhi.	 For	
example,	 taking	 the	 Afghan	 migrant	 as	 an	 ethnographic	 artefact	 as	 is	 done	 in	
chapters	three	through	five,	one	can	describe	various	levels	at	which	the	migrant	is	
constituted	 as	 a	 person	 by	 the	 UNHCR,	 religious	 groups,	 transnational	 corporate	
networks,	etc.	The	physical	and	ideational	relations	inhering	in	and	constituting	this	
‘object’	differ	at	the	various	scales.	Yet,	this	fact	does	not	render	the	Afghan	migrant	
as	 multiple	 persons.	 The	 migrant	 remains	 a	 singular	 Afghan	 migrant	 constituted	
materially	 and	 ideationally	 by	 multiple,	 simultaneous,	 and	 potentially	 divergent	
processes.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	 ethnographic	 chapters	 below,	 this	 is	 not	 a	 passive	
process;	rather,	migrants	are	aware	of	and	engage	with	these	various	processes	 in	
cultivating	 a	 sense	 of	 who	 they	 are.	 Against	 assertions	 of	 moral	 incoherence	
described	above,	one	can	thus	understand	how	a	migrant	who	is	a	unitary	artefact	
can	be	apprehended	materially	and	relationally	in	a	diversity	of	ways,	but	how	this	
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does	not	necessarily	imply	an	experience	of	incoherence	more	than	an	experience	of	
ontological	complexity.	
	
A	perspectivist	would	likely	balk	at	the	above	description	of	the	Afghan	migrant	as	
an	 ethnographic	 artefact,	 arguing	 that	 it	 returns	 to	 asserting	 the	 unity	 of	 nature	
understood	 through	 multiple	 epistemologies	 and	 that	 one	 cannot	 experience	
ontological	multiplicity	 due	 to	 radical	 ontological	 alterity.	 The	 assertion	 of	 radical	
alterity	 thus	marks	 the	 limit	of	perspectivist	 theory	 for	 this	 thesis.	Though	 radical	
alterity	 might	 be	 a	 possibility,	 it	 is	 conceptually	 unproductive	 for	 ethnographic	
thought	 as	 by	 its	 nature	 the	 existence	 of	 radical	 alterity	 cannot	 be	 recognized	 or	
communicated.	 The	 claim	 that	 ontological	 difference	 is	 absolute	 to	 the	 extent	
individuals	cannot	grasp	another’s	ontology	assumes	(i)	that	a	person	understands	
him	 or	 herself	 within	 a	 sole	 ontological	 framework,	 (ii)	 that	 there	 are	 distinct	
ontologies	possessed	by	 ‘peoples’	such	as	Amerindians,	Mongolian	Shamans,	Euro‐
Americans,	etc.,	and	(iii)	that	these	ontologies	are	defined	by	radical	difference.	
	
My	 position	 draws	 on	 Keane’s	 (2009)	 argument	 that	 while	 the	 move	 to	 take	
ontological	 multiplicity	 seriously	 is	 productive	 in	 demonstrating	 how	 material	
things	not	only	exceed	concepts	but	also	exist	across	different	concepts,	times,	etc.,	
the	assertion	of	radical	alterity	folds	these	concepts	inwards,	effectively	reasserting	
a	 stable	 essence	 to	 the	 object.	 	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 perspectivist	 position	 repeats	 a	
similar	move	to	the	assertion	of	essentialized	ideas	of	Indian	personhood	or	Afghan	
identity	 that	 render	 the	 individual	 interlocutor	 invisible	 amidst	 a	 generalized	
whole20.	 The	 presentation	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	 ethnographic	material	 in	 this	 thesis	
endeavours	 to	 retain	 the	 ontological	 complexity	 related	 in	 Afghan	 migrants’	
experience	in	Delhi	without	making	this	reductionist	theoretical	move.	
	 	 	
The	question	still	remains,	however,	as	to	how	to	apprehend	ethnographic	subjects	
that	 exist	 within	 multiple	 ontological	 systems?	Within	 the	 ontological	 turn,	 there	
have	been	recent	 theoretical	moves	to	consider	conceptual	proximities	of	radically	
different	 ontologies	 existing	 in	 tandem	 (Fontein	 2011)	 that	 suggest	 rather	 than	
																																																								
20	A	 perspectivist	 might	 insist,	 however,	 that	 to	 describe	 a	 particular	 ontology	 as	 Amerindian	 for	
example,	 is	not	 to	essentialize	all	native	peoples	 in	 the	Americas,	but	 rather	 to	deploy	a	necessary	
synecdoche	for	theorization	of	the	possibility	of	alternative	ontologies	(Viveiros	de	Castro	2012:62‐
63).	
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thinking	of	ontologies	as	typologically	distinct,	one	can	conceive	of	a	state	of	“poly‐
ontology”	 or	 “small‐scale	 mono‐ontologies”	 (Scott	 2007:15)	 where	 binaries	 of	
mind/body,	 essentialist/non‐dualist,	 etc.	 come	 to	 be	 combined	 in	 variegated	
configurations	 (Scott	 in	 Venkatesan	 et	 al	 2011:306‐308).	 Candea’s	 (2010)	
ethnography	 on	 Corsican	 identity	 is	 particularly	 attentive	 to	 the	 tension	 between	
alterity	and	sameness.	Candea	draws	on	work	within	the	ontological	turn	to	develop	
an	idea	of	ontological	openness,	illustrating	how	people’s	thinking	about,	achieving,	
or	 maintaining	 notions	 of	 sameness	 and	 difference	 on	 the	 island	 is	 always	
contingent,	 partial,	 and	 incomplete.	 He	 pays	 particular	 attention	 to	 how	 people	
interact	 through	 everyday	 management	 of	 things,	 others,	 and	 languages	 within	
particular	 epistemological	 and	 institutional	 frameworks.	 In	 this	 sense,	 his	
ethnography	 can	 also	 be	 understood	 as	 an	 enquiry	 into	 the	 ethical	 practices	 of	
developing	an	idea	of	belonging	in	Corsica.	Where	the	ontological	turn	has	attended	
to	 difference	 at	 the	 level	 of	 groups,	 anthropological	 discussion	 on	 morality	 and	
ethics	 has	 considered	 how	 individuals	manage	 the	messiness,	 contradictions,	 and	
difficulties	of	being	in	the	world,	and	thus	provides	theoretical	and	methodological	
models	for	considering	individual	experience	of	ontological	multiplicity.	
Morality,	Ethics,	and	Multiplicity	
Morality	and	ethics	can	be	seen	as	continuous	concerns	in	anthropological	research	
to	the	extent	the	discipline	has	sought	to	explore	local	conceptions	of	the	person	and	
the	 attendant	moral	 values	 (Durkheim	1953;	 Evans‐Pritchard	1970;	 Fortes	 1987).	
As	with	ontology,	 the	 last	 two	decades	have	witnessed	what	some	have	termed	an	
‘ethical	 turn’	 within	 the	 discipline	 (Laidlaw	 2014;	 Zigon	 and	 Throop	 2014).	
Contributions	 to	 this	 theoretical	 turn	 have	 come	 in	 large	 part	 from	 within	 the	
anthropological	 study	 of	 religion	 and	 attempts	 to	 reconsider	 categorization	 and	
analytical	 approach	 (Asad	 1986,	 1993;	 Laidlaw	 1995),	 individual	 reflection	 and	
creativity	in	practice	(Marsden	2005,	2007),	and	the	role	of	religion	in	social	change	
(Robbins	2004,	2007).	Building	from	philosophical	work	on	ethics,	the	studies	have	
proffered	varying	definitions	of	morality	and	ethics,	with	some	preferring	one	term	
as	a	subset	of	the	other	(Lambek	2010)	and	others	making	a	distinction	between	the	
embodied	 moral	 ways	 of	 being	 in	 the	 world	 and	 the	 reflexive	 practices	 through	
which	individuals	consider	and	determine	what	it	means	to	be	a	moral	person	in	this	
world	(Laidlaw	2002;	Zigon	2007,	2008).	Once	again,	it	is	not	an	aim	of	this	thesis	to	
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engage	 in	 an	 evaluation	 of	 the	 theoretical	 turn.	 Rather	 the	 thesis	 draws	 on	
anthropological	 work	 on	 ethics	 and	 morality	 to	 develop	 an	 analytical	 approach,	
focused	 on	 persons	 creatively	 accounting	 for	 their	 self	 through	 interactions,	
practices,	 and	 reflections.	 In	 this	way,	 research	 on	 ethics	 and	morality	 provides	 a	
methodological	 approach	 for	 identifying	 the	 conceptual	 considerations	 taken	 from	
work	on	ontology.	
	
Those	 writing	 within	 the	 ethical	 turn	 have	 moved	 from	 considering	 morality	 as	
merely	coterminous	with	normative	social	behaviour,	to	thinking	through	morality	
and	 ethics	 as	 specific	 experiential	 modalities	 within	 everyday	 life.	 In	 doing	 so,	
scholarship	has	approached	the	subject	of	morality	primarily	 through	examination	
of	 individuals	 and	 how	 they	 create	 relationships	 between	 “various	 constituent	
elements	 of	 the	 self	 (body,	 reason,	 emotion,	 volition,	 and	 so	 on)”	 (Mahmood	
2003:846)	that	are	structured	within	local	discourses	of	authority	(Mahmood	2003),	
local	 and	 transnational	 political	 and	 social	 environments	 (Deeb	 2006,	 2009;	
Mahmood	 2005),	 epistemologies	 (Hirschkind	 2001,	 2006),	 and	 with	 specific	
intentions	 of	 creating	 not	 just	 individual	 but	 also	 social	 change	 (Anderson	 2011;	
Haniffa	2008).	Far	 from	presenting	 individuals	as	exclusively	dedicated	to	creating	
themselves	within	a	single	coherent	discursive	framework,	however,	scholarship	has	
demonstrated	 how	 individuals	 hold	 multiple	 conflicting	 conceptions	 of	 the	 self	
simultaneously	 (Marsden	 2008,	 2009b;	 Schielke	 2009)	 and	 deploy	 or	 enact	
particular	 subjectivities	 creatively	 and	 purposefully	 according	 to	 social	 contexts	
(Marsden	 2007;	 Rasanayagam	 2006),	 choosing	 and	 adhering	 to	 a	 multiplicity	 of	
conflicting	 moral	 values	 in	 developing	 moral	 selves	 with	 a	 degree	 of	 freedom	
structured	by	the	many	frameworks	coexisting	within	a	given	context	(Howell	1997;	
Laidlaw	 1995).	 Scholarship	 further	 illustrates	 that	 personhood	 is	 created	 not	 just	
through	discourse,	but	also	through	social	experience	that	an	individual	considers	as	
moral	(Marsden	2005;	Rasanayagam	2010).	The	process	through	which	individuals	
create	 themselves	 as	 moral	 persons	 is	 thus	 shown	 to	 be	 executed	 against	 a	
background	of	 ambiguity	 and	of	 struggling	 to	 adjust	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 an	ever‐
changing	world	(Louw	2006;	Schielke	2009).	
	
In	 this	way,	research	on	morality	and	ethics	provides	a	useful	way	of	conceptually	
thinking	 through	 how	 individuals	 can	 consider	 the	 different	 ontological	 and	
	 51
discursive	 frames	 within	 which	 they	 exist	 without	 succumbing	 to	 ‘moral	
incoherence’.	 But	 how	 can	 one	 apprehend	 the	 manoeuvres	 through	 which	
individuals	 navigate	 this	 complexity?	 Scholarship	 suggests	 ethical	 considerations	
can	 be	 found	 implicitly	 in	 individuals’	 everyday	 practices	 of	 speech	 and	 action	
(Lambek	 2010);	 in	moments	where	 individuals	 actively	 reflect	 on	 their	 self	 as	 an	
object,	on	their	present	and	desired	condition,	and	on	the	means	to	connect	the	two	
(Faubion	2001;	Laidlaw	2002;	Zigon	2010);	and	 in	 intersubjective	relations	where	
universal	values	are	experienced	or	deployed	in	particular	settings	(Kleinman	1999;	
Rasanayagam	 2010).	 In	 calling	 attention	 to	 the	 fact	 ethical	 events	 require	
communication,		Lempert	(2013)	further	suggests	that	attention	should	be	given	to	
the	 communicative	 methods	 and	 work	 individuals	 engage	 in	 to	 make	 ethics	
recognizable	and	effective	in	interactions.	
	
Taking	 these	 various	 reflections	 that	 locate	 ethics	 in	 practice,	 Keane	 (2014)	 puts	
forward	an	ethnographic	approach	to	exploring	ethics	 in	everyday	 interaction.	For	
Keane,	ethics	is	always	emergent,	so	that	in	making	ethical	evaluations	and	decisions,	
people	inventively	draw	on	existing	cultural	vocabularies	with	regard	to	aspects	of	
their	 own	 experiences	 or	 those	 of	 others	 around	 them,	 as	 well	 as	 from	 their	
surroundings.	 Keane	 suggests	 that	 these	 ‘affordances’	 lie	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 social	
interaction	 and	 can	 be	 apprehended	 ethnographically	 in	 instances	 of	 giving	 an	
account	 of	 oneself	 or	 others	 through	 the	 social	 dynamics	 of	 conversation	 and	 the	
propensity	 to	 seek	out	others’	 intentions.	He	emphasizes	 that	verbal	 interaction	 is	
not	merely	 a	 cognitive	 practice	where	 the	 self	 is	 formed	 discursively.	 Rather,	 the	
very	palpability	of	social	interaction	and	its	mediated	forms,	which	compel,	provide,	
or	 demand	 actors	 to	 give	 an	 account,	 are	 affective	 and	 must	 thus	 be	 considered	
materially	as	well	as	cognitively.	This	thesis	follows	Keane’s	approach	in	seeking	to	
understand	the	multiplicity	of	what	it	means	to	be	Afghan	in	Delhi	and	how	Afghans	
belong	in	the	city	by	examining	how	emotions,	bodies,	and	technology	are	involved	
in	 ‘giving	an	account’	of	migrants	within	 institutional	perspectives	(chapter	three),	
individual	narratives	(chapters	four	and	five),	and	practices	of	community	(chapter	
six).	
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Bringing	Perspectives	in	Scale	
Before	continuing	to	the	ethnographic	chapters,	it	is	necessary	to	comment	briefly	on	
the	 idea	 of	 scale.	 I	 draw	 on	 Strathern’s	 (1995,	 2013)	 conceptualization	 of	 scale	 in	
writing	ethnography	as	(i)	an	ordering	of	knowledge	and	(ii)	a	measure	of	magnitude.	
In	the	first	instance,	scale	can	be	understood	as	the	“organization	of	perspectives	on	
objects	of	knowledge	and	enquiry”	(Strathern	1991:xvi).	While	this	could	be	seen	to	
suggest	an	infinite	set	of	orderings	through	which	to	consider	ethnographic	material	
(see	 Holbraad	 and	 Pedersen	 2009),	 this	 thesis	 specifically	 attends	 to	 three	
interrelated	 scales	of	 the	 state,	 the	 individual,	 and	 the	 community.	These	are	 scales	
that	were	referenced	by	the	migrants	with	whom	I	worked	and	I	am	aware	they	are	as	
much	 socially	 produced	 as	 they	 are	 also	 constitutive	 of	migrants’	 understanding	 of	
their	 place	 in	 the	world	 (Smith	1984).	These	 three	 scales	 of	 analysis	 should	not	 be	
considered	as	linear	perspectives	standing	in	relative	hierarchy.	Rather,	similar	to	Mol	
and	Law’s	(1994)	description	of	fluid	spatiality,	they	are	scales	that	can	be	differently	
configured	 and	 ordered	 within	 different	 contexts	 and	 by	 different	 individuals.	 For	
example,	 as	 discussed	 in	 chapters	 four	 and	 five,	migrants	 order	 various	 notions	 of	
belonging	across	scales	and	with	differing	degrees	of	importance.	
	
The	second	way	this	thesis	attends	to	questions	of	scale,	that	is	by	examining	the	idea	
of	scale	as	magnitude,	relates	to	such	degrees	of	importance.	The	thesis	explores	the	
relative	effects	of	the	different	understandings	of	Afghan	belonging	in	Delhi	at	various	
scales	within	specific	contexts	of	migrants’	lives.	It	does	so	by	focusing	on	when	and	
how	Afghan	migrants	reflect	on	and	engage	with	the	different	 ideas	of	being	Afghan	
and	belonging	in	Delhi.	This	approach	to	scale	affords	an	understanding	of	how	even	
though	there	are	many	of	ways	of	being	and	belonging	as	Afghan	in	Delhi,	within	the	
context	of	the	city	not	all	of	these	forms	of	belonging	are	equally	viable	or	recognized	
for	all	individuals.	Considering	the	ethnographic	material	through	this	second	sense	of	
scale	 also	 allows	 the	 study	 to	make	 a	 broader	 argument.	 As	 research	 on	migration	
suggests,	transnational	migrants’	movements	and	practices	of	belonging	are	not	only	
impacted	by	different	scale‐making	projects	in	the	places	they	move	through,	but	also	
affect	 and	 reflect	 the	broader	 social	 contexts	within	 these	places	 (Glick	Schiller	 and	
Çağlar	 2011;	 Xiang	 2013).	 The	 study	 thus	 holds	 that	 the	 experience	 of	 Afghan	
migrants	in	the	city	is	also	indicative	of	broader	issues	of	belonging	in	Delhi	today.	
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3. The	State	Scale	
“What	you	have	to	understand,”	Mr	Watandar	said	as	he	took	a	sip	of	black	tea,	“is	
that	there	are	four	kinds	of	Afghans	here	in	Delhi.”	The	crystal	teacup	clinked	back	
into	the	saucer	like	a	full	stop.	I	had	been	back	in	Delhi	for	less	than	a	week	before	
deciding	to	call	the	Afghanistan	embassy.	Confused	as	to	what	I	was	enquiring	about,	
the	receptionist	assumed	I	was	an	Afghan	student	and	put	me	in	touch	with	the	head	
of	 student	 affairs,	 Mr	 Watandar.	 He	 too	 was	 unsure	 why	 I	 was	 asking	 questions	
about	Delhi’s	Afghan	community	and	suggested	it	would	be	best	if	I	came	to	speak	in	
person.	Two	hours	 later,	 I	was	standing	outside	 the	nondescript	embassy	gates	on	
Shantipath,	or	Peace	Avenue,	 in	Delhi’s	diplomatic	area	of	Chanakyapuri.	Mistaken	
for	a	confused	Afghan	student,	I	was	ushered	in	without	event	and	not	even	asked	to	
cede	my	phone	and	laptop	at	the	front	desk,	and	left	to	find	my	own	way	to	a	small	
room	crammed	with	three	fatigued	looking	bureaucrats.	
	
The	 cold	Delhi	 dusk	 seeped	 in	 through	 the	windows,	 barely	 held	 at	 bay	 by	 space	
heaters	placed	around	 the	 room.	Pistachio	 curtains	with	gold	brocade	 framed	 two	
slender	windows,	enhancing	the	green	chapan21	of	an	Afghan	historical	figure	whose	
painted	 portrait	 covered	 the	 wall	 between	 the	 windows.	 “There	 are	 no	 Afghan	
associations	 or	 groups	 of	 the	 kind	 you’re	 seeking,”	 Watandar	 began,	 “except	 for	
perhaps	 among	 the	Ahle	Hunood22.”	 He	 then	 proceeded	 to	 define	 for	me	 the	 four	
categories	of	Afghans	residing	in	Delhi:	
“As	I	just	mentioned,	there	are	the	Ahle	Hunood	who	mostly	live	in	Faridabad,	
Tilak	Nagar,	and	Vikas	Puri.	Then	there	are	the	refugees	(refugee‐ha),	but	we	
have	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 them	 as	 they	 are	 with	 the	 UNHCR.	 There	 are,	 of	
course,	 the	 seasonal	 tourists	 (muhajireene	mausami)	who	 come	 here	 either	
for	 medical	 reasons	 or	 for	 pleasure,	 and	 then	 finally	 the	 students	
(muhajireene	mahsali,	lit.	educational	migrants).”	
	
																																																								
21	A	 kind	 of	 overcoat	 worn	 throughout	 Central	 Asia	 and	 parts	 of	 South	 Asia,	 most	 recently	 made	
famous	 through	 its	 symbolic	 use	 by	 Afghanistan’s	 former	 President	 Ahmed	 Karzai	 in	 an	 outfit	
symbolising	a	pan‐Afghan	identity.	
22	A	term	used	in	Afghanistan	to	refer	to	Afghan	Hindus	and	Sikhs,	literally	meaning	“people	of	India”.	
This	term	is	discussed	again	below.	
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Mr	Watandar	was	adamant	that	the	embassy	did	not	–	could	not	–	keep	any	kind	of	
statistics	on	Afghans	coming	through	Delhi.	Instead,	he	suggested	I	approach	airline	
companies	who	might	have	more	 information.	He	apologized	 for	not	being	able	 to	
provide	more	 assistance,	 but	 told	me	 emphatically	 before	 I	 left	 that	 I	 should	 “not	
waste	[my]	time	with	the	Afghans	in	Lajpat	Nagar	and	Bhogal,”	i.e.	the	refugees,	“as	
they	[had]	truly	gone	astray”	(bekhi	gom	shodand)	and	that	I’d	be	better	off	meeting	
with	the	Afghan	Sikhs	and	Hindus	who	had	retained	their	Afghan	culture	(farhang)	
and	still	spoke	Pashto	at	home	despite	being	in	India	for	so	many	years.	It	was	too	
early	in	my	fieldwork	for	me	to	recognize	the	cold	disdain	with	which	Mr	Watandar	
spoke	of	refugees,	but	the	importance	of	this	label	would	soon	become	clear	to	me.	
	
Over	 the	 next	months,	 I	 became	 accustomed	 to	 the	 ritual	 clarifying	 statement	 that	
tourists	 or	 students23	from	 Afghanistan	 residing	 in	 Delhi	 would	 make	 during	
introductions	to	 impress	on	me	they	were	not	refugees.	On	several	occasions,	when	
meeting	an	Afghan	student	for	the	first	time,	the	student	would	emphasize	how	they	
did	not	associate	with	other	Afghans,	especially	refugees	who	could	not	be	trusted.	As	
one	student	I	met	in	a	hospital	waiting	room	explained:	“I	don’t	associate	with	those	
people”,	 i.e.	refugees,	“they’re	bad	people	(mardome	bad).”	His	reasoning	echoed	the	
numerous	statements	I	had	heard	from	tourists	and	even	refugees	alike,	that	Delhi’s	
Afghan	refugees	were	charlatans	preying	on	the	unassuming,	newly	arrived	Afghans	
in	Delhi,	stealing	from	their	own	people	(az	mardome	khod	duzdi	mikonand),	prone	to	
gossip,	 and	 willing	 to	 slander	 you	 behind	 your	 back	 (poshtet	 yek	 raqam	 gap	
mizanand!).	 Among	 the	 wider	 populace	 of	 Delhi,	 “Afghan”	 and	 “refugee”	 were	
generally	 synonymous,	 and	Afghan	 refugees	were	viewed	with	ambivalence.	On	 the	
one	hand,	refugees	were	afforded	sympathy	and	placed	within	a	narrative	of	loss	and	
dispossession.	This	was	mirrored,	however,	with	a	suspicion	of	the	possibility	of	false	
(naqli)	 refugees	 residing	 in	 Delhi,	 of	 refugees	 potentially	 receiving	 government	
benefits	exceeding	 their	needs	 that	could	 instead	be	used	to	help	 Indian	citizens,	or	
more	rarely	that	Afghan	refugees	might	even	be	a	threat	to	safety	in	the	city.	
	
																																																								
23	While	Delhi’s	Afghan	 student	population	pales	 in	 comparison	 to	Pune’s	–	a	 centre	 for	 the	 Indian	
Council	 for	 Cultural	 Relations’	 student	 exchange	 programs	 –	 Mr	 Watandar	 had	 estimated	 Delhi	
hosted	 a	 sizeable	 group	of	 600	Afghan	 students.	 There	was,	 however,	 no	 union	 or	 organization	 of	
Afghan	students.	Afghan	students	are	discussed	again	in	the	following	chapter.	
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In	Delhi,	Afghan	refugees	are	thus	the	Afghans	who	matter	in	that	“Afghan	refugee”	
is	not	just	a	label	that	defines	a	certain	kind	of	Afghan	in	the	city,	but	also	the	label	
against	which	other	Afghan	migrants	place	themselves	and	are	defined.	This	chapter	
focuses	on	the	‘Afghan	refugee’	to	consider	what	it	means	to	be	and	belong	as	Afghan	
in	Delhi	 at	 the	 state	 scale.	 The	 ethnographic	material	 and	 analysis	 in	 this	 chapter	
serves	to	demonstrate	how	at	the	state	scale,	Afghan	migrants	are	considered	to	not	
belong	 in	Delhi	and	their	presence	 in	the	city	 is	considered	 in	terms	of	 their	being	
either	 legal	migrants	 or	 illegal	 economic	migrants.	 Belonging	 is	 understood	 as	 an	
emotional	and	physical	connection	of	an	individual	to	a	community,	which	in	turn	is	
grounded	 in	 a	 nation	 state.	 The	 ethnographic	 examples	 from	 the	 Afghan	 Sikh	
community	 discussed	 in	 section	 four	 brings	 into	 question	 the	 state	 scale	
assumptions	of	how	Afghan	migrants	belong	in	the	city,	and	points	to	the	existence	
of	multiple	ways	Afghan	migrants	consider	belonging	as	individuals	or	communities,	
which	is	explored	more	specifically	in	subsequent	chapters.	
	
This	chapter	begins	with	a	review	of	 the	national	 framework	within	which	refugees	
exist	 in	India,	and	the	system	through	which	they	are	recognized	and	managed.	The	
state	scale	can	be	considered	an	epistemological	framework	grounded	in	the	nation‐
state,	where	 individuals,	 culture,	 and	 identity	 are	 imagined	 as	 territorialized	within	
national	boundaries.	The	development	of	 refugee	policy	and	study	of	 refugees	have	
largely	 been	 conducted	 at	 this	 scale	 (Malkki	 1995b),	where	 conceptions	 of	 refugee	
identity	 are	 naturalized	 through	 the	 organic	metaphor	 of	 being	 ‘rooted’	 in	 a	 nation	
state	 (Malkki	 1992).	 Of	 course,	 like	 other	 transnationally	 mobile	 people,	 refugees	
create	 and	 maintain	 multiple	 social	 relations	 and	 can	 identify	 with	 multiple	
communities	determined	beyond	considerations	of	national	belonging,	and	taking	into	
account	access	to	citizenship	rights	(Kibreab	1999,	2003a,	2003b;	Malkki	1995a).	
	
Indeed,	 the	 international	 discourse	 on	 refugees	 takes	 the	 hierarchical	 model	 of	
citizen‐nation‐state	 as	 a	 given,	 in	which	 refugees	 are	 citizens	denied	protection	of	
their	 state	 of	 origin	 and	 unable	 to	 remain	 within	 the	 state	 (Soguk	 1999).	 State	
bureaucrats	and	policy	makers	in	turn	use	the	refugee	label	to	manage	refugees	by	
politically	disaggregating	their	identity	from	that	of	the	citizen	(Zetter	1991).	In	this	
vein,	 the	 second	 and	 third	 sections	 of	 the	 chapter	 look	 specifically	 at	 how	 the	
refugee	 label	 is	 controlled	 through	 the	 process	 of	 Refugee	 Status	 Determination	
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(RSD)	and	how,	in	India,	the	Afghan	refugee	label	is	created	as	split	along	religious	
lines.	The	sections	consider	what	these	processes	relate	about	the	meaning	of	being	
and	belonging	as	Afghan	in	Delhi	at	the	state	scale,	and	what	this	might	also	indicate	
about	the	nature	of	citizenship	in	India.	
	
The	 category	 of	 the	 refugee	 is	 itself	 problematic	 for	 both	 legal	 practitioners	 and	
researchers	 alike.	 The	 incongruence	 of	 the	 international	 legal	 definition	with	 host	
states’	political	or	legal	realities	has	been	demonstrated	to	result	in	the	development	
of	 refugee	 policy	 that	 can	 worsen	 refugee	 living	 conditions	 or	 even	 endanger	
refugees’	lives	(De	Waal	1988;	Kaiser	2006;	Sandvik	2011).	Chimni	(2009)	suggests	
this	 incongruence	 is	 a	 result	 of	 global	 power	 dynamics	 in	which	 refugee	 policy	 is	
developed	to	keep	refugees	from	the	global	south	from	migrating	north,	and	argues	
for	 a	 reconsideration	 of	 the	 legal	 definition	 of	 the	 refugee	 in	 light	 of	 the	
“geographical	spread	of	capitalism	and	the	politics	of	imperialism”	that	have	marked	
refugee	movements	since	the	twentieth	century	(1998:	359).	Hayden	(2006)	further	
draws	attention	to	how	the	personhood	of	the	refugee	under	international	law	rests	
on	the	concept	of	the	individual	under	bourgeois	law,	where	a	distinction	is	created	
between	political	rights	tied	to	the	state	that	are	worthy	of	protection,	and	economic	
rights	 that	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	 inherently	 unequal	 and	 not	 meriting	 of	 state	
safeguarding.	 This	 fact	 comes	 out	 clearly	 in	 the	 UNHCR	 interactions	 with	 Afghan	
refugees	in	India	mentioned	in	the	chapter,	which	demonstrate	how	Afghan	refugees	
are	required	to	at	once	to	demonstrate	a	 lack	of	agency	while	concomitantly	being	
encouraged	to	act	as	entrepreneurial	agents	to	access	their	rights.	This	assumption	
of	 economic	 inequality	and	subsequent	access	 to	 rights	hints	at	 the	need	consider	
how	 access	 to	 resources	 affects	 refugees’	 ways	 of	 belonging	 in	 the	 city:	 an	 issue	
addressed	again	in	subsequent	chapters.	
3.1 Context:	The	Refugee	System	in	India	
That	I	turned	to	the	Afghanistan	embassy	as	one	of	the	first	avenues	to	understand	
the	Afghan	community	in	Delhi	betrays	how	my	own	conceptions	of	belonging	were	
shaped	 through	 thinking	 at	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 state.	 That	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 state	 is	 a	
construct,	 expressed	 and	 reified	 through	 diverse	 contexts	 and	 imbricated	 in	 state	
and	 non‐state	 institutions	 and	 practices	 is	 well	 documented	 (Abrams	 1988;	
Anderson	 2006).	 Specifically	 within	 the	 Indian	 context,	 Gupta	 (2012)	 argues	 that	
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while	 the	 state	 as	 a	 system	 of	 governance	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 unitary	 whole,	 the	
conditions	 through	 which	 it	 operates	 must	 be	 seen	 as	 (i)	 decentralized	 and	
disaggregated,	 (ii)	 constituted	 through	 the	 intersection	 of	 local,	 regional,	 national,	
and	 international	 processes,	 and	 (iii)	 historically	 and	 culturally	 specific	 in	 belying	
notions	 of	 separation	 of	 state	 and	 civil	 society	 understood	 from	 the	 European	
experience	of	state	formation24.	In	the	following	sketch	of	the	context	within	which	
refugees	exist	in	Delhi,	I	reassert	this	point	and	consider	how	what	it	means	to	be	a	
refugee	 at	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 state	 is	 shaped	 by	 the	 interaction	 and	 operation	 of	
historical	phenomena	and	bureaucracies	at	various	levels.	
	
On	the	whole,	refugees	in	India	are	in	a	difficult	position,	lacking	any	legal	personality	
qua	 refugees.	 According	 to	 UNHCR	 India	 (2013),	 the	 country	 currently	 hosts	
approximately	 224,000	 refugees	 and	 asylum	 seekers,	 the	 majority	 of	 whom	 are	
Tibetan	or	Sri	Lankan	Tamil	refugees	recognized	and	assisted	by	the	government	with	
partial	 support	 from	 the	 UNHCR.	 Roughly	 24,000	 persons,	 however,	 are	 not	
recognized	by	the	government	as	refugees	and	are	instead	registered	solely	under	the	
mandate	of	the	UNHCR.	This	population	represents	refugees	from	over	ten	different	
countries	 in	Africa,	Eastern	Europe,	and	South,	Southeast,	and	Western	Asia.	Of	 this	
population,	about	45%	come	from	Afghanistan	(Morand	and	Crisp	2013).	
	
India,	like	all	other	South	Asian	countries	except	Afghanistan,	is	neither	party	to	the	
1951	Convention	nor	 the	1967	Protocol	 on	 the	 Status	of	Refugees.	The	 country	 is	
therefore	not	obliged	 to	adhere	 to	 international	 standards	of	cooperation	with	 the	
UNHCR	or	to	enact	national	refugee	legislation.	In	practice,	however,	the	country	has	
accepted	 the	 principle	 of	 non‐refoulement,	 as	 outlined	 in	 the	 1966	 Bangkok	
Principles	on	the	Status	and	Treatment	of	Refugees,	and	so	persons	claiming	asylum	
in	India	are	theoretically	not	forcefully	deported.	Additionally,	India	has	acceded	to	
the	 International	 Covenants	 on	 Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights	 (ICCPR)	 and	 Economic,	
Social,	and	Cultural	Rights	(ECOSOC),	as	well	as	the	international	Convention	on	the	
Rights	 of	 the	 Child.	 These	 agreements	 all	 contain	 specific	 obligations	 toward	
protection	of	certain	refugee	rights.	While	India	has	not	formally	incorporated	these	
international	 obligations	 into	domestic	 law,	 and	has	 reserved	 its	 right	 to	 apply	 its	
																																																								
24	See	also	Ferguson	and	Gupta	(2002)	on	India	and	Zambia,	or	Nielsen	2007	on	Mozambique,	on	the	
blurring	 of	 spatialization	 of	 state	 and	 government	 through	 the	 translation	 of	 international	
development	norms	at	various	levels	of	bureaucracy.	
	 58
own	 municipal	 law	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 expulsion	 of	 foreigners,	 its	 judicial	 system	
allows	 for	 consideration	 of	 international	 obligations	 in	 the	 interpretation	 of	
statutory	law	(Ananthachari	2006;	Chimni	1994).	
	
Domestically,	India	does	not	have	a	national	refugee	law	or	any	legislation	regulating	
the	 entry	or	 status	of	 refugees25.	While	 there	have	been	 instances	of	 specific	 legal	
provisions	made	for	particular	groups	of	refugees26,	the	government	has	historically	
handled	 refugee	 flows	 on	 an	 ad	hoc	basis	 at	 a	 political	 and	 administrative	 level	
rather	 than	 legally.	 By	 law,	 refugees	 are	 merely	 considered	 aliens27	and	 are	
bureaucratically	 treated	 like	 any	 other	 foreigners	 residing	 in	 India,	 required	 to	
obtain	 relevant	 visas	 or	 stays	 and	 register	 their	 presence	 with	 the	 Foreigner	
Regional	 Registration	 Offices	 (FRRO).	 The	 Indian	 Supreme	 court	 has	 ruled	 that	
foreigners	 residing	 in	 India	 do	 not	 possess	 the	 right	 accorded	 to	 Indian	 citizens	
under	Article	19(1)(e)	to	reside	or	settle	freely	in	the	country,	and	that	foreigners’	
rights	in	India	are	limited	to	those	contained	in	Article	21	of	the	Constitution,	which	
guarantees	the	right	to	life	and	liberty	and	the	right	to	education	for	children	aged	
six	to	fourteen	(Chimni	1994).	
	
Refugees	in	India	thus	have	no	legal	personality	as	refugees;	they	are	not	recognized	
by	the	state	as	refugees	and	have	no	right	to	claim	protection	from	the	government.	
The	 ad	 hoc	 nature	 of	 addressing	 refugee	 flows	 has,	 however,	 allowed	 for	 two	
exceptions	to	this	case:	the	Tibetan	refugees	of	1959	and	Sri	Lankan	Tamil	refugees	
of	 the	 1980s.	 In	 both	 cases	 the	 government	 of	 India	 decided	 on	 strategic	 political	
grounds	to	officially	grant	these	groups	asylum,	recognize	their	refugee	status,	and	
take	 responsibility	 for	 their	 welfare.	 Consequently,	 both	 Sri	 Lankan	 Tamil	 and	
Tibetan	 refugees	 are	 furnished	 with	 state‐recognized	 identification,	 allotted	 aid	
through	 rationing	 or	 settlements,	 and	 afforded	 varying	 degrees	 of	 freedom	 of	
movement,	 where	 Tibetan	 refugees	 may	 even	 travel	 internationally	 through	
obtaining	 a	 ‘no	 objection	 to	 return	 to	 India’	 (NORI)	 stamp	 on	 their	 identification	
																																																								
25	Possible	reasons	given	for	this	situation	are	discussed	later	in	the	chapter.	
26	For	example,	the	1972	Foreigners	from	Uganda	Order,	which	dealt	with	Ugandan	refugees	of	Indian	
origin	(see	Saxena	1986).	
27	As	 Chimni	 (1994)	 clarifies,	 the	 word	 ‘alien’	 is	 not	 defined	 anywhere	 in	 Indian	 legislation,	 but	
appears	 in	a	number	of	statutes,	 including	the	Civil	Procedure	Code	and	 in	Article	22	of	 the	 Indian	
Constitution.	The	regulation	of	aliens	 in	 India	 is	guided	by	 the	 following	 legislation:	 the	Foreigners	
Act,	1946;	the	Registration	Act,	1939;	the	Passport	(Entry	into	India)	Act,	1920;	and	the	Passport	Act,	
1967.	
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certificate.	Of	course,	despite	official	recognition,	the	lack	of	a	wider	legal	framework	
to	recognize	their	rights	as	refugees	means	members	of	these	two	groups	still	 face	
various	bureaucratic	and	social	obstacles	 to	enjoyment	and	exercise	of	 their	rights	
(IRBC	2009,	2010;	Oberoi	2006;	USBCIS	2003).	
	
The	 Tibetan	 and	 Sri	 Lankan	 Tamil	 refugees	 are,	 however,	 in	 a	 significantly	 more	
privileged	 position	 than	 other	 refugees	 groups	 who	 lack	 any	 legal	 personality	
whatsoever.	While	refugees	from	other	countries	might	be	entitled	to	stay	in	India,	
they	do	not	de	jure	have	access	to	employment	or	higher	education28.	These	refuges	
thus	 face	 serious	 hurdles	 to	 ensuring	 their	 subsistence	 and	 are	 legally	 completely	
dependent	 on	 the	 UNHCR	 for	 protection.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 legal	 framework,	
however,	the	UNHCR	can	only	provide	limited	de	facto	protection.	
	
To	 elucidate	 the	 predicament	 of	 refugee	 protection	 in	 the	 country,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	
briefly	mention	the	history	of	the	UNHCR	in	India.	Having	actively	participated	in	the	
development	 of	 an	 international	 refugee	 regime	 in	 the	 1940s,	 India	 was	
disappointed	with	the	ultimate	UN	promulgation	of	a	regime	limiting	the	spatial	and	
temporal	definition	of	refugees	to	only	those	displaced	in	Europe	during	the	Second	
World	War.	As	a	leader	of	the	non‐aligned	movement,	India	further	distanced	itself	
from	the	newly	formed	UNHCR,	which	it	perceived	as	an	arbiter	of	the	Western‐bloc	
countries.	 In	 the	 late	 sixties,	however,	when	 it	became	clear	 that	Tibetan	 refugees	
would	need	long‐term	assistance,	India	allowed	the	UNHCR	informal	presence	in	the	
country	to	address	the	refugees’	needs	(Oberoi	2006).	
	
With	the	1971	flood	of	refugees	into	India	from	East	Pakistan	(now	Bangladesh),	the	
government	 of	 India	 established	 a	 formal	 working	 relationship	 with	 the	 UNHCR,	
which	had	already	had	an	in‐country	presence	for	two	years,	and	appointed	it	as	the	
focal	 point	 for	 refugee	 relief	 efforts.	 The	 same	 year,	 upon	 entering	 the	 United	
Nations,	 the	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 China	 placed	 an	 objection	 to	 the	 UNHCR’s	 relief	
efforts	 for	 Tibetan	 refugees	 in	 India;	 resultantly,	 in	 1975,	 the	 UNHCR	 unilaterally	
																																																								
28	While	 I	was	 in	India,	the	government	 informally	agreed	with	the	UNHCR	to	 issue	 long‐term	visas	
for	recognized	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	from	select	countries.	According	to	the	UNHCR	in	India	
website,	some	refugees	can	now	apply	for	“long	term	visas	(LTVs)	issued	by	the	Government	of	India,	
based	on	UNHCR	documentation”	 (UNHCR	2014).	 In	 personal	 communication	with	 current	Afghan	
refugees	in	Delhi,	I	have	been	told	the	government	is	yet	to	issue	LTVs	to	refugees.	The	UNHCR	has	
not	responded	to	enquiry.	
	 60
discontinued	operations	in	India.	This	move	soured	the	already	tenuous	relationship	
between	 the	 UNHCR	 and	 the	 government	 of	 India29.	 Following	 the	 growth	 of	 a	
sizeable	Afghan	refugee	population	in	Delhi	after	1979,	the	government	allowed	the	
UNHCR	 to	 establish	 a	presence	 in	 the	 country	 in	1981	 (Oberoi	 2006;	Rizvi	2003).	
Since	 then,	 the	 UNHCR	 has	 taken	 on	 responsibility	 for	 registration	 of	 all	 refugees	
entering	India	excepting	Tibetans	and	Sri	Lankan	Tamils.	To	date,	the	office	has	not	
been	 permitted	 to	 establish	 a	 formal	 independent	 presence	 in	 India	 and	 operates	
under	the	auspices	of	the	United	Nations	Development	Program	(UNDP).	
	
The	 absence	 of	 an	 official	 framework	 for	 the	 UNHCR’s	 work	 in	 India	 compounds	
problems	 stemming	 from	 a	 lack	 of	 refugee	 law	 in	 that	 it	 creates	 an	 ambiguity	
allowing	 for	 both	 the	 UNHCR	 and	 the	 government	 of	 India	 to	 deny	 responsibility	
toward	refugees.	For	the	government,	the	UNHCR	holds	complete	responsibility	for	
the	protection	and	welfare	of	refugees.	The	UNHCR,	on	the	other	hand,	sees	its	role	
as	specifically	limited	to	Refugee	Status	Determination	(RSD).	As	one	UNHCR	officer	
related	 to	me:	 “We	 are	 only	 responsible	 for	 identifying	 and	 registering	 refugees…	
there	 is	 only	 so	 much	 we	 can	 do.”	 The	 institutional	 situation	 was	 not	 lost	 on	
refugees,	who	often	 expressed	 the	 sentiment	 of	 falling	 through	 the	 cracks.	 As	 one	
Afghan	man	explained	to	me,	wondering	if	he	had	made	the	right	choice	in	coming	to	
India	 as	 a	 refugee:	 “the	 government	doesn’t	want	us,	 the	UNHCR	doesn’t	want	us,	
what	good	 is	 this	 [being	a	 refugee]?”	 (hukumat	mara	na	mi	khwahad,	UNHCR	mara	
na	mi	khwahad,	che	faida	dara?”).	
	
Though	 the	 UNHCR	 accepts	 responsibility	 only	 for	 RSD,	 it	 cooperates	 with	 two	
implementing	partners	 in	Delhi	 in	an	effort	to	provide	refugees	with	basic	support	
services.	 Both	 organizations,	 the	 international	 catholic	 charity	 of	 Don	 Bosco	
Ashalayam	 (Bosco)	 and	 a	 non‐profit	 legal	 aid	 and	 educational	 organization	 called	
the	 Socio‐Legal	 Information	Centre	 (SLIC),	were	 selected	 through	 an	 open	 call	 for	
proposals	 by	 the	UNHCR	and	have	been	working	with	 the	organization	 for	 over	 a	
decade	through	renewable	contracts.		
	
																																																								
29	While	 the	 UNHCR’s	 official	 stance	 is	 that	 there	 was	 no	 longer	 a	 justifiable	 need	 for	 in‐country	
presence,	the	government	interpreted	this	move	as	politically	motivated	and	against	the	non‐political	
mandate	of	the	organization.	
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SLIC	 developed	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 as	 a	 product	 of	 a	 national	 workshop	 on	 Human	
Rights,	Social	Movements	and	the	Law	in	India.	It	is	currently	a	collective	of	lawyers	
and	social	 activists,	drawn	 from	different	 socio‐economic	and	 regional	backgrounds	
from	across	India,	who	come	together	on	regular	and	ad	hoc	bases	to	address	various	
issues	 across	 the	 country	 related	 to	 advancing	 human	 rights	 and	 justice	 through	
increasing	and	 facilitating	people’s	access	 to	 the	 legal	system.	They	do	so	 through	a	
collective,	called	the	Human	Rights	Law	Network	(HRLN)	which	runs	several	services	
nationally,	aimed	at	defending	the	rights	of	minorities,	women,	children,	and	the	poor.		
Since	 its	 founding,	 SLIC	 has	 become	 one	 of	 the	 primary	 national	 organizations	
working	 on	 access	 to	 justice	 issues	 among	 various	 communities	 across	 the	 country	
and	works	with	governmental,	non‐governmental,	and	international	organizations	on	
a	 range	 of	 projects	 including	 human	 rights	 law	 training,	 monitoring,	 reform,	 and	
publishing.	Under	the	UNHCR,	SLIC	provides	pro	bono	legal	assistance	to	refugees	and	
asylum	seekers,	works	with	local	authorities	to	ensure	refugee	safety	and	protection,	
and	spearheads	the	UNHCR’s	efforts	to	obtain	Indian	citizenship	for	Hindu	and	Sikh	
refugees	from	Afghanistan	(discussed	in	section	four).	
	
Bosco	is	a	branch	of	the	international	religious	network	of	the	Salesians	of	Don	Bosco	
(SDB),	founded	in	the	late	1800s	in	Italy	to	provide	education	and	assistance	for	poor	
children.	With	operations	all	over	the	globe,	Bosco	has	been	operating	in	India	since	
the	 late	 1990s,	 primarily	 on	 providing	 shelter,	 food,	 and	 education	 to	 destitute	
children	 and	marginalized	 youth.	While	 the	 SDB	 do	 not	 generally	work	 on	 refugee	
issues,	the	organization	began	its	work	with	the	UNHCR	in	2003	to	provide	education	
and	services	for	refugee	youth	in	Delhi.	Following	a	scandal30	in	2012	which	resulted	
in	the	UNHCR	breaking	relationship	with	the	YMCA,	Bosco	became	the	UNHCR’s	sole	
implementing	partner	in	India	on	refugee	social	services,	and	began	providing	a	range	
of	 services	 to	 both	 refugee	 youth	 and	 adults.	 During	 my	 time	 in	 the	 field,	 the	
organization	was	providing	services	 to	 refugees	and	asylum	seekers	at	 four	centres	
across	North,	South,	Central,	and	West	Delhi	in	areas	with	large	refugee	populations.	
They	 ran	 eleven	 community‐based	 youth	 groups	 for	 refugees	 and	 non‐refugee	
																																																								
30	In	my	meetings	with	the	UNHCR,	I	was	told	the	relationship	with	the	YMCA	came	to	a	close	with	the	
end	of	a	contract	and	a	new	call	for	proposals.	As	is	usual,	I	was	provided	several	stories	of	why	the	
relationship	with	the	YMCA	was	terminated	by	refugees	and	members	of	civil	society	organizations.	
Various	 accusations	 were	 made	 against	 the	 YMCA	 ranging	 from	 organizational	 mismanagement,	
nepotism	 and	 corruption	 that	 resulted	 in	 a	 public	 protest	 by	 refugees,	 and	 allegations	 of	 financial	
extortion	and	preferential	treatment	by	YMCA	staff.		
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children	and	held	a	number	of	annual	events	aimed	at	refugee	youth.	Bosco	was	also	
helping	refugee	and	asylum	seeker	children	with	school	admissions,	providing	tuition	
classes,	and	running	crèches	for	preschool‐aged	children.	
	
For	adults,	Bosco	offered	vocational	training	and	basic	language	training	in	English	
and	Hindi,	aimed	at	providing	refugees	access	to	employment	in	the	informal	sector.	
The	 Bosco	 centres	 also	 housed	 the	 UNHCR’s	 Income	 Generation	 Activities	 (IGA)	
scheme	where	 limited	 places	 are	made	 available	 to	 refugees	 to	work	 for	 a	 salary	
making	paper	plates	or	tailoring.	The	income	from	these	centres	was	approximately	
Rs	3,000	(roughly	£30)	per	month:	a	salary	that	fell	well	short	of	monthly	expenses	
in	 a	 city	 where	 monthly	 rent	 alone	 might	 have	 cost	 that	 much31.	 Aside	 from	
employment	 assistance,	 Bosco	 also	 assisted	 refugees	 in	 accessing	 government	
hospitals	 and	 dispensaries,	 obtaining	 generic	 medicines	 and	 treatment,	 and	
provided	help	with	psychological	illness	assessment	and	treatment.	
	
This	overview	of	 the	historical	and	bureaucratic	context	 in	which	refugees	exist	 in	
India	illustrates	how	the	refugee	comes	to	exist	as	a	subject	of	the	state.		While	the	
nascent	 Indian	 state	 was	 committed	 to	 securing	 the	 rights	 of	 refugees,	 historical	
processes	 at	 the	 international	 level	 resulted	 in	 a	 situation	 where,	 aside	 from	 the	
above‐mentioned	exceptions,	the	Indian	state	does	not	officially	recognize	refugees	
today.	 Instead,	refugees	are	considered	by	the	state	to	be	dealt	with	outside	of	the	
state	through	the	bureaucracy	of	the	UNHCR,	which	in	turn	engages	the	services	of	
local	NGOs	to	address	the	needs	of	refugees.	
	
Of	 course,	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 state	 does	 not	 impact	 refugees’	 lives.	 As	
Chatterjee	 (2004)	and	Gupta	 (2012)	have	demonstrated	with	 regard	 to	 the	 Indian	
state’s	 relationship	 to	 the	 poor,	 the	 state’s	 relationship	 to	 refugees	 cannot	 be	
grasped	 within	 a	 framework	 that	 divides	 governmental	 and	 non‐governmental	
bureaucracy.	 What	 it	 means	 to	 be	 a	 refugee	 in	 India	 is	 shaped	 as	 much	 by	
transnational	legal	definitions	of	refugeehood	as	by	the	practices	of	the	government	
of	 India,	 the	 UNCHR,	 Bosco,	 and	 SLIC.	 As	 anthropological	 studies	 of	 bureaucracy	
demonstrate,	 bureaucracy	 is	 not	 just	 a	 constitutive	 site	 but	 also	 an	 expression	 of	
																																																								
31	Over	the	summer	of	2014,	Shahrukh	(introduced	in	the	next	chapter)	informed	me	that	the	UNHCR	
had	shut	down	the	IGA	service.	This	was	not	reconfirmed	in	my	communication	with	the	UNHCR,	but	
information	on	IGA	service	has	been	removed	from	the	UNHCR‐India	website.	
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social	formation,	and	bureaucratic	artefacts	are	not	produced	only	as	products	of	the	
techniques	of	government,	but	also	as	results	of	the	joint	interaction	of	bureaucratic	
structures	 and	 the	 individuals	 being	 governed	 (Hull	 2012).	 Such	 artefacts,	 like	
documents,	 statements,	 etc.,	 require	 the	 individuals	 engaged	 in	 their	 creation	 to	
enact	 certain	 subjectivities	 and	 it	 is	 through	 them	 that	 the	 state	 is	 brought	 into	
people’s	everyday	lives	(Navaro‐Yashin	2012).	
	
This	bringing	of	the	state	into	people’s	lives	reflects	the	second	sense	in	which	this	
thesis	considers	scale,	 i.e.	the	impact	of	epistemological	frameworks	on	the	lives	of	
individuals.	In	the	following	two	sections	I	consider	the	artefact	of	the	RSD	interview	
and	the	citizenship	scheme	made	available	to	Hindu	and	Sikh	Afghans	as	indicative	
of	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 personhood	 of	 the	 Afghan	 refugee	 at	 the	 state	 scale,	 and	
reflect	on	the	scale	at	which	the	state	perspective	impacts	migrants’	lives.	
3.2 Controlling	the	Refugee	Label	
It	was	not	until	several	months	after	the	trip	to	the	Afghanistan	embassy	that	I	was	
finally	able	to	get	a	meeting	with	the	organization	responsible	for	determining	who	
fit	 the	 label:	 the	UNHCR.32.	 Located	 in	 the	upscale	neighbourhood	of	Vasant	Vihar,	
couched	among	compounds	of	the	many	embassies,	diplomatic	residences,	and	elite	
private	 schools	 lining	 the	 broad,	 winding,	 tree‐shaded	 streets,	 the	 UNHCR	 main	
office	 is	 most	 easily	 reached	 by	 taxi	 or	 auto	 rickshaw.	 Given	 the	 propensity	 of	
drivers	to	charge	extra	for	driving	to	the	area	and	the	recently	 increased	metering	
charges,	 I	 opted,	 like	many	 refugees,	 to	 take	 the	 one‐hour	 bus	 ride	 along	 the	 ring	
road	and	then	walk	the	half	kilometre	to	the	office.	
	
As	I	waded	through	the	Delhi	summer	heat	and	humidity	in	‘Pocket	B’,	I	was	struck	
by	 the	 silence	 and	 tranquillity	 in	 the	neighbourhood:	 a	 stark	 contrast	 to	 the	 city	 I	
inhabited.	I	trudged	along	a	footpath	that	occasionally	disappeared	into	gravel	and	
																																																								
32	Arranging	a	meeting	was	a	 trying	procedure	 that	 required	mobilising	connections	of	 friends	and	
family	in	both	Afghanistan	and	India.	Ultimately,	I	was	able	to	schedule	a	meeting	with	a	legal	adviser	
and	an	external	relations	representative.	It	was	almost	impossible	to	schedule	any	further	meetings	
during	my	stay	in	Delhi.	A	friend	within	the	organization	later	informed	me	this	was	largely	a	result	of	
the	UNHCR	 India	 staff	with	whom	 I	had	met	being	 reprimanded	and	 told,	 along	with	others	 in	 the	
office,	not	to	engage	with	me	any	further.	This	reaction	to	my	inquiries,	I	was	told,	lay	in	the	UNHCR	
Delhi	office’s	having	recently	faced	severe	criticism	from	the	international	community	following	the	
international	 release	 of	 a	 documentary	 on	 Delhi	 refugees	 produced	 by	 independent	 Indian	
researchers	with	whom	the	UNHCR	Delhi	office	had	cooperated.	
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dirt,	 conscious	 that	merely	days	ago	 this	ground	had	been	cleared	of	 thousands	of	
Rohingya	 refugees	 who	 had	 been	 protesting	 the	 UNHCR	 offices	 for	 a	 month.	 The	
Resident	 Welfare	 Association	 (RWA)	 did	 not	 take	 kindly	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 the	
picketers	and	had	cooperated	with	 the	government	and	UNHCR	 in	working	out	an	
appeasement	and	ejecting	them33.	
	
When	I	finally	arrived	at	the	UNHCR	offices,	I	would	not	have	initially	known	where	
the	building	was.	The	minimalist	right‐angled	building	is	hidden	from	view	by	a	tall	
boundary	wall	and	even	taller	eucalyptus	and	royal	poinciana	trees.	The	presence	of	
the	office	was	announced,	however,	by	a	combination	of	rusting,	wheeled	chain‐link	
barriers	and	chain‐post	fencing	covered	in	peeling	red	and	white	paint	that	served	
to	corral	visitors	along	the	footpath	toward	a	metal	detector	doorway	placed	several	
meters	from	the	black	iron	gate	entrance	of	the	compound.	The	metal	detector	stood	
idly	 next	 to	 an	 empty	 desk,	 suggesting	 the	 doorway	might	 usually	 be	manned	 for	
long	queues	of	people	waiting	to	get	in.	Yet	the	two	times	I	went	to	the	office,	there	
were	only	ever	a	 few	people	 loitering	outside	while	waiting	 to	be	summoned	by	a	
security	 guard,	 seeking	 shade	 from	 the	 sun	 under	 the	 thick	 bougainvillea	 bushes	
hanging	over	the	boundary	wall.	
	
I	 walked	 up	 to	 the	 empty	 metal	 detector	 and	 two	 men	 standing	 by	 the	 wall	
approached	me.	One	 of	 them	 recognized	me	 from	a	Refugee	 Solidarity	Committee	
meeting.	After	the	customary	round	of	greetings,	he	asked	me	the	standard	question	
Afghan	 refugees	would	 ask	 each	 other:	 “and	 how	 are	 you	with	 the	 UNHCR?”	 (wa	
hamrahye	UNHCR	chetor	asten).	Surprised	 to	 find	out	 I	was	 there	 for	a	meeting,	he	
began	 recounting	 his	 story.	 He	 had	 been	 in	 Delhi	 for	 twenty	 years	 as	 a	 refugee.	
Finding	 out	 he	 would	 soon	 be	 up	 for	 resettlement,	 he	 returned	 to	 Kabul	 to	 get	
married.	 Trying	 to	 register	 his	 new	 bride	 as	 a	 refugee	 upon	 his	 return,	 he	 was	
notified	of	having	 lost	his	 refugee	 status34.	 “I’ve	been	coming	here	every	day	 for	a	
year	now	to	get	somebody	to	listen	to	my	story,”	he	explained,	“I	have	a	wife	and	a	
																																																								
33	In	a	discussion	with	a	 legal	NGO	worker	 following	the	case	of	the	Rohingya,	 it	was	suggested	the	
UNHCR	was	complicit	with	the	government	in	riling	up	the	Rohingya	to	demonstrate	so	as	to	create	a	
situation	in	which	they	would	not	receive	refugee	status	but	could	be	issued	UNHCR	documents	and	
thus	 be	 easily	 traceable	 by	 the	 state.	 The	 NGO	 worker	 implied	 the	 fact	 Rohingya	 are	 a	 Muslim	
minority	is	why	the	state	wished	to	track	them	and	prevent	them	from	gaining	full	refugee	status.	
34	Refugee	status	is	annulled	upon	return	to	one’s	country	of	origin.	Aside	from	the	exceptional	cases	
of	Sri	Lankan	and	Tibetan	refugees	mentioned	earlier,	refugees	who	travel	out	of	India	for	any	reason	
might	not	be	let	back	in	the	country	if	they	do	not	have	a	valid	visa.	
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child;	I	can’t	stay	in	this	country.	I	was	here	for	twenty	years.	Is	this	just?	…	They	ask	
me:	 If	 you’re	a	 refugee,	why	did	you	go	back?”	He	 took	my	number	and	asked	 if	 I	
could	talk	to	somebody	inside	on	his	behalf	or	maybe	find	him	a	lawyer.	In	the	shade	
of	the	bougainvillea,	partially	concealed	behind	a	chain‐link	barrier,	I	could	make	out	
a	woman	in	a	long	overcoat	crouched	on	the	ground,	feeding	a	child.	Like	the	UNHCR	
building	hidden	behind	tall	trees	and	high	concrete	walls,	in	the	shade	of	which	the	
family	 were	 waiting,	 the	 man	 perceived	 refugee	 status	 to	 be	 in	 reach	 but	 it	 was	
unavailable.	The	man	had	called	me	regularly	over	the	next	month	until	he	realized	I	
could	not	help	him.	
	
This	chance	meeting	outside	the	UNHCR	on	my	first	visit	was	apt.	It	demonstrates	on	
the	one	hand	the	particular	person	of	the	refugee	at	the	state	scale.	Being	registered	
as	a	refugee	with	the	UNHCR	is	premised	on	the	assumption	of	an	 impossibility	of	
returning	to	Afghanistan,	on	the	truth	of	having	to	 leave	one’s	national	boundaries	
against	 one’s	 desire.	 As	 Schuster	 (2011)	 has	 discussed	 with	 regard	 to	 Afghan	
refugees	 in	 the	 European	 context,	 refugees	 are	 required	 to	 demonstrate	 a	 lack	 of	
agency,	to	“emphatically	present	themselves	as	passive	victims	grateful	for	whatever	
minimal	 tolerance	 they	 are	 shown”	 (1403).	 	 The	 inability	 to	 do	 so	 in	 the	 Indian	
context	results	in	their	transformation	into	illegal	economic	migrants	for	whom	the	
UNHCR	is	not	accountable35.	In	this	way,	the	man’s	story	also	suggests	how	the	scale	
at	which	the	state	perspective	of	the	refugee	as	a	person	impacts	people’s	lives.	It	is	
true	 many	 Afghan	 refugees	 in	 Delhi	 did	 move	 back	 and	 forth	 with	 duplicate	
passports	 and	 documents,	 while	 officially	 maintaining	 the	 fiction	 of	 permanently	
residing	 in	Delhi,	 through	using	both	social	and	financial	capital.	This	man	had	not	
done	so	and	was	bearing	the	consequence	of	demonstrating	his	desire	and	ability	to	
move	across	state	boundaries.	Thus,	on	that	day,	unlike	me,	he	could	not	enter	the	
UNHCR	compound.	He	no	longer	fit	the	Afghan	refugee	label.	
	
My	 aim	 for	 this	 first	 meeting	 with	 the	 UNHCR	 was,	 in	 part,	 to	 understand	 the	
organization’s	 perspective	 on	what	 it	meant	 to	 be	 an	Afghan	 refugee	 in	 India	 and	
what	challenges	refugees	faced	in	the	country.	I	was	also	interested,	however,	in	the	
process	 through	which	 the	UNHCR	determined	who	 fit	 the	refugee	 label.	Labelling	
refugees,	 as	 Zetter	 (1991)	 describes,	 is	 a	 process	 whereby	 policy	 makers	 create	
																																																								
35	See	also	Samers	(2004)	on	the	European	context.	
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disaggregated,	 standardized	 institutional	 identities	 for	 people	 through	 the	
formulation	 of	 seemingly	 clear‐cut	 categories	 allowing	 for	 easily	 defining	 and	
assigning	‘needs’	to	refugee	groups	and	creating	refugee	policy.	The	counterpart	to	
stereotyping	 is	 control:	 the	 enforcement	 of	 conformity	 to	 the	 stereotype,	 which	
drives	a	wedge	between	the	actual	situation	of	a	refugee	and	the	story	needed	to	fit	
the	 label,	 transforming	refugees’	 individual	 identities	through	the	reinforcement	of	
an	institutional,	uniform	refugee	identity.	While	labelling	depends	on	policy	makers	
and	bureaucrats’	subjective	judgements,	distinctions,	and	political	considerations,	it	
is	presented	as	a	neutral	and	precise	bureaucratic	procedure.	
	
As	 I	 finished	my	 conversation	with	 the	man	 outside	 the	 offices,	 a	 UNHCR	 vehicle	
drew	up	to	the	gate	and	a	security	guard	noticed	me.	He	rang	inside	to	confirm	my	
appointment;	 details	 were	 checked	 and	 I	 was	 handed	 a	 visitor	 tag	 attached	 to	 a	
grimy	green	cord	that	 I	was	 instructed	to	wear	around	my	neck	by	the	guard	who	
lead	 me	 through	 a	 side	 entrance	 into	 a	 stairwell.	 I	 left	 the	 Delhi	 I	 knew	 at	 the	
doorstep.	 The	 air	was	 cooled	 through	 gently	 humming	 vents	 to	 a	 comfortable	 20	
degrees,	the	marble	flooring	was	spotless,	and	doors	were	operated	with	magnetic	
cards.	The	echoes	of	our	footsteps	rippled	across	the	rows	of	closed	doors	lining	the	
corridors,	shut	presumably	to	keep	the	cool	air	within	the	offices.	The	silence	began	
to	make	me	wonder	 how	many	people	were	 actually	working	 in	 the	 building.	We	
reached	the	intended	office	and	the	guard	told	me	to	wait	outside	the	room	until	the	
representatives	indicated	I	could	enter.	
	
After	 some	 inaudible	 deliberations	 between	 themselves,	 the	 UNHCR	 legal	 adviser	
and	PR	representative	asked	me	to	come	in.	Within	the	first	minutes	of	the	meeting	I	
was	given	a	categorical	breakdown	of	Afghans	in	Delhi	identical	to	that	related	to	me	
at	 the	 Afghanistan	 embassy.	 The	 representatives	 indicated,	 however,	 that	 the	
UNHCR	 divided	 Afghan	 refugees	 into	 two	 categories:	 the	 “Hindu‐Sikh”	 and	 the	
“ethnic”36	Afghans,	 and	 that	 unlike	 other	 refugees,	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans	 are	 able	 to	
participate	in	a	UNHCR	initiative	to	help	them	procure	Indian	citizenship	(discussed	
in	the	following	section).	All	refugees	must,	however,	go	through	the	RSD	process	to	
ensure	 only	 individuals	 who	 fit	 the	 international	 definition	 of	 the	 refugee	 are	
																																																								
36	I	discuss	this	problematic	label	further	below.	
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accepted.	Once	accepted	by	the	UNHCR,	the	options	available	to	“ethnic”	Afghans	are	
either	voluntary	repatriation	or	waiting	for	resettlement	in	a	third	country.		
	
While	I	was	not	allowed	access	to	the	refugee	determination	process,	I	was	able	to	
arrange	 a	 brief	 meeting	 with	 a	 UNHCR	 RSD	 officer	 who	 had	 recently	 arrived	 on	
assignment	 in	 India.	 Dressed	 in	 smart	 office	 clothes	 and	 exuding	 enthusiasm,	 she	
apologized	for	the	complete	lack	of	official	documents	explaining	the	RSD	procedure,	
and	 instead	 verbally	 outlined	 of	 the	 process	 for	me.	 Persons	wishing	 to	 apply	 for	
asylum,	she	explained,	must	register	at	 the	UNHCR’s	west	Delhi	centre	where	they	
obtain	 an	 India‐specific	 UNHCR	 registration	 form.	 The	 completed	 form,	 once	
submitted,	is	entered	into	the	UNCHR’s	system	for	tracking	refugees	called	ProGress,	
and	refugees	receive	a	 ‘White	Paper’	with	a	UNHCR	stamp	explaining	that	they	are	
registered	 asylum	 seekers	whose	 case	 is	 under	 review.	 Unlike	 in	 other	 countries,	
refugees	in	India	do	not	have	biometric	data	collected,	but	do	provide	other	generic	
information	 such	 as	 date	 of	 birth	 and	 a	 photograph.	 After	 registration,	 they	 are	
scheduled	 for	 a	 RSD	 interview	 and	 are	 generally	 interviewed	 once	 or	 twice	
depending	on	the	time	required	to	record	the	case	and	the	kind	of	information	they	
are	able	to	provide.	In	the	case	an	applicant	is	rejected,	they	are	informed	via	a	letter	
and	given	the	opportunity	to	lodge	an	appeal	within	30	days.	The	RSD	officer	stated	
that	 delayed	 appeals	 were	 also	 accepted	 within	 one	 calendar	 year.	 She	 added,	
however,	that	if	no	new	information	is	presented	in	the	appeal,	then	applicants	are	
unlikely	 to	be	 interviewed	again,	 but	 that	 in	99%	of	 cases	 they	 are	 seen	 a	 second	
time.	If	an	application	is	successful,	the	refugee	is	contacted	by	phone	to	come	and	
collect	their	‘blue	card’.	
	
For	the	UNHCR	representatives,	the	process	was	clear	and	impartial,	and	therefore	
just.	For	the	RSD	officer	it	was	difficult	to	imagine	otherwise	since	“RSD	work	is	very	
logical,	based	on	certain	principles	and	legal	frameworks.”	The	process,	she	held,	is	
designed	to	the	logic	of	the	international	definition	of	the	refugee	so	that	only	‘real’	
refugees	could	be	recognized.	
“The	person…	[must	 fit]	every	element	of	 the	definition:	 (1)	 the	person	has	
left	their	country	and	can’t	be	an	Indian	citizen;	(2)	has	a	well‐founded	fear	of	
persecution,	 well‐founded	 being	 that	 it’s	 objective	 and	 not	 just	 in	 ‘his’	
head…that	 it	 really	 may	 have	 happened…	we	 have	 questioning	 techniques	
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using	the	testimony	of	 the	refugee	himself…	when	you	do	a	complementary	
interview,	you	just	compare	the	answers…	[and	sometimes]	go	in	detail…	you	
confirm	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 information	 –	 COR	 –	 which	 is	 available	 on	
public	 networks,	 Human	 Rights	 Watch	 networks,	 etc.	 that	 confirms	 the	
general	 trends;	 (3)	 Then	 we	 look	 for	 the	 general	 nexus	 that	 this	 fear	 of	
persecution,	 i.e.	 the	 grave	 violation	 of	 human	 rights	 compatible	 with	
international	law:	there	are	5	reasons	[of]	race,	religion,	nationality,	political	
opinion,	 or	 membership	 in	 particular	 social	 group,	 and	 that	 the	 person	
cannot	go	back	because	of	this	well‐found	fear.”	
	
The	RSD	officer’s	description	of	 the	system	was	surgical	and	precise.	The	system	
controlled	 for	 a	 certain	kind	of	person:	one	who	 could	 testify	 to	a	 story	of	being	
compelled	 to	 move	 outside	 their	 national	 borders	 against	 an	 assumed	 natural	
desire	to	not	do	so,	based	on	a	story	that	“really	may	have	happened.”	Despite	the	
sterile	precision	of	the	officer’s	description,	I	wondered	whether	it	was	difficult	to	
extricate	 the	 list	 of	 details	 the	 RSD	 officer	 had	 just	 enumerated	 from	 the	
complicated	 stories	 of	 migration	 where	 reasons	 for	 leaving,	 dates,	 stories,	 etc.	
often	can	be	convoluted	or	confused.	As	a	rejected	refugee	stated	at	a	UNHCR	open	
meeting	with	the	Afghan	community:	
“…	when	 I	was	going	 for	my	RSD	 [interview]	 I	didn’t	 remember	what	 I	had	
eaten	 for	 breakfast	 [that	 day].	 This	morning	 I	 asked	 one	woman	 about	 her	
travels	in	Kabul	from	where	she	had	just	arrived	and	she	couldn’t	remember.”	
His	 point	 was	 that	 for	 those	 who	 have	 been	 refugees	 multiple	 times	 over	 an	
extended	 period,	 the	 pressure	 to	 remember	 things	 that	 happened	 long	 ago	 or	
during	 a	 period	 of	 general	 confusion	 can	 be	 frustrating	 and,	 coupled	with	 being	
emotionally	 or	 psychologically	 ill‐prepared	 for	 in‐depth	 questioning,	 can	 easily	
induce	forgetting	and	absent‐mindedness.		“Of	course,”	responded	the	RSD	Officer	
somewhat	evading	the	question,	
“this	work	 leads	 to	 burn	 out,	 so	 you	 need	 to	 have	 coping	 strategies.	 Some	
people	 start	 screaming	 and…	 just	 you	 need	 to	 have	 your	 own	 coping	
mechanism,	you	need	to	have	a	work‐life	balance.”	
I	never	got	an	answer	to	the	question	of	how	complicated	life	stories	could	be	made	
to	fit	into	the	small	boxes	of	forms,	but	from	her	statement	and	the	frustration	many	
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Afghans	expressed	to	me	concerning	the	RSD	process,	it	was	apparent	it	was	no	easy	
task	for	the	interviewer	or	the	interviewee.		
	
One	of	my	main	 insights	 into	the	refugee	experience	of	RSD	came	from	Jamshed,	a	
friend	of	an	acquaintance	from	the	US,	who	had	arrived	in	Delhi	during	the	middle	
my	fieldwork	with	his	newly	wed	wife.	Complementing	what	I	had	been	told	by	the	
UNHCR	RSD	officer,	Jamshed	explained	that	he	and	his	wife	went	to	register	with	the	
UNHCR	offices	where	they	were	given	refugee	registration	forms,	which	they	had	to	
submit	within	 seven	 to	 ten	days.	Upon	 submitting	 their	 forms,	 they	 received	 their	
‘White	 Papers’,	 on	 the	 back	 of	 which	 were	 two	 columns	 of	 boxes	 in	 which	 the	
UNHCR	could	renew	the	letter	multiple	times	with	a	new	stamp	and	expiration	date.	
Upon	 registration,	 they	 received	 an	 interview	 date	 for	 two	 weeks	 later,	 though	
others	 I	met	 had	 had	 to	wait	 for	 up	 to	 three	months.	 Jamshed	 and	 his	wife	were	
interviewed	 separately	 for	 approximately	 three	 hours.	He	was	 very	 concerned	his	
case	 not	 be	 rejected,	 and	 even	 though	 he	 was	 normally	 over‐confident	 in	 his	
command	of	English,	he	accepted	to	have	an	 interpreter	at	his	 interview	whom	he	
occasionally	had	to	correct.	
	
Considering	the	RSD	interview	as	a	bureaucratic	artefact	reveals	how	it	requires	the	
refugee	 to	 invoke	 a	 truth	 about	 the	 refugee’s	 self,	 and	 also	 how	 it	 is	 a	 product	 of	
labour	of	not	just	the	refugee,	but	also	the	UNHCR	and	others.	I	asked	Jamshed	what	
he	 was	 asked	 in	 the	 interview	 and	 his	 response	 indicated	 how	 it	 was	 like	 a	 test	
where	one	had	to	give	the	correct	answer.	 “They	 just	ask	you	about	everything	on	
the	form,”	he	explained,	“to	try	and	see	if	you’re	 lying	and	if	you	have	a	reason	[to	
leave	 Afghanistan].”	 He	 was	 initially	 unimpressed	 with	 the	 RSD	 officer	 who	
conducted	his	interview,	as	she	was	a	young	girl	who	had	told	him	at	the	beginning	
of	 the	 interview	 she	 was	 working	 there	 because	 she	 wanted	 to	 gain	 experience.	
Jamshed	 initially	 felt	 she	 did	 not	 seem	 “very	 serious”	 (besiyar	 jiddi)	 about	 the	
process.	He	soon	changed	his	mind	however,	after	he	saw	the	speed	with	which	she	
typed	 up	 the	 notes	 on	 his	 interview.	 “They	 type	 up	 all	 your	 responses…	 and	 they	
type	so	fast!	I	can’t	explain	it	to	you!	...	 it’s	all	on	an	internal	network	you	know,	so	
they	can	compare	things	instantaneously.”	The	technology	of	being	able	to	verify	and	
crosscheck	 information	 impressed	 Jamshed	 and	 convinced	 him	 that	 it	 was	 only	
people	with	“real	cases”	(case‐haye	asli)	who	would	be	accepted	as	refugees.	
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The	 story	 is	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 ‘case’	 and	 so	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 becoming	 a	
refugee.	Jamshed’s	story	was	fairly	straightforward.	He	was	in	his	mid‐twenties	with	
a	 background	 in	 law,	 and	 had	 been	 the	 Country	 Consultant	 for	 a	 US‐based	 NGO	
working	in	Afghanistan	on	women’s	legal	rights	and	empowerment.	Several	months	
before	 his	 marriage,	 while	 working	 in	 Kandahar,	 Jamshed	 was	 kidnapped,	 held	
hostage,	 and	 tortured.	 Deep	 grooves	 in	 his	 forehead	 and	 on	 his	 cheeks	 remained	
where	his	skin	had	been	cut.	After	his	release,	he	had	received	threats	in	Kabul	for	
continuing	 to	 work	 with	 the	 NGO.	 His	 organization	 suggested	 he	 seek	 asylum	 in	
India,	while	they	pursued	connections	in	the	US	to	have	him	and	his	wife	resettled	
there.	The	 two	thus	came	to	 India	on	a	 three‐month	tourist	visa,	saying	 they	were	
celebrating	their	honeymoon.	They	were	lucky	that	they	had	contacts	in	the	US	and	
India	who	could	assist	them	in	finding	their	way	through	the	process	of	becoming	a	
refugee.	Within	nine	months	of	arriving	in	Delhi,	the	two	were	not	only	accepted	as	
refugees	 by	 the	 UNHCR,	 but	 their	 application	 had	 also	 been	 forwarded	 to	 the	 US	
Embassy,	 and	 they	 would	 be	 resettled	 in	 the	 US	 within	 a	 year.	 This	 was	 highly	
unusual	 for	 the	 refugees	 I	 met	 in	 Delhi,	 most	 of	 whom	 had	 been	 waiting	 for	
resettlement	for	over	three	years.	
	
Jamshed	 did	 not	 go	 into	 his	 interview	 unprepared,	 but	 had	 an	 awareness	 of	 the	
UNHCR	policy,	 and	 had	 been	 practicing	 for	 the	 interview	with	 a	 former	 colleague	
from	 the	US	now	based	 in	Delhi	who	had	worked	on	 refugee	 issues.	He	explained	
how	the	interviewer	asked	him	multiple	times	why	he	chose	to	come	to	India	rather	
than	Pakistan	or	 Iran,	despite	 Jamshed’s	 repeated	explanation	of	 how	 India	was	 a	
safer	 place	 for	 him	 to	 flee	 from	 the	 Taliban.	 	 Though	 he	 was	 irritated,	 Jamshed	
described	how	he	understood	why	he	was	asked	the	question	repeatedly.	
“[The]	 problem,”	 he	 conceded,	 “is	 that	 for	 the	 UNHCR	 [India	 is]	 a	 third	
country	 for	 Afghans…	 They	 tell	 them	 they	 should	 go	 to	 Pakistan	 or	 Iran…	
their	actual	policy	is	to	send	people	to	a	second	country	[not	a	third].”	
Jamshed	suggested	that	this	was	why	the	UNHCR	
“doesn’t	 make	 any	 efforts	 for	 Afghans…	 there	 are	 so	 many	 Burmese,	
Bhutanese,	etc.	for	whom	India	is	a	second	country	so	the	UNHCR	feels	they	
should	help	them	first.”	
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Jamshed’s	 understanding	 of	 UNHCR	 policy	 derived	 in	 part	 from	 his	 own	 research	
and	information	from	colleagues	in	the	US,	but	was	also	gleaned,	he	explained,	from	
conversations	 with	 other	 Afghans.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 RSD	 process	 can	 be	 seen	 to	
involve	the	work	of	 individuals	outside	of	the	 interview	who	can	assist	the	asylum	
seeker	 in	 developing	 the	 correct	 story	 or	 disposition.	 Rather	 than	 the	 neutral	
description	 offered	 by	 the	 RSD	 officer,	 this	 suggests	 the	 process	 operates	 along	 a	
power	 gradient37	where	 those	 with	 access	 to	 social	 resources	 can	 be	 better	
positioned	to	engage	in	it.	
	
That	 Jamshed	 drew	 on	 information	 from	 other	 refugees	 in	 navigating	 the	 RSD	
process	 reflects	how	Afghan	 refugees	and	asylum	seekers	 in	Delhi	understood	 the	
necessity	 of	 strategically	 presenting	 oneself	 in	 a	 certain	 way	when	 filling	 out	 the	
registration	 form	 and	 conducting	 the	 interview.	 People	 generally	 displayed	 an	
awareness	 of	 what	 it	 meant	 to	 be	 a	 refugee	 for	 the	 UNHCR	 and	 the	 rights	 that	
followed	from	that	status.	While	Afghans	did	not	usually	hang	out	in	groups	in	public	
in	 Delhi38,	 there	 were	 contexts	 in	 which	 they	 would	 come	 face	 to	 face	 with	 one	
another,	such	as	barber	shops,	waiting	to	pick	up	bread	in	the	market,	or	in	hospital	
waiting	 rooms.	There	was	a	 reluctance	 to	discuss	personal	matters	with	unknown	
people	 one	 could	 not	 trust,	 and	 discussing	 the	 ineffectiveness	 or	 injustice	 of	 the	
UNHCR	was	a	safe	topic.	People	would	often	criticize,	in	a	general	sense,	how	when	
talking	with	the	UNHCR	or	during	open	meetings,	others	would	put	on	airs	of	being	
in	 danger	 or	 of	 receiving	 threats	 as	 a	 way	 to	 demonstrate	 they	 deserved	 to	 be	
resettled.	At	open	meetings,	these	same	people	would	press	for	demands,	reminding	
the	 UNHCR	 officers	 that	 “the	 UNHCR	 has	 a	 responsibility	 (masooliyat)	 to	 protect	
[them]	as	refugees.”	
	
Jamshed,	like	many	others,	held	a	low	opinion	of	Afghan	refugees	in	Delhi	and	saw	
such	 behaviour	 as	 another	 example	 of	 how	 many	 Afghans	 tried	 to	 “misuse”	 (su	
istefada	 kardan)	 refugee	 status	 as	 an	 easy	 ticket	 to	 the	 ‘west’	 (gharb)	 through	
fabricated	stories	that	fit	the	UNHCR’s	expectation.	He	related	a	story	he	had	heard	
of	 two	 brothers	 who	 had	 applied	 for	 asylum	 together.	 When	 they	 were	 being	
																																																								
37	Gupta	(2012)	argues	that	governmental	bureaucracy	 in	 India	operates	along	this	power	gradient	
where	those	without	access	to	social	capital	are	not	just	poorly	equipped	at	navigating	bureaucracy,	
but	also	ultimately	bear	a	greater	burden	in	accessing	it.	
38	Though	 people	 did	 not	 hang	 out	 in	 groups	 in	 public,	 they	 did	 stick	 to	 small	 circles	 of	 close	
acquaintances.	Issues	of	community	are	discussed	more	in	chapter	six.		
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interviewed,	one	brother	had	said	their	father	had	died	before	they	left	Afghanistan	
and	the	last	people	they	saw	were	their	mother	and	sister.	The	second	brother,	on	
the	 other	 hand,	 told	 his	 interviewer	 the	 last	 person	 he	 had	 contact	 with	 before	
leaving	 was	 their	 father.	 While	 one	 brother	 had	 said	 the	 family	 came	 from	 the	
Shomali	region,	the	other	said	the	family	was	from	Kabul.	Their	case	was	rejected.	In	
Jamshed’s	opinion,	it	was	situations	like	this	that	“oblige	[UNHCR]	officers	to	ask	you	
questions	like	this	[that	can	trip	you	up].	It’s	not	the	fault	(gunah)	of	the	UNHCR	that	
they	don’t	accept	Afghans,	it’s	their	[i.e.	Afghan’s]	own	fault.”	
	
Such	stories	circulated	among	refugees	with	a	double	intent,	linking	the	truth	of	the	
story	to	the	truth	of	feeling	and	moving	across	borders.	On	the	one	hand,	the	stories	
provided	 comic	 relief	 and	 served	 as	 a	way	 for	 both	 the	 narrator	 and	 audience	 to	
indicate	 through	 their	 reactions	 that	 they	had	 ‘real’	 cases	and	 thus	deserved	 to	be	
resettled	unlike	the	stories’	protagonists.	 In	reaction,	many	Afghan	refugees	would	
lament	 the	 large	number	of	Afghans	 lying	 (drogh	goftan)	 to	 the	UNHCR	with	 their	
made‐up	cases	 (case‐haye	sakhtagi)	 in	order	 to	be	sent	abroad	 (ta	ba	kharij	rawan	
shawan).	 Statements	 to	 this	 effect	were	 often	meant	 to	 indicate	 the	 sincerity	 and	
misfortune	of	those	voicing	them,	those	with	‘real’	cases	who	were	left	behind	(pas	
mandand)	in	India,	but	deserved	to	have	their	desire	for	resettled	met.	
	
On	the	other	hand,	these	stories	also	served	as	a	lesson,	especially	for	new	arrivals	in	
the	city,	that	if	one	wished	to	be	resettled,	one	needed	to	ensure	the	consistency	of	
one’s	story	with	the	UNCHR.	The	existence	of	a	distinction	between	one’s	story	and	
one’s	 situation,	 and	 the	 necessity	 of	 altering	 the	 ‘truth’	 of	 one’s	 story	 to	meet	 the	
UNHCR	 requirements	 was	 generally	 understood	 as	 inevitable.	 An	 older	 Afghan	
gentleman	who	had	been	a	refugee	multiple	times	in	Pakistan	and	had	been	denied	
refugee	status	in	India	explained:	
“[Refugees’]	 stories	 are	mostly	 lies.	Why	 is	 it	 like	 that	 here?	 [Because]	 the	
UNHCR	will	reject	you	[otherwise]…	most	[Afghans]	went	to	Pakistan	to	live	
there	(zindagi	kardan)	…	97%	[of	 those]	here	 [in	Delhi]	want	 to	get	asylum	
abroad.”	
The	 implication	 was	 that	 asylum	 seekers’	 desire	 for	 third	 country	 resettlement	
necessitated	 tailoring	 one’s	 story	 to	 fit	 the	 UNHCR’s	 requirements	 by	 not	 naming	
this	desire	as	the	cause	of	leaving	Afghanistan.	
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Yet	to	say	that	refugees’	stories	were	lies	(drogh)	did	not	reflect	a	sentiment	that	all	
stories	 were	 utterly	 fabricated,	 though	 such	 allegations	 were	 also	 made.	 Rather,	
there	was	 an	 understanding	 that	 in	 order	 to	 attain	 the	 refugee	 status	 one	 rightly	
deserved	but	could	not	attain	through	recounting	the	entire	truth	of	one’s	story,	one	
needed	 to	 regulate	 what	 was	 narrated.	 As	 a	 registered	 refugee	 advised	 a	 newly	
arrived	asylum	seeker:	“if	your	case	is	very	complicated	(besiyar	pechida	mi	bashad),	
you	 will	 be	 rejected.”	 The	 asylum	 seeker	 was	 finding	 it	 difficult	 to	 accurately	
complete	 a	 section	 on	 living	 and	 deceased	 family	 members	 in	 the	 refugee	
registration	form.	His	father	had	multiple	wives	and	children	who	all	knew	him	by	
name,	but	whom	he	in	turn	did	not	know	or	had	never	met.	The	solution	suggested	
was	to	only	mention	his	nuclear	family,	as	he	hoped	his	mother	and	siblings	would	
join	him	in	India	if	he	gained	refugee	status.	His	complicated	family	relations	were	
thus	pared	down	to	 the	nuclear	 family	 that	could	 fit	 the	refugee	registration	 form.	
This	would	become	his	‘real’	(asli)	story.	It	was	indeed	not	false;	it	fit	the	lines	on	the	
asylum	form	that	could	not	contain	the	excess	of	his	actual	situation.		
	
The	sentiment	that	Afghans	were	using	refugee	status	in	India	as	a	transit	to	get	to	
the	 west	 was	 shared	 by	 refugees	 as	 well	 as	 the	 UNHCR	 and	 its	 implementing	
partners.	 The	 UNHCR	 and	 SLIC	 representatives	 I	 met	 were	 aware	 there	 were	
registered	refugees	with	false	cases.		The	SLIC	representative	mentioned	how	in	the	
1990s	it	was	very	common	for	Afghans	coming	for	medical	treatment	or	vacation	to	
India	to	“hear	from	other	people	that	[they	can	get]	registered	with	[the]	UNHCR	and	
get	 resettled	 [abroad].”	 She	 added	 how	 recently	 SLIC	 discovered	 a	 trend	 where	
women	with	children	claiming	to	be	widows	would	register	 for	asylum,	explaining	
they	had	barely	escaped	with	their	lives	in	the	face	of	problems	with	family,	forced	
marriage,	clan	disputes,	etc.	Once	accepted,	however,	
“they	start	to	 live	normally	(sahi	se)	but	then…	they	find	out	from	others	that	
you	have	to	create	problems	for	yourself…	You’re	not	supposed	to	just	live	in	
India…	the	next	step	is	to	go	out	of	India	to	have	a	better	life	so	your	husband	
will	join	you	there.”	
	
The	representative	explained	that	“we	can’t	go	to	Afghanistan	to	check	everyone	to	
see	if	they’re	really	a	widow	or	not,”	but	it’s	clear	many	of	them	receive	support	from	
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Afghanistan,	“money	is	being	sent	here,	they’re	living	comfortably,	but	they’ll	create	
problems	 for	 themselves.”	 She	 was	 quite	 frank	 in	 saying	 while	 there	 were	 many	
people	who	had	“genuine	problems”,	many	others	“just	[use]	the	UNHCR	as	a	transit,	
expecting	 the	 UNHCR	 to	 pay	 for	 them	 and	 give	 assistance.”	 In	 support,	 she	
mentioned	how	one	only	needed	to	go	to	the	local	market	to	see	all	the	rich	Afghans	
who	claim	one	thing	on	paper	and	lead	a	different	lifestyle.	
	
While	the	difference	between	refugees’	situation	and	their	story	did	seem	wrong	to	
her,	 the	SLIC	representative	was	more	concerned	about	 the	negative	 impact	 it	had	
on	her	work	in	sensitizing	local	authorities	to	refugee	rights.	
“While	the	police	have	been	very	cooperative,	[the	abuse	of	refugee	status	by	
some]	makes	it	hard	to	deal	with	the	police	[when	trying	to	sensitize	them	to	
refugee	problems]	because	they	will	point	out	how	many	of	the	Afghans	drive	
nice	cars	with	loud	music	and	drink	alcohol	[i.e.	disturb	the	peace].”	
For	 the	 SLIC	 representative,	 what	 was	 more	 important	 was	 the	 role	 she	 was	
supposed	to	fulfil.	“I	tell	them:	that	matter	is	between	you	and	them	(aap	ka	masla	
hai	 aur	 unka	 masla	 hai),”	 she	 stated	 switching	 then	 to	 English,	 “as	 far	 as	 I’m	
concerned	 they	 have	 refugee	 cards.”	 The	 argument	 was	 that	 if	 they	 had	 refugee	
cards,	the	police	could	not	harass	them,	but	had	to	report	them	to	SLIC.	“If	they	don’t	
have	 identity	cards,	 they’re	not	our	concern,”	she	added.	The	SLIC	representative’s	
comments	should	not	be	taken	as	an	expression	bureaucratic	indifference	(Herzfeld		
1992)	 against	 police	 harassment	 of	 a	 symbolic	 other	 of	 the	 migrant,	 but	 more	 a	
recognition	 of	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 meaningful	 action	 she	 could	 take	 as	 part	 of	 the	
bureaucracy.	 As	 she	 had	 explained	 earlier,	 it	 was	 impossible	 to	 determine	
completely	whether	refugees’	stories	were	 indeed	real,	but	 it	was	also	not	her	 job.	
The	story	of	the	refugee	was	‘real’	even	if	the	refugee’s	situation	indicated	otherwise.	
	
From	the	UNHCR	perspective,	the	representatives	acknowledged	the	inevitability	of	
individuals	being	accepted	on	the	basis	of	fabricated	cases,	but	also	demonstrated,	at	
least	officially,	a	deep	conviction	that	the	RSD	system	was	inherently	impartial	and	
thorough,	and	that	it	ensured	accurate	assessment	of	cases.	During	my	first	meeting	
with	 the	 UNHCR,	 I	 had	 asked	 the	 representative	 about	 whether	 they	 had	 many	
incidences	 where	 accepted	 refugees	 were	 found	 to	 have	 fabricated	 cases.	 She	
indicated	that	there	were	very	few	incidences,	but	that	“some	people	get	tired	of	the	
	 75
refugee	 life,	 you	 know?	 Last	 year	 50	 people	 approached	 us	 for	 repatriation.”	 Her	
statement	 was	 made	 to	 obliquely	 state	 that	 not	 all	 accepted	 refugee	 cases	 were	
genuine	as	some	people	voluntarily	chose	 to	return	 to	Afghanistan.	The	possibility	
that	one	might	voluntarily	repatriate	due	 to	an	 inability	 to	continue	 living	 in	 India	
under	financial	or	other	forms	of	duress,	or	because	of	better	opportunities	arising	
elsewhere	was	not	a	possibility	for	the	UNHCR	representatives.	The	truth	of	being	a	
refugee	lay	in	an	inability	to	return	to	one’s	nation	of	origin.	To	return	only	signified	
one	had	not	been	a	true	refugee	in	the	first	place.	
	
The	 forgoing	 discussion	 illustrates	 how	 the	 RSD	 system	 involves	 the	 creation	 of	
knowledge	by	the	UNHCR,	its	implementing	partners,	and	Afghans	seeking	asylum	on	
what	 kind	 of	 person	 the	 refugee	 is.	 At	 the	 state	 perspective,	 the	 refugee	 is	 an	
individual	person	 located	within	the	state	at	 the	end	point	of	a	vector	of	movement	
from	 the	 refugee’s	 state	 of	 origin.	 As	 a	person,	 the	 refugee	 embodies	 a	narrative	of	
movement	that	indicates	an	initial	desire	to	remain	within	the	state	of	origin	to	which	
the	refugee	belongs	emotionally.	Examining	the	RSD	system	as	a	process	of	controlling	
refugee	identity	thus	hints	at	how	the	kind	of	person	the	refugee	is	at	the	state	scale	is	
considered	 in	 terms	 of	 movement	 and	 desire.	 To	 attend	 more	 specifically	 to	 how	
Afghans	are	 considered	 to	belong	 in	 India	 at	 the	 state	 scale,	 I	 turn	now	 in	 the	next	
section	 to	 the	 process	 of	 stereotyping	 whereby	 the	 categories	 of	 “Hindu‐Sikh”	 and	
“ethnic”	Afghan	refugees	are	created	under	the	Afghan	refugee	label.	
3.3 Stereotyping	and	Belonging:	Splitting	the	Afghan	Refugee	Label	
The	 splitting	 of	 the	 Afghan	 refugee	 label	 into	 the	 “Hindu‐Sikh”	 and	 “ethnic”	
categories	was	one	of	the	first	points	the	PR	representative	impressed	on	me	in	my	
initial	meeting	with	the	UNHCR,	explaining	how	
“It’s	 important	 to	 distinguish	 between	 “Hindu‐Sikh”	 Afghans,	 and	 “ethnic”	
Afghans.	 [The	 former]	 have	 a	 genuine	 desire	 to	 stay	 on,	 because	 they	 see	
themselves	coming	home	and	you	can’t	even	tell	the	difference	between	the	
first	 generation	 and	 “regular”	 Indians.	 The	 “ethnic”	 Afghans	 want	 to	 move	
somewhere	else.”	
As	 illustrated	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	 person	 of	 the	 refugee	 is	 assumed	 to	
naturally	 desire	 to	 remain	 within	 the	 state	 of	 origin.	 The	 Afghan	 Hindu	 and	 Sikh	
refugees	 provide	 an	 interesting	 case	 in	 that	 even	 though	 their	 state	 of	 ‘origin’	 is	
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Afghanistan,	they	are	considered	to	be	“coming	home”	to	India.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	on	the	
basis	 of	 their	 “genuine	desire”	 to	be	 in	 India	 that	 the	UNHCR	was	undertaking	 an	
effort	 to	 make	 Indian	 citizenship	 available	 to	 them.	 That	 the	 UNHCR,	 with	 the	
cooperation	of	 the	government	of	 India,	made	citizenship	an	option	 for	Hindu	and	
Sikh	Afghans	relates	an	understanding	of	how	the	Afghan	refugee	can	belong	in	the	
state	(or	not).	
	
To	 push	 the	 issue,	 I	 asked	 the	 representatives	 why	 the	 UNHCR	 only	 focused	 on	
citizenship	 for	Afghan	Hindus	and	Sikhs	and	not	other	 refugees?	The	 legal	adviser	
replied	mechanistically:	
“At	the	end	of	the	day	it	is	up	to	the	government	to	decide,	but	it’s	clear	the	
Hindu‐Sikh	 Afghans	 have	 a	 cultural	 and	 linguistic	 affinity	 with	 India	 and	
share	historical	ties…	it	 just	doesn’t	make	sense	to	look	for	resettlement	for	
them.”	
The	 PR	 representative	 added	 that	 the	 Hindu‐Sikh	 Afghans’	 connection	 to	 India	
granted	 them	 the	 ability	 to	 blend	 in,	 unlike	 the	 “ethnic”	 Afghans	 whose	 cultural	
difference	 impeded	 them	 from	 assimilating	 (I	 return	 to	 the	 problematic	 label	 of	
‘ethnic’	Afghans	shortly).	Presenting	the	matter	as	a	logical	fact,	the	representatives’	
statements	not	only	reinforced	the	point	of	Hindu	and	Sikh	Afghans’	natural	desire	
to	belong	in	India	rather	than	elsewhere,	but	also	suggested	their	belonging	in	India	
was	 expressed	 in	 the	 comportment	 of	 their	 physical	 bodies,	 dictated	 by	 their	
linguistic	and	historical	ties	to	India.	
	
The	UNHCR	representatives	also	saw	refugees	as	belonging	in	a	community,	which	
in	 turn	was	 grounded	 in	 the	 nation.	 Thus,	 another	 reason	 I	 was	 given	 for	 why	 it	
made	 more	 sense	 to	 consider	 citizenship	 as	 an	 option	 for	 Hindu‐Sikh	 Afghan	
refugees,	 was	 that	 they	 had	 a	 “strong	 sense	 of	 community”	 themselves	 and	were	
“well	integrated”	into	local	communities	in	Delhi,	and	thus	didn’t	necessarily	require	
the	same	amount	of	support	“ethnic”	Afghan	refugees	might	need	in	order	to	live	in	
India.	 Interestingly,	 the	PR	representative	 later	suggested	“ethnic	Afghan”	refugees	
had	 a	 comparative	 advantage	 over	 other	 refugee	 groups,	 particularly	 Somalis,	 as	
they	“have	an	easier	time	in	India	…	[and]	are	able	to	pick	up	the	language	quickly…	
[as]	 it’s	close	 to	 their	 language…	[so]	 it’s	easier	 for	 them	to	 integrate.”	She	did	not	
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appear	to	catch	any	contradiction	with	her	earlier	statements	about	their	inability	to	
assimilate.	
	
The	 SLIC	 representative	 expressed	 annoyance	with	 the	UNHCR’s	 attitudes	 toward	
the	Hindu	and	Sikh	Afghans,	suggesting	that	the	program	to	procure	citizenship	for	
them	 was	 in	 large	 part	 a	 result	 of	 the	 ever	 dwindling	 funding	 for	 UNHCR	 India	
operations	(this	point	is	addressed	again	at	the	end	of	the	chapter).	“They’ve	really	
been	left	in	the	lurch,”	the	representative	sighed,	“it’s	really	wrong	how	the	UNHCR	
has	 ignored	them,	saying	they	are	well‐integrated.”	The	representative’s	point	was	
not	so	much	that	the	UNHCR	specifically	strove	to	singly	ignore	the	Hindu	and	Sikh	
Afghans,	 but	 that	 it	 was	 easier	 for	 the	 organization	 to	 step	 away	 from	 its	
responsibility	 toward	 them	 rather	 than	 the	 “ethnic”	 Afghans	 precisely	 because	
Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans	are	seen	as	belonging	in	India.	“The	UNHCR	has	no	money	and	
they’ve	told	 the	Khalsa	Diwan39	people”	What	she	was	 implying	was	 that	since	 the	
UNHCR	 was	 facing	 severe	 funding	 cuts	 and	 had	 to	 cut	 back	 on	 all	 programming,	
seeking	Indian	citizenship	 for	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans	was	seen	not	only	as	 logical	but	
also	cost‐effective	in	the	long‐term.	
	
As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 process	 of	 stereotyping	 refugee	 identity	 is	 presented	 as	
logical	 and	 neutral,	 yet	 it	 is	 inherently	 political	 and	 reflects	 the	 judgments	 and	
assumptions	 of	 bureaucrats	 and	 policy	 makers.	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 way	 the	
program	to	procure	citizenship	for	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans	was	affected	by	policy	at	the	
international	 level	of	UNHCR	funding.	However,	 the	splitting	of	the	Afghan	refugee	
label	 into	 the	Hindu‐Sikh	 and	 “ethnic	Afghan”	 categories	 also	 appeared	 to	parallel	
Hindu	nationalist	discourse	on	the	religious	nature	of	the	nation	state.	To	this	end,	I	
asked	 the	 UNHCR	 PR	 representative	 how	 the	 two	 terms	 ‘Hindu‐Sikh’	 and	 ‘ethnic’	
were	arrived	at,	indicating	the	choice	of	‘ethnic’	as	a	category	was	odd.	It	was	not	the	
distinction	between	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans	and	other	Afghans	that	was	strange,	as	even	
in	Afghanistan	Hindus	and	Sikhs	are	often	considered	together	under	the	label	Ahle	
Hunood	 (people	of	 India).	 	Rather,	 the	combining	of	all	other	Afghan	nationals	 into	
the	category	of	being	 ‘ethnically’	Afghan	was	unusual.	Ethnicity	 in	Afghanistan	 is	a	
																																																								
39	Founded	in	Jalalabad	in	Eastern	Afghanistan	in	the	1920s	to	address	the	social	and	economic	needs	
of	Afghanistan’s	Hindu	and	Sikh	community,	the	Khalsa	Diwan	now	has	offices	in	Afghanistan,	India,	
the	UK,	and	Germany.	Along	with	the	Afghan	Hindu‐Sikh	Welfare	Society	(AHSWS),	the	Khalsa	Diwan	
is	one	of	the	main	organizations	serving	the	Afghan	Hindu‐Sikh	community	in	Delhi.	
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complex	issue,	as	indicated	in	the	foregoing	chapter,	and	while	ethnic	identities	are	
fluid	 and	 overlapping	 and	 questions	 exist	 about	 the	 nexus	 of	 Afghan‐Pashtun‐
national	 identity,	 Afghan	 nationality	 would	 not	 necessarily	 be	 considered	 as	 an	
ethnicity,	just	as	being	Indian	in	India	is	not	considered	an	ethnicity.	Surprised	at	the	
question,	the	UNHCR	representative	responded	nonchalantly	with	“I	suppose	it	has	
always	been	like	that.”	
	
To	pursue	the	origin	of	the	 ‘ethnic	Afghan’	category	and	the	splitting	of	the	Afghan	
refugee	label,	I	later	spoke	with	a	family	friend40,	Yasmin,	who	had	been	involved	in	
the	 setting	 up	 of	 the	 UNHCR	 offices	 in	 Delhi	 in	 the	 1980s	 and	 now	 held	 an	
international	 post	 with	 the	 organization.	 Yasmin	 gave	 a	 slightly	 different	
perspective:	
“In	 the	eighties,	 the	government	was	 concerned	with	 the	 sudden	growth	of	
the	Afghan	community	in	Delhi,	you	know,	‘why	are	they	here’?	So	they	asked	
the	 UNHCR	 to	 help…	 In	 ‘92/’93,	 suddenly,	 many	 Hindu‐Sikhs	 arrived,	 but	
their	situation	is	different,	that	is	why	they	are	a	different	group.”	
While	still	not	providing	an	origin	 for	the	term	“Hindu‐Sikh”,	Yasmin’s	explanation	
points	to	possible	rationales.	Firstly,	that	Hindu	and	Sikh	Afghan	refugees	are	from	a	
different	generation	of	refugees	and	thus	categorized	differently.	The	second	layer	of	
Yasmin’s	statement	points	 to	 the	consideration	of	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans	as	naturally	
belonging	 to	 India,	 and	 thus	 not	worthy	 of	 government	 interest	 or	 suspicion.	 The	
Indian	 government’s	 concern	with	 the	 influx	 of	Muslim	 Afghans	 but	 not	 with	 the	
arrival	of	Afghan	Hindus	and	Sikhs	was	also	touched	upon	by	a	worker	at	SLIC	who	
confided	 in	 frustration	 that	 the	 term	 “ethnic”	 Afghans	 was	 merely	 shorthand	 for	
‘Muslim	Afghans’,	and	represented	an	anti‐Muslim	political	environment.	
	
Indeed,	 many	 Afghan	 refugees	 I	 met	 saw	 the	 Indian	 government’s	 interest	 in	
Afghans	 as	 hostile.	 Several	 Afghan	 Sikhs	 related	 a	 conviction	 that	 the	 Indian	
government	was	 biased	 against	 all	 Afghans	 regardless	 of	 religion	because	 of	 their	
cultural	 affiliation	 to	 the	 Islamic	 republic,	 and	was	 purposefully	 standing	 in	 their	
																																																								
40	As	related	in	the	first	footnote	of	section	II,	UNHCR	staff	had	been	informed	not	to	meet	with	me.	I	
had	 thus	 had	 to	 resort	 to	 a	 sort	 of	 social	 ambush	 through	 family	 members	 in	 getting	 invited	 to	
Yasmin’s	 father’s	 house	 during	 a	 period	where	 she	was	 visiting	Delhi	 from	her	 international	 post.	
Though	we	knew	each	other	 socially	 and	professionally	 from	my	 time	 in	Afghanistan,	 Yasmin	was	
very	cold	and	loathe	to	speak	to	me	about	the	UNHCR’s	history	in	Delhi,	keeping	discussion	very	short	
and	refusing	my	invitations	to	meet	again	socially.	
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way	 to	 resettlement	 or	 citizenship.	 The	UNHCR	PR	 representative	 dismissed	 such	
views	 and	 suggested	 the	 government	was	possibly	 suspicious	 of	Afghans	 entering	
India	 because	 of	 threats	 of	 terrorism,	 but	 that	 this	 might	 also	 be	 positive	 in	 a	
roundabout	 way.	 She	 intimated	 that	 Afghan	 refugees	 were	 placed	 in	 a	 better	
position	than	other	refugee	groups,	as	
“Afghan	refugees	get	processed	the	most	quickly:	within	six	months…[since]	
the	government	wants	us	to	process	[them]	very	quickly.	Of	course,	don’t	tell	
them	that!”		
The	 PR	 representative	made	 this	 statement	with	 reference	 to	 the	 2001	 and	 2008	
terrorist	 attacks	 in	 Delhi	 and	 Bombay,	 alluding	 to	 the	 government’s	 possible	
suspicion	of	Muslims	or	people	from	Muslim	majority	countries	being	terrorists.	For	
the	 representative,	 the	 government’s	 fear	 of	 Muslims	 –	 assumed	 rather	 than	
explicitly	stated	–	translated	into	a	boon	for	Afghans	in	getting	processed	with	more	
urgency41.		
	
If	 the	 ‘ethnic	 Afghan’	 label	was	 a	way	 to	 separate	 the	 Hindus	 and	 Sikhs	 from	 the	
Muslims,	I	wondered	what	this	meant	for	the	many	Afghan	Christian	converts	whose	
population	 in	 Delhi,	 according	 to	 church	 leaders,	 was	 growing.	 The	 UNHCR	
representatives	were	sceptical	on	whether	the	population	was	growing	and	insisted	
that	 they	 did	 not	 keep	 any	 records	 on	 religious	 adherence	 and	 that	 the	 Afghan	
Christian	 converts	 were	 counted	 under	 the	 ‘ethnic	 Afghan’	 label.	 The	 SLIC	
representative,	who	worked	closely	with	a	number	of	Afghan	Christians	claiming	to	
receive	 threats	 from	 Afghanistan	 and	 within	 Delhi,	 also	 voiced	 scepticism	 of	
converts’	intentions.	Recognising	they	should	be	afforded	recognition	of	their	rights,	
the	representative	cynically	asked:	
“The	 question	 is:	 How	 come	 you	 have	 lost	 your	 faith?	 Have	 you	 converted	
because	 you	 are	 getting	 benefit	 from	 the	 church…	because,	 see,	 the	 church	
can	also	give	you	benefits:	 education,	money,	 etc.	…	Some	subsidies	you	do	
get	[from	the	UNHCR],	but	that	can	be	one	attraction	[of	the	church].	So	even	
																																																								
41	There	 is	 no	 available	 documentary	 evidence	 for	 governmental	 bias	 against	 Afghan	 Muslims.	
Baujard	 (2008),	 however,	 mentions	 that	 the	 Indian	 Government	 communicated	 to	 the	 UNHCR	 in	
2001	that,	following	the	toppling	of	the	Taliban	regime	in	Afghanistan,	it	would	adopt	a	policy	of	no	
longer	furnishing	residence	permits	to	Afghan	refugees,	excepting	Afghan	Hindus	and	Sikhs.	Baujard	
further	 describes	 how	 the	 UNHCR	was	 able	 to	 sidestep	 this	 policy	 directive	 through	 bureaucratic	
procedure	and	negotiation	with	the	government	of	India.	
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if	 you’re	 just	 going	 there	 superficially,	 at	 least	 you’re	 getting	 something	 to	
eat;	which	is	the	struggle	here...	Is	that	the	reason	[they	are	converting]?”	
For	 the	 UNHCR	 and	 its	 implementing	 partners,	 the	 Afghan	 Christian	 convert	
refugees	were	a	dubious	category	that	had	to	be	recognized,	but	whose	actual	status	
as	‘real’	Christians	and,	in	turn,	as	real	refugees	was	questionable.	
	
The	suspicion	of	the	authenticity	of	the	Afghan	Christian	converts’	decision	reflects	in	
one	way	the	general	suspicion	under	which	the	refugee	comes	into	being	at	the	state	
scale	 (a	 fact	 that	 is	 returned	 to	 in	 chapter	 six	 in	 considering	 the	 effect	 on	 forms	of	
Afghan	 community	 at	 the	 state	 scale	 in	Delhi).	 Refugees	 are	 suspicious	 objects,	 but	
some	 more	 so	 than	 others.	 In	 this	 case	 the	 Afghan	 Christian	 converts	 serve	 as	 an	
interesting	parallel	to	the	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans.	The	latter’s	assumed	belonging	in	India	
reflects	how	at	 the	 state	 scale,	 language,	 culture,	 and	 specifically	Hindu	 religion	are	
being	rearticulated	as	grounded	in	the	Indian	state.	Hindu	nationalist	feelings	are	not	
only	reproduced	through	the	political	engagement	of	various	groups	advocating	and	
resisting	 ideas	 of	 a	 Hindu	 nation	 (Corbridge	 and	 Harriss	 2000)	 but	 also	 through	 a	
“banal	 nationalism”	 (Billig	 1995)	 where	 Hindu	 nationalist	 discourse	 is	 being	
normalized	 in	 everyday	 life	 via	 popular	 media	 consumption	 (Malhotra	 and	 Alagh	
2004;	Manuel	2008)	and	government	practices	(Bénéï	2014;	Simpson	2004;	Sundar	
2004),	 and	 the	positioning	of	Muslims	 (Jaffrelot	1996;	 Sbriccoli	 and	Simpson	2013)	
and	 Christians	 (Froerer	 2006)	 as	 national	 others.	 In	 this	 context,	 non‐Hindu‐Sikh	
Afghan	 refugees	 are	 assumed	 and	 expected	 to	 demonstrate	 a	 similar	 emotional	
connection	to	Afghanistan,	which	is	seen	as	a	Muslim	country.	The	decision	to	convert	
to	 Christianity	 thus	 calls	 into	 question	 Afghan	 Christian	 refugees’	 attachment	 to	
Afghanistan	and	renders	their	truth	of	being	refugees	questionable	by	consequence42.	
	
At	 the	 state	 scale,	 belonging	 as	 Afghan	 in	 Delhi	 means	 not	 belonging	 to	 India	
emotionally	 or	 physically.	 In	 this	 way,	 Hindu‐Sikh	 Afghans	 are	 seen	 as	 “coming	
home”	and	desiring	to	stay	in	India,	whereas	other	Afghan	refugees	are	considered	
to	not	feel	any	such	desire	or	experience	any	connection	to	India.	Of	course,	studies	
																																																								
42	Rasanayagam	 (2014)	 discusses	 how	 the	 fusion	 of	 religion	 with	 ethno‐national	 identity	 in	 post‐
Soviet	Uzbekistan	results	in	a	situation	where	religious	conversion	out	of	the	religion	associated	with	
one’s	ethnic	group	is	equated	with	cultural	inauthenticity	and	subsequently	with	not	being	a	proper	
citizen	and	rather	a	potential	 security	 threat.	The	case	of	Afghans	converting	 to	Christianity	would	
not	be	seen	as	more	or	less	dangerous	because	of	conversion.	Rather	the	act	of	conversion	would	be	
seen	as	a	potentially	dishonest	way	to	procure	refugee	status	in	India.	
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of	migration	have	moved	past	 a	 “methodological	 nationalism”	 (Wimmer	 and	Glick	
Schiller	2006)	that	addresses	migrants	as	belonging	to	spatially	static	communities	
or	homelands,	and	moving	between	defined	places	of	origin	and	destination	(Basch	
et	al	 1994).	 Instead,	migrants’	 belonging	 is	 suggested	 as	multi‐local	 (Levitt	 2011),	
where	 bodies,	 communities,	 and	 even	 nations	 come	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 multi‐
layered	and	variegated	(Ahmed	et	al	2003).	In	the	following	chapters	this	process	is	
explored	 through	 the	 scales	of	 the	 individual	 and	community.	As	a	prelude	 to	 this	
discussion,	I	end	this	chapter	with	a	discussion	on	the	UNHCR’s	citizenship	program	
for	 Hindu‐Sikh	 Afghans.	 The	 ethnography	 from	 the	 Afghan	 Sikh	 community	
illustrates	 the	 possibility	 of	 multiple	 belongings	 and	 raises	 questions	 of	 how	 the	
categories	of	the	individual	and	community	are	imagined	at	the	state	scale.	
3.4 The	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans	and	Citizenship:	Belonging	and	Scale	
As	noted	at	the	beginning	of	the	chapter,	Afghan	refugees	are	the	category	through	
which	other	Afghans	in	the	city	are	considered.	The	discussions	above	illustrate	how	
at	the	state	scale	Afghans	are	considered	to	not	belong	in	India	and	are	understood	
instead	 as	 individuals	 constituted	 through	 emotional	 and	 physical	 ties	 to	 a	
community	grounded	in	the	state	of	Afghanistan.	The	category	of	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghan	
refugee,	 however,	 destabilizes	 this	 view.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 explore	 both	 the	
bureaucratic	 process	 of	 the	UNHCR’s	 citizenship	 program	 for	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans,	
and	 the	 experience	 of	 these	 refugees	 in	 migrating	 to	 India.	 A	 description	 of	 the	
bureaucratic	nature	of	the	citizenship	scheme	illustrates,	on	the	one	hand,	how	the	
state	 scale	operates	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 policy	development	 and	 implementation.	
Individual	 stories	 of	 migration	 reveal,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 how	 other	 forms	 of	
belonging	might	be	considered	outside	the	state	scale.	
The	Citizenship	Scheme	
During	my	 fieldwork,	 one	 of	 the	 headline	 stories	 on	 the	UNHCR	 India	website	was	
about	 an	 Afghan	 Sikh	woman	who	 became	 an	 Indian	 citizen	 through	 the	 UNHCR’s	
assistance	and	was	now	teaching	Hindi	to	Afghan	refugee	children	in	her	community.	
Assisting	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans	on	their	path	to	Indian	citizenship	was	presented	by	the	
UNHCR	 as	 one	 of	 the	 success	 stories	 of	 the	 organization’s	 India	 operations.	 In	
conversations	with	members	of	 the	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghan	community,	however,	a	very	
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different	 story	emerged:	 that	 the	program	had	not	been	successful	and	was	 instead	
used	by	the	UNHCR	as	a	cover	for	eschewing	responsibility	toward	the	community.	
	
In	 my	 first	 meeting	 with	 the	 UNHCR,	 the	 legal	 adviser	 explained	 that	 until	 2004	
Indian	citizenship	could	be	granted	to	anyone	born	to	an	Indian	parent	as	long	as	the	
non‐Indian	parent	was	not	an	illegal	alien,	but	that	very	few	Afghan	Hindu	and	Sikh	
children	were	able	to	get	citizenship	that	way.	The	UNHCR	had	thus	discussed	with	
the	 government	 the	 possibility	 of	 extending	 citizenship	 to	 the	 Afghan	Hindus	 and	
Sikhs	 through	 a	 policy	 like	 that	 of	 the	 2004	 Citizenship	 Amendment	 Rules	which	
recognized	Pakistani	Hindus	and	Sikhs	living	in	Gujarat	and	Rajasthan43	as	a	group	
to	be	provided	a	facilitated	process	for	attaining	Indian	citizenship.	The	discussions	
were	 unsuccessful	 and	 in	 2007,	 the	 adviser	 explained,	 the	 UNHCR	 decided	 to	
undertake	 a	 program	 to	 assist	 Afghan	 Hindus	 and	 Sikhs	 in	 navigating	 the	
governmental	 bureaucracy	 in	 applying	 for	 citizenship.	 “At	 the	 time	 approximately	
7,500	people	were	eligible,	 of	which	around	5,000	were	 interested	 in	 citizenship,”	
the	adviser	began,	
“the	 whole	 process	 is	 extremely	 labour	 intensive.	 First	 the	 applications	 are	
submitted	to	the	local	civil	authority,	the	Subdivisional	Magistrate	(SDM),	from	
where	 they	are	sent	 to	 the	FRRO	 for	police	verification	and	 then	returned	 to	
the	 SDM	 to	 be	 submitted	 to	 the	 state	 government,	 from	 where	 they	 are	
provided	to	the	Central	Government…	to	the	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs	(MHA).”	
In	one	breath,	 the	adviser	had	reduced	 the	 “labour	 intensive”	process	 to	a	smooth	
bureaucratic	conveyer	belt.	
	
The	adviser	conceded	that	there	had	been	setbacks	to	the	program.	She	stated	that	
in	2009,	the	government	retroactively	amended	the	application	process,	which	had	
several	 implications.	The	main	amendment	was	an	 increase	 in	 the	 application	 fee.	
Where	the	entire	process	had	initially	cost	an	applicant	Rs	1,700,	with	Rs	200	paid	
upon	application	and	the	remainder	at	the	end	of	the	process,	 the	new	regulations	
required	all	applicants	to	pay	a	total	of	Rs	14,700,	with	Rs	1,500	due	at	the	time	of	
																																																								
43	The	 community	 concerned	was	of	Hindus	 and	Sikhs	 from	Pakistan	who	had	been	displaced	as	 a	
result	of	the	1965	war	with	Pakistan.	Pakistani	Hindus	regularly	arrive	in	India	seeking	asylum	but	
are	not	granted	citizenship.	During	my	fieldwork	there	was	much	media	coverage	of	a	large	number	
of	such	asylum	seekers	arrived	from	Sindh,	as	there	was	a	possibility	they	might	be	deported.	They	
were,	in	the	end,	not	deported.	
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application.	 The	 increase	 applied	 not	 only	 to	 new	 applications,	 but	 also	 to	 those	
applications	still	under	consideration.	
	
The	more	 severe	 implication	 for	Afghan	 refugees	 in	particular	was	with	 regard	 to	
the	documents	required	for	attaining	Indian	citizenship.	Normally,	applicants	must	
submit	evidence	of	renunciation	of	previous	citizenship	and	their	cancelled	previous	
passport	with	the	application	for	Indian	citizenship.	Since	many	Afghan	Hindus	and	
Sikhs	 did	 not	 have	 valid	 passports	 or	 other	 documentation	 demonstrating	 their	
Afghan	 citizenship,	 the	UNHCR	had	 reach	an	agreement	with	 the	government	 that	
they	could	be	exempted	from	this	requirement	with	the	submission	of	a	waiver	form	
and	an	attached	affidavit	of	UNHCR	refugee	status.	The	amendment	did	not	take	into	
account	 this	 exception,	 and	 from	 2010	 all	 Afghan	 Hindus	 and	 Sikhs	 were	 again	
required	to	provide	the	requisite	documents	(discussed	in	more	detail	below).	While	
this	 was	 difficult	 for	 new	 applicants,	 it	 was	 even	more	 frustrating	 for	 those	 who	
were	 already	 in	 process.	 “We	would	 never	 ask	 them	 to	 go	 to	 their	 embassy,”	 the	
adviser	 said,	 “plus	 the	Afghan	Embassy	charges	 them	a	non‐compounded	 fee	 for	a	
new	passport.”	
	
I	asked	the	legal	adviser	if	the	UNHCR	could	not	renegotiate	an	agreement	with	the	
government.	 “We	 have	 connections	 with	 high	 level	 government	 contacts,”	 replied	
the	adviser,	“but	unfortunately,	for	the	government,	a	population	of	4,000	people	is	
not	a	big	deal.”	She	mentioned	that	the	Khalsa	Diwan	had	tried	to	lobby	the	National	
Committee	of	Minorities	to	no	avail.	“The	most	we	can	do,	through	SLIC,	is	to	provide	
counselling	for	interested	parties	and	conduct	follow‐up	for	applications	currently	in	
process.”	The	description	provided	by	the	UNHCR	was	as	clinical	as	the	sterile	office	
room	in	which	I	was	conducting	the	interview.	Everything	was	done	according	to	a	
procedure;	 the	hiccups	were	merely	procedural	hurdles	 in	neat	rows	and	columns	
on	printed	paper.	
	
As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 UNHCR	 operates	 at	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 bureaucracy.	 The	
representatives	 I	spoke	with	were	at	pains	 to	explain	their	hands	were	tied	as	 the	
organization	 could	 only	 work	 within	 the	 legal	 framework	 in	 India	 and	 take	
responsibility	 for	 refugee	 status	 determination.	 That	 they	 engaged	 implementing	
partners	 to	provide	additional	 services,	 they	described,	was	a	humanitarian	action	
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for	which	 funding	 from	the	 international	 community	was	waning.	Already,	we	can	
see	in	the	helplessness	expressed	by	the	UNHCR	representatives	how	the	state	scale	
operates	 unevenly	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 policy.	 For	 the	 government	 of	 India,	 the	
change	 in	policy	was	made	with	 considerations	 that	did	not	 take	 into	 account	 the	
reality	of	 implementation	for	the	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghan	refugees.	Nestled	in	the	swish	
south	 Delhi	 neighbourhood	 of	 Vasant	 Vihar	 with	 other	 international	 NGOs	 and	
embassies,	 however,	 the	 UNHCR	 operated	 at	 a	 level	where	 their	 concern	was	 the	
clarification	 and	 development	 of	 policy	 and	 reporting	 of	 statistics	 to	 the	
international	community.	“If	you’d	like	more	information,”	the	legal	adviser	added,	“I	
can	put	you	 in	 touch	with	SLIC.	They	will	be	able	 to	 inform	you	on	the	citizenship	
issue	in	much	more	detail.”	
	
A	visit	 to	 the	offices	of	SLIC	revealed	a	 less	clinical	view	of	 the	process.	Unlike	the	
UNHCR,	 SLIC’s	 offices	 are	 located	 off	 a	 small	 alley	 in	 Bhogal,	 a	 lower	 class	
neighbourhood	home	to	many	refugees.	The	nondescript	offices	are	announced	by	a	
small	 Human	 Rights	 Lawyers	 Network	 (HRLN)	 sign	 dwarfed	 by	 billboards,	 large	
signs	 of	 surrounding	 shops,	 and	window	unit	 air‐conditioners	 jutting	 out	 into	 the	
alley.	One	would	not	know	there	is	an	office	building	among	the	bustle	of	cars,	carts,	
dogs,	 and	other	animals	 in	 the	alley	 if	not	 for	a	 lone	watchman	sitting	outside	 the	
office.	It	was	raining	and	he	asked	me	to	stand	under	the	small	ledge	over	the	door	
while	 checking	 I	 was	 indeed	 expected.	 “I’m	 sorry,	 we	 just	 have	 to	 be	 a	 little	
cautious,”	the	SLIC	representative	later	apologized.	
	
The	 atmosphere	 inside	 was	 markedly	 different	 from	 the	 sterile	 silence	 and	
detachedness	of	 the	UNHCR	offices.	The	SLIC	offices	 lay	past	 a	 small	 reception	 in	 a	
long,	narrow	room	that	had	been	divided	into	offices	with	plywood	dividers	creating	a	
central	 corridor	 with	 little	 rooms	 with	 lockable	 doors	 onto	 the	 corridor	 and	 an	
internal	walkway	 between	 the	 offices.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 UNHCR	 building,	 the	 SLIC	
offices	did	not	get	natural	light,	but	were	well	lit	and	filled	with	books	and	papers	and	
buzzed	with	the	hum	of	chatter	 from	phone	conversations,	 interviews	and	meetings	
being	conducted,	and	with	a	general	feeling	that	important	work	was	being	done.	The	
downstairs	 library	 and	 resource	 centre	was	 comparatively	 quiet,	with	 caseworkers	
and	an	intern	poring	over	documents	and	books.	I	did	not	visit	the	two	upper	levels,	
but	the	shelves	of	paperwork	and	requests	for	documents	being	shouted	over	phones	
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and	 across	 the	 office	 underscored	 the	 level	 of	 implementation	 SLIC	 operated	 at,	
mediating	between	refugees	needs	and	official	requirements	through	the	production	
of	“paper	truths”	(Tarlo	2003)	to	feed	the	bureaucratic	machinery.	
	
The	SLIC	representative	I	spoke	with	sat	at	a	busy	table	covered	with	a	sheet	of	glass	
under	 which	 photographs,	 lists	 of	 names,	 phone	 numbers,	 and	 paperwork	 were	
frozen	in	place.	Three	chairs	were	crammed	into	the	small	cubicle	space	in	front	of	
the	desk	and	to	the	wall	on	their	side	hung	a	corkboard	affixed	with	informational	
posters	 in	 English	 and	 a	 flowchart	 of	 the	 naturalization	 process	 in	 Punjabi.	 She	
chuckled	when	I	relayed	the	information	I’d	received	from	the	UNHCR.	“We	started	
the	naturalization	project	 in	2003,”	she	corrected	me,	 “at	 the	 time	the	UNHCR	had	
been	paying	the	application	fees.”	The	SLIC	representative	suggested	that	the	2009	
fee	 hike	 was	 partially	 due	 to	 the	 government	 trying	 to	 extract	 money	 from	 the	
UNHCR.	The	 simple,	 straightforward	process	 suggested	by	 the	UNHCR,	 I	was	 told,	
was	slightly	more	complicated.	
“We	fill	out	all	 the	forms	and	submit	them	with	the	fee	and	advertisement44.	
One	 of	 the	 problems	 though	 is	 that	while	 on	 paper	 the	process	 should	 take	
nine	months	 to	one	year,	 there	have	been	so	many	changes	and	 transfers	of	
officers	and	clerks	that	[SLIC]	is	constantly	having	to	brief	new	people	in	the	
system	on	the	changes…	[and	with]	 the	retroactive	 law	change…	 it	has	been	
taking	 so	 long…	we’ve	 had	 to	 keep	 furnishing	 copies	 of	 new	 documents	 for	
applicants	as	their	original	documents	expire	while	the	applications	have	been	
in	process.”	
The	actual	material	process,	 it	appeared,	was	much	messier	 than	what	 the	UNHCR	
representative	had	described,	and	was	further	complicated	by	delays	in	the	process	
and	constant	changes	of	governmental	office	personnel.	
	
SLIC	must	compile	seven	copies	of	each	application	to	submit	to	the	SDM.	One	copy	
is	provided	to	the	office	of	the	Deputy	Commissioner	of	Police	(DCP)	and	the	FRRO	
each,	so	they	may	conduct	an	investigation	of	person	for	the	applicant.	At	the	same	
time,	 five	copies	are	provided	to	the	Delhi	Secretariat	(DS)	to	begin	the	citizenship	
application	process.	Once	the	SDM	receives	the	completed	copies	of	the	application	
																																																								
44	Adults	not	married	to	an	Indian	citizen,	who	wish	to	apply	for	citizenship,	are	required	to	place	an	
advertisement	 in	 the	newspaper	announcing	 their	 intention	 to	apply	 for	 Indian	citizenship,	 in	 case	
there	are	any	objections.	
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from	the	FRRO	and	DCP,	 they	are	passed	on	 to	 the	DS	 to	complete	 the	application	
file,	which	is	then	ready	to	be	submitted	to	the	MHA.	Once	the	MHA	has	verified	the	
completed	application,	the	applicant	is	submitted	a	letter	with	a	request	to	provide:	
the	 final	 fee,	 their	 old	 passport,	 and	 a	 certificate	 of	 renunciation	 of	 their	 old	
citizenship.	Once	 these	are	submitted,	 the	applicant	 is	 invited	to	 take	an	oath	on	a	
new	nationality	certificate.	
	
The	 fallout	 from	the	2009	Citizenship	Act	amendment	that	 the	UNHCR	legal	adviser	
had	referenced	offhand	has	had	very	serious	implications	for	SLIC	aside	from	the	fee	
hike.	 The	 amendment	 also	 introduced	 a	 new	 form,	which	meant	 the	 approximately	
4,000	applications	still	in	process	had	to	be	re‐filed	and	new	documents	submitted	to	
each	office,	with	new	officers	and	clerks	who	had	not	been	briefed	and	lobbied	on	the	
naturalization	process	or	the	special	case	of	Afghan	Hindus	and	Sikhs	who	had	been	
allowed	to	submit	a	UNHCR	affidavit	 instead	of	a	passport.	This	bureaucratic	hurdle	
on	the	 Indian	side	was	 furthered	by	a	recent	directive	 from	the	MHA	requiring	that	
applicants	 not	 just	 provide	 a	 certificate	 of	 renunciation	 from	 the	 Afghanistan	
Embassy,	 but	 also	 a	Certificate	 of	No‐Objection	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 applicant	had	no	
criminal	convictions	or	outstanding	debts	in	Afghanistan	(discussed	below).	
	 	
The	 variation	 between	 the	 descriptions	 of	 the	 citizenship	 process	 for	 Hindu‐Sikh	
Afghans	offered	by	representatives	from	SLIC	and	the	UNHCR	how	the	state	scale	is	
productive	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 policy	 creation	 and	 implementation.	 Governmental	
policy	is	created	with	an	assumption	of	what	it	means	to	be	a	person	at	the	state	scale,	
that	is	a	citizen	with	documents	demonstrating	previous	national	belonging.	Policy	is	
produced	to	work	with	such	persons.	The	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans’	reality	however	does	
not	align	at	the	 level	of	 implementation	and	the	UNHCR	intervenes	at	a	policy	 level,	
deploying	concepts	of	belonging	at	the	state	scale	to	consider	the	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans	
as	persons	naturally	belonging	 in	 India.	The	efforts	of	 SLIC	 to	assist	 refugees	 in	 the	
citizenship	process	demonstrate	how	the	state	scale	 is	produced	bureaucratically	at	
the	 individual	 level	 through	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 files	 and	documents	 through	which	
refugees	must	demonstrate	their	selves	as	eligible	to	be	citizens.	
	
In	the	case	of	individual	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghan	refugees,	however,	even	demonstrating	
eligibility	 does	 not	 ensure	 the	 ability	 to	 become	 a	 naturalized	 citizen.	 In	my	 first	
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meeting	with	Khalsa	Diwan	members	in	their	West	Delhi	office,	the	first	issue	raised	
was	 the	 UNHCR	 citizenship	 scheme	 and	 how	 the	 byzantine	 process	 requiring	
cooperation	 of	 multiple	 levels	 of	 governmental	 bureaucracy	 in	 both	 India	 and	
Afghanistan,	 coupled	with	 the	 fee	hike	had	placed	 citizenship	outside	 the	 reach	of	
many	 in	 the	 community.	 “There	 are	 about	 20,000	 of	 us	 here	 in	 Delhi,”	 a	 Diwan	
member	explained,	quoting	a	number	much	higher	than	the	official	UNHCR	estimate	
of	Afghan	refugees	in	the	city,	“but	we	are	very	dispersed.	Our	main	problem	is	the	
citizenship	 issue,	and	more	precisely	 the	 issue	of	 the	no‐objection	certificate.”	The	
Diwan	member	explained	that	
“Prior	to	2008,	people	would	apply	for	citizenship	and	their	Afghan	passports	
would	 be	 sent	 to	 the	 Afghanistan	 Embassy	 with	 a	 request	 to	 approve	 the	
change	 in	 citizenship.	 The	 embassy	 would	 not	 respond	 and	 the	 Indian	
government	would	 cast	 a	 blind	 eye	 (nazar	andaz	mi	kona).	 From	2009,	 the	
government	of	 India	started	requiring	a	certificate	saying	that	the	applicant	
didn’t	 have	 any	 remaining	 responsibilities	 (masooliyat)	 in	 Afghanistan	 and	
had	 not	 committed	 any	 crimes.	 The	 community	 approached	 the	 embassy	
saying	‘please	grant	us	this	certificate,’	and	we	were	told	the	embassy	had	no	
objection	 to	doing	 so	but	 that	 it	was	not	 in	 their	hands.	 In	order	 to	get	 the	
certificate,	 an	 individual’s	 file	 is	 sent	 from	 the	 embassy	 to	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Foreign	 Affairs	 in	 Afghanistan,	who	 pass	 it	 by	 the	Ministry	 of	 Justice,	 after	
which	 it	 is	 sent	 to	 the	 presidential	 cabinet45	and	 finally	 Karzai’s	 desk	 for	
personal	approval.	Tell	me,	what	need	is	there	for	this	for	an	eighteen	year‐
old	child	who	was	merely	five	or	six	years	old	when	moving	here	[to	India]?”	
	
Many	Sikhs	I	spoke	with	expressed	frustration	at	having	been	left	in	the	cold	by	the	
UNHCR	and	the	governments	of	both	India	and	Afghanistan.	“You	see,”	a	man	once	
asked	me	thinking	I	was	a	journalist,	“they	send	the	Muslims	to	another	country	but	
not	us…	but	 then	why	don’t	 they	give	us	citizenship?”	He	concluded:	“it	 is	because	
the	 government	 is	 afraid	 of	 us	 [Afghan	 Sikhs]…	 that	 we	 come	 from	 Afghanistan.”	
Many	betrayed	a	sense	of	abandonment	and	alienation.	 “As	 the	Urdu	saying	goes,”	
one	 Diwan	 member	 said	 sadly,	 “a	 washerman’s	 donkey46	belongs	 neither	 at	 the	
																																																								
45	He	used	the	term	“majlis‐e	wuzura”	which	would	mean	the	presidential	cabinet,	but	he	might	have	
meant	to	refer	to	the	parliament.	
46	The	 idiomatic	 expression	 in	 Urdu	 refers	 to	 the	 washerman’s	 dog	 (dhobi	 ka	 kutta).	 This	 could,	
perhaps,	be	a	regional	variation.	
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house	 nor	 the	 docks,”	 i.e.	 neither	 here	 nor	 there.	 The	 sentiment	 was	 that	 he	
belonged	 in	 Afghanistan,	 but	 that	 in	 becoming	 a	 refugee,	 he	 could	 not	 belong	
anywhere.	
Afghan	Sikh	Experiences	
As	discussed	above,	at	the	state	scale,	the	Afghan	refugee	is	considered	as	a	person	
constituted	 through	 the	 nation‐state.	 The	 various	 bureaucracies	 operating	 at	
different	levels	deploy	this	concept	of	the	person	in	differing	ways	to	different	ends.	
However,	 as	 Navaro‐Yashin	 has	 demonstrated,	 these	 institutions	 and	 their	
bureaucratic	artefacts	are	not	only	productive	of	a	certain	reality,	but	also	“evoke	a	
complex	spectrum	of	affect”	(2012:82)	in	that	they	are	experienced,	perceived,	and	
reacted	 to	by	 individuals.	 In	doing	so,	 they	not	only	produce	 the	 truth	of	 the	state	
scale,	but	also	reflect	an	“abjected	underside”	(2007:95)	that	opposes	this	truth.	This	
disjuncture	 comes	 across	 in	 the	 sentiments	 of	 alienation	 and	not	belonging	 of	 the	
Diwan	 member,	 produced	 as	 a	 result	 of	 proving	 belonging	 in	 India.	 These	
sentiments	also	point	to	other	ways	of	considering	belonging	outside	the	state	scale,	
and	it	is	to	these	that	I	now	turn.	
	
One	of	the	Afghan	Sikhs	I	spoke	with	in	Delhi	was	Mr	Singh.	He	never	spoke	to	me	of	
his	occupation	or	what	he	did	in	Delhi;	I	knew	him	only	as	one	of	the	members	of	the	
Khalsa	Diwan,	to	which	he	was	passionately	committed.	As	with	many	Afghan	Sikh	
refugees,	 the	 Diwan	 had	 been	 the	 support	 that	 got	Mr	 Singh	 through	 the	 difficult	
process	of	migration.	Now	a	naturalized	Indian	citizen,	Mr	Singh	had	initially	come	
to	India	with	the	intention	to	return	to	Afghanistan.	He	arrived	with	his	family	in	the	
early	1980s,	unlike	most	Afghan	Hindu	and	Sikhs	who	migrated	during	the	civil	war	
period	of	1989‐1992.	 Singh	had	 sold	his	haveli	 –	 a	 large	house	–	 for	 a	 small	 price	
before	fleeing	Afghanistan,	and	spoke	of	it	several	times.	
	
I	once	asked	Mr	Singh	if	he	had	ever	felt	as	an	outsider	(beganah)	in	India?	“Look,”	
he	told	me,	
“the	younger	generation	don’t	know	about	Afghanistan…	about	those	times.	
People	like	me…	now	have	a	life	here	and	think	‘that	was	then,	it’s	over.’	But	
believe	me	over	the	29	years	that	I’ve	been	here	–	and	I’m	62	now	–	till	today,	
in	my	dreams	I	see	Jalalabad.	Delhi	is	not	the	place	I	see	in	my	dreams.”	
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He	then	proceeded	to	tell	me	how,	in	1993,	after	civil	war	when	the	Taliban	came	to	
power,	he	went	back	to	Afghanistan	with	the	intent	to	buy	back	his	house	and	return	
to	the	country.	He	arrived	in	Kabul	and	went	to	Jalalabad.	His	neighbours	were	happy	
to	see	him,	but	complained	about	the	nomadic	Kuchi	people	who	were	squatting	on	
the	land	opposite	his	house.	During	his	second	night	back,	two	masked	men	who	he	
suspects	were	members	of	 the	Kuchi	group,	came	to	his	hotel	room	and	threatened	
him	with	a	gun,	 telling	him	 to	 leave	and	 that	he	had	no	more	business	 there.	While	
telling	this	story,	Mr	Singh’s	eyes	went	misty.	“I	packed	up	the	next	day,	left	the	power	
of	attorney	with	my	uncle,	and	have	never	been	back,”	he	told	me.	What	Mr	Singh	did	
could	have	cost	him	his	refugee	status	had	he	been	found	out.	Luckily,	he	was	able	to	
come	back	 and	go	 through	 the	 long	and	–	 even	at	 that	 time	–	 expensive	process	of	
becoming	an	Indian	citizen.	Mr	Singh’s	story	of	belonging	in	India	was	in	some	ways	
more	a	story	about	not	being	able	to	belong	in	Afghanistan	anymore.	
	
While	 many	 of	 the	 Afghan	 Sikhs	 I	 spoke	 with	 shared	 sentiments	 similar	 to	 Mr	
Singh’s,	 there	 were	 of	 course	 also	 those	 who	 did	 simultaneously	 feel	 like	 they	
belonged	in	Afghanistan	and	also	had	a	place	in	India	(and	perhaps	even	elsewhere).	
One	 such	 individual	was	Mr	 Jasmeet,	who	was	able	 to	maintain	an	 identity	 that	 is	
both	Afghan	and	 Indian.	Mr	 Jasmeet	 came	 from	a	historically	wealthy,	upper‐class	
family	 that	 had	 historically	 moved	 between	 India	 and	 Afghanistan,	 and	 he	 had	
permanently	moved	to	 India	 in	 the	1970s	 for	business	purposes.	He	claimed	to	be	
among	 the	 first	Afghan	 Sikhs	 to	 get	 Indian	 citizenship,	 and	 explained	how	he	 saw	
himself	as	fully	Afghan	and	Indian.	While	he	was	well	known	and	respected	by	the	
wider	 Afghan	 Hindu	 and	 Sikh	 community,	 he	 was	 also	 somewhat	 ostracized	 by	
community	leaders	and	preferred	to	stay	away	from	their	politics.	“They	come	to	me	
when	 they	need	 financial	help,”	he	explained,	 “but	 they’re	not	 interested	 in	what	 I	
have	to	say.”	
	
The	Afghan	Hindus	and	Sikhs	whom	I	encountered	who	did	feel	they	belong	more	in	
India	held	political	beliefs	aligned	with	more	right‐wing	narratives	of	Afghan	Hindus	
and	Sikhs	as	victims	of	Muslim	violence,	and	would	often	stop	speaking	to	me	upon	
realizing	I	was	Muslim.	One	man	at	a	gurudwara47	in	the	west	Delhi	neighbourhood	
of	Tilak	Nagar	who	had	been	cursing	Muslims	in	my	presence	until	somebody	subtly	
																																																								
47	A	gurdwara	is	a	Sikh	house	of	worship	open	to	members	of	all	faiths.	
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indicated	to	him	I	was	a	Muslim,	turned	to	me	and	said	“of	course	not	all	Muslims	are	
like	that,	but	you	know	what	I	mean.”	As	I	left	the	gurudwara,	he	walked	out	with	me	
and	continued	to	try	and	engage	me	in	a	discussion	on	how	Hinduism	was	superior	
to	 Islam,	 about	 my	 Afghan	 ancestry,	 and	 about	 my	 ‘real	 reason’	 (maqsad)	 for	
conducting	research	in	Delhi.	Finally,	losing	his	temper	when	I	would	not	concede	to	
being	anti‐Hindu,	he	blurted	out:		
“Everything	you’re	saying	is	just	cheap	talk	(faqat	gap	ast),	a	man	can	seduce	a	
woman	 with	 words	 saying	 he	 will	 provide	 security	 and	 then	 once	 she	 has	
become	a	prostitute	(fahish)	he	will	discard	her	and	spread	rumours	about	her	
to	the	world.	You’re	loyal	to	Pakistan,	don’t	deny	it!	I	know	because	we	used	to	
be	in	the	same	position.	We	would	say	we	are	Afghan,	but	we	always	had	our	
eyes	on	India	(hamesha	nigah	beh	hindustan	dashtem)48.”	
I	 mentioned	 this	 story	 once	 to	 Mr	 Jasmeet.	 “It’s	 unfortunate,”	 he	 replied	 in	 his	
Anglicized	Indian	English,	“the	[political]	right	welcomed	a	lot	of	these	people	with	
open	 arms	 in	 the	 90s.	 They	 have	 nothing	 [financially],	 but	 their	 feelings	 are	 kept	
alive	by	the	RSS49	and	their	likes.”	
	
That	the	Hindu	nationalist	parties	in	Delhi	might	welcome	Afghan	Hindus	and	Sikhs	
is	not	unexpected.	The	rise	of	 the	Hindu	nationalist	parties	 in	Delhi	came	with	 the	
influx	of	Hindu	refugees	following	the	partition	of	British	India	in	1947.	The	Hindu	
nationalist	parties	capitalized	on	the	refugees’	resentment,	presenting	themselves	as	
the	benefactors	of	the	Hindu	refugee	community.	Many	refugees	from	West	Punjab	
(now	 in	 Pakistan)	 quickly	 rose	 to	 prominence	 in	 the	 right‐wing	 parties,	 and	 the	
majority	of	these	people	came	from	the	Khatri	caste	(Jaffrelot	2000)	to	which	many	
of	the	Hindus	and	Sikhs	in	Afghanistan	also	belong	(Emadi	2014;	Markovits	2000).	
Newly	 arrived	 refugees	 from	Afghanistan	would	 not	 only	 have	 found	 fellow	 caste	
members	 among	 the	 nationalist	 parties,	 but	 also	 a	 discourse	 of	 resentment	 that	
resonated	 with	 their	 experience	 of	 fleeing	 from	 a	 Muslim‐majority	 area,	 as	 Mr	
Jasmeet	suggested.	Of	course,	Afghan	Hindu	and	Sikh	refugees	might	be	drawn	to	the	
Hindu	 nationalist	 parties	 for	 a	 range	 of	 reasons,	 but	 unfortunately	 this	 was	 not	
																																																								
48	While	 the	 man	 was	 undoubtedly	 speaking	 of	 his	 own	 experience,	 his	 statement	 was	 also	 a	
reflection	of	the	Hindutva	assertion,	mentioned	further	above,	of	national	loyalties	being	connected	to	
religious	affiliation.		
49	The	Rashtriya	Swayamsevak	Sangh	(National	Volunteer	Organization)	is	a	right	wing,	paramilitary,	
volunteer	Hindu	nationalist	organization	based	on	an	ideology	of	service	to	the	nation.	
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something	I	could	pursue,	as	the	more	right‐wing	Afghan	Hindus	and	Sikhs	were	not	
willing	to	meet	with	me50.	
	
Where	some	found	religious	belonging	in	Hindu	nationalist	rhetoric,	the	majority	of	
the	 Afghan	 Sikhs	whom	 I	met	 in	 Delhi	 had	 a	more	 ecumenical	 view	 of	 how	 their	
religion	 connected	 them	 to	 India.	 	 “They	 think	 it	 is	 just	 in	 India	 that	 you	have	 the	
holy	 sites?”	Mr	 Singh	had	 exclaimed,	 “in	Afghanistan	we	 also	have	holy	 Sikh	 sites.	
Many	 important	 Sikhi	 figures	 come	 from	 Afghanistan!”	 The	 oldest	member	 of	 the	
Khalsa	Diwan,	Ghani	Saheb,	intervened	saying:	“You	know,	our	Guru	Nanak	Devji51…	
he	 came	 to	 Afghanistan.”	 Ghani	 Saheb’s	 statement	 was	 a	 prelude	 to	 a	 number	 of	
stories	of	how	Guru	Nanak	had	performed	the	Hajj	and	brought	peace	to	Hindus	and	
Muslims,	and	how	the	first	brick	of	the	Golden	Temple	in	Amritsar	had	been	laid	by	a	
Muslim	 saint.	 Ghani	 Saheb	 even	 drew	 the	 Golden	 Temple	 into	 connection	 with	
Afghanistan.	“You	know,	in	Afghanistan	they	told	me	I	could	never	go	to	Mecca,	but	
when	Zahir	Shah	came	to	visit	 India,	he	went	 to	visit	our	Darbar	Sahib52...	when	 it	
was	time	for	his	prayer,	the	guide	took	his	own	cape	(shaale	khodash)	and	lay	it	on	
the	 floor	 for	him	 to	pray.”	Ghani	 Saheb	 told	 this	 story	not	 to	 suggest	 Sikhism	was	
somehow	better	 than	Islam,	but	 to	emphasize	how	Sikhism	could	 flourish	 in	 India,	
Afghanistan,	or	elsewhere	because	of	its	acceptance	of	others.	
	
The	 descriptions	 above	 demonstrate	 how	Afghan	 Sikhs	 experience	 belonging	 to	 a	
“simultaneity”	 (Levitt	 and	 Glick	 Schiller	 2004)	 of	 places	 that	 is	 engendered	 and	
sustained	 through	experiences,	 emotions,	 and	memories.	They	 counter	 the	 idea	of	
Afghan	Sikhs	“coming	home”	to	India,	as	the	UNHCR	representative	had	suggested,	
and	instead	demonstrate	how	Afghan	Sikhs	are	aware	of	many	types	of	connections	
that	 serve	 to	 place	 them	 in	 Afghanistan	 or	 India.	 Indeed,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 the	
previous	chapter,	Afghan	Sikhs	do	not	generally	see	themselves	as	a	return‐diaspora	
group.	Unlike	Adyge‐Abkhaz	Circassian	diaspora‐returnees	(Erciyes	2008),	there	is	
not	a	sentiment	of	having	returned	to	a	homeland	in	India53,	and	thus	no	subsequent	
questioning	of	really	being	Indian	or	Sikh	akin	to	Japanese‐Brazilians’	experience	in	
																																																								
50	The	relationship	of	Hindu	nationalist	parties	with	Sikh	groups	 in	particular	has	been	historically	
fraught	due	to	regional,	political,	and	economic	considerations.	For	more	see	Moliner	(2011).	
51	The	founder	of	the	Sikh	faith	
52	He	was	referring	to	the	Golden	Temple	at	Amritsar	
53	Delhi‐based	 photographer,	 Gauri	 Gill,	 has	 explored	Delhi’s	 Afghan	 Sikh’s	 ideas	 of	 Afghanistan	 as	
homeland	 in	 an	 exhibition	 entitled	 “What	 Remains”.	 A	 description	 can	 be	 found	 at	
http://www.gaurigill.com/works.html.	
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moving	to	Japan	(Ishikawa	2009).	In	some	ways,	the	Afghan	Sikhs	I	met	considered	
themselves	as	a	diaspora	group,	like	the	Jordanian	Circassian	diaspora	described	by	
Shami	 (2012),	 underscoring	 their	 distinctiveness	 to	mark	 themselves	 as	 outsiders	
compared	 to	 local	 Indian	Sikhs,	 and	connected	 to	other	Afghan	Sikhs	 in	 the	UK	or	
Germany.	 They	 could	 also	 be	 considered	 part	 of	 a	 “circulation	 society”	 (Aslanian	
2011;	Markovits	et	al	2003)	like	the	Pashtun	moneylender	community,	discussed	in	
chapter	six.	
	
The	idea	presented	by	the	UNHCR	that	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghans	could	easily	integrate	in	
India	through	being	connected	to	local	communities	held	some	currency	in	the	case	
of	 the	Hindu	 nationalist	 parties	 described	 above.	 In	 practice	 however,	 the	 Afghan	
Sikhs	in	Delhi	were	tightly	knit	and	while	they	were	divided	even	among	themselves	
by	 regional	or	 cast	 affiliation,	 there	was	a	hesitancy	and	bitterness	 toward	Delhi’s	
non‐Afghan	 Sikhs	 that	 I	 encountered	 among	 many	 in	 the	 community.	 	 Mr	 Singh	
related	how	he	had	arrived	 in	 India	with	enough	money	 to	pay	 for	expenses	 for	a	
while,	 but	 when	 funds	 began	 to	 fall	 short,	 the	 Khalsa	 Diwan	 helped	 him	 with	
purchasing	a	street	stall.	“I	started	with	vegetables,	then	some	little	toys	for	children,	
and	then	I	was	able	to	get	more	stalls,	until	I	could	do	a	business,”	he	recounted.	
	
Talking	 about	 relationships	 with	 Delhi’s	 Indian	 Sikh	 community,	 Mr	 Singh	 grew	
visibly	irate	and	exclaimed:	“You	think	I	would	have	to	sell	vegetables	if	they	wanted	
to	help?”	Mr	Singh	related	to	me	the	view	that	the	“Indians”	(hindi‐ha),	as	they	called	
Indian	Sikhs,	wanted	nothing	to	do	with	the	Afghan	Sikhs.	“They	don’t	accept	us,”	he	
explained,	“because	we	are	different.”	Indeed	Afghan	Sikhs	were	culturally	different	
from	 Indian	 Sikhs54,	 eating	 Afghan	 foods	 at	 home,	 dressing	 in	 perahan‐tunban55,	
practicing	 slightly	more	 conservative	 rites,	 and	 even	 speaking	 a	 different	 Punjabi	
peppered	with	Dari	and	Pashto	words	and	phrases.	While	Mr	Singh’s	feelings	toward	
Indian	Sikhs	were	a	little	more	nuanced	and	also	cannot	be	taken	as	emblematic	of	
all	Afghan	Sikh’s	 feelings,	 his	 attitudes	 echoed	 the	 comments	 of	many	others	with	
whom	I	met.	
																																																								
54	I	am	not	aware	of	any	ethnographic	study	of	differences	between	Indian	and	Afghan	Sikhs.	Like	Mr	
Sigh,	 members	 of	 the	 Afghan	 Sikh	 community	 would	 consistently	 enumerate	 to	 me	 the	 various	
differences	 between	 Indians	 and	 Afghans	 and	 how	 they	 were	 more	 like	 me	 (they	 assumed	 I	 was	
Afghan).	Indian	Sikhs	on	the	other	hand	had	various	reactions,	but	there	was	a	general	sentiment	that	
the	Afghan	Sikh	community	was	deeply	inward	looking	and	religiously	very	conservative	(kattar).	
55	Afghan	tunic	and	trousers.	
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While	 the	Afghan	Sikhs	 in	Delhi	were	 tightly	knit,	 there	were	also	divisions	within	
the	community	along	caste	and	class	 lines.	The	two	main	organizations	catering	to	
the	community,	the	Khalsa	Diwan	and	Afghan	Hindu	Sikh	Welfare	Society	(AHSWS),	
both	worked	 together,	but	also	had	 their	differences.	When	 the	head	of	 the	Diwan	
had	suggested	I	talk	with	somebody	at	the	AHSWS,	Ghani	Saheb	had	added	“yes,	they	
do	good	work;	they	have	their	own	opinions”,	subtly	distancing	himself	from	them.	I	
understood	more	clearly	what	he	meant	after	meeting	with	members	of	the	AHSWS	
in	their	offices	in	the	GK‐2	neighbourhood	gurdwara,	tucked	away	among	mansions	
of	Delhi’s	millionaires.	The	members	I	met	with	were	very	suspicious	of	who	I	was	
and	 why	 I	 was	 talking	 to	 them,	 their	 questions	 indicating	 a	 distrust	 of	 me	 as	 a	
Muslim56.	The	meeting	was	interrupted	by	an	attendant	who	relayed	to	the	head	of	
the	 AHSWS	 that	 he	 had	 received	 a	 message	 from	 the	 Khasla	 Diwan	 regarding	 a	
financial	 matter.	 It	 seemed	 the	 Diwan	 owed	 some	 money	 to	 the	 AHSWS.	 “These	
Khalsa‐types	(Khalsa	waley)	are	like	that.	When	it’s	a	question	of	money	(paisey	da	
mamla),	then	everyone	remembers	their	caste	(biradari)!”	He	told	the	attendant	to	
inform	the	Diwan	they	would	still	have	to	pay	the	requisite	sum.	
	
Again,	 the	 UNHCR	 representative’s	 assertion	 that	 the	 Hindu‐Sikh	 Afghans	 did	 not	
require	 as	 much	 support	 because	 of	 the	 “strong	 sense	 of	 community”	 among	
themselves	 is	not	necessarily	untrue.	That	Afghan	Sikhs	were	 tight‐knit	 ensured	a	
modicum	of	economic	support	was	available	to	those	most	in	need.	Ghani	Saheb,	at	
the	end	of	 the	day,	 chose	 to	distance	himself	 from	the	AHSWS	 in	his	 comments	 to	
me,	but	not	convey	any	sense	of	division	between	them.	However,	there	were	many	
kinds	of	divisions	among	the	Afghan	Sikhs	that	I	was	not	privy	to	as	an	outsider	and	
as	somebody	who	was	only	there	for	a	limited	time.	Some	divisions	might	have	had	
to	do	with	different	generations	of	migrants.	As	one	Sikh	man	from	Kabul,	whom	I	
met	at	a	west	Delhi	gurdwara	and	who	had	been	in	Delhi	for	several	months	with	his	
teenage	son,	explained	to	me:	
“I’ve	decided	to	go	back	[to	Kabul].	These	people	[i.e.	Afghan	Sikhs	in	Delhi]	
have	been	here	for	years.	They	are	rich	(paisadar)	but	don’t	care	(parwa	na	
																																																								
56	“I	don’t	understand	who	he	is	and	why	he	is	here,	just	give	him	something	and	finish	this,”	one	of	
the	members	had	said	uncomfortably	to	the	head	in	Punjabi,	assuming	I	was	Afghan	and	would	not	be	
able	to	understand.	
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darand)	about	us	[i.e.	people	in	Afghanistan]…	At	least	I	have	a	job	(karobar)	
in	Kabul	[and]	family	(khwesh	o	qaum).	
	
I	did	not	see	the	man	or	his	son	again	at	the	gurdwara,	so	can	only	assume	that	they	
returned	 to	 Kabul.	 They	were	 not	 the	 only	 ones	 happy	 to	 leave	 India.	 Though	Mr	
Singh	was	now	was	in	a	good	financial	situation	and	was	content	with	the	life	he	had	
built	 in	 India,	when	he	 found	out	I	was	studying	 in	London	he	exclaimed	 in	shock:	
“Why	are	you	here?	You	speak	Dari,	 you	are	Pashtun,	go	and	become	a	 refugee	 in	
England!”	He	spoke	about	how	it	was	too	late	for	him,	but	that	he	had	managed	to	
marry	one	of	his	daughters	off	in	London.	He	regretted	not	having	sent	his	son	there	
through	a	trafficker	as	some	of	his	friends	had	done.	“The	money	is	there	you	see.	If	
you	have	money	there,	you	can	have	a	life	here.”	Leaving	India	was	a	goal	shared	by	
many	Afghan	Sikhs	I	met.	The	UNHCR	assisted	Afghan	refugees	to	apply	for	limited	
scholarships	under	a	special	program	with	the	German	Academic	Exchange	Service	
(DAAD),	but	most	sought	to	leave	through	family	networks	or	traffickers.	
	
Still,	 though	many	 Afghan	 Sikhs	 are	 focused	 on	 leaving	 India	 or	 do	 not	 feel	 they	
belong	in	India,	it	does	not	prevent	them	from	making	a	life	in	the	country.	The	same	
bureaucracy	 that	 prevents	 them	 from	 attaining	 citizenship	 allows	 for	 them	 to	
contravene	 regulations	 against	 setting	 up	 domicile	 in	 the	 country,	 or	 as	Mr	 Singh	
explained:	
“Because	the	government	doesn’t	help,	it	can’t	say	‘don’t	work’…	Some	people	
have	built	houses,	though	most	are	renting.	Also,	people	here	prefer	to	rent	to	
Afghans…	 because	 unlike	 Indians,	 people	 from	 Afghanistan	 are	 honest	
(imaandar)	and	don't	make	problems	 for	 landlords	or	 try	 to	occupy	 (qabza	
kardan)	the	property57.”	
The	fact	authorities	turned	a	blind	eye	to	Afghan	Sikhs	working	or	owning	property	
was	also	observed	by	the	SLIC	representative	who	said	
“Go	 to	 Amar	 Colony	 Market	 and	 talk	 to	 the	 refugee	 shop	 keepers.	 They’ll	
always	 tell	 you	 their	 shop	 is	 rented,	 but	 everybody	 knows	 they	 bought	 it	
somehow…you	know,	bribery	and	all.”	
	
																																																								
57	This	 statement	was	 repeated	 to	me	by	non	Hindu‐Sikh	Afghan	refugees	as	well,	 though	 I	believe	
landlords’	attitudes	toward	Afghans	has	more	to	do	with	a	general	perception	that	Afghans	are	rich.	
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There	is	no	proof	as	such,	but	it	is	an	open	secret	among	many	people	that	many	of	
the	Afghans	living	in	Delhi	since	the	90s,	Hindu‐Sikh	or	otherwise,	have	been	able	to	
attain	a	number	of	identity	documents,	own	houses,	start	businesses	etc.	The	same	
governmental	 functioning	 that	 prevents	 them	 from	 becoming	 legal	 citizens	 also	
allows	them	to	operate	unofficially	as	citizens.	As	Sadiq		(2010)	has	described,	such	
“documentary	citizenship”	can	allow	non‐citizens	to	pass	as	citizens	both	inside	and	
outside	the	country	of	residence.	There	were	many	stories	of	Afghan	Sikhs	in	Delhi	
who	 had	multiple	 passports	 and	would	 travel	 to	 Central	 Asia,	 Eastern	 Europe,	 or	
even	 the	United	Kingdom	 to	 do	 business,	 though	 I	 never	met	 anyone	who	 openly	
admitted	to	doing	so.	Formally,	of	course,	the	story	had	to	be	maintained	that	they	
are	not	accorded	rights	of	citizenship.	
3.5 Conclusion	
In	this	chapter,	I	have	considered	what	it	means	to	be	and	belong	as	Afghan	in	Delhi	at	
the	 state	 scale,	 through	 examining	 the	 kind	 of	 person	 envisaged	 under	 the	 Afghan	
refugee	label.	The	label	calls	forth	a	subject	whose	identity,	religion,	language,	etc.	are	
coterminous	with	national	belonging,	and	who	is	connected	through	emotional	ties	to	
a	community	grounded	in	the	nation.	Thus,	to	be	Afghan	in	Delhi,	at	the	state	scale,	is	
to	not	belong	in	Delhi.	That	Hindu	and	Sikh	Afghans	can	be	eligible	for	citizenship	is	
based	on	an	assumption	of	their	not	belonging	to	Afghanistan.	This	subjectivity	of	the	
Afghan	refugee	is	maintained	and	entrenched	through	the	schemes	made	available	by	
the	UNHCR,	which	are	shaped	not	only	by	the	political	context	in	the	country,	but	also	
the	international	and	local	politics	of	the	organization.	
	
BS	Chimni	has	argued,	the	current	international	system	governing	refugees	exists	in	
an	“imperial	global	order	in	which…	the	real	concern	of	the	North…	is	the	defence	of	
global	 capitalism”	 (2009:24)	 under	which	 “refugees	 are	no	 longer	welcome	 in	 the	
North,	 and	 the	 UNHCR	 is	 being	 forced	 to	 come	 to	 terms	 with	 this”	 (1998:	 367).	
Indeed,	over	the	course	of	my	fieldwork,	the	UNHCR	progressed	from	suggesting	to	
refugees	 they	be	prepared	 to	wait	 a	 very	 long	 time	before	 resettlement,	 to	 telling	
them	point	blank	that	they	should	expect	to	not	be	resettled	abroad.	
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In	 a	 June	2012	open	meeting	with	 the	Afghan	 community,	 after	 fielding	questions	
and	comments	from	those	present,	the	UNHCR	Chief	of	Mission	began	by	discussing	
the	RSD	procedure,	stating	that:	
“I	 understand	 that	 when	 a	 case	 is	 rejected,	 especially	 on	 appeal,	 it	 is	
disappointing.	 I	 know	 you	 think	 we	 made	 a	 mistake.	 We	 are	 human;	 it	 is	
possible.	This	 is	why	the	system	has	an	appeals	process…	[but	an	appeal]	 is	
not	a	right,	it	is	an	exception	[allowed	by	the	UNHCR	in	India].”	
She	 then	proceeded	 to	ask	how	many	 in	 the	audience	had	received	a	 final,	 second	
rejection,	 and	 said	 to	 the	 handful	 of	 people	 present:	 “I’m	 very	 sorry,	 the	 UNHCR	
cannot	do	anything	for	migrants	–	only	refugees.”	After	making	this	migrant/refugee	
distinction	 and	 excluding	 the	 former,	 she	 addressed	 the	 refugees	 specifically.	 She	
explained	the	UNHCR’s	efforts	to	procure	agreement	from	the	government	of	India	
on	 getting	 long‐term	 visas	 for	 refugees,	 and	 indicated	 the	 community	 should	 be	
grateful	 to	 the	 government.	 She	proceeded	 to	 describe	 how	 resettlement	was	 “for	
people	who	arrived	before	2001”	and	that	she	was	not	ruling	out	resettlement	 for	
everyone,	 but	 that	 they	 would	 be	 staying	 for	 a	 long	 time	 in	 India	 and	 it	 was	
important	they	“make	the	most	of	[their]	time.”	
	
The	crowd	was	getting	restless;	people	started	heckling	her	about	having	spent	so	
much	time	in	Delhi	without	any	indication	of	being	resettled.	She	took	a	breath	and	
answered	questions	and	comments	in	her	stern,	terse	manner:	
“The	countries	that	give	us	money	are	having	problems	and	are	giving	us	less	
money	while	the	refugees	are	increasing.	The	UNHCR	will	be	able	to	help	you	
less	and	less…	We	expect	families	and	communities	to	help	people…	We	need	
to	be	 realistic…	you	do	need	 support,	 but	 getting	a	 job	 is	 something	you	 can	
capitalize	on.”	
The	 meeting	 came	 to	 an	 abrupt	 end	 as	 the	 UNHCR	 entourage	 hurriedly	 exited,	
evading	people	 trying	to	stop	and	ask	 them	questions.	The	refugees	 in	general	did	
not	appear	optimistic	or	excited	about	the	possibility	of	long‐stay	visas.	
	
As	 the	 ethnographic	material	 in	 this	 chapter	 illustrates,	 a	 refugee’s	 situation	 does	
not	always	conform	to	the	story	that	must	be	recounted	or	represented	in	order	to	
be	included	in	the	refugee	label.	However,	it	is	ultimately	those	with	the	financial	or	
social	capital	who	can	navigate	the	process	of	becoming	a	refugee	and/or	procuring	
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alternative	access	to	citizenship	through	which	they	can	remain	in	the	country.		This	
raises	 the	 issue	 of	 scale	 as	 impact,	 as	 it	 suggests	 there	 are	 some	 for	whom	 being	
Afghan	at	the	state	scale	has	less	bearing	on	their	daily	life	than	others.	That	is	there	
is	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 refugee	who	 can	make	 it	 in	 India.	 This	 fact	 is	 explored	 in	 the	
following	chapters	at	both	the	scale	of	individuals	and	of	community.	
	
The	Chief	of	Mission’s	statement	hints	as	to	the	kind	of	person	that	can	succeed	as	a	
refugee:	 the	entrepreneurial	 individual	of	 the	 free	market.	We	can	 take	 this	 in	 the	
literal	sense	directly	from	her	statements:	in	order	for	a	refugee	to	remain	in	India,	
she	 must	 be	 enterprising	 and	 willing	 to	 “capitalize	 on”	 any	 opportunity	 for	
assistance.	 The	 Chief	 of	 Mission’s	 words	 reiterated	 a	 point	 the	 UNHCR	
representatives	made	during	my	first	meeting	with	them,	where	they	tried	to	assure	
me	 that	 Afghan	 refugees	 could	 easily	 live	 comfortably	 in	 India	 given	 the	 large	
informal	 sector.	 The	 implication	 was	 that	 one	 needed	 only	 to	 try.	 The	 Chief	 of	
Mission’s	comments	also	suggest	that	it	is	not	only	the	individual	who	is	responsible	
for	 cultivating	 the	personhood	 to	enable	 remaining	 in	 India,	but	 that	 communities	
must	 also	 come	 to	 help	 each	 other,	 reiterating	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 individual	 being	
grounded	in	a	community	of	individuals	who	feel	a	certain	way	toward	each	other.		
	
I	am	reminded	again	of	the	man	whom	I	met	outside	the	UNHCR	offices	at	my	first	
meeting.	I	do	not	know	about	the	validity	of	his	case,	but	perhaps	he	did	not	possess	
the	entrepreneurial	spirit	to	ensure	his	identity	strategically	conform	to	that	of	the	
Afghan	refugee	label.	There	did	not	seem	to	be	a	community	to	assist	him.	It	was	not	
till	the	end	of	my	time	in	Delhi	that	I	revisited	my	conversation	with	him	to	see	that	
perhaps	what	was	at	stake	was	a	difference	in	how	he	perceived	what	it	meant	to	be	
a	refugee	and	the	kind	of	person	envisaged	at	 the	state	scale.	 In	 the	 following	 two	
chapters	I	enquire	into	this	slippage,	turning	from	the	state	scale	to	the	scale	of	the	
individual,	 to	 explore	 the	 complexity	 of	 being	 and	 belonging	 as	 Afghan	 in	 Delhi,	
attending	to	the	trajectories	of	movement	placing	Afghans	in	Delhi	and	the	material	
and	affective	ways	they	relate	to	the	city.	
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Figure	1:	Offices	of	the	Khalsa	Diwan	in	West	Delhi
Figure	2:	Persian	Verse	above	Khalsa	Diwan	Main	Office	Door	
Written	by	Nandlal	Goya,	a	17th	century	Afghan	Sikh	scholar,	the	verse	has	
been	printed	in	Persian	and	Gurmukhi	transliteration	and	reads:	“May	
spring	stay	fresh	eternally/	O	God,	far	away	from	the	evil	eye.”	
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Figure	3:	The	Lal	Sai	Sindhi	temple	in	Lajpat	Nagar	
The	UNHCR	would	hold	its	open	meetings	with	the	Afghan	refugee	
community	in	the	large	hall	that	comprised	the	top	floor	of	the	temple.	
	 100
4. Migrant	Trajectories:	Being	Afghan	in	Delhi	
“Once	Hamid	Khan	held	a	grand	 festival	 to	which	he	 invited	a	 large	body	 of	
noblemen.	 Malik	 Bahlol	 was	 among	 those	 invited.	 He	 instructed	 his	 Afghan	
followers	 to	 behave	 in	 this	 assembly	 in	 a	 foolish	 and	 stupid	manner,	 so	 that	
Hamid	Khan,	 taking	 them	 to	 be	 simpletons,	might	 cease	 to	 have	 any	 fear	 or	
apprehension	 of	 them.	 Some	 of	 them	 tied	 their	 shoes	 to	 their	 waists,	 while	
others	put	them	on	a	shelf	above	the	Khan’s	head...	they	performed	many	other	
antics…	“They	are	country	bumpkins	and	have	rarely	been	with	civilized	people.	
All	they	know	is	how	to	eat	and	die”	[Malik	Bahlol	related	to	Hamid	Khan]…	at	
a	sign	from	the	latter…	[the	Afghans]	all	rushed	together	and	for	every	guard	of	
Hamid	 Khan,	 there	 were	 two	 Afghans	 standing	 by.	 When	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
banquet,	 the	Khan’s	men	 took	 leave,	Qutb	Khan	 drew	 out	 a	 chain…	 [Hamid]	
Khan	was	put	in	irons	and	handed	over	to	the	guards.”		
(Haravī	[1613]	1958:32‐33)	58	
	
This	chapter	and	the	next	turn	to	the	scale	of	the	individual	to	respectively	examine	
the	 different	 meanings	 of	 being	 and	 belonging	 as	 Afghan	 in	 Delhi.	 The	 current	
chapter	 focuses	 on	 individual	 Afghan	 migrants’	 trajectories	 of	 movement	 that	
connect	them	to	Delhi.	Through	attending	to	individual	narratives	of	how	migrants	
come	to	the	city,	the	chapter	complicates	notions	of	migrant	movement	presented	at	
the	state	scale	in	the	previous	chapter,	illustrating	the	absence	of	a	unifying	logic	of	
migration	among	Afghans	 in	Delhi	and	highlighting	the	subsequent	unsuitability	of	
the	 economic	migrant/refugee	 dichotomy.	 In	 outlining	 the	 reality	 of	 transnational	
migration	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 individual,	 where	 Afghan	migrants	 are	 connected	 to	
Delhi	in	multiple	ways,	the	chapter	also	sets	the	scene	for	discussion	of	the	multiple	
ways	 Afghan	 migrants	 understand	 how	 they	 belong	 in	 Delhi,	 which	 is	 explored	
further	in	chapter	five.	
	 	
																																																								
58	I	am	indebted	to	Hannah	Archambault	and	William	Warner	respectively	for	bringing	this	story	to	
my	attention	and	assisting	in	locating	the	text.	While	I	have	used	the	excerpt	from	Roy’s	translation	
(Haravī	1958),	I	have	also	consulted	Imam	al‐Din’s	in‐depth	analysis	and	compilation	(Haravī	1960)	
and	Dorn’s	most	recent	translation	(Haravī	2000).	
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The	 incident	 outlined	 in	 the	 excerpt	 above	 and	 the	 manuscript	 from	 which	 it	 is	
taken,	 the	Tarikh‐e	Khan	Jahani	wa	Makhzan‐e	Afghan	(The	History	 of	 Khan	 Jahan	
and	 the	 Treasures59	of	 the	 Afghans),	 serve	 as	 an	 appropriate	 starting	 point	 for	
introducing	the	following	two	chapters,	both	ethnographically	and	theoretically.	The	
passage	 quoted	 above	 illustrates	 how	 individuals	 engage	 with	 different	 ideas	 of	
being	Afghan,	mirrored	 in	 the	 ethnographic	material	 below,	while	 the	manuscript	
demonstrates	 how	 a	 single	 object	 can	 be	 constituted	 contemporaneously	 through	
multiple	processes	delineating	different	meanings	of	what	it	means	to	be	Afghan	in	
India,	 theoretically	 affording	 an	 appreciation	 of	 how	 Afghan	 migrants	 are	
constituted	 at	 multiple	 scales.	 As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 two,	 the	 term	 “Afghan”	 is	
employed	 in	 this	 thesis	 to	 reflect	 the	multiple	ways	 it	 is	 considered	by	 those	with	
whom	 I	 conducted	 research.	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	
discussion	of	the	Makhzan‐e	Afghan	below,	the	manuscript	uses	the	term	“Afghan”	to	
refer	specifically	to	Pashtuns,	like	other	texts	from	the	same	period.	
	
The	passage	from	the	Makhzan‐e	Afghan	quoted	above	relates	the	founding	moment	
of	 the	 Lodhi	 dynasty	 (1451‐1526),	 the	 first	 Afghan	 dynasty	 too	 rule	 the	 Delhi	
Sultanate	 before	 establishment	 of	 Mughal	 imperial	 rule.	 After	 having	 launched	 a	
number	of	unsuccessful	attacks	from	the	Punjab,	where	he	had	already	consolidated	
power,	Bahlol	Lodhi	assumes	the	Delhi	Sultanate	by	deposing	Hamid	Khan60	through	
political	 tactic	 rather	 than	 military	 force.	 The	 text	 describes	 how	 Hamid	 Khan	
initially	barred	Bahlol	Lodhi	from	entering	Delhi,	given	his	previous	designs	on	the	
sultanate.	Bahlol	Lodhi,	 in	 turn,	organized	other	Afghan	tribes	who	had	previously	
been	in	conflict	against	one	another	into	a	single	force.	His	men	were	Afghans	from	
Roh,	a	mountainous	area	east	of	Delhi,	 and	were	considered	rugged	mountaineers	
unaccustomed	to	the	ways	and	intrigues	of	political	life	in	the	court.	As	the	excerpt	
relates,	Bahlol	Lodhi	was	able	to	infiltrate	the	court	through	demonstrating	his	men	
were	 merely	 Afghans,	 i.e.	 “country	 bumpkins”,	 and	 thus	 located	 outside	 of	 the	
existing	 power	 structure.	 Comparable	 to	 the	 incident	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter	of	the	young	Afghan	boy	filling	out	family	information	on	the	UNHCR	form,	
Bahlol	Lodhi’s	men’s	“antics”	in	Hamid	Khan’s	court	can	be	seen	as	a	performance	of	
																																																								
59	In	English	translations,	Makhzan‐e	Afghan	is	translated	as	“History	of	the	Afghans”	referring	to	the	
genealogical	account	of	Pashtun	tribes	and	historical	narratives	of	Afghan	rule	in	India	included	in	the	
text.	The	work	is	also	often	just	referred	to	by	its	shorter	title	of	Makhzan‐e	Afghan.	
60	Hamid	Khan	was	not	a	dynastic	ruler,	but	the	minister	of	the	last	ruler	of	the	Sayyid	dynasty	who	
had	abdicated	the	throne	and	placed	Hamid	Khan	in	his	stead.		
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a	specific	way	of	being	a	person,	particularly	an	Afghan	person	in	this	case,	within	a	
particular	structure.	As	a	performance,	it	was	“a	reduction:	a	single	act	created	out	of	
composite	 relationships”	 (Strathern	 1994:248)	 that	 demonstrated	 how	 being	
Afghan	was	 to	be	a	 simpleton	and	apart	 from	 “civilized”	people.	 It	 did	not	negate,	
however,	another	way	of	being	Afghan,	i.e.	as	part	of	a	corporate	cultural	group	that	
could	 act	 in	 tandem	 to	 overthrow	 the	 political	 order,	 which	 Bahlol	 Lodhi’s	 men	
demonstrated	as	soon	as	the	court	setting	was	cleared	of	Hamid	Khan’s	men.	These	
two	 ways	 of	 being	 Afghan	 are	 addressed	 in	 the	Makhzan‐e	Afghan	 with	 political	
aims,	as	I	will	discuss	shortly.	
	
As	 an	 ethnographic	 artefact,	 the	 Makhzan‐e	 Afghan	 is	 an	 interesting	 object	 to	
consider	 meanings	 of	 being	 Afghan	 in	 India.	 The	 text	 is	 a	 panegyric	 to	 the	
accomplishments	of	Khan	Jahan	Lodhi,	an	Afghan	officer	who	had	commissioned	the	
text	 and	 was	 the	 Mughal	 viceroy	 in	 the	 Deccan.	 The	 manuscript	 is	 also	 a	
historiographical	work.	It	is	one	of	the	first	texts	to	put	forward	a	genealogy	of	the	
Afghan	tribes,	tracing	their	origins	to	the	founding	community	of	Islam,	and	one	of	
the	 earliest	 texts	 to	 provide	 extensive	 detail	 on	 the	 Afghan	 saints	 of	 India.	 It	 is	
among	a	 limited	number	of	works	 from	the	period	 that	record	the	history	of	early	
Afghan	 rule	 in	 India,	 concentrating	 particularly	 on	 the	 Lodhi	 and	 Sur	 dynasties.	
Relatively	little	is	known	of	the	origins	of	the	author,	Niʻmat	Allah	Haravi,	other	than	
his	father’s	being	a	reputable	scholar	in	Emperor	Akbar’s	court.	Niʻmat	Allah	himself	
had	a	distinguished	career	before	his	employment	under	Khan	Jahan	Lodhi61.	While	
his	 name,	 Haravi,	 suggests	 a	 connection	 to	 the	 city	 of	 Herat	 in	 modern‐day	
Afghanistan,	 Niʻmat	 Allah	 is	 considered	 to	 not	 have	 been	 Afghan	 given	 his	
professional	background.	In	his	introduction	to	the	Makhzan‐e	Afghan,	Niʻmat	Allah	
credits	his	knowledge	of	Afghan	genealogy	to	an	Afghan	he	was	introduced	to	during	
his	 employment	 under	 Khan	 Jahan	 Lodhi	 (Dale	 2012;	 Haravī	 [1613]	 1958;	Mehta	
1986:23‐24).	
	
It	 is	not	unusual	that	the	Makhzan‐e	Afghan	should	be	a	historiography	of	Afghans,	
commissioned	by	an	Indian	Mughal	officer	of	Pashtun	descent,	and	written	by	a	non‐
																																																								
61	He	served	as	 librarian	 to	Abdul	Rahim	Khan‐e	Khanan,	one	of	Akbar’s	most	 important	ministers,	
and	as	court	chronicler	under	Akbar’s	successor,	Jahangir.	
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Pashtun62	in	Indo‐Persian	for	an	Indian	elite	audience.	It	is	emblematic,	rather,	of	a	
“local	 cosmopolitanism”	 (Ho	 2006)	 characteristic	 of	 continuous	 movements	 and	
interactions	among	groups	and	individuals	throughout	and	beyond	South	Asia	from	
the	 pre‐modern	 through	 the	 contemporary	 periods	 (Harper	 and	 Amrith	 2012;	
Ludden	 2003a;	Marsden	 2008;	 Tsing	 1993).	 As	 an	 object,	 the	 text	 represents	 the	
complexity	of	such	cosmopolitanism.	As	just	described,	its	production	suggests	how	
being	Afghan	in	India	can	mean,	in	one	sense,	to	be	part	of	a	diverse	milieu	in	which	
movement	 and	 interaction	 create	 “affect‐laden	 spaces	 that	 include	 all	 kinds	 of	
people	and	foster	cultural	identity	in	and	among	territories”	(Ludden	2003b:1069).	
The	Makhzan‐e	Afghan	 presents	 the	 historical	 narratives	 and	 stories	 of	 saints	 and	
kings	as	proper	 to	 India	and	as	part	of	 the	 Indian	 landscape,	both	 figuratively	and	
physically.	 Even	 today,	 the	 history	 and	 landmarks	 indexed	 in	 the	 text	 are	
incorporated	 into	 the	 imaginary	 and	material	 landscapes	 of	 Delhi	 and	 indeed	 the	
country	more	broadly.	
	
The	 Makhzan‐e	 Afghan	 appears	 as	 quite	 a	 different	 object,	 however,	 when	
considering	 the	 context	 and	political	 end	 to	which	 it	was	written.	The	manuscript	
was	commissioned	at	a	time	where	Khan	Jahan	Lodhi	was	consolidating	his	power	in	
the	Deccan.	 From	 this	position,	Khan	 Jahan	would	eventually	 launch	an	ultimately	
unsuccessful	three‐year	rebellion	against	Jahangir’s	successor,	Emperor	Shah	Jahan.	
With	alternating	political	gain	and	loss	heavily	taxing	resources	on	both	sides,	Khan	
Jahan’s	 political	 supporters	 in	 the	 Deccan	 eventually	 abandoned	 him.	 Khan	 Jahan	
had	foreseen	this	possibility	and	had	thus	been	rallying	Afghan	nobles	in	the	Punjab	
and	elsewhere	against	Mughal	rule,	enabling	him	to	move	to	Punjab	where	he	would	
finally	 face	defeat	 (Mehta	 1984:420‐422).	 The	Makhzan‐e	Afghan	was	 thus	 part	 of	
this	effort	to	rally	Afghans	around	a	glorious	past	preceding	Mughal	rule,	and	placed	
Khan	 Jahan	 as	 an	 inheritor	 of	 the	 Lodhi	 dynasty.	 It	 is	 not	 coincidental	 then	 that	
Bahlol	Lodhi’s	ability	to	bring	forth	the	shared	Afghan	identity	of	the	disunited	tribes	
against	a	marginalized	Afghan	identity	is	highlighted	in	the	text.	The	manuscript	was	
indeed	 one	 among	 several	 works	 from	 the	 same	 period	 through	 which	 Pashtun	
elites	 in	 India	 endeavoured	 to	 articulate	 an	 “Afghan”	 identity	 by	 tribalizing	 ties	 to	
																																																								
62	Alam	and	Subrahmanyam	(2007:128‐129)	describe,	with	the	specific	example	of	travelogues,	how	
imperial	court	scribes	of	the	time	were	expected	to	show	dexterity	in	being	able	to	relate	events	from	
contexts	very	different	from	their	own.	
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Islam	through	recourse	to	history	and	genealogy	(Green	2008,	2012)63,	to	assert	an	
identity	 separate	 from	 that	 of	 Mughals.	 Against	 this	 background,	 the	Makhzan‐e	
Afghan	operates	as	an	object	in	contrast	to	the	multicultural	context	that	produced	
it,	 representing	 instead	 a	 process	 wherein	 individuals	 were	 building	 on	 cross‐
cultural	interaction	to	negotiate	cultural	difference64.	
	
The	 cultural	 difference	 articulated	 in	 the	Makhzan‐e	Afghan	 is	 different	 from	 that	
assumed	under	the	state	scale	discussed	in	chapter	three,	where	Afghan	belonging	in	
Delhi	 is	 understood	 within	 the	 frame	 of	 the	 nation	 state.	 The	Makhzan‐e	Afghan	
illustrates	 the	 possibility	 of	 different	 ways	 of	 being	 Afghan	 in	 Delhi:	 as	 part	 of	 a	
pluralist	 enterprise	 connecting	 people	 through	 shared	 cultural	 expression	 within	
and	outside	of	India,	or	as	an	ethnically	distinct	group	grounded	in	India	through	a	
particular	 history	 and	 culture.	 In	 the	 ethnographic	material	 presented	 in	 the	 next	
two	chapters,	both	of	these	forms	of	being	Afghan	in	Delhi	are	referenced	alongside	
that	 envisioned	 at	 the	 state	 scale.	 The	 individual	 narratives	 of	 Afghan	 migrants	
presented	 are,	 however,	 not	 provided	 to	 merely	 counter	 the	 state	 scale	
understanding	 of	 how	Afghans	 belong	 in	Delhi,	 but	 rather	 to	 present	 the	 latter	 as	
one	among	a	plurality	of	ways	Afghan	migrants	can	be	considered	to	belong	in	the	
city.	 As	 Kalir	 et	al	 (2012:16)	 note,	 it	 is	 naïve	 to	 merely	 critique	 state	 categories’	
failure	 to	 capture	 the	 lived	 reality	 of	 transnationally	 mobile	 people,	 as	 if	 such	
categories	need	only	be	 tweaked	to	attain	greater	accuracy.	 Instead,	what	must	be	
accounted	 for	 is	 how	 such	 categories	 and	 their	 incongruence	 with	 migrants’	
experience	 reflect	 a	 reality	 of	 transnational	 movement,	 a	 reality	 that	 is	 often	 the	
basis	 for	 the	 very	 state	 anxieties	 that	 produce	 the	 categories.	 Research	 on	Afghan	
migration	 has	 been	 attuned	 to	 this	 issue	 particularly	 through	 problematizing	 the	
dichotomous	categories	of	refugee	and	illegal	economic	migrant	ascribed	to	Afghan	
migrants	by	the	UNHCR	and	other	state‐level	bodies,	as	described	in	chapter	three.	
	
Studies	on	Afghan	migrants	echo	broader	research	and	theory	that	emphasizes	the	
centrality	of	mobility	to	social	life	(Urry	2000,	2011)	and	the	complex	consequences	
																																																								
63	Green	further	argues	that	argues	that	this	budding	“Afghan”	identity,	voiced	as	separate	from	that	
of	the	pluralistic	Indian	Mughal	identity,	would	later	be	transferred	to	the	Afghan	state	upon	Mughal	
political	decline.	
64	CA	 Bayly	 (1989),	 Fewkes	 (2012),	 Ho	 (2006),	 and	 Marsden	 (2009)	 address	 this	 complexity	 of	
cosmopolitanism	 in	 demonstrating	 how	 individuals	 interact	 and	 integrate	 in	 multiple	 locales	 via	
trade	and	travel,	developing	a	consciousness	of	the	broader	world	within	which	they	operate,	but	also	
cultivating	a	sense	of	separateness	within	the	cosmopolitan	miasma.	
	 105
of	transnational	movement	as	both	destabilizing	migrant	identities	(Chambers	1994;	
Featherstone	 1995)	 and	 leading	 to	 migrants’	 cultivation	 of	 multifaceted,	 multi‐
locational,	and	deterritorialized	forms	of	belonging	(Levitt	and	Glick	Schiller	2004;	
Soysal	1994).	Research	on	Afghan	migration	delineates	how	ethnic	and	social	class	
affiliations	 can	 determine	 how	 Afghan	 migrants	 orient	 themselves	 toward	
Afghanistan	 or	 countries	 of	 settlement,	 and	 also	 regulate	 the	 networks	 and	
migration	 strategies	 available	 to	 these	 migrants	 (Gehrig	 and	 Monsutti	 2003;	
Monsutti	2009).	However,	as	is	discussed	in	this	chapter	and	the	next,	the	networks	
through	which	Afghan	migrants	move	often	predate	 the	 establishment	 of	 national	
boundaries	 so	 that	 individual	 migrants	 experience	 places	 of	 migration	 through	 a	
simultaneity	of	overlapping	place‐making	projects,	attaching	different	significances	
to	 their	 experiences	 based	 on	 the	 logics	 of	 their	 own	 situations	 (Novak	 2007a,	
2007b).	 Research	 further	 illustrates	 how	 individuals,	 families,	 and	 other	 social	
groups	deploy	different	migratory	strategies	in	tandem	not	just	in	response	to	social,	
economic,	or	political	conditions	in	Afghanistan,	but	also	as	part	of	moral	and	ethical	
considerations	 of	 being	 or	 becoming	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 person	 (Monsutti	 2005c;	
Marsden	2013),	and	that	Afghan	migrants’	movements	are	also	recurrent	over	time	
so	that	a	clear	distinction	between	refugees	and	economic	migrants,	or	voluntary	or	
in‐voluntary	migration,	ceases	to	hold	analytic	relevance	(Monsutti	2005a,	2010a).	
Thus,	 while	 the	migratory	 trajectories	 of	 individual	 Afghans	 are	 intertwined	with	
economic	and	political	considerations,	they	cannot	be	reduced	to	solely	commercial	
or	political	logics,	and	must	also	be	understood	as	part	of	complex	ethical	decisions	
made	in	pursuing	a	“well‐lived”	life	(Marsden	2014).	
	
To	 attend	 to	 this	 moral	 quality	 of	 migration,	 this	 chapter	 explores	 the	 different	
meanings	of	being	Afghan	in	Delhi	at	the	scale	of	the	individual.	The	simultaneously	
multiple	and	contrasting	meanings	of	what	it	means	to	be	Afghan	in	India	presented	
by	the	Makhzan‐e	Afghan	are	thus	 instructive,	not	 just	considering	the	context	and	
the	 constitution	 of	 the	 text	 itself	 as	 an	 object,	 but	 also	 in	 its	 descriptions	 of	 how	
Bahlol	 Lodhi’s	 men	 connected	 to	 and	 interacted	 with	 the	 material	 world	 of	 the	
court65	(foods,	 rugs,	clothes,	and	 language).	Their	 “antics”	demonstrate,	on	the	one	
hand,	a	particular	sense	of	what	it	meant	to	be	Afghan	outside	the	power	structure,	
																																																								
65	I	have	removed	most	of	the	examples	in	the	quotation	at	the	beginning	of	the	chapter,	as	it	would	
render	the	passage	quite	long,	
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while	concurrently	representing	an	opposite	meaning	through	the	subversive	intent	
and	nature	of	 their	behaviour.	This	example	 from	the	Makhzan‐e	Afghan	 reiterates	
anthropological	theory	on	morality	and	ethics	that	suggests	the	multiple	processes	
through	which	persons	are	constituted	can	be	grasped	in	individuals’	accounting	for	
their	self	and	their	inventiveness	in	their	practices,	reflections,	and	inter‐subjective	
relations	(Keane	2014;	Kleinman	1999;	Lambek	2010;	Zigon	2010).	In	this	vein,	the	
chapter	focuses	on	individual	Afghan	migrants’	accounts	of	their	travels	to	India	and	
Delhi,	attending	to	their	relationships	with	persons,	places,	and	things.	
	
As	demonstrated	in	chapter	three,	at	the	state	scale,	to	be	Afghan	in	India	is	to	be	a	
body	in	stasis	at	the	end	point	of	a	vector	of	movement	from	Afghanistan	into	India,	
emotionally	oriented	toward	the	state	of	Afghanistan.	What	defines	being	Afghan	in	
Delhi	at	 this	scale	 is	 thus	an	 individual’s	story	of	movement	to	India.	The	accounts	
considered	in	this	chapter,	at	the	scale	of	the	individual,	reveal	how	Afghan	migrants	
in	Delhi	consider	themselves	as	persons	on	a	trajectory	of	movement	rather	than	at	
the	 end‐point	 of	 a	 journey	 to	 India,	 even	 if	 they	 do	 feel	 constrained	 (bandi,	 lit.	
imprisoned)	or	 stuck	 (basta)	 in	Delhi.	 The	 three	 sections	below	present	 stories	 of	
three	Afghan	men’s	migration	to	India:	Shahrukh,	an	accepted	refugee;	Musa	Saheb,	
an	 asylum	 seeker	 whose	 case	 has	 been	 rejected	 by	 the	 UNHCR	 and	 who	 is	 thus	
classified	 officially	 as	 an	 economic	 migrant;	 and	 Ali,	 a	 student	 at	 a	 prominent	
university	in	Delhi.	The	accounts	are	based	on	a	series	of	interviews	with	each	man;	
they	 are	 provided	 below	 as	 independent	 narratives	 to	 retain	 the	 particularity	 of	
each	 case,	 and	are	 compared	and	 contrasted	 in	 the	 conclusion	of	 the	 chapter.	The	
three	men’s	stories	illustrate	how	migrant	movements	cannot	be	reduced	solely	to	a	
set	 of	 rational	 economic	 considerations,	 and	 are	 shaped	 equally	 by	 coincidence,	
chance,	 and	 improvisation	 (Silverstein	 2005;	 Amit	 2012),	 where	 directionality	 of	
movement	is	not	always	pre‐determined	or	even	controlled	(Wong	and	Suan	2012),	
and	where	connections	to	the	nation	or	a	homeland	can	be	ambivalent	(Oonk	2007;	
Vora	2013).	The	different	patterns	of	movement	presented	 in	 the	 stories	 reiterate	
the	 inadequacy	 of	 the	 dichotomous	 categorization	 of	 illegal	 economic	 migrants	
against	 legal	refugees	 in	 the	context	of	Afghan	migration	 to	 India,	and	point	 to	 the	
multiple	connections	individual	Afghan	migrants	have	to	Delhi	as	a	place.	
	 107
4.1 Case	1:	Shahrukh,	The	Refugee	
I	 met	 Shahrukh	 at	 the	 very	 first	 Sunday	 service	 I	 attended	 of	 the	 Dari	 Afghan	
Congregation,	one	of	Delhi’s	several	Afghan	churches66.	After	interrogating	me	over	
the	phone	and	in	person,	the	pastor,	Sharif,	invited	me	to	services	and	instructed	me	
to	be	at	the	church	gates	at	3pm.	In	my	eagerness	I	arrived	half	an	hour	early	at	the	
small	church	compound,	located	in	a	lower‐middle	class	south	Delhi	neighbourhood.	
The	church	building	belonged	to	an	Indian	church	that,	like	the	Afghan	congregation,	
was	 affiliated	 with	 the	 Delhi	 Bible	 Fellowship.	 It	 was	 nestled	 between	 a	 large	
government	school	and	an	empty	lot	filled	with	refuse	from	the	adjacent	vegetable	
market.	The	Indian	church	allowed	the	Afghan	congregation	use	of	their	premises	on	
Sundays	and	special	days	of	worship67.	Arriving	early,	I	walked	into	the	tail	end	of	a	
bible	study	session	where	Shahrukh	was	eagerly	expounding	his	views	on	scripture	
in	a	circle	of	rather	bored‐seeming	men.	
	
Shahrukh	 is	 a	 dark,	 thin	 young	 man	 with	 sunken	 cheekbones	 and	 a	 gaunt	 face.	
Though	his	dark	 skin	 is	weathered	and	his	 fine	black	hair	 slicked	back	 like	an	old	
man’s,	 he	 speaks	 with	 a	 broad,	 white,	 sincere	 smile	 and	 his	 eyes	 gleam	 with	
excitement	and	warmth,	indicating	that	he	is	young	(he	is	in	his	late	twenties),	but	
physically	worn	down.	He	has	delicate	mannerisms	but	a	squawky	voice	and	cackles	
often	 as	 he	 claps	 his	 hands	 forcefully	 at	 his	 own	 jokes.	 He	 is	 straightforward	 and	
looks	you	in	the	eye	when	talking,	and	one	can	sense	his	honesty	in	the	clarity	and	
directness	of	his	speech.	This	honesty	and	an	almost	childlike	inquisitiveness	leads	
others	 to	 think	 he	 is	 naïve	 and	 slow‐witted,	 but	 he	 has	 a	 voracious	 appetite	 for	
learning	and	can	speak	extensively	and	expressively	about	his	personal	experiences,	
travels,	and	self‐education.	He	always	wears	the	same	set	of	clothes,	but	takes	care	
																																																								
66	The	Dari	Afghan	congregation’s	pastor	related	to	me	that	the	congregation	is	non‐denominational,	
though	the	Delhi	Bible	Fellowship	to	which	it	was	connected	is	an	evangelical	organization.	It	was	not	
until	my	last	month	in	Delhi	that	I	learned	through	Shahrukh	of	a	Hazara	congregation	and	another	
evangelical	church	that	allegedly	held	both	Pashto	and	Dari	services.	I	was	not	able	to	contact	either	
congregation.	Shahrukh	and	an	Iranian	pastor	I	met	at	another	church	in	Delhi	reported	the	Afghan	
congregations	did	not	maintain	good	relations	with	each	other.	
67	Several	weeks	before	leaving,	I	met	with	the	pastor	of	the	Indian	church	who	explained	his	church	
would	be	discontinuing	 its	relationship	with	 the	Dari	Afghan	congregation	 in	2013,	due	the	 latter’s	
lack	of	financial	transparency.	The	pastor	stated	his	church	was	wary	of	any	potential	investigation	of	
the	 Afghan	 church	 by	 the	 Indian	 government	 or	 the	 local	 police	 that	 might	 reflect	 poorly	 on	 the	
Indian	church.	
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to	never	appear	dishevelled	or	unclean.	 “God	 loves	 those	who	are	clean	and	pure”	
(khodawand	pakeezgan	ra	dost	darad)68	he	would	say.	
	
We	 did	 not	 speak	 that	 first	 day,	 but	 I	 saw	 him	 a	 little	 over	 a	 month	 later	 at	 the	
UNHCR	 general	 meeting	 with	 the	 Afghan	 Community	 in	 Lajpat	 Nagar,	 one	 of	 the	
more	 middle‐class	 Afghan	 parts	 of	 Delhi.	 As	 usual,	 people	 arrived	 in	 their	 small	
groups	of	 two	or	 four,	not	chatting	much	with	others	around	them.	Several	people	
whom	 I	 had	 spoken	 to	 at	 length	 individually	 pretended	not	 to	 notice	me,	 sticking	
instead	to	 their	small	groups.	Shahrukh	on	 the	other	hand	called	out	 to	me	with	a	
loud	 “Salam!”	 and	 obliquely	 referenced	 the	 church	 (which	 he	 could	 not	 directly	
name	around	other	Afghans)	in	case	I	had	forgotten	him.	It	appeared	he	did	not	have	
friends	at	the	meeting	and	I	was	more	than	happy	to	have	somebody	talk	to.	
	
Of	the	Afghans	I	met	in	Delhi	during	fieldwork,	Shahrukh	was	the	only	person	who	
actively	 sought	me	out	 to	 spend	 time	 together.	Unlike	many	Afghans	 in	Delhi	who	
were	 wary	 of	 actively	 seeking	 friendships	 with	 people	 outside	 their	 circle	 of	
friends69,	 Shahrukh	 went	 out	 of	 his	 way	 to	 meet	 new	 Afghans	 in	 the	 city	 and	 to	
spend	time	with	them	to	get	to	know	them	better.	His	friendliness	and	generosity	of	
time	with	others,	could	possibly	have	been	a	result	of	his	feeling	lonely	in	Delhi.	He	
would	tell	me	repeatedly	how	I	was	the	only	person	he	knew	whom	he	could	just	call	
without	reason	or	who	would	go	with	him	on	outings	(chakkar	berand)	to	different	
parts	of	the	city.		Every	time	we	met	during	my	last	three	months	in	Delhi,	he	would	
reprimand	me:	“Don’t	forget	me	in	London,	Londoners	are	very	unfaithful	(bewafa)!	
Many	 people	 from	 my	 village	 are	 there.”	 He	 would	 talk	 about	 how	 he	 felt	 alone	
(tanha)	even	though	he	had	the	church	and	that	perhaps	what	he	needed	was	a	good	
wife	(zane	khub).	
	
																																																								
68	This	is	a	phrase	from	the	Quran,	but	fits	in	neatly	with	Biblical	teachings	in	Leviticus	as	well.	I	never	
asked	 Shahrukh	 which	 he	 was	 referring	 to,	 but	 his	 way	 of	 being	 Christian	 incorporates	 a	 lot	 of	
cultural	elements	of	being	Pashtun	that	are	inflected	with	Muslim	viewpoints.	This	is	not	unusual	as	
studies	of	conversion	 to	Christianity	 in	South	and	Southeast	Asia	have	shown,	conversion	does	not	
entail	a	complete	rejection	of	one’s	previous	belief,	but	a	becoming	of	a	particular	kind	of	Christian	in	
an	indigenous	way	(S	Bayly	1989;	Rafael	1993).	
69	Of	course	there	is	not	one	reason	for	such	behaviour.	In	chapter	six,	I	explore	how	this	is	perhaps	
partly	due	to	the	context	of	suspicion	within	which	the	subject	of	the	refugee	is	formed	in	Delhi.	
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The	need	for	a	good	wife	came	up	frequently	in	my	conversations	with	Shahrukh70,	
and	the	issue	of	marriage	was	addressed	several	times	in	the	bible	study	sessions	I	
attended	with	him.	Held	 in	sex‐segregated	groups	 in	different	parts	of	 the	city,	 the	
bible	study	sessions	took	place	in	a	private	flat	rented	by	three	young	Afghan	men	
working	for	the	church.	The	attendees	were	mostly	young	single	men	without	family	
obligations,	and	after	the	discussion	the	group	would	congregate	in	the	living	room	
to	 talk	 over	 biscuits	 and	 soft	 drinks,	 or	 hot	 tea	 depending	 on	 the	weather.	 These	
discussions	 were	 spaces	 where	 the	 men	 could	 discuss	 personal	 problems	 in	 a	
supportive	 environment,	 or	 have	 a	 good	 laugh	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 each	 other.	 The	
meetings	also	provided	an	arena	to	discuss	personal	spiritual	revelations	or	moral	
lapses,	 usually	 those	 of	 former	 churchgoers	 or	 of	 “Afghans”	 (afghanha)	 more	
generally.	The	looming	threat	of	the	vices	(karhaye	bad)	or	sins	(gunaha)	of	sleeping	
with	women	(zenakari)	and	alcoholism	(sharab	khordan)	featured	often	in	stories	of	
those	who	had	 left	 the	 church	unexpectedly.	 Conversations	on	 such	 topics	usually	
ended	with	the	discussion	leader	making	a	communal	prayer	that	all	those	present	
find	 good	 spouses	 (hamsarane	khub)	 who	would	 strengthen	 their	 faith.	 The	 good	
spouse	was,	of	course,	assumed	to	be	a	Christian.	As	Shahrukh	once	related	 to	the	
group,	holding	his	arms	wide	apart,	“it	doesn’t	matter	to	me,	even	if	she	is	as	fat	as	
this	(eeraqam	chaaq	bashad),	she	just	needs	to	be	Christian.”	
	
The	way	Shahrukh	and	his	church	friends	spoke	of	a	good	wife	contrasted	with	how	
his	friends	in	Lajpat	Nagar	(a	neighbourhood	discussed	in	chapter	six)	would	talk	or	
brag	about	the	“girls”	(dukhtaran)	they	desired.	The	majority	of	Shahrukh’s	friends	I	
met	in	Lajpat	Nagar	were	young	men	in	their	20s	or	30s	who	had	migrated	to	Delhi	
by	themselves	and	were	making	a	living	through	taking	on	odd	jobs.	They	did	not	fit	
the	image	of	young	Afghan	men	held	by	many	Indian	inhabitants	of	Lajpat	Nagar	as	
being	wealthy	womanizers	with	 a	 penchant	 for	 drinking	 and	 rash	 driving.	 As	 one	
clothing	stall	keeper	in	the	central	market	explained	to	me:	
“These	Afghan	people	are	very	good	and	peaceful	 (shaant),	but	 their	young	
boys	 (jawan	ladke)…	 come	 here	 and	 get	 drunk	 and	 drive	 like	 crazy	 people	
																																																								
70	The	possibility	of	 finding	a	partner	 continues	 to	be	a	 concern	 for	Shahrukh.	There	are	not	many	
options	among	 the	Delhi	Afghan	Christian	community,	which	waxes	and	wanes	with	 refugee	 flows,	
and	he	cannot	rely	on	connections	he	would	have	had	through	the	Pashtun	network	in	India.	He	was	
briefly	interested	in	an	Indian	Christian	girl,	but	her	family	did	not	approve	of	the	relationship	over	
concerns	of	his	ability	to	provide	for	the	family.	
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(pagalon	 ki	 tarha).	 They	 do	 bad	 things	 (bure	 kam)	 here…	 like	 drugs	 and	
teasing	girls	(ladkiyon	ko	chhedna)71.”		
	
Shahrukh’s	friends	attributed	such	behaviour	to	the	Afghan	tourists	visiting	Delhi	or	
to	the	more	affluent	(paisadar)	Afghan	migrants	who,	like	their	Indian	counterparts,	
could	 often	 be	 seen	 on	 clandestine	 dates	 in	 the	 various	 cafes	 outside	 the	 main	
market	 area	 of	 the	 neighbourhood,	 where	 their	 friends	 kept	 a	 look	 out	 for	 any	
potential	family	members	in	the	vicinity.	For	Shahrukh’s	friends,	who	had	very	little	
social	 interaction	 with	 women,	 meeting	 a	 “girl”	 in	 this	 way	 was	 something	 that	
rarely	 happened	 but	 was	 often	 bragged	 about.	 Such	 “girls”	 were,	 however,	
ambivalent	 figures.	Often,	 they	 embodied	 a	 perceived	 crisis	 of	 prostitution	 among	
Afghans	 living	 in	 Delhi	 (discussed	 again	 in	 chapter	 six),	 and	 represented	 for	
Shahrukh’s	 friends	 their	own	difficult	position	of	having	become	migrants	 in	Delhi	
and	 living	 with	 financial	 instability.	 However,	 such	 women	 also	 presented	 the	
possibility	of	 temporary	sexual	relief.	Shahrukh’s	Lajpat	Nagar	friends	would	often	
brag	 about	 having	 obtained	 the	 phone	 number	 of	 a	 “girl”	 who	 worked	 as	 an	
interpreter	(terjuman)	for	medical	tourists,	only	to	have	their	bluff	called	by	others	
when	pestered	to	phone	the	girl	on	the	spot.	
	
While	it	did	not	seem	Shahrukh’s	Lajpat	Nagar	friends	had	much	sexual	contact	with	
women	 in	 real	 life,	 they	 did	 have	 access	 to	 freely	 available	 pornography	 on	 their	
mobile	phones.	They	would	 share	videos	with	each	other	on	 their	phones	 ranging	
from	 hard‐core	 pornography	 to	 YouTube	 clips	 of	 women	 dancing	 in	 traditional	
Afghan	clothing.	On	a	visit	to	Amirkhel’s	shop	(introduced	in	chapter	five),	Amirkhel	
was	explaining	to	me	how	Afghan	women	were	the	most	beautiful,	and	played	one	
such	video	on	his	phone	of	the	celebrated	Ustad	Hamahang	singing	for	a	dancing	girl	
at	 a	 house	 party	 in	 Kabul.	 	 Shahrukh	 peeked	 at	 the	 video	 reluctantly	 then	 turned	
away,	exclaiming	loudly	that	this	was	not	good	culture	(farhange	khub	nist)	and	that	
Aamirkhel	should	use	his	phone	 for	something	better,	 like	good	music	or	 learning.	
His	 tone	was	 not	 one	 of	 chastisement;	 rather	 it	 seemed	 Shahrukh	was	 convincing	
																																																								
71	Such	actions	are,	of	course,	not	unique	to	Afghan	men.	Similar	anxieties	were	also	held	about	young	
male	 students	 from	 African	 countries	 living	 in	 the	 neighbourhood.	 Later	 that	 year,	 the	 highly	
publicized	case	of	the	rape	and	murder	of	Jyoti	Singh	Pandey	would	reignite	discussion	on	women’s	
harassment	in	the	capital	and	in	India	more	broadly	both	at	the	local	and	international	level.	The	stall	
keeper’s	comments	can	perhaps	also	be	considered	in	light	of	rising	xenophobia	and	pervasive	Hindu	
nationalist	discourse	that	places	Muslim	masculinity	as	a	“dangerously	virile”	(Anand	2007)	threat	to	
the	nation	(see	also	Chopra	et	al	2004,	Murty	2009).	
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himself	that	it	was	right	not	to	watch	the	video.	Amirkhel,	however,	took	offense	and	
politely	excused	himself	saying	he	needed	to	go	and	pray,	leaving	me	and	Shahrukh	
to	watch	the	shop.	Such	interactions	would	eventually	lead	to	a	falling	out	between	
Amirkhel	and	Shahrukh,	compounding	Shahrukh’s	feeling	of	loneliness	in	Delhi.	
	
I	 once	 discussed	 Shahrukh’s	 loneliness	 with	 Jamal,	 an	 ethnic	 Uzbek	 refugee	 from	
Mazar‐e	 Sharif	 who	 was	 training	 to	 become	 a	 pastor	 in	 the	 Afghan	 church,	
remarking	how	it	seemed	odd	given	Shahrukh	was	so	friendly.		Jamal	chuckled	and	
said	“he’s	a	good	guy,	but	marches	to	the	beat	of	his	own	drum”	(bachcha	khob	ast,	
ama	 bekhi	 diger	 raqam	 ast).	 The	 implication	 was	 not	 just	 that	 Shahrukh	 was	
different,	 but	 that	 he	 did	 not	 fit	 in	 and	 was	 somewhat	 difficult	 to	 handle.	 From	
Shahrukh’s	descriptions	of	his	 life	 in	Afghanistan,	 it	appeared	he	had	indeed	never	
really	 fit	 in	 anywhere	 and	 tended	 to	 run	 afoul	 of	 people	 due	 to	 his	 propensity	 to	
speak	 his	 mind	 and	 live	 as	 he	 thought	 fit	 even	 if	 it	 meant	 holding	 an	 unpopular	
position.	In	Afghanistan,	as	related	below,	this	eventually	led	to	his	having	to	leave	
his	 village.	 In	 Delhi,	 Shahrukh’s	 eventual	 conversion	 to	 Christianity,	 discussed	 in	
chapter	 six,	 resulted	 in	 his	 having	 to	 leave	 the	mostly	 Pashtun	 neighbourhood	 he	
was	 initially	 living	 in.	 Even	 at	 church,	 his	 long‐winded,	 dramatic,	 and	 didactic	
interpretations	 of	 scripture	would	 often	 be	 tolerated	 by	 Jamal	 and	 Sharif,	 though	
their	displeasure	would	occasionally	show	as	they	cut	him	off	curtly	with	an	“Ok,	ok,	
let’s	move	forward”	(Sahi	ast,	berim	pesh	edama	bedim).		In	everyday	settings	such	as	
at	 our	mutual	 friend	Aamirkhel’s	 shop	where	 Afghan	 customers	would	 gather	 for	
chatting	 and	 buying	 a	 variety	 of	 clothing	 items,	 Shahrukh’s	 lack	 of	 tact	 and	 his	
tendency	 to	 spread	 the	 good	 news	 of	 the	 Bible	 to	 anyone	 present,	 led	 to	 others	
excusing	 themselves	 upon	 hearing	 he	 was	 coming,	 avoiding	 him	 in	 public,	 or	 on	
occasion	taunting	him	and	asking	him	to	leave.	
	
I	only	ever	heard	from	others	of	Shahrukh	being	reprimanded	or	taunted	in	public.	
He	alleged	it	did	not	bother	him	as	he	had	to	deal	with	it	on	a	regular	basis	after	his	
conversion	to	Christianity.	Though	he	would	sometimes	question	why	his	 life	 took	
this	turn,	he	had	faith	he	was	doing	the	right	thing	and	also	felt	such	behaviour	from	
others	was	emblematic	of	contemporary	Afghan	society,	where	 	 “5%	of	 the	people	
are	good	and	have	a	sense	of	humanity	(insaniyat)	in	dealing	with	others;	the	other	
95%	 have	 bad	 habits	 and	 a	 bad	 ‘culture’	 (farhang	wa	 aadaate	bad	darand).”	 He	
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argued	that	today	Afghans	are	 just	 interested	in	personal	profit	(faidaye	khod)	and	
are	hypocrites	(taqallubi),	especially	the	Afghans	in	Delhi.	As	proof,	he	referenced	a	
number	of	individuals	he	knew	in	Delhi	who	were	outwardly	observant	Muslims,	but	
would	 secretly	womanize,	 drink,	 or	 have	 kept	 boys.	While	 such	 views	 on	Afghans	
were	not	uncommon	among	migrants	I	met	in	Delhi,	Shahrukh’s	feelings	appeared	to	
arise	in	part	from	a	resentment	borne	of	his	experience	with	other	Pashtuns	in	India,	
discussed	more	in	chapter	six.	
	
Though	he	was	a	 registered	 refugee,	he	 initially	 came	 to	 India	 looking	 for	work.	As	
described	 below,	 Shahrukh’s	 initial	 sojourn	 in	 India	 was	 as	 part	 of	 a	 “circulation	
society”	(Aslanian	2011;	Markovits	et	al	2003)	of	Pashtun	traders	and	moneylenders	
that	spans	across	South	Asia	from	Bangladesh	to	Baluchistan.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	
Shahrukh	did	not	see	being	a	refugee	as	a	‘normal’	(aadi)	status	for	Afghans	in	India,	
but	rather	a	status	peculiar	to	those	in	Delhi.	For	him	Afghan	migration	to	India	was	
akin	 to	migrant	 labour	 to	 the	Gulf,	 though	he	was	aware	Afghan	migrants’	 status	 in	
India	was	not	 legal	in	the	eyes	of	the	state	as	 it	might	be	for	those	sponsored	in	the	
Gulf.	He	 confided	 to	me	once	 that	he	 chose	not	 to	 go	 to	Pakistan	mainly	because	 it	
would	have	been	embarrassing	when	others	from	his	village	were	going	to	Dubai	or	
London,	which	he	could	not	afford	to	do	without	connections.	While	his	connection	to	
the	 Pashtun	 network	 in	 India	 initially	 allowed	 him	 to	 move	 across	 the	 country	 in	
search	of	work,	his	conversion	to	Christianity	was	seen	as	a	breach	of	proper	conduct	
and	resulted	in	his	subsequent	ostracism	from	that	network.	
	
Shahrukh’s	initial	impetus	to	come	to	India	was	to	seek	work,	but	was	also	due	to	a	
threat	 to	 his	 life	 and	 livelihood	 in	 his	 home	 province	 of	 Paktia	 in	 eastern	
Afghanistan.	Shahrukh	described	how	in	Paktia	he	came	 from	a	high	status	 family.	
His	 father	was	 an	 important	 elder	 of	 the	 village,	 and	his	 family	 had	 a	 large	 house	
(haveli)	and	some	land.	In	Paktia,	Shahrukh	worked	as	a	carpenter	and	painter	at	a	
radio	 tower	 being	 built	 by	USAID	 and	NATO.	He	would	 hide	 the	 personal	written	
threats	 he	 received	 from	 the	 Taliban	 from	 his	 family,	 but	 when	 a	 DVD	 of	 fifteen	
people	being	beheaded	was	delivered	directly	to	his	family’s	door	with	a	note	stating	
he	would	face	the	same	end	unless	he	ceased	working	at	the	station,	his	mother	and	
brother,	 with	 whom	 his	 relations	 were	 already	 strained,	 ordered	 him	 to	 stop	
working	 or	 to	 go	 sleep	 with	 the	 “Americans”	 instead	 of	 causing	 the	 family	 more	
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trouble	(janjaal).	Soon	after,	he	moved	out,	his	friend	called	him	and	told	him	never	
to	return	as	the	Taliban	had	made	an	announcement	that	“any	family	with	members	
cooperating	with	the	foreigners	(kharijiha)	need	not	report	them	to	the	Taliban,	but	
should	[instead]	 just	kick	them	out	of	their	house	and	[the	Taliban]	will	kill	 them.”	
Already	infamous	in	his	village	for	being	a	statue	maker72	(mujassama‐saz)	and	not	
being	religiously	observant,	Shahrukh	decided	not	to	return	home	and	to	approach	
the	 district	 governor’s	 office	 (woleswal)	 for	 assistance.	 Functionaries	 at	 the	 office	
explained	that	at	 least	 twenty	people	came	every	day	with	similar	 letters	 from	the	
Taliban	and	that	he	should	go	 to	Kabul	where	“nobody	says	anything	 to	anyone	…	
there	is	freedom	(azadi)	…	and	you	can	find	a	room	for	yourself.”	
	
Arriving	 in	 Kabul,	 Shahrukh	 found	 himself	 in	 a	 socio‐economically	 disadvantaged	
position.	 Without	 connections,	 and	 without	 knowing	 a	 word	 of	 Dari,	 he	 was	
perceived	as	a	provincial	Pashtun.	He	could	not	find	work	and	found	it	increasingly	
difficult	to	make	ends	meet.	An	acquaintance	suggested	he	go	to	India	where	there	
was	work	 for	 statue‐makers,	 and	after	 a	harsh	winter	 in	Kabul,	 he	 saved	up	3000	
Afghanis73	for	the	passport	application	fee,	and	returned	to	his	district	to	obtain	the	
requisite	 signatures	 from	 the	 leader	 of	 his	 tribe	 (malik).	He	was	 able	 to	move	 his	
application	 through	 the	 bureaucracy	 with	 the	 influence	 of	 a	 family	 friend	 who	
worked	in	the	district	capital	and	was	a	former	Khalqi74	and	thus	felt	solidarity	with	
Shahrukh	who	was	maligned	in	his	village	for	being	irreligious.	
	
“I	 remember	 I	 arrived	 in	 Delhi	 on	 a	 Sunday	 because	 everything	 was	 closed,”	
Shahrukh	 told	 me,	 explaining	 how	 before	 coming	 to	 India	 he	 had	 no	 idea	 of	 the	
country	or	what	to	expect.	“Besides	a	visa,	I	had	no	clue	what	I	would	need!”	Arriving	
at	 the	 airport,	 he	 sat	 in	 an	 auto‐rickshaw	 and	 asked	 the	 driver	 to	 take	 him	 to	
wherever	there	are	Afghans75:	
“The	 driver	 told	me	 it	would	 be	Rs	 300...	We	 drove	 for	 some	 time	until	 he	
asked	me	if	I	had	change	…	I	gladly	took	out	the	Afghanis	I	had	in	my	pocket	
																																																								
72	Many	Muslims	believe	the	making	of	statues	goes	against	religious	teachings	on	idolatry.	
73	The	currency	of	Afghanistan.	
74	A	faction	of	the	former	communist	party	in	Afghanistan.	
75	This	is	a	common	story	among	many	Afghans	I	met	who	had	come	to	Delhi	between	2006	and	2009.	
From	my	own	observations	at	Delhi’s	Indira	Gandhi	airport	in	2012,	when	there	were	at	least	three	
daily	flights	arriving	from	Afghanistan,	the	private	taxi	stands	outside	the	international	arrivals	gate	
had	unofficially	employed	Afghan	refugees	and	asylum	seekers	as	drivers.	These	mostly	young	men	
would	wait	outside	the	gates	and	solicit	Afghan	passengers	exiting	the	terminal.	
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to	show	him	and	he	yelled	at	me	saying	he	needed	Indian	money.	 	When	he	
found	out	I	didn’t	have	any,	he	said	he	would	take	my	watch…	worth	at	least	
Rs	700‐800.	 I	 asked	him	 to	 take	me	back	 to	 the	airport,	but	he	 just	 left	me	
under	this	bridge...	Luckily,	half	the	Afghans	who	had	come	on	my	flight	were	
still	there	[when	I	returned	to	the	airport].”	
He	 approached	 a	man	 for	 help	who	 asked	 if	 he	 had	 come	 to	 India	 to	work	 or	 to	
become	a	refugee.	When	he	explained	he	was	looking	for	work,	the	man	took	him	to	
a	hotel	in	Ballimaran	in	Old	Delhi.		The	Pashtuns	he	met	in	Ballimaran	dissuaded	him	
from	 registering	 with	 the	 FRRO,	 urging	 him	 instead	 to	 throw	 away	 his	 passport,	
never	return	to	Afghanistan,	and	instead	do	“business”	in	India.	“They	played	a	trick	
on	me,”	he	said	smiling,	“because	they	all	just	hide	their	passports	(put	mi	konand).”	
While	 Shahrukh	 didn’t	 go	 to	 the	 FRRO,	 he	 did	 keep	 his	 passport,	 which	 would	
eventually	 come	 handy	 years	 later	 in	 applying	 for	 asylum	with	 the	 UNHCR.	 	 The	
Ballimaran	 Pashtuns	 told	 him	 to	 go	 to	 Bombay	where	many	 Afghans	 had	made	 a	
fortune	 through	 moneylending	 (Oonja	 afghanha	 ziad	 astand	 ke	 bekhi	 paisadar	
shodand	wa	 kare	 sood	me	 konand)	 and	 that	 there	 was	 a	 shrine	 (ziyaret)	 nearby	
where	they	would	go	and	help	poorer	Afghans76.	
	
“They	 built	 a	 beautiful	 building	 [of	 images]	 for	 me,”	 Shahrukh	 explains,	 “and	 I	
decided	 to	 take	…	 a	 train	 to	 Bombay.”	He	 had	 been	 given	 contact	 information	 for	
Agha	Saheb	who	was	the	spiritual	guide	(pir)	of	a	shrine	known	as	Makane	Sharif77	
in	 Akola	 and	 who	 distributed	 alms	 (khairat)	 collected	 from	 the	 Pashtun	
moneylenders.	 Agha	 Saheb	 instructed	 Shahrukh	 to	 come	 to	Makane	Sharif	 where	
people	 are	 considered	 guests	 for	 three	 days	 and	 are	 free	 to	 stay	 longer	 provided	
they	 render	 some	 kind	 of	 service	 to	 the	 shrine	 or	 its	 associated	 farms	 and	
properties.	“I	showed	Agha	Saheb	the	photo	albums	of	my	statues	from	Afghanistan	
and	said	I	was	looking	for	work,”	Shahrukh	explains,	
“He	said	 ‘make	things	for	me	and	we’ll	see	how	good	you	are	before	finding	
you	other	work.’	 	 I	made	many	 statues	 of	 camels,	 lions,	 tigers,	 birds…	 they	
																																																								
76	I	did	not	visit	Makane	Sharif.	However,	on	a	personal	trip	to	Bombay,	I	met	with	the	Afghan	Consul	
General	who	informed	me	of	another	Pashtun	shrine	in	the	city	that	is	the	centre	of	Bombay’s	‘local’	
Pashtun	community.	Shahrukh	was	familiar	with	the	shrine	and	stated	most	people	go	there	before	
going	to	Akola.	
77	The	Afghanistan	Consul	General	in	Bombay	explained	to	me	that	year‐round	there	would	be	about	
3,000	people	at	Makane	Sharif,	mostly	Pashtuns,	from	Pakistan,	Afghanistan,	and	India.	
	 115
gave	me	a	little	salary	of	1	to	3,000	rupees	but	also	gave	me	food,	clothes…	I	
had	a	fun	time.”		
Impressed	by	the	stories	and	lifestyle	of	the	moneylenders	who	would	come	through	
Makane	Sharif	regularly,	Shahrukh	decided	to	return	to	Bombay	in	hopes	of	making	
a	 better	 living.	 Despite	 assurances	 from	many	 acquaintances,	 Shahrukh	 could	 not	
find	work	in	Bombay,	but	was	too	embarrassed	to	return	to	Akola.		
	
Serendipitously,	 a	 prominent	 Pashtun	 moneylender	 in	 Calcutta	 who	 had	 seen	
pictures	of	Shahrukh’s	 statues	at	Akola,	which	had	been	sent	 to	his	mobile	phone,	
contacted	 Shahrukh	 to	 come	 build	 a	 statue	 of	 Khan	 Abdul	 Ghaffar	 Khan78	for	 his	
house.	Early	during	his	time	in	eastern	India,	Shahrukh	met	an	Afghan	man	in	Assam	
who	eked	out	his	 living	by	begging	from	house	to	house.	 	One	day,	the	man	was	in	
unusually	good	spirits	and	explained	to	Shahrukh	that	he	was	a	refugee	and	that	he	
had	just	been	informed	his	case	had	been	sent	to	the	US	Embassy,	and	that	he	was	
due	to	leave	India	in	five	months.	“Many	Pashtuns	have	come	here	and	ruined	their	
life,	don’t	waste	yours!	Take	your	passport	 and	go	 to	 the	UNHCR!”	 the	man	urged	
Shahrukh.	 It	 took	 a	 year	 of	 travelling	 and	 working	 before	 Shahrukh	 became	
dissatisfied	with	his	life	in	eastern	India	and	remembered	the	man’s	words	and	went	
to	Delhi	to	apply	for	refugee	status.	
	
After	 registering	with	 the	UNHCR,	 Shahrukh	waited	 for	 nine	months	 for	 an	 initial	
interview	and	another	three	months	for	a	second	interview.	At	his	wits	end,	during	
the	second	interview	he	asked	if	the	UNHCR	could	provide	him	with	work	while	he	
waited	 to	 hear	 back.	 Realizing	 he	 could	 not	 get	 work	 unless	 he	 was	 a	 registered	
refugee,	 he	 informed	 the	 RSD	 officer	 that	 as	 he	 had	 no	means	 to	 live	 in	Delhi,	 he	
would	be	forced	to	return	to	Guwahati,	Assam.	They	told	him	they	would	be	in	touch	
soon.	However,	to	buy	his	ticket	to	Guwahati,	Shahrukh	had	had	to	sell	his	phone.	He	
waited	two	months	before	calling	the	UNHCR	to	check	on	his	case	and	discovered	he	
had	actually	been	accepted	the	day	he	left	for	Assam.	
	
When	he	returned	to	Delhi	to	pick	up	his	‘Blue	Card’,	the	UNHCR	representative	he	
spoke	with	suggested	that	since	he	had	little	money,	he	live	in	Wazirabad	in	North	
																																																								
78	A	 freedom	 fighter	 against	 the	 British	 Raj	 from	 what	 is	 now	 Khyber	 Pakhtunkhwa	 in	 Pakistan,	
whose	non‐violent	struggle	against	the	British	is	discussed	by	Banerjee	(2000).	
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Delhi	 where	 many	 Afghan	 Pashtun79	refugees	 are	 settled	 and	 rent	 is	 cheap.	
Incidentally,	 Wazirabad	 was	 also	 where	 many	 of	 Shahrukh’s	 acquaintances	 and	
contacts	 through	the	Pashtun	moneylender	network	also	 lived,	and	he	was	able	 to	
find	a	room	for	Rs	1500	per	month	even	though	he	only	had	Rs	900	on	him	at	the	
time.	He	promised	to	pay	any	outstanding	rent	once	he	got	a	job.	He	initially	worked	
at	 the	 UNHCR	 under	 their	 IGA	 (Income	 Generation	 Activities)	 program	where	 he	
received	Rs	3000	per	month,	but	 switched	 to	a	 slightly	better	paying	 job	with	 the	
YMCA	 that	 ended	 after	 five	 months	 when	 the	 UNHCR	 terminated	 its	 relationship	
with	 the	 organization80.	 “Since	 then	 my	 main	 problem	 is	 finances,”	 Shahrukh	
explains.	At	least	once	a	year	he	tries	to	meet	with	the	UNHCR	officer	responsible	for	
welfare	 issues	 “She	says	 I	 just	have	 to	bear	with	 the	 [financial]	 circumstances	and	
find	my	way	since	the	UNHCR	cannot	help.”	During	the	year	I	was	in	Delhi,	Shahrukh	
managed	 to	 hold	 a	 job	 through	 his	 church,	 distributing	 Christian	 tracts	 and	 other	
proselytization	materials	across	Delhi.	This	job	was	sufficient	for	covering	his	rent,	
and	he	would	find	odd	jobs	doing	 interpretation	in	the	spring,	autumn,	and	winter	
when	many	Afghans	visit	Delhi.	In	mid‐2014,	he	was	told	the	church	could	no	longer	
fund	 his	 position.	 He	 managed	 to	 secure	 assistance	 with	 expenses	 for	 several	
months	through	connections	abroad	until	he	found	new	work	doing	interpretation81.	
	
Shahrukh’s	 conversion	 to	 Christianity	 eventually	 led	 to	 the	 Pashtun	 community	
ejecting	(kharij	kardan)	him	from	Wazirabad.	The	social	ostracism	meant	Shahrukh	
did	not	feel	safe	living	in	Afghan	areas	of	Delhi,	which	in	turn	affected	his	ability	to	
find	 housing.	 While	 SLIC	 undertook	 sensitization	 training	 for	 police,	 Residence	
Welfare	 Associations,	 and	 landlords	 in	 areas	 with	 large	 refugee	 populations,	
Shahrukh	was	forced	to	look	for	housing	in	the	poorer	neighbourhoods	away	from	
refugee	 populations	 where	 landlords	 were	 suspicious	 of	 Afghans	 and	 where	
policemen	 who	 noticed	 him	 proselytizing	 in	 his	 neighbourhood	 market	 had	
harassed	 him	 and	 tried	 to	 get	 him	 to	 leave.	Whereas	 Shahrukh	 had	 been	 able	 to	
travel	 across	 India	 through	his	 involvement	 in	 the	Pashtun	moneylender	network,	
																																																								
79	In	 2012,	 while	 I	 was	 doing	 fieldwork,	 many	 Somali	 refugees	 had	 also	 settled	 in	 Wazirabad,	
presumable	 following	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Bosco	 centre	 there,	 which	 in	 turn	 had	 been	
established	due	to	the	large	Afghan	refugee	population	in	the	area.	
80	See	chapter	three	for	details	on	the	UNHCR‐YMCA	relationship.	
81	From	our	 conversations,	 I	 suspect	 this	 is	 not	 the	whole	 story,	 but	 I	 have	 no	way	 of	 knowing	 or	
asking.	
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he	now	felt	stuck	in	Delhi.	He	was	critical	of	the	“Blue	Card”	provided	by	the	UNHCR,	
as	it	
“doesn’t	 give	 you	 anything!	 You	 can’t	 get	 a	 house,	 a	 SIM	 card,	 buy	 a	 train	
ticket,	or	even	spend	a	night	 in	a	hotel	with	 it.	 It	 just	says	on	the	back	that	
they	can’t	kick	you	out	of	 India…	you	can	sleep	under	a	bridge	 for	all	 they	
care…	[you	are]	restricted	to	stay	in	Delhi.	You	can	even	travel	around	India	
right	now,	but	as	a	refugee	you	have	to	reside	in	Delhi…	the	UNHCR	has	no	
authority	outside	of	[Delhi]	and	can	only	help	you	here.”	
	
Of	 course,	 as	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 three,	 some	 refugees	 did	 obtain	 duplicate	
passports	 or	 find	other	means	 to	 travel	 between	Afghanistan	 and	 India.	 Shahrukh	
could	not	do	so,	but	was	aware	that	others	did.	He	believed	this	was	dishonest,	but	
laid	 the	 blame	 on	 the	 UNHCR’s	 inability	 to	 “separate	 the	 goats	 from	 the	 sheep”	
(oonha	 buz	 az	 gosfand	 joda	 na	 mekonand),	 i.e.	 the	 rich	 from	 the	 poor	 or	 the	
deserving	 from	 the	 undeserving.	 Having	 worked	 as	 a	 volunteer	 on	 an	 AUSAID	
project	 identifying	 refugees	most	 in	 need,	 Shahrukh	 conducted	 surveys	 of	 Afghan	
refugees	across	South	and	North	Delhi	and	claimed	to	have	seen	the	poorest	of	the	
poor.	He	pointed	out,	however,	that	
“There	 are	 many	 people	 who	 came	 here	 to	 do	 business,	 to	 make	
hotels/restaurants	and	not	to	be	sent	to	a	third	country.	They	came	here	for	
financial	benefit.	They	were	rich	 in	Afghanistan	and	saw	 that	here	 there	 is	
security,	 schooling	 for	 children…	 they	 have	 crores82	of	 rupees.	 There	 are	
many	families	who	are	supporters	of	[political	parties	such	as]	Hizb‐e	Islami	
or	Khalqis	or	Parchamis83,	but	want	to	go	to	America.	They	all	receive	help	
from	the	UNHCR	because	the	UNHCR	cannot	do	a	survey	to	see	who	is	lying	
or	telling	the	truth	of	their	situation.”	
	
Shahrukh’s	 view	 on	 the	 inability	 of	 the	 UNHCR	 to	 identify	 real	 refugees	 against	
alleged	 imposters	 recognizes,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 inaccuracy	 of	 the	 state‐scale	
dichotomization	of	the	economic	migrant	and	refugee	dichotomy.	He	relates	a	reality	
																																																								
82	A	crore	is	a	unit	of	measurement	equalling	ten	million.	
83	There	 are	no	 organ	offices	 of	Afghan	political	 parties	 in	Delhi	 as	 in	Pakistan	or	 Iran.	 Shahrukh’s	
point	was	that	those	with	political	connections	in	Afghanistan	have	access	to	financial	assistance	that	
allows	 them	 to	 maintain	 a	 comfortable	 lifestyle	 in	 India,	 but	 that	 the	 UNHCR	 has	 no	 way	 of	
apprehending	this	fact.	In	general	it	is	rare	to	find	Afghans	openly	discussing	their	political	affiliations	
in	Delhi.	
	 118
of	 transnational	 migration,	 addressed	 more	 fully	 in	 chapter	 five,	 where	 different	
forms	of	migration	are	deployed	 in	 tandem,	so	 that	 there	 is	not	a	clear	distinction	
between	 those	 who	 would	 be	 classified	 as	 either	 refugees	 or	 economic	migrants.	
This	 is,	 of	 course,	 apparent	 in	 his	 own	 story	 of	 coming	 to	 India	 and	 eventually	
becoming	a	refugee.	His	comment,	however,	goes	further	as	he	illustrates	there	are	
those	who	are	able	to	use	different	ideas	of	what	it	means	to	be	Afghan	in	Delhi	or	
India	to	their	advantage	through	greater	access	to	social	or	financial	resources.	This	
issue	is	also	discussed	in	the	next	chapter	with	regard	to	belonging	and	scale.	
		
Shahrukh’s	primary	concern,	however,	was	that	he	not	waste	his	youth	in	India.	He	
explained	that:	
“They	always	talk	about	human	rights,	they	should	give	us	those	rights!	I	don’t	
ask	for	money	from	them,	I	just	want	my	right	[to	be	able	to	work]…	I’m	28…	
in	ten	years	I’ll	be	almost	40…I	will	be	a	burden	and	unable	to	contribute	to	a	
new	country.	If	they	send	me	now	I	can	work	for	myself	and	even	if	I	just	wash	
clothes	or	polish	shoes	it	will	be	a	service	to	other	people	in	another	country…	
[remaining]	in	this	country,	my	life	will	be	destroyed.”	
There	was	not	any	one	country	his	heart	was	set	on,	though	he	said	he’d	prefer	to	go	
to	Canada	or	the	USA	where	he	could	practice	his	religion	freely	and	perhaps	find	a	
wife.	 Israel	 was	 another	 possible	 option	 where	 he	 believed	 he	 would	 be	 able	 to	
assimilate	due	to	Pashtun	culture’s	similarity	to	historical	Judaic	culture84,	find	a	job,	
and	start	a	family.	Our	meetings	would	often	end	with	such	reflections,	and	he	would	
often	 say	 he	 was	 losing	 faith	 he	 would	 ever	 leave.	 He	 would,	 however,	 usually	
immediately	 correct	 himself	 and	 explain	 how	before	 converting	 to	 Christianity	 he	
thought	only	the	UNHCR	could	help	him,	but	that	now	he	only	had	faith	in	God	who	
had	put	 him	here	 for	 a	 reason	 and	would	 see	 him	 through.	He	 said	 this	 gave	him	
hope	 that	ultimately	 the	UNHCR	would	help	him	somehow.	 “At	 least	 I	have	a	blue	
card,”	he	would	remind	himself,	 “If	 I	were	sent	back	 to	Afghanistan	 they’d	kill	me.	
Even	my	family	doesn’t	accept	me.”	
																																																								
84	Shahrukh	had	read	on	the	internet	about	the	theory	that	the	Pashtun	were	descended	from	the	lost	
tribe	of	Israel	and	would	spend	a	lot	of	time	watching	documentaries	on	the	subject	on	YouTube,	and	
searching	for	information	and	theories	on	how	Israel	wished	to	repatriate	Pashtuns.	
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4.2 Case	2:	Musa	Saheb,	the	Economic	Migrant	
Musa	Saheb	was	one	of	the	few	people	including	Ali,	introduced	below,	who	invited	
me	 to	 meet	 at	 their	 house85.	 In	 fact,	 I	 almost	 only	 ever	 saw	 him	 at	 home	 as	 he	
avoided	being	seen	with	me	in	public86	following	an	incident	where	I	was	accused	of	
being	 a	 UNHCR	 spy	 at	 a	 meeting	 of	 the	 Refugee	 Solidarity	 Committee	 (RSC),	
discussed	in	chapter	five.	The	RSC	was	a	defunct	group	that	Musa	Saheb	had	revived	
during	my	time	in	Delhi	and	as	the	head	of	the	group	it	would	have	been	problematic	
for	him	to	be	seen	with	me.	Though	I	did	not	see	him	as	frequently	as	Shahrukh,	we	
ended	up	building	a	close	relationship	because	of	his	interest	in	poetry,	music,	and	
history,	and	we	would	meet	and	talk	at	his	place	for	hours	at	a	time.	Our	relationship	
became	closer	after	he	too	left	the	RSC	following	allegations	of	sabotage.	
	
I	met	Musa	Saheb	at	my	first	RSC	meeting,	when	he	was	still	heading	the	committee.	I	
had	arrived	near	 the	end	of	 the	meeting	and	went	 to	 introduce	myself.	Musa	Saheb	
was	sitting	and	laughing	in	his	usual	jovial	way,	having	doubtlessly	cracked	one	of	his	
jokes	 that	were	generally	double‐entendres.	He	 is	a	short,	 study	man,	with	a	strong	
physique.	Though	in	his	 late	sixties,	his	robust	 frame	and	jovial	demeanour	give	the	
impression	he	is	much	younger.	What	he	lacks	in	height,	Musa	Saheb	makes	up	in	wit.	
An	urbane	gentleman,	he	is	well	read	in	the	Persian	classics	and	has	a	wide	knowledge	
of	 both	 Urdu	 and	 Persian	 poetry.	 His	 intellectual	 background	 comes	 across	 in	 his	
speech.	Unlike	most	of	the	refugees	I	met	in	Delhi,	Musa	Saheb	almost	always	speaks	
in	a	very	formal	and	genteel	register,	addressing	others	formally	regardless	of	age	or	
status,	enunciating	and	pronouncing	his	words	as	if	he	were	a	newscaster.	Despite	the	
class	status	reflected	in	his	speech,	Musa	Saheb	has	a	way	of	interacting	with	people	at	
their	own	level	of	discourse,	setting	them	at	ease	and	encouraging	them	to	engage	in	
conversation.	 An	 impeccable	 dresser,	 he	 always	 wears	 a	 clean,	 pressed,	 simply	
																																																								
85	The	house	 can	be	 a	 problematic	 space	 for	Afghans	 in	Delhi.	Whereas	 in	Afghanistan,	 houses	 are	
built	with	separate	areas	to	entertain	outside	male	guests,	many	of	the	refugees	I	met	lived	in	rooms	
or	apartments	where	it	would	have	been	difficult	to	observe	the	customary	segregation.	Additionally,	
for	some,	the	state	of	their	living	conditions	in	Delhi	compared	to	what	they	had	in	Afghanistan	might	
have	been	a	source	of	embarrassment.	
86	Though	Musa	Saheb	had	spearheaded	the	reestablishment	of	the	RSC,	his	position	in	the	group	had	
been	weakened	by	his	status	as	a	rejected	refugee	and	the	subsequent	refusal	of	the	UNHCR	to	work	
with	the	group	while	he	was	at	its	helm.	Already	having	stepped	down	as	head	of	the	committee,	his	
intentions	and	loyalty	to	the	RSC	would	have	been	called	into	question	if	he	were	to	be	seen	with	me	
in	public	after	members	of	 the	RSC	had	publically	accused	me	of	spying	on	the	Afghan	community.	
Though	he	never	stated	this	fact	explicitly,	he	obliquely	apologized	for	the	need	to	meet	secretively	
almost	every	time	we	met.	
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embroidered	perahan‐tunban	and,	depending	on	the	weather,	a	black	karakul	hat	and	
waistcoat.	His	manicured,	close‐cropped	white	beard	and	short,	silky‐white	hair	adds	
coolness	to	the	air	around	him	that	is	reflected	in	his	laughing,	light	brown	eyes.	
	
Musa	Saheb	and	his	family	live	in	a	flat	on	a	small,	quiet	side	street	in	a	comfortable,	
middle‐class	area	of	Lajpat	Nagar.	The	nondescript	doorway	leading	to	his	building	
is	almost	hidden	from	view	by	a	ground	floor	shop	selling	miscellaneous	foodstuffs,	
household	items,	and	fresh	tea	made	on	a	little	burner.	Behind	this	doorway,	a	dark	
and	narrow	flight	of	stairs	leads	to	a	balcony	lined	with	potted	plants,	and	a	screen	
door	at	 the	 far	end	opens	onto	Musa	Saheb’s	drawing	room:	only	part	of	 the	 flat	 I	
was	privy	to	as	a	male	guest.	The	entrance	to	the	flat	gives	the	impression	that	the	
accommodation	is	spacious.	The	drawing	room	is	large	and	comfortable,	and	easily	
fits	a	party	of	fifteen	people.	Two	thirds	of	the	room	is	covered	in	a	thin	red	carpet	
on	 top	 of	 which	 toshaks87	are	 laid	 out	 neatly	 in	 a	 large	 rectangle,	 with	 bolsters	
provided	 for	 guests	 to	 recline	 on.	 The	 covers	 of	 the	 toshaks	 and	 bolsters	 always	
match	 the	 curtains	 in	 the	 room,	 changing	 from	 a	 cream	 and	 red,	 scalloped	 cotton	
material	 in	warmer	weather	 to	a	heavier,	 softer	green	and	maroon	material	 in	 the	
colder	months.	
	
Musa	Saheb	lived	with	his	wife,	his	youngest	son	and	daughter	of	twelve	and	eight	
respectively,	 and	 his	 eldest	 son	 who	 worked	 at	 the	 Afghanistan	 embassy.	 As	 an	
outside	male	guest,	I	never	met	his	wife	or	daughter	at	the	flat.	I	did,	however,	once	
bump	 into	Musa	Saheb,	his	wife,	and	a	 female	neighbour	 in	Lajpat	Nagar’s	Central	
Market	as	they	stood	at	a	street	stall	eating	golgappe88	and	laughing	while	watching	
each	other	manoeuvre	the	precarious	snacks	without	spilling	the	contents	on	their	
clothes.	I	politely	greeted	Musa	Saheb	who	appeared	to	be	taken	aback	for	an	instant,	
before.	He	quickly	introduced	his	wife	and	the	female	neighbour	who	smiled,	briefly	
greeted	me	with	a	‘salam’,	and	then	stepped	aside	to	continue	talking	to	each	other.	
Though	 I	 never	met	 his	 daughter,	Musa	 Saheb	would	 recount	 his	 fondness	 of	 her,	
often	 in	 the	 context	 of	 his	 love	of	 children	 and	 their	 innocent	 outlook	on	 life,	 and	
																																																								
87	Large	cushions	that	serve	as	seats.	
88	Golgappe	are	a	street	food	consisting	of	thin	and	crispy	bite‐sized,	hollow	flour	pastries	filled	with	a	
mixture	of	spicy	water,	chickpea	filling,	and	tamarind	chutney.	They	are	served	one	at	a	time	and	in	
quick	succession,	requiring	customers	to	exercise	dexterity	in	eating	them.	
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described	 how	 he	 would	 take	 her	 on	 outings	 with	 the	 whole	 family	 so	 that	 they	
would	know	about	the	city	they	lived	in.	
	
When	I	would	visit	 the	 flat,	a	dastarkhwan89	would	be	 laid	out	ahead	of	my	arrival	
with	 freshly	 brewed	 green	 tea	 and	 sweets.	 Sometimes	 during	 our	 conversations,	
which	usually	took	place	in	the	middle	of	the	day,	Musa	Saheb’s	wife	would	alert	him	
with	a	cough	or	some	other	indication	imperceptible	to	me,	that	the	food	was	ready.	
He	would	excuse	himself	and	walk	to	the	curtain	at	the	end	of	the	room	to	receive	a	
tray	laden	with	plates,	cutlery,	and	food.	On	weekends,	when	his	children	were	home,	
his	younger	son	would	bring	out	the	tray	and	sometimes	join	us	in	the	meal.	Musa	
Saheb	was	 always	 a	 gracious	 host	 and	would	 recount	 stories	 of	 large	 dinners	 he	
would	 host	 of	 10‐20	 friends,	 I	 assumed	 all	 men,	 who	 would	 gather	 and	 discuss	
politics	 in	Afghanistan	and	 India	 late	 into	 the	night.	Musa	Saheb	explained	 that	he	
liked	to	keep	the	company	of	people	of	varying	age	groups	and	social	backgrounds,	
unlike	the	majority	of	his	friends	of	the	same	age	who	he	described	as	not	knowing	
“how	to	talk	to	young	people	(jawanan).”	He	suggested	that	in	comparison	to	other	
Afghan	men	of	a	similar	class	and	generation,	he	saw	social	and	religious	issues	from	
an	accommodating	perspective	 (nigaahe	wasee)	and	was	 thus	able	 to	connect	well	
with	people	 from	different	generations	who	would	 confide	 in	him	easily.	 “For	 this	
reason,”	he	explained,	“I	understand	the	problems	of	Delhi’s	Afghans	very	well.”	
	
While	Musa	Saheb	and	I	discussed	a	variety	of	issues	including	Afghans	in	Delhi,	he	
was	loath	to	talk	about	his	personal	history	as	a	refugee	and	his	experience	with	the	
UNHCR.	He	would	generally	avoid	direct	questions	about	his	personal	history,	giving	
a	basic	outline	and	 then	changing	 the	 flow	of	 the	discussion.	There	were	only	 two	
occasions	on	which	he	discussed	his	flight	to	Pakistan	and	the	subsequent	move	to	
India,	where	he	was	 rejected	by	 the	UNHCR	and	considered	an	economic	migrant.	
Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 year,	 however,	 between	 our	 discussions	 on	 the	 RSC,	 the	
Afghan	 community	 in	 Delhi,	 the	 connectedness	 of	 India	 to	 Afghanistan,	 and	 his	
political	 and	 philosophical	 views	 on	 man	 and	 society,	 his	 general	 opinion	 on	 the	
UNHCR	came	 filtered	through	clearly;	 it	was	not	 favourable.	 In	 the	 following	 I	will	
summarize	Musa	Saheb’s	story	and	his	view	of	the	UNHCR,	as	pieced	together	from	
multiple	conversations.	
																																																								
89	A	patterned	tablecloth	spread	on	the	ground	on	which	food	or	refreshment	is	served.	
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Musa	 Saheb	 comes	 from	 a	 religiously	 and	 ethnically	 mixed	 family,	 which	 is	 not	
unusual	 for	 a	man	of	 his	 background.	His	paternal	 ancestry	was	Hazara	 and	Tajik	
and	his	mother,	 the	 fourth	wife	 of	 his	 father,	was	 a	 Pashtun.	A	 Shia	 himself,	 he	 is	
currently	married	 to	his	 second	wife,	 a	Sunni	Pashtun	woman,	 and	attends	Friday	
prayers	at	a	Sunni	mosque	for	theological	and	social	reasons.	He	does	not	agree	with	
the	 theological	 orientation	 of	 the	 Afghan	 Shia	 community	 in	 Delhi,	 and	 the	 Sunni	
mosque	 in	 Defence	 Colony	 is	where	 the	majority	 of	 Afghans	 in	 is	 neighbourhood,	
Lajpat	 Nagar,	 attend	 Friday	 prayers.	 He	 does,	 however,	 participate	 in	 religious	
events	that	the	Afghan	Shia	community	hold	at	a	Shia	mosque	in	central	Delhi.		
	
While	 he	 never	 spoke	 in	 detail	 about	 his	 father,	 it	 was	 clear	 from	 Musa	 Saheb’s	
stories	 that	 the	 man	 was	 an	 intellectual	 and	 politically	 active	 in	 Afghanistan,	 for	
which	he	was	imprisoned	several	times	under	Zahir	Shah.	Musa	Saheb	cited	growing	
up	in	a	rural	area	between	Kabul	and	Bamiyan,	where	his	family	would	be	holed	up	
in	 the	 house	 during	 heavy	 winter	 snowfalls,	 as	 the	 reason	 he	 became	 well	
acquainted	with	the	great	works	of	Persian‐language	literature	as	a	young	boy	and	
developed	 an	 interest	 in	 the	 study	 of	 history,	 religion,	 and	 linguistics.	 Later,	 as	 a	
young	man,	he	attended	Kabul	University	where	he	studied	agriculture	but	attended	
lectures	 in	 the	 literature	department	on	his	own	 time,	which	allowed	him	 to	 later	
take	 up	 employment	 as	 a	 journalist	 in	 Afghanistan,	 and	 become	 part	 of	 Kabul’s	
intelligentsia	(roshan	fikr).		
	
As	a	member	of	the	intelligentsia,	Musa	Saheb’s	views	led	to	his	imprisonment	under	
the	PDPA	regime	in	Afghanistan.	“I	would	not	have	ever	left	Afghanistan	even	during	
the	Communists’	[time],”	he	once	said,	“but	they	said	I	was	a	supporter	of	the	West	
(goftand	ke	man	gharbi	astum).	 I	wasn’t	a	 communist	and	still	 say	 I’m	not.”	He	 left	
after	 being	 imprisoned	 a	 second	 time,	 as	 he	 feared	 for	 his	 safety	 and	 that	 of	 his	
family.	 I	 once	asked	him	why	he	did	not	migrate	 to	 Iran,	where	many	Hazara	and	
Shia	 fled	 from	Afghanistan.	He	 explained	his	 decision	 to	 go	 to	Pakistan	 initially	 in	
religious	terms:	
“	I	didn’t	go	to	Iran	even	though	I	speak	Farsi	and	am	Shia.	Why?	I	didn’t	go	
because	 I	 don’t	 like	 the	 form	 of	 Islamic	 government	 of	 Khomeini…	 of	 the	
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Guardianship	of	the	Jurist	(velayate	faqih)…	[even	if]	maybe	Khomeini	was	a	
good	jurist.”	
Another	complication	was	that	Musa	Saheb	had	changed	his	mujtahed,	the	religious	
teacher	he	and	his	family	follow,	which	was	not	looked	favourably	upon	by	some	in	
his	extended	family.		Musa	Saheb	added	that,	as	a	Hazara,	he	was	disillusioned	with	
Iran.	He	explained	how,	in	his	view,	the	Iranian	State	never	came	to	the	assistance	of	
Hazaras	 in	Afghanistan	at	any	point	when	 they	were	being	attacked	 “from	all	 four	
sides”,	especially	when	the	“ISI	[via	the	mujahedeen]	came	in	the	name	of	‘freedom’	
(nejaat)	and	religion	(mazhab)	and	massacred	the	Shias.	 Iran	did	nothing,”	he	said	
lowering	 his	 voice	 and	 furrowing	 his	 brow,	 “Conversely,	 Iranians	 were	 rejecting	
Hazaras	[from	Iran].	For	this	I	am	very	resentful	(gilamand)	of	Iran	and	don’t	accept	
the	Islamic‐ness	of	their	so‐called	Islamic	Revolution.”	
	
Thus,	 instead	of	 Iran,	Musa	Saheb	decided	to	take	his	 family	 to	Pakistan,	where	he	
felt	Afghans	would	be	able	to	create	a	 ‘national	sentiment’	(ehsase	milli)	to	reclaim	
their	country.	He	soon	became	disillusioned	with	the	situation	in	Peshawar,	where	
he	did	not	intend	to	stay	long,	but	eventually	remained	until	a	series	of	events	forced	
him	to	flee	in	200890.	As	Musa	Saheb	explains,	in	Peshawar	he	had	been	working	for	
a	 political	 organization	whose	 offices	were	 broken	 into	 and	 the	 hard	 drive	 of	 his	
computer	had	been	stolen.	It	was	later	found	that	a	Taliban	group	orchestrated	the	
theft,	 but	 by	 the	 time	 the	 perpetrators	 were	 arrested,	 the	 Taliban	 had	 already	
disseminated	information	against	Musa	Saheb	in	Peshawar	and	Afghanistan,	saying	
that	 he	 had	 been	 agitating	 against	 them	 (goftand	ke	man	zidde	Taliban	tablighi	mi	
kardaahm).	The	organization,	on	the	other	hand,	accused	him	of	having	worked	with	
the	Taliban	and	having	given	them	information	on	the	location	of	the	offices.	
	
Following	 these	 allegations,	 Musa	 Saheb	 felt	 his	 only	 option	 was	 to	 seek	 asylum	
outside	of	Pakistan.	“I	gave	[the	UNHCR]	the	strongest	letter	anyone	could	give,”	he	
explained.	He	described	to	me	how	not	only	was	there	the	incident	with	the	Taliban,	
but	that	the	door	to	his	house	had	been	shot	at,	and	that	his	house	was	always	under	
surveillance.	 “There	 were	 always	 young	 men	 standing	 outside,	 two	 or	 three,	
																																																								
90	Several	refugees	who	had	previously	been	refugees	 in	Pakistan	before	coming	to	Delhi	related	to	
me	that	between	2006	and	2008	the	Pakistani	state	made	conditions	increasingly	difficult	for	Afghan	
refugees,	and	claimed	they	were	targeted	by	police	or	other	state‐backed	actors.	There	is	of	course	no	
way	to	verify	this	information,	but	it	was	usually	related	to	me	as	an	issue	that	could	not	be	revealed	
to	the	UNHCR	otherwise	it	might	weaken	one’s	case.	
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staring…	taxis	would	park	in	front	of	the	door	so	we	could	neither	enter	nor	exit…	
it’s	Peshawar…	you	know	what	these	things	mean.”	The	final	straw	came	when	his	
son,	who	was	working	with	the	Afghanistan	Consul,	was	attacked.	Musa	Saheb’s	son	
escaped,	but	a	bodyguard	died.	“[The	UNHCR]	had	pictures,	 letters	(sened),	articles	
(maqalaha),	but	they	still	rejected	[my	case]”	Musa	Saheb	sighed.	
	
After	the	attack	on	his	son,	Musa	Saheb	decided	he	could	not	stay	in	Peshawar	and	
that	it	might	perhaps	be	safer	to	relocate	to	Kabul.	Upon	arrival,	however,	he	found	
out	the	Taliban	had	branded	him	as	an	apostate	(murtad).	“It’s	a	funny	story,	you’ll	
laugh	but	it’s	true,”	he	begins	with	a	chuckle,	
“during	 the	 time	 of	 the	 Taliban,	 a	 poet	 from	 Mazar	 had	 written	 a	 verse	
attacking	Mullah	Omar	that	had	become	well	known.	Nobody	knew	the	poet	
but	 it	was	 obviously	 a	 big	 problem	where	 the	 Taliban	was	 concerned.	 The	
poet	was	a	friend	of	mine	and	I	had	his	files	on	my	computer.	When	they	stole	
my	 hard	 drive,	 they	 discovered	 it	 and	 thought	 it	was	mine	 and	 spread	 the	
word	 that	 I	 had	 left	 the	 religion	 and	was	 an	 apostate.	 You	 know	what	 that	
means	for	somebody	in	Afghanistan.”	
	
It	soon	became	clear	he	could	not	stay	in	Kabul.	His	extended	family	would	not	meet	
with	him	out	of	fear	of	being	targeted.	Particularly	painful	for	him	was	that	he	could	
not	 see	 his	 daughter	 who	 was	 married	 to	 his	 brother’s	 son.	 “From	when	 we	 left	
Kabul	 till	 today,	 not	 a	 single	 word	 has	 been	 exchanged	 between	 mother	 and	
daughter	even	telephonically.”	Musa	Saheb	describes	that	as	he	couldn’t	go	back	to	
Pakistan,	and	Iran	was	not	an	option,	the	only	other	alternative	was	India.	Through	
connections,	Musa	Saheb’s	son	arranged	for	the	ticket	and	visa	to	India,	and	booked	
a	hotel	over	the	internet	in	Paharganj,	the	cheap,	backpacker	area	of	the	city,	as	well	
as	a	taxi	that	would	transport	the	family	from	the	airport.	He	recounted	that	
“When	 I	 escaped	 Afghanistan,	 I	 wasn’t	 thinking	 about	 India.	 I	 was	 just	
thinking	 of	 getting	 out	 of	 Afghanistan…	 You	might	 not	 believe	 it,	 but	 after	
arriving	in	Delhi	I	couldn’t	wake	up.	I	slept	for	48	hours.”	
Like	Shahrukh,	Musa	Saheb	explained	 that	he	had	no	 idea	of	what	awaited	him	 in	
India	 or	 any	 awareness	 of	 Afghans	 in	 India,	 stating	 that:	 “to	 be	 honest,	 when	 I	
arrived,	I	didn’t	want	to	know	any	Afghans.	I	didn't	want	people	to	know	I	was	here.”	
After	a	week,	he	realized	he	could	not	stretch	his	limited	funds	if	he	stayed	in	a	hotel	
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and	rented	a	small	40‐70	square	 feet	house,	where	the	 family	of	 five	remained	 for	
two	years	until	the	proprietor	asked	them	to	leave.	Then	they	moved	to	the	flat	they	
currently	live	in,	in	an	Afghan	part	of	the	city.	
	
He	applied	with	the	UNHCR	for	asylum	shortly	after	arriving	in	2008	and	ultimately	
received	his	final	rejection	two	years	later,	making	him	an	illegal	‘economic	migrant’	
in	the	eyes	of	the	state,	as	explained	in	the	previous	chapter.	“I	had	no	expectation	of	
the	UNHCR…	I	knew	I’d	be	rejected,”	he	told	me,	“they	didn’t	accept	me	in	Peshawar	
with	such	a	strong	case,	why	would	they	accept	me	here?	And	the	Chief	of	Mission	
[in	 India]	was	the	same	woman	[who	had	been]	 there	[in	Peshawar].”	Musa	Saheb	
did	not	have	much	 faith	 in	 the	process	 in	general	 as	he	 told	me	many	 times	 “they	
accept	only	the	false	cases	and	reject	the	real	ones.”	One	of	the	reasons	he	suggested	
was	because	of	incompetence.	Using	his	own	story	as	an	example,	he	explained	how	
he	was	called	in	for	interviews	twice	
“once	from	two	in	the	afternoon	till	eight	at	night	then	again	from	nine	in	the	
morning	till	eight	at	night,	and	they	still	could	not	understand	my	case.	Other	
people	write	their	case	in	half	a	page.	I	wrote	ten	pages	that	were	translated	
into	 thirteen	 pages	 in	 English.	 I	 knew	 nobody	 would	 read	 it…	 people	 give	
them	[the	UNHCR]	money	[to	look	at	their	case]…	that’s	it.”	
Though	 Musa	 Saheb	 does	 not	 speak	 English,	 he	 has	 good	 written	 and	 aural	
comprehension	 of	 the	 language.	 He	 would	 borrow	 books	 from	me	 to	 learn	 more	
about	 anthropological	 theory	 and	 I’d	 often	 find	 him	 at	 home	 watching	 English	
language	 satellite	 television.	 He	 explained	 how	 the	 young	 lady	 serving	 as	 his	
interpreter	 was	 not	 as	 competent	 in	 English	 and	 could	 not	 express	 what	 he	 was	
saying	and	he	consistently	had	to	correct	her.	At	one	point	he	was	describing	his	job	
for	the	department	of	food	distribution	(arzaq)	in	the	ministry	of	agriculture	and	the	
interpreter	 insisted	 it	was	 the	 “fruit	 department.”	 The	 Indian	 UNHCR	RSD	 officer,	
according	 to	 Musa	 Saheb,	 was	 thus	 confused	 and	 could	 not	 understand	 his	
explanations.	
	
Not	that	different	from	Chimni	(1998),	Musa	Saheb	also	saw	the	UNHCR	as	part	of	a	
global	hegemony,	and	believed	a	second	reason	his	case	was	rejected	had	to	do	with	
what	he	saw	as	a	conspiracy	to	ensure	Afghanistan	does	not	become	a	stable	nation‐
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state:	a	cause	he	had	been	striving	for	even	before	becoming	a	refugee.	He	described	
his	realization	of	the	conspiracy	as	follows:	
“As	 I	did	not	agree	with	the	government	 in	Kabul,	 I	stayed	back	 in	Pakistan	
very	long…	[Initially]	I	thought	Pakistan	fears	Russia	and…	when	Afghanistan	
is	 free,	 Pakistan	 will	 be	 safe	 and	 that’s	 it.	 At	 some	 point…	 I	 understood	
Pakistan	was	saying	to	the	west	that	‘I’m	at	the	front	of	the	war	with	Russia,	
you	leave	it	to	me	and	follow	my	lead’…	Pakistan	led	the	west	to	believe	they	
should	 lead	the	offensive	against	Russia…	the	west	accepted…[even	though]	
they	knew	Pakistan	was	playing	dirty	(kharabi	me	konad)…	till	today	America	
gives	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 money	 to	 Pakistan	 –	 which	 I’m	 not	 against	 as	 I	
know	this	money	is	meant	for	development.	
	
If	you	look	at	the	map…	Pakistan	is	like	a	little	foot	bone	between	Afghanistan	
and	 India.	 If	 one	 day	 [the	 two	 countries]	 decide	 to,	 they	 can	 quickly	 finish	
Pakistan	 off…[For	 this	 reason]	 Pakistanis	 do	 not	 wish	 for	 Afghanistan	 to	
succeed.	 Afghanistan’s	 life	 is	 Pakistan’s	 death…	 to	 divide	 Afghanistan	 and	
take	 the	 Pashtun	 side	 will	 be	 an	 economic	 boon…	 giving	 [Pakistan]	 a	
mountainous	 vantage	 point...	 and	 cheap	 ‘meat	 and	 blood’	 that	 can	 be	
manipulated	by	stupid	mullahs…	
	
Pakistan	wants	 Afghanistan	 to	 be	weak	 and	 because	 it	 leads	 the	 policy	 on	
Afghanistan…	it	gets	what	it	wants.	The	UK’s	benefit	is	that	it	uses	Pakistan	as	
a	proxy	so	[it	needs]	a	strong	Pakistan…	I	think	the	UNHCR’s	role	therefore,	
to	whatever	extent,	is	to	keep	an	eye	on	Afghans	and	Afghanistan.”	
Musa	 Saheb	 thus	 saw	 his	 case	 being	 rejected	 on	 political	 grounds,	 and	 while	 he	
accepted	 that	 some	 ‘real’	 cases	 were	 indeed	 accepted,	 he	 was	 convinced	 “the	
majority	of	cases	accepted	are	false.”	Like	Shahrukh,	he	felt	that	“those	people	who	
make	 a	 plan	 and	 sell	 their	 house,	 car,	 land,	 etc.	 and	 have	 several	 thousands	 of	
dollars,	 it’s	 easy	 for	 them	 to	 buy	 a	 case,	 [and]	 to	 write	 a	 beautifully	 embellished	
story”	to	be	accepted	as	a	refugee	and	live	comfortably	in	Delhi.	
	
Unlike	Shahrukh,	Musa	Saheb	was,	however,	not	on	the	social	margins.	He	was	held	
in	high	esteem	and	well	known	among	the	Afghans	living	in	Lajpat	Nagar	and	Bhogal		
(two	Afghan	neighbourhoods	of	south	Delhi),	and	there	was	never	a	time	when	I	was	
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with	him	that	his	phone	did	not	stop	ringing	with	people	asking	him	for	advice,	for	
assistance,	or	for	connections.	He	admitted	that	he	did	not	have	a	bad	life	 in	Delhi.	
He	explained	that	initially	he	had	worked	intermittently	providing	private	tuition	in	
Persian	 language	 to	 refugee	 children,	 and	while	 I	 was	 in	 Delhi	 he	 had	 some	 jobs	
editing	 books	 that	 poets	 and	 writers	 would	 send	 to	 him	 from	 Afghanistan	
electronically.	Through	a	connection,	he	was	also	invited	to	speak	at	the	Afghanistan	
Embassy	 on	 occasions	 such	 as	Martyrs’	 Day.	 The	 family’s	main	 source	 of	 income,	
however,	 was	 from	 a	 son	 who	 worked	 at	 the	 Afghanistan	 Embassy	 within	 the	
consular	section.	Musa	Saheb	explained	how	
“One	day,	I	found	out	that	my	friend	was	the	Consul	in	Delhi.	I	spoke	with	him	
and	he	explained	they	needed	somebody	and	I	suggested	my	son.	He	took	an	
exam	and	as	he	speaks	good	English,	Hindi,	and	Farsi	he	was	accepted	and	he	
has	been	the	best	employee	they	have	had.”	
When	I	asked	how	he	was	able	to	work	in	India,	given	their	legal	status?	Musa	Saheb	
chuckled	 and	 said:	 “the	 [Indian]	 government	 doesn’t	 give	 [migrants]	 the	 right	 to	
work,	but	in	its	drowsiness	(taghaful)	it	turns	a	blind	eye	(nazar	andazi	me	konad).”	
	
Again,	 Musa	 Saheb’s	 case	 illustrates	 the	 incommensurability	 of	 the	 state	 scale	
division	of	 the	economic	migrant	and	refugee	 identities.	While	Musa	Saheb’s	 story	
contains	 the	 elements	 required	 to	 be	 considered	 a	 refugee,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	
previous	chapter,	the	complicated	movements	in	and	out	of	Afghanistan	meant	that	
he	did	not	fit	the	state‐scale	conception	of	Afghan	refugees’	unidirectional	trajectory	
of	 movement	 from	 Afghanistan	 to	 India,	 and	 was	 thus	 classified	 as	 an	 economic	
migrant.	 As	 he	 could	 not	 return	 to	 Afghanistan,	 he	 relied	 on	 his	 networks	 to	
maintain	 the	 financial	 wellbeing	 of	 his	 family:	 an	 action	 that	 would	 also	 lead	 to	
consider	 him	as	 an	 economic	migrant.	Musa	 Saheb’s	 experience	 in	Delhi	 points	 to	
another	 issue,	 discussed	 more	 in	 the	 conclusion	 of	 this	 chapter,	 regarding	 how	
migrants	view	the	state	and	the	legal	recognition	it	affords	as	one	among	a	plurality	
of	authorities	to	engage	with	in	moving	across	national	borders.		
4.3 Case	3:	Ali,	the	Student	
I	came	across	Ali	by	chance.	He	was	listed	as	a	contact	on	the	International	Students	
webpage	of	his	university,	where	I	briefly	considered	getting	visiting	student	status.	
His	full	name	suggested	he	was	Shia,	and	a	reference	to	a	province	in	Afghanistan	in	
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his	 email	 suggested	 his	 nationality.	 When	 I	 first	 met	 him,	 he	 was	 finishing	 his	
undergraduate	 degree	 at	 a	 prominent	 university	 in	 Delhi	 and	 about	 to	 turn	 25.	
Though	he	had	not	initially	planned	on	it,	and	as	I	discuss	further	below,	he	decided	
to	stay	on	for	a	Master’s	program	and	consulted	me	on	potential	PhD	research	topics	
he	might	be	able	to	pursue	either	in	India	or	abroad.	For	him,	higher	education	was	a	
way	to	remain	outside	Afghanistan.		
	
Though	 Ali	 was	 born	 in	 Afghanistan,	 he	 grew	 up	 in	 Iran.	 His	 family	moved	 there	
following	the	Taliban’s	rise	to	power	in	Afghanistan,	when	Ali	was	just	five	years	old.	
Ali	did	not	have	fond	memories	of	Iran,	where	he	was	marginalized	as	a	Hazara.	Both	
his	parents	are	Hazaras.	His	mother	is	from	a	Pashtun	dominated	area	of	Ghazni,	in	
eastern	Afghanistan,	 and	his	 father	 is	 from	central	Afghanistan,	 from	a	 family	 that	
traces	its	roots	to	the	family	of	the	Prophet	Muhammad.	Though	ethnicity	was	never	
discussed	 in	 his	 home,	 he	 did	 notice	 that	 others	 who	 looked	 like	 him	 “were	
marginalized	 in	 Iran	 not	 just	 by	 Iranians,	 but	 also	 by	 Pashtuns	 and	 Tajik	 who	
‘looked’	like	the	Iranians.”	
	
Ali	reports	not	having	felt	the	brunt	of	racism	against	Hazaras	in	Iran	until	finishing	
school,	 when	 he	 found	 he	 could	 not	 attend	 university	 without	 a	 letter	 from	 the	
Afghanistan	 Embassy	 in	 Tehran.	 Ali	 did	 not	 have	 a	 tezkira	 (Afghan	 identity	
document)	or	a	passport	 and	was	 rebuffed	by	 the	 functionaries	at	 the	embassy.	 “I	
didn’t	 realize	 that	 there	were	different	parties	 and	 that	 they	were	 related	 to	 your	
ethnicity,”	he	explained.	The	people	at	the	embassy	refused	to	help	him	as	he	had	no	
connections	 (waseta)	 and	was	 a	Hazara.	 They	 told	 him	 to	 go	 to	 the	 offices	 of	 the	
Hazara	 political	 parties,	 where	 he	 was	 rebuffed	 for	 being	 a	 Syed91	and	 not	 a	 real	
Hazara.	“I	saw	my	identity	from	the	eyes	of	others…	not	my	own	eyes,”	he	said.	After	
a	year	of	unsuccessfully	trying	to	get	ID	documents,	he	decided	to	move	back	to	his	
family’s	town	in	northern	Afghanistan	just	ahead	of	the	US‐led	invasion,	after	which	
his	family	followed	him	in	moving	to	Afghanistan.	
	
In	Iran,	Ali	had	learned	his	father’s	trade	of	calligraphy	at	home,	which	allowed	him	
to	take	up	employment	in	Afghanistan	as	a	sign	painter.	When	his	family	moved	back	
																																																								
91	‘Syed’	 is	a	 category	 indicating	descent	 from	the	 family	of	 the	Prophet,	 and	 is	 sometimes	used	by	
some	Hazaras	 to	 differentiate	 themselves	 from	 other	Hazaras	 by	 claiming	 a	 higher	 status	 through	
having	an	‘Arab’	lineage.	
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to	Afghanistan	and	his	father	recovered	their	lost	land,	Ali	was	obliged	to	move	into	
his	father’s	home,	though	a	disagreement	with	his	father	over	religious	observance	
of	 the	daily	prayers	and	 fasting	 forced	him	 to	 leave	home.	He	established	his	own	
atelier	 in	a	one‐room	shop	where	he	also	 lived.	A	representative	of	the	Ministry	of	
Communication	 and	 Culture	 in	 his	 region	 provided	 him	 regular	 work	 and	 Ali	
eventually	 curated	 an	 exhibition	 for	 visiting	 dignitaries	 to	 the	 region.	 An	 official	
from	 Kabul,	 impressed	 with	 Ali’s	 talent	 and	 knowledge	 of	 Persian	 and	 Afghan	
history,	 invited	 him	 to	 come	 work	 for	 the	 ministry’s	 regional	 office.	 Through	 his	
growing	professional	network,	Ali	was	eventually	 contacted	by	 the	US	Embassy	 in	
Kabul	to	run	a	series	of	programs,	which	turned	into	a	full‐time	job	with	the	regional	
cultural	 affairs	 office	 of	 the	 US	 Embassy.	 His	 work	with	 the	 US	 Embassy	 and	 the	
ministry	allowed	Ali	to	become	steeped	in	the	historical	and	archaeological	history	
of	Afghanistan,	complementing	the	reading	in	Central	Asian	and	Persian	history	and	
literature	that	he	had	undertaken	in	Iran,	and	also	allowed	him	to	hone	his	written	
and	oral	English	proficiency.	
	
Unlike	 the	majority	 of	 Afghan	 students	 studying	 in	 India,	 Ali	 did	 not	 come	 to	 the	
country	as	a	participant	 in	the	programs	offered	by	the	Indian	Council	 for	Cultural	
Relations	 (ICCR)92.	 Ali	 initially	 visited	 India	 in	 2005	 as	 a	 tourist	 in	Goa.	 “The	 first	
thing	 I	 understood	 [when	 I	 came	 to	 India]	 was	 that	 the	 Bollywood	 films	 are	 not	
right!”	Ali	 joked.	He	found	that	people	were	more	humble	and	less	gregarious	than	
he	 had	 imagined	 from	 television,	 and	 much	 more	 “modern”,	 though	 he	 admitted	
there	 is	 “a	 big	 population	 and	 so	 [much]	 poverty.”	 He	 was	 impressed	 with	 the	
infrastructure,	which	he	claimed	was	superior	to	that	in	Iran,	and	with	the	“modern”	
attitudes	 of	 the	 people	 he	 met.	 While	 Ali	 had	 gone	 straight	 to	 Goa,	 he	 was	
particularly	 struck	 by	 how,	 driving	 through	 Delhi,	 he	 could	 see	 “there	 are	 sufi	
[shrines]	 and	 mosques	 everywhere.”	 He	 thus	 decided	 to	 make	 a	 second	 trip	 to	
specifically	 visit	 Delhi’s	 historical	monuments.	 During	 this	 second	 trip,	 Ali	met	 an	
Afghan	 student	who	 urged	 him	 to	meet	with	 professors	 at	 his	 university,	 and	 Ali	
decided	to	put	in	an	application	for	enrolment	before	going	back	to	Afghanistan.	He	
described	 how,	 in	 Afghanistan,	 the	 officer	 interviewing	 him	 for	 his	 student	 visa	
joked	that	he	seemed	to	know	more	about	Indian	history	than	any	Indian.	
																																																								
92	Ali	made	a	point	 to	mention	 this	 fact,	 so	as	 to	 separate	himself	 from	other	Afghan	students.	The	
unspoken	implication	was	that	they	perhaps	had	come	because	of	financial	incentives	of	government	
programs,	but	he	had	come	of	his	own	volition	and	was	free	to	do	as	he	liked.	
	 130
	
Unlike	 Shahrukh	 and	 Musa	 Saheb,	 Ali	 had	 more	 freedom	 of	 movement	 in	 India.	
Officially,	he	could	only	travel	to	specific	places	listed	on	his	student	visa	and	would	
be	required	to	register	with	relevant	authorities.	However,	with	a	proof	of	residence	
and	 student	 ID,	 he	was	 able	 to	 easily	 buy	 tickets	 to	 travel	 in	 India,	 visiting	many	
Zoroastrian,	Buddhist,	and	Hindu	sites	around	the	country.	Oddly,	Ali	had	not	been	
allowed	into	the	Jama	Masjid	in	Old	Delhi	the	first	time	he	visited,	and	did	not	visit	
for	four	years	until	I	was	on	fieldwork.		He	had	gone	to	the	mosque	outside	of	tourist	
visiting	 hours	 and	 the	 attendant	 at	 the	 gate	 had	 denied	 him	 entry	 because	 of	 his	
perceived	non‐Muslim	appearance93.	The	incident	left	a	bad	impression	on	Ali,	who	
interpreted	the	event	as	an	example	of	the	increasing	narrow‐mindedness	of	Indian	
Muslims,	which	he	also	saw	mirrored	on	trips	home	to	Afghanistan	where	he	felt	his	
work	 “is	becoming	more	difficult…	 [as	people]	are	not	 interested	anymore	 for	our	
history	and	culture.”	
	
Ali’s	experiences	with	religion	in	Iran	and	Afghanistan	had	not	been	pleasant	and	for	
this	reason	he	had	been	wary	of	connecting	with	other	Afghans	when	he	first	arrived	
in	 Delhi,	 assuming	 that	 they	 might	 hold	 more	 rigid	 religious	 views	 than	 his.	 He	
became	deeply	 involved	with	the	 international	student	group	at	his	university	and	
cultivated	 an	 eclectic	 group	 of	 friends	 from	 around	 the	 globe.	 He	 maintained	 an	
active	 social	 life	 on	 campus	 and	 regularly	 travelled	 around	 the	 country	 with	 his	
friends.	He	did	still	make	an	effort	 to	 connect	with	other	Afghan	students	 in	Delhi	
through	organising	an	Afghan	stall	at	the	yearly	International	Food	Festival	held	at	
his	 university.	 About	 twenty	 to	 thirty	 young	 Afghan	men	 and	women	 studying	 at	
universities	across	Delhi	would	help	him	 in	cooking	 large	pots	of	kabuli	pulau	 and	
roasting	 kababs,	 which	 they	 would	 serve	 fresh	 alongside	 bread	 ordered	 from	 an	
Afghan	bakery	in	Lajpat	Nagar.	Ali	explained	how	the	students	would	come	together	
for	the	food	festival,	but	had	no	interest	in	socialising	otherwise.	
	
Despite	his	initial	unease,	Ali	explained	that	he	eventually	became	friends	with	three	
Afghan	 students	 at	 his	 own	university.	 To	his	 surprise,	 they	 accepted	him	despite	
																																																								
93	Ahmed	(2006)	presents	a	detailed	account	of	how	the	monumentalization	of	 the	 Jama	Masjid	by	
Muslim	 politicians	 and	 political	 parties	within	 a	 context	 of	 rising	Hindu	Nationalism	has	 led	 to	 its	
transformation	into	a	representation	of	the	collective	political	existence	of	India’s	Muslim	community	
to	the	exclusion	of	other	groups.	Ali	explained	how	his	Hazara	features	and	style	of	dress	led	to	the	
attendant	to	believe	he	was	a	Christian	from	northeast	India.	
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holding	different	views	on	religious	practice,	and	it	was	instead	other	Indian	Muslim	
acquaintances	who	chastised94	him	for	not	praying	or	not	 fasting	during	Ramadan:	
both	 of	 which	 he	 did,	 but	 not	 regularly.	 His	 relationship	 with	 the	 three	 Afghan	
students	seemed	to	go	well	until	he	started	dating	a	Hindu	girl.	While	they	told	Ali	
their	objections	were	to	her	personality,	he	believed	it	was	because	of	her	religious	
background.	Once	the	relationship	ended,	she	would	become	good	friends	with	the	
other	Afghan	students	and	would	go	on	 to	 learn	Persian	and	develop	an	academic	
interest	 in	 in	 the	 history	 and	 archaeology	 of	 Afghanistan.	 Shortly	 after	 the	
relationship	 ended,	 Ali	 began	 seeing	 another	 girl,	 a	 Muslim,	 whom	 he	 had	 met	
through	 one	 of	 his	 classes.	 His	 Afghan	 friends	 did	 not	 approve	 of	 this	 new	
relationship	either,	as	the	young	woman	was	from	a	family	that	adhered	to	deobandi	
practice	and	thus	quite	conservative	in	her	religious	views.	
	
While	 the	 two	 appeared	 to	 like	 each	 other	 very	much,	 Ali’s	 heterodox	 views	 and	
religious	practices95	put	a	strain	on	 the	relationship.	Ali’s	new	girlfriend	suggested	
they	 get	 married	 several	 months	 into	 the	 relationship,	 and	 he	 was	 cautiously	
receptive	 to	 the	 idea.	 However,	 when	 the	 young	 woman’s	 father	 insisted	 that	 he	
make	 an	 official	 statement	 regarding	 his	 adherence	 to	 Sunni	 Muslim	 practice,	 Ali	
decided	to	end	the	relationship.	To	get	over	the	heartbreak,	Ali	explained,	he	threw	
himself	into	his	studies.	
	
When	 I	 first	 arrived	 in	Delhi,	 Ali	was	 still	 convinced	 that	 he	wanted	 to	 eventually	
return	to	Afghanistan	to	work	on	restoration	and	preservation	of	monuments	after	
obtaining	 a	 Masters	 or	 PhD.	 However,	 after	 spending	 a	 summer	 at	 home	 before	
starting	his	master’s	 degree,	 he	was	not	 so	 convinced	of	 this	 plan	 anymore.	Aside	
from	his	frustration	over	opportunities	to	continue	his	work	in	Afghanistan,	Ali	was	
also	disappointed	by	the	Afghans	in	Delhi	at	the	university,	at	the	embassy,	and	even	
the	refugees,	whom	he	saw	as	being	 interested	only	 in	personal	 financial	or	social	
advancement.	He	was	disappointed	with	the	rise	in	what	he	termed	‘salafism’	among	
Indian	Muslims,	as	much	as	he	 felt	 they	were	also	victims	of	discrimination	by	the	
																																																								
94	The	disappointment	with	Afghan	students’	lack	of	religious	observance	was	a	sentiment	expressed	
to	me	by	Muslim	students	at	two	other	universities	who	were	frustrated	by	the	lack	of	interest	young	
Afghan	male	students	showed	in	participating	in	religious	practices	like	communal	prayer	or	fasting.	
95	Ali’s	 interest	 in	 Afghanistan’s	 history	 and	 archaeology	 led	 him	 undertake	 extensive	 research	 on	
Buddhism	and	Hinduism	and	develop	a	deep	appreciation	 for	both	 faiths.	He	had	also	managed	 to	
convince	the	Delhi	Zoroastrian	community	to	allow	him	into	their	services	and	even	worshiped	with	
them.	He	still	maintained	that	he	was	Muslim	even	if	he	worshiped	with	people	of	other	faiths.	
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state.	 Most	 of	 all,	 however,	 he	 was	 disappointed	 in	 what	 he	 saw	 as	 the	 Indian	
government’s	 efforts	 to	 erase	 Delhi’s	 Muslim	 history:	 his	 link	 to	 Afghanistan	
(discussed	 in	 the	 next	 chapter).	 He	 asked	me	 how	 feasible	 it	was	 to	 get	 into	 PhD	
programs	in	the	UK	or	the	US	and	started	to	apply	to	places	in	Europe	and	Australia.	
	
Without	garnering	enough	funding	to	study	elsewhere,	Ali	continues	to	study	in	Delhi	
where	 he	 has	 become	 entrenched	 in	 academic	 circles.	 During	 my	 fieldwork	 he	
organized	 a	 conference	 on	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Afghan	 province	 of	 Bamiyan	 and	 its	
connection	 to	 India,	bringing	together	academics	 from	Afghanistan	and	India,	which	
led	 to	 the	 publication	 of	 a	 special	 issue	 in	 an	 Indian	 academic	 journal.	 Ali	 also	
continues	to	create	and	maintain	contacts	with	international	scholars	on	the	ancient	
history	of	the	region,	trying	to	find	ways	to	further	fund	his	endeavours	in	India	and	
possibly	 find	 avenues	 for	 research	 elsewhere.	 Ali	 still	 makes	 trips	 to	 Afghanistan	
where	he	holds	seminars	for	young	people	and	university	students	on	Afghan	history,	
though	 he	 seems	 to	 be	 emotionally	 settling	 in	 India.	 Regularly	 posting	 links	 on	 his	
Facebook	 page	 that	 tie	 together	 the	 history	 and	 cultures	 of	 India,	 Afghanistan,	 Iran	
and	Central	Asia,	on	August	15th,	2014	Ali	updated	his	Facebook	status	as	follows:	
	“To	my	all	dear	Indian	friends,	
Happy	Independence	Day!	
India	is	where	I	love	the	most...”	
4.4 Conclusion	
Building	methodologically	on	anthropological	work	on	ethics	and	morality,	this	chapter	
has	attended	to	Shahrukh,	Musa	Saheb,	and	Ali’s	accounting	of	what	it	means	for	them	to	
be	Afghan	 in	Delhi,	and	has	 focused	on	the	 trajectories	of	movement	 that	have	placed	
each	man	 in	 the	 city.	 Against	 the	 state	 scale	 understanding	 of	 being	 Afghan	 in	 Delhi	
presented	in	the	previous	chapter,	where	Afghan	migrants	are	understood	as	bodies	out	
of	place	at	the	end	point	of	a	journey	to	India,	the	three	cases	presented	above	present	a	
diversity	 of	 experience	 of	 Afghan	migration	 to	 Delhi.	 Like	 the	Makhzan‐e	Afghan,	 the	
three	men’s	stories	 indicate	how	they	simultaneously	consider	different	ways	of	being	
Afghan	in	Delhi	in	their	own	experiences.	None	of	them	are	oblivious	of	the	state	scale	
conception	of	their	place	in	the	city,	but	consider	it	as	one	among	several	ways	of	being	
Afghan	in	Delhi.	The	variation	in	the	histories,	trajectories,	and	networks	that	underpin	
and	 constitute	 these	 migrants’	 movement	 from	 Afghanistan	 to	 India	 also	 point	 to	
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different	 ways	 migrants	 are	 connected	 to	 Delhi,	 and	 encourage	 a	 consideration	 of	
migrant	movement	beyond	economic	or	political	push	and	pull	factors.	
	
In	 all	 three	 cases,	 the	 journey	 from	 Afghanistan	 is	 not	 a	 one‐time,	 unidirectional	
movement.	Rather,	echoing	research	on	Afghan	migration	it	Iran	and	Pakistan	(Monsutti	
2004a:185‐216;	Monsutti	et	al	2006),	 the	migrants’	 journeys	 to	 India	appear	among	a	
series	of	multidirectional	and	recurrent	movements	throughout	the	region.	Ali	and	Musa	
Saheb	circulate	between	Afghanistan	and	neighbouring	states,	with	each	man	taking	on	
different	 forms	of	migration.	While	both	of	Musa	 Saheb’s	 journeys	out	of	Afghanistan	
were	taken	under	situations	of	political	duress,	Ali	was	first	a	refugee	in	Iran,	and	then	
subsequently	 circulated	between	Afghanistan	and	 India	 as	 a	 ‘legal’	migrant	 on	 tourist	
and	student	visas	to	pursue	opportunities	he	would	not	have	had	in	Afghanistan.	Unlike	
the	 other	 two,	 Shahrukh	 followed	 employment	 opportunities	 in	 India	 and	 travelled	
extensively	across	the	country,	finally	pursuing	asylum	as	part	of	a	longer‐term	course	to	
seeking	a	better	life.	Shahrukh’s	case	exemplifies	how	migration	has	been	and	continues	
to	be	a	way	of	life	for	many	in	Afghanistan	(Nichols	2008;	Stigter	and	Monsutti	2005).	
	
In	this	sense,	a	moral	quality	runs	through	each	of	the	three	men’s	stories	of	migration,	
alongside	the	economic	or	political	considerations	taken	into	account	when	undertaking	
their	journeys	to	India.	All	three	individuals	leave	Afghanistan	with	an	aim	to	pursue	a	
life	of	value:	Ali	to	create	possibilities	for	continuing	his	research	and	preservation	work	
in	both	India	and	Afghanistan	(discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter),	Shahrukh	to	
seek	a	life	where	his	skills	could	“contribute	to…	[and]	provide	service	to	other	people	in	
another	 country”,	 and	 Musa	 Saheb	 to	 pursue	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 “national	 sentiment”	
among	Afghans	for	the	ultimate	betterment	his	country.	Their	stories	relate	how	their	
migration	to	India	is	enveloped	in	these	aspirations	to	be	somebody	as	much	as	in	the	
economic	and	political	realities	prompting	them	to	leave	Afghanistan,	belying	any	single	
economic	or	political	logic	to	the	decision	to	come	to	India.	
	
Unlike	Jamshed	and	his	wife,	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	who	planned	to	travel	to	
India	and	apply	for	asylum	in	a	third	country,	the	decision	to	migrate	to	India	in	each	
man’s	 case	 above	 also	 involves	 a	 large	 element	 of	 chance.	Musa	 Saheb	 and	 Shahrukh	
both	 came	 to	 India	 unprepared.	 For	 the	 former	 it	 was	 a	 destination	 of	 last	 resort,	
whereas	 for	 the	 latter	 a	 chance	 encounter	 with	 someone	 who	 had	 made	 a	 similar	
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journey	 prompted	 the	 move.	 Ali’s	 decision	 to	 pursue	 higher	 education	 in	 India	 was	
similarly	the	product	of	a	coincidental	meeting.	As	much	as	the	decision	to	turn	to	India	
might	not	have	been	planned,	the	desire	or	ability	to	remain	in	India	is	also	not	entirely	
under	the	three	men’s	control,	leaving	the	possibility	for	future	migration	open.	In	this	
way,	 all	 three	 men	 put	 forward	 an	 understanding	 of	 their	 selves	 as	 persons	 still	 in	
movement	 toward	 potential,	 indeterminate	 destinations,	 and	 develop	 different	
considerations	of	what	it	means	to	be	Afghan	in	Delhi	in	this	process.	
	
The	varying	 conditions	of	 the	 three	men’s	being	 in	 India	 reflect,	 on	 the	one	hand,	 the	
haziness	of	the	boundary	between	forced	and	voluntary	migration.	The	experiences	of	
Musa	Saheb	and	Shahrukh	in	particular	illustrate	the	problematic	nature	of	the	economic	
migrant	and	refugee	dichotomy.	It	 is	 impossible	to	know	the	grounds	of	Musa	Saheb’s	
rejection	 of	 asylum,	 though	 his	 story	 was	 likely	 too	 complicated	 to	 fit	 the	 RSD	
framework.	Musa	Saheb	admitted	that	while	it	would	have	been	easier	to	tailor	a	story	
acceptable	to	the	UNHCR,	he	could	“only	write	what	happened	to	[him].”	Shahrukh	never	
discussed	his	UNHCR	interview	with	me,	but	intimated	his	flight	from	the	Taliban	was	
proof	of	his	inability	to	return	to	Afghanistan;	it	is	clear	that	disclosure	of	his	initial	move	
to	India	in	search	of	work	would	have	resulted	in	the	rejection	of	his	case.	Musa	Saheb	
and	Shahrukh’s	situations	reflect	a	recognition	within	refugee	and	migration	studies	that	
factors	 motivating	 migration	 are	 shared	 by	 both	 those	 categorized	 as	 forced	 and	
voluntary	migrants	 (Kronenfeld	2008;	Monsutti	et	al	2006),	 and	 that	migrants	exhibit	
varying	degrees	of	agency	in	recognising	and	responding	to	these	multiple	factors	across	
time	(Connor	1987;	Richmond	1993).	
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 multiple	 trajectories	 of	 movement	 on	 which	 each	 man	 sees	
himself,	reflect	a	reality	of	transnational	migration	where	refugee	movements	cannot	be	
separated	 from	 phenomenon	 driving	 other	 forms	 of	 migration	 (Castles	 2003).	 For	
example,	 under	 differing	 circumstances,	 both	 Shahrukh	 and	 Ali	 leave	 Afghanistan	 for	
wont	 of	 professional	 opportunities	 grounded	 in	 the	 political	 climate	 of	 the	 country.	
Shahrukh’s	 widespread	 travels	 across	 India	 through	 the	 Pashtun	 network	 and	 Musa	
Saheb’s	decision	to	remain	in	India	despite	being	rejected	also	depict	how	transnational	
migrants	are	not	always	immediately	concerned	with	their	legal	status	with	regard	to	the	
state,	 experiencing	 the	state	rather	as	permeable	and	among	a	plurality	of	authorities	
they	 engage	with	 (Sur	2012;	Verkaaik	et	al	 2012).	As	Wong	and	Suan	 (2012)	discuss	
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with	 regard	 to	 Rohingya	 migrants,	 in	 creating	 zones	 of	 legality,	 such	 as	 through	 the	
construction	of	the	category	of	the	legal	refugee,	the	state	also	creates	zones	of	illicitness	
like	the	catchall	category	of	the	economic	migrant,	to	which	it	is	effectively	blind	in	legal	
terms,	as	Shahrukh	pointed	out	 in	his	criticism	of	 the	UNHR.	This	blindness,	however,	
does	not	mean	that	the	state	is	absent	in	these	areas,	but	that	in	acting	against	or	outside	
the	state	requires	a	complicity	of	the	state	in	turning	a	blind	eye,	or	being	“drowsy”	as	
Musa	Saheb	described96.	It	is	in	this	way	that,	as	discussed	in	the	conclusion	of	chapter	
three,	that	the	UNHCR	Chief	of	Mission	could	exhort	refugees	to	display	entrepreneurial	
spirit	 in	 securing	 their	own	 livelihood,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 refusing	 to	 speak	with	
illegal	economic	migrants.	
	
While	the	three	men	are	aware	of	the	state	scale	understanding	of	what	it	means	to	be	
Afghan	 in	 Delhi,	 they	 also	 draw	 on	 different	 networks	 to	 remain	 in	 the	 country.	
Shahrukh’s	access	to	the	moneylender	network	afforded	him	the	social	capital	to	move	
freely	across	India	outside	the	state	structure,	though	his	conversion	to	Christianity	and	
subsequent	compromising	of	Pashtun	identity,	discussed	in	chapter	six,	resulted	in	his	
being	cut	off	from	the	network:	an	issue	he	continues	to	grapple	with	in	trying	to	survive	
in	Delhi97.	Musa	Saheb	and	Ali	both	access	networks	based	on	social	background98.	Musa	
Saheb’s	 connection	 to	 the	 Kabul	 intelligentsia	 afforded	 him	 contacts	 in	 Pakistan	 and	
India	that	granted	both	him	and	his	son	the	ability	to	work	beyond	state	regulations.	Ali,	
in	turn,	has	created	a	network	of	academic	contacts	 in	 India,	Afghanistan,	and	beyond	
through	which	 he	 is	 able	 to	 continue	 his	 work	 in	 India.	 In	 both	 engaging	 with	 state	
categories	 and	 moving	 across	 these	 different	 networks,	 the	 three	 men	 are	
simultaneously	connected	to	India	in	different	ways	and	in	their	narratives	they	suggest	
multiple	orientations	toward	Delhi	and	Afghanistan.	It	is	to	this	subject	that	I	turn	in	the	
next	chapter,	to	examine	how	Afghan	migrants	understand	their	belonging	in	Delhi.	
	
																																																								
96	Conversely,	 as	Kalir	2012	describes	with	 regard	 to	migrant	workers	 in	 Israel,	 states	 can	also	act	
illegally	in	ways	they	consider	licit	within	these	areas	of	legal	blindness.	
97	As	 Aslanian	 discusses	 regarding	 the	 Julfan	 Armenian	 merchants	 network,	 the	 rationale	 of	
maintaining	a	closed	network	based	on	identity	is	not	just	rooted	in	identitarian	politics,	but	also	in	
rational	 economic	 considerations	 of	 the	 cost	 of	 conducting	 business,	 to	 minimise	 chances	 of	
opportunistic	behaviour.	Abandoning	one’s	communal	identity	is	to	break	with	the	social	solidarity	of	
the	network	and	thus	become	a	risk	to	the	network’s	business	(2011:166‐201).	
98	Whereas	Hazaras	 in	Pakistan	and	Iran	would	appear	 to	rely	on	ethnic‐based	networks	(Monsutti	
2005a,	2009),	Musa	Saheb	and	Ali	do	not.	They	can	both	be	considered	minorities	within	minorities	
politically	and	religiously	as	explained	in	their	case	stories.	
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5. Feeling	in	One’s	Place:	Afghan	Belonging	in	
Delhi	
Ali	lived	in	one	of	his	university’s	several	dormitories	and	spent	most	of	his	time	on‐
campus,	 which	 meant	 we	 usually	 met	 at	 his	 home.	 Among	 the	 doors	 lining	 his	
corridor,	 plastered	 predominantly	 with	 leftist	 political	 bills	 or	 movie‐themed	
posters,	Ali’s	was	a	work	of	art.	A	piece	of	plastic	cut	 into	 the	shape	of	 the	map	of	
Afghanistan	covered	most	of	the	door.	“You	like	it?	I	decorated	it	myself,”	he	told	me.	
It	 was	 covered	 with	 some	 trinkets	 and	 the	 basmala99,	 and	 Ali	 had	 masterfully	
written	his	name	and	 the	words	 ‘khush	amdeed”	 (welcome)	with	glitter	 in	 flowing	
nastaliq	Persian	script	in	the	centre	(Figure	4).	He	had	also	paid	equal	attention	to	
decorating	the	inside	of	his	room.	The	walls	were	covered	with	numerous	pictures	
from	 Afghanistan.	 Pictures	 of	 the	 Bamiyan	 Buddhas	 hung	 over	 a	 Tibetan	 Buddha	
statuette	on	his	 table.	A	salabhanjika100	figurine	similarly	mirrored	the	beloveds	 in	
the	miniature	 Persian	 paintings	 on	 the	 wall	 across	 the	 room.	 An	 entire	 wall	 was	
dominated	by	three	maps:	a	Persian	language	map	centred	on	the	Arabian	Peninsula	
that	included	Iran,	Turkey,	India,	and	Afghanistan;	an	English	language	political	map	
of	India;	and	a	hand‐drawn	map	Ali	had	charted	himself.	Drawn	on	several	pieces	of	
plain	 paper	 held	 together	 by	 translucent	 tape,	 the	 map	 covered	 the	 area	 of	 Iran,	
Afghanistan,	 and	 India.	 Ali	 had	 drawn	 in	 the	main	 lakes,	 rivers,	 and	 tributaries	 in	
blue	ink,	and	marked	major	cities	of	the	region	with	red	dots	(Figure	5).	Noticeably	
absent	from	the	map	were	political	boundaries.	I	commented	on	the	skill	and	detail	
of	the	map	and	he	explained	how	he	had	drawn	the	map	as	“this	is	the	region	I	study	
and,”	he	added	seamlessly,	“there	shouldn’t	be	borders	anyway.”	
	
Like	 the	map,	 the	 other	 objects	 in	 Ali’s	 room	 represented	 some	 form	 of	 emotional	
attachment	 to	a	place,	 a	period	 in	his	 life,	 a	person,	etc.	Taken	 together,	 the	objects	
reflected	 a	 sense	 of	 how	 he	 belonged	 in	 India	 similar	 to	 that	 within	 which	 the	
Makhzan‐e	Afghan	 (discussed	 in	 chapter	 four)	was	produced,	 i.e.	 as	 part	 of	 a	wider	
																																																								
99	The	 term	 for	 an	 Islamic	phrase	 invoking	God	 that	Muslims	 frequently	 recite	before	 commencing	
any	task.	
100	A	12th	century	depiction	of	a	woman	with	exaggerated	breasts	and	hips	holding	a	tree	or	a	branch	
found	in	temples	in	South	India.	Ali	had	collected	such	items	during	his	travels	in	India.	
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historical	and	cultural	milieu	that	connected	Afghanistan	to	India	and	elsewhere.	Ali	
conceded,	 however,	 that	 this	 was	 a	 sentiment	 he	 appreciated	 as	 “somebody	 who	
studies	history,”	that	is	as	somebody	who	has	learned	to	perceive	the	links	between	
these	different	places	across	time.	He	described	how	a	Hazara	from	Kandahar,	whom	
he	had	met	at	the	university,	had	recently	visited	with	some	other	Delhi‐based	Afghan	
students,	 and	 that	 they	 had	 disapproved	 of	 some	 of	 his	 décor	 choices,	 namely	 the	
statuettes	and	miniature	prints,	indicating	that	they	were	not	religiously	or	culturally	
appropriate.	“They	are	good	people,”	Ali	explained	and	evoked	the	recent	tumultuous	
history	of	Afghanistan	to	explain	how	“they	can’t	see	all	these	things,	you	know?”	
	
That	Ali	should	use	 the	metaphor	of	sight	 to	differentiate	his	position	 from	that	of	
the	other	Afghan	students	is	fitting.	The	previous	chapter	illustrated	how,	in	contrast	
to	 understandings	 at	 the	 state	 scale,	 Afghan	 migrants	 in	 Delhi	 are	 more	 suitably	
considered	as	individuals	in	motion	and	that	the	networks	through	which	they	move	
to	and	through	India	are	varying	and	disparate.	To	move	is,	of	course,	not	merely	to	
travel	 or	 be	 displaced	 spatially,	 but	 also	 entails	 a	 qualitative	 experience	 of	
movement	 that	 is	 at	 once	 formed	 through	 perception	 and	 sensation	 of	 one’s	
surroundings,	 but	 which	 in	 turn	 also	 shapes	 how	 one	 perceives	 and	 feels	 these	
surroundings	 (Ingold	 2000;	 Massumi	 2002;	 Svašek	 2012).	 In	 this	 way,	 human	
mobility	 is	 also	 a	 transformative	 experience	 for	 individuals	 (Ahmed	 et	 al	 2003;	
Milton	 2002)	 as	 they	 move	 through	 the	 world	 creating	 diverse	 and	 complex	
relationships	with	other	persons,	things,	and	places	(Marsden	2009a;	Vertovec	2006;	
Wise	and	Chapman	2005).	It	is	thus	understandable	that	Afghan	migrants’	differing	
experiences	of	travelling	to	India	would	be	reflected	in	varying	perceptions	of	India	
as	 a	 place	 and	 differing	 dispositions	 to	 how	 they	 belong	 in	 India.	 Building	 on	
anthropological	 work	 on	 ontology,	 as	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 two,	 this	 chapter	
addresses	these	different	understandings	of	belonging	or	not	belonging	in	Delhi	that	
Afghan	migrants	hold	through	considering	the	variety	of	material	and	affective	ways	
Afghan	migrants	interact	with	and	relate	to	the	city.				
	
As	discussed	in	chapter	three,	at	the	state	scale,	Afghan	migrants	are	assumed	to	not	
belong	in	Delhi,	neither	as	a	community	nor	as	individuals.	Chapter	six	returns	to	the	
issue	of	belonging	and	 community,	while	 the	material	below	enquires	 into	Afghan	
migrants’	 belonging	 in	Delhi	 at	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 individual.	 The	 chapter	 focuses	on	
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two	areas,	language	and	history,	as	the	UNHCR	representatives	discussed	in	chapter	
three	 specifically	 outlined	 how	 non	 Hindu	 and	 Sikh	 Afghan	 migrants	 were	
considered	 to	not	belong	 in	Delhi	 through	a	marked	 lack	of	 linguistic	or	historical	
“affinity”	to	the	place.	Where	the	state	scale	conception	of	Afghan	belonging	places	
Afghan	migrants	as	 foreign	bodies	without	 linguistic	or	historical	 ties	 to	Delhi,	 the	
material	 below	 illustrates	 multiple	 and	 complex	 relationships	 that	 individual	
migrants	 have	 to	 language	 and	 ideas	 of	 history	 that	 affect	 their	 consideration	 of	
Delhi	as	a	place	they	belong	to.	To	consider	these	relationships,	 I	have	drawn	on	a	
range	of	anthropological	literature	on	personhood,	language,	memory,	emotion,	and	
place	that	emphasizes	the	relationality	of	persons	with	the	world	around	them.	
	
Before	 addressing	 issues	 of	 language	 and	 history,	 the	 first	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	
relates	 the	 story	 of	 three	 members	 of	 the	 Pashtun	 moneylender	 community	 to	
consider	how	Afghan	migrants	are	constituted	as	persons	through	multiple	material	
and	 cognitive	 processes.	 As	 stated	 in	 chapter	 two,	 this	 thesis	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	
assumption	 that	 multiple	 forms	 of	 personhood	 and	 relatedness	 described	 in	
anthropological	 research	 from	 South	 Asia	 or	 elsewhere	 can	 be	 seen	 to	 represent	
general	 human	 ways	 of	 relating,	 which	 can	 operate	 in	 a	 composite	 and	
contemporaneous	 fashion	 to	 inform	people’s	understanding	of	 their	selves.	Taking	
this	 position	permits	 considering	persons	 ethnographically	 as	 both	 individual	 and	
dividual	(Strathern	1987;	Willerslev	2007)	through	attending	to	how	they	navigate	
the	plural	forms	of	relatedness	in	their	interactions	with	other	persons	(Leach	2008;	
Strathern	1994)	 and	 things	 (Appadurai	1986b;	Latour	2005;	Moore	2007)	 around	
them.	 People	 can,	 in	 this	 sense,	 be	 understood	 like	 the	 mirrors	 at	 the	 centre	 of	
Buriad101	chests	(Empson	2011)	that	reveal	the	exemplary	personhood	of	the	chest’s	
owner,	 formed	as	a	conglomerate	reflection	of	the	various	objects	contained	in	the	
chest	which	 index	 and	 inhere	multiple	 forms	 of	 sociality	within	which	 the	 chest’s	
owner	exists.	Considering	Afghan	migrants	as	 relational	beings	 in	 this	way,	allows	
for	 the	 exploration	 of	 their	 relationship	 to	 language,	 history,	 and	place	 in	 the	 two	
subsequent	sections.	
	
The	second	section	of	 the	chapter	returns	to	experiences	of	 the	Ali,	Shahrukh,	and	
Musa	Saheb	to	explore	the	linguistic	and	historical	connections	between	Afghanistan	
																																																								
101	The	Buriad	are	a	northern	ethnic	Mongol	group	living	across	Mongolia	and	Russia.	
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and	 India	 that	 underlie	 their	 conceptions	 of	 how	 they	 belong	 in	 Delhi.	 The	
ethnographic	material	presented	illustrates	how	language,	memory,	and	experience	
are	 woven	 together	 in	 migrants’	 experience	 of	 Delhi,	 revealing	 the	 multiple	 and	
embodied	 nature	 of	 place	 (Low	 and	 Lawrence‐Zúñiga	 2003)	 as	 arising	 from	
individuals’	 particular	 positions	 and	 perceptions	 (Feld	 and	 Basso	 1996;	 Haraway	
1991).	 To	 consider	 the	 role	 of	 language	 in	 the	 complex	 social	 relations	 of	 place,	
society,	and	the	self,	 I	draw	on	Webb	Keane’s	work	that	considers	 language	as	not	
just	 a	 semiotic	 system,	 but	 also	 a	 material	 medium	 or	 substance	 through	 which	
persons	 are	 connected	 to	 and	 affected	 by	 the	 world	 around	 them.	 Keane	
demonstrates	how	the	way	people	interact	with	language	reflects	their	relationship	
with	others	and	objects	(2003,	1998),	and	that	individuals’	relationship	to	language	
both	 shapes	 and	 is	 transformed	 by	 their	 experience	 and	 perception	 of	 the	 world	
around	 them	 (2007).	 The	 three	 men’s	 experiences	 thus	 echo	 anthropological	
research	that	emphasizes	how	places	are	not	merely	empty	containers	of	historical	
memory,	 but	 are	 “politicized,	 culturally	 relative,	 historically	 specific,	 local,	 and	
multiple	 constructions”	 (Rodman	 1996:641),	 forged	 from	 social	 and	 individual	
experience	 (Kuper	 1972),	 at	 once	 imbued	 with	 meaning	 and	 also	 employed	 in	
creating	a	sense	of	self	(Hoelscher	2003;	Humphrey	1995;	Navaro‐Yashin	2009).	
	
Recognizing	 this	 fact,	 however,	 also	 necessitates	 understanding	 how	 Afghan	
migrants	 also	 do	 not	 belong	 in	 Delhi.	 In	 this	 vein,	 the	 final	 section	 turns	 to	 the	
experiences	of	Jamshed	and	Shahrukh	to	reflect	on	how	the	very	links	that	can	serve	
to	connect	 some	 to	Delhi	 can	be	experienced	by	others	as	estranging.	The	chapter	
concludes	by	considering	how	the	multiple	ways	Afghan	migrants	feel	belonging,	or	
not	 belonging,	 in	 Delhi	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 second	 notion	 of	 scale	 discussed	 in	
chapter	two.	That	is	they	draw	attention	to	the	relative	impact	on	migrants’	lives	of	
state	 scale	 understandings	 of	 Afghan	 belonging	 in	 Delhi	 in	 comparison	 to	 other	
understandings	presented	at	the	scale	of	individuals.	The	material	considered	below	
suggests	that	while	Afghan	migrants	can	belong	 in	Delhi	 in	a	plurality	of	ways,	 the	
context	within	which	these	migrants	 find	themselves	 is	one	where	not	all	 forms	of	
belonging	are	equally	viable	or	recognized	for	all	persons,	and	those	with	access	to	
sufficient	financial	or	economic	resources	are	more	able	to	be	Afghan	and	belong	in	
Delhi	outside	the	notions	presented	at	the	state	scale.	
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5.1 Doing	Business	and	Eating	Spicy	Food:	Afghan	Migrants	and	Personhood	
I	would	often	meet	Shahrukh	at	our	mutual	friend	Amirkhel’s	shop	in	Lajpat	Nagar,	
one	 of	 Delhi’s	 Afghan	 neighbourhoods	 discussed	more	 in	 the	 next	 chapter.	 In	 his	
early	 twenties,	 Amirkhel	 had	 moved	 to	 Delhi	 with	 his	 family	 six	 years	 ago	 as	 a	
refugee	 from	 Paktia.	 He	 was	 one	 of	 the	 few	 people	 from	 Wazirabad	 who	 still	
maintained	 contact	 and	 friendship	 with	 Shahrukh.	 A	 possible	 reason,	 Shahrukh	
suggested,	 was	 that	 following	 a	 disagreement	 with	 neighbours,	 Amirkhel’s	 family	
had	left	Wazirabad	to	move	to	east	Delhi,	and	Amirkhel	felt	a	sense	of	solidarity	with	
Shahrukh	 over	 being	 forced	 out	 of	 the	 neighbourhood.	 Below	 I	 recount	 a	
conversation	from	Amirkhel’s	shop	to	consider	how	Afghan	migrants	belong	in	Delhi	
in	different	ways	that	reflect	various	forms	of	personhood	constituting	them	as	both	
individuals	and	dividuals.	
	
One	 afternoon	 I	 arrived	 at	 the	 shop	 to	 find	 an	 older	 man,	 whom	 Amirkhel	 later	
introduced	 as	 his	 older	 brother	 Akhtar,	 sitting	 in	 Amirkhel’s	 place	 in	 the	 shop.	
Akhtar	 was	 visiting	 from	 “Bengal”.	 Shahrukh	 would	 later	 recount	 how	 the	 family	
were	 registered	 as	 refugees,	 but	 made	 their	 money	 through	 moneylending	 and	
trading	 across	 eastern	 India.	While	 the	 older	 brothers	 spent	most	 of	 their	 time	 in	
Assam	 or	 Bengal,	 Amirkhel	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 manning	 the	 small	 one‐room	 shop	
sandwiched	 between	 two	 other	 shops,	 tucked	 away	 in	 a	 narrow	 corridor	 on	 the	
ground	 floor	of	a	 residential	building	on	 the	periphery	of	 the	market	place102.	The	
shop’s	obscure	location	was	not	a	mistake.	Signs	in	Dari	on	the	street	front	listed	a	
number	 of	 articles	 of	 clothing	 and	 objects	 one	 could	 purchase	 inside.	 The	 use	 of	
Pashto	character	variants	and	the	shop’s	name,	the	family’s	patronymic,	indicated	its	
Pashtun	 ownership.	 The	 building	 housing	 the	 shop	 was	 located	 across	 the	 street	
from	 a	 barbershop	 selling	 SIM	 cards,	 and	was	 two	 doors	 down	 from	 an	 air	 ticket	
sales	agent	catering	to	Afghans	visiting	Delhi.	
	
The	 shop	 thus	 welcomed	 many	 tourists	 wishing	 to	 buy	 gifts	 to	 take	 back	 to	
Afghanistan	 with	 them	 from	 India.	 The	 three	 square	 meter	 room	 was	 lined	 with	
shelves	 stocked	 with	 multi‐coloured	 Banarasi	 Silk	 shawls	 that	 would	 be	 used	 to	
																																																								
102	Shahrukh	 suggested	 on	 more	 than	 one	 occasion	 that,	 like	 other	 Pashtun	 shops	 in	 Old	 Delhi,	
Amirkhel’s	family	used	the	shop	as	a	cover	for	other	less	legal	revenue.	This	perception	was	common	
among	many	non‐Pashtun	refugees.	
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make	“Kuchi	dresses103”	back	in	Afghanistan,	sombre	toned	sarongs	that	doubled	as	
men’s	 turbans104,	 shawls	 from	 Himachal	 Pradesh	 to	 be	 used	 as	 patu105,	 different	
varieties	 of	 embroidered	 Afghan	 tunics,	 and	 a	 couple	 of	 solar	 panels.	 Amirkhel	
explained	 that	 visitors	 from	 more	 remote	 areas	 of	 Afghanistan	 were	 particularly	
keen	on	buying	the	solar	panels	at	a	significantly	cheaper	price	in	India,	which	the	
family	still	made	a	profit	on	by	buying	them	wholesale	from	factories	in	Bihar.	It	was	
with	a	fresh	batch	of	such	goods	that	Akhtar	had	recently	returned	to	Delhi.		
	
I	 had	 just	 been	 introduced	 to	 Akhtar	 when	 a	 friend	 of	 his	 arrived	 at	 the	 shop.	
Khiyalay,	also	a	Pashtun	from	Paktia,	had	grown	up	in	Kabul	and	had	been	living	in	
Delhi	for	the	last	five	years	as	a	refugee.	A	dentist	by	training,	Khiyalay	now	worked	
as	 an	 interpreter	 for	Afghans	visiting	Delhi	 and	 seemed	 to	be	doing	quite	well	 for	
himself.	 After	 introductions	 and	 pleasantries,	 Akhtar	 turned	 to	 a	 subject	 nobody	
seemed	to	tire	of:	 the	Delhi	heat.	He	complained	of	having	to	spend	the	end	of	 the	
summer	 in	 Delhi,	 mentioning	 how	 he	 found	 Guwahati 106 	more	 agreeable.	
Accustomed	 to	 this	 line	 of	 conversation,	 I	 commented	 on	 how	 the	 heat	 in	
Afghanistan	 is	 at	 least	 dry	 and	 therefore	 better	 and	 more	 bearable	 than	 Delhi’s	
humid	 heat,	 which	 was	 the	 usual	 turn	 such	 conversations	 would	 take.	 Akhtar’s	
unexpected	response	to	my	comment	sparked	a	lively	conversation	among	the	three	
men	that	illustrates	the	different	ways	they	understand	their	belonging	in	Delhi,	and	
reflects	multiple	 ideas	 about	 how	persons	 are	 constituted	 and	 connected	 to	 other	
people	and	places.	
	
“Forget	 about	 Afghanistan!”	 (Afghanistan	ra	pas	ko!)	 Akhtar	 exclaimed	 raising	 his	
hand	up	forcefully	as	if	swatting	flies	away	from	his	face.	“What	do	they	have	there?	
Insecurity	(beamniyati)?	Unemployment	(berozgari)?”	He	explained	how	India	was	a	
good	place	as	one	 could	do	 “business”	and	have	a	good	 life.	 “Look	at	 this	guy!”	he	
said	grabbing	Khiyalay’s	arm	and	slapping	his	back,	“he	has	become	a	real	Lala107,	a	
Delhiite	 (dilliwala).”	 This	 complimentary	 teasing	 indicated	 how	 Khiyalay	 had	 the	
skills	 to	 live	 in	 Delhi	 like	 an	 Indian	 and	 to	 be	 successful.	 Others	 were	 less	
																																																								
103	Kuchis	 are	 a	 nomadic	 Pashtun	 people	 of	 Afghanistan.	 Their	 folk	 dress	 for	 women	 are	 sewn	
together	 from	 patches	 of	 brightly	 coloured	 cloth.	 The	 style	 is	 emulated	 by	many	 designers	 in	 the	
region.	
104	Incidentally,	the	Afghan	turban	and	the	Indian	sarong‐like	garment	share	the	same	name	(lungi).	
105	A	multipurpose	every‐day	use	shawl	used	by	men	in	Afghanistan.	
106	Guwahati	is	a	city	in	Assam	with	a	historic	Pashtun	population.	
107	“Lala”	means	older	brother,	but	is	often	used	to	address	Hindus	and	Sikhs	in	Afghanistan.	
	 142
appreciative	 of	 Khiyalay’s	 ability.	 Another	 Afghan	 interpreter	 once	 advised	me	 to	
stay	 away	 from	Khiyalay	 as	he	did	not	have	 good	habits	 and	had	become	 like	 the	
‘Punjabis’	 (adaatash	 kharab	 shoda	punjabi‐ha	ware)	 in	 using	 people	 for	 personal	
benefit108.	Khiyalay	was	not	Indian,	but	he	had	become	like	an	Indian	in	the	way	he	
acted	 and	 conducted	 himself,	 not	 just	 by	 having	 a	 successful	 business	 but	 also	 in	
how	he	interacted	differently	in	different	contexts	with	different	people,	i.e.	Afghan	
medical	tourists	or	Indian	hospital	officials	and	staff.	
	
“He’s	 right	 (rast	 mega),”	 Khiyalay	 responded.	 He	 recounted	 how	 unlike	 most	
Afghans	 in	Delhi,	he	had	come	 to	 India	via	Pakistan	and	 that	when	he	crossed	 the	
border	he	had	immediately	felt	a	sense	of	ease	(rahat	wa	asoodagi)	compared	to	the	
tension	 (fishar)	of	Pakistan.	 I	 asked	him	what	he	meant	 and	he	merely	 responded	
that	 “Indian	 people	 are	 the	 best	 in	 the	 world;	 they	 have	 humanity	 (insaniyat	wa	
bashardosti).”	He	lamented	having	spent	time	studying	medicine	(doktari)	in	Kabul	
which	did	not	benefit	him,	but	that	in	India	“If	you	have	money,	you	have	everything:	
a	 father,	 mother,	 brother,	 sister,”	 he	 counted	 them	 out	 with	 his	 fingers.	 “I	 have	
everything,”	he	explained,	“I	have	a	car,	I	pay	rent,	I	have	my	family…	My	wife	likes	
India	so	much	she	doesn’t	want	to	go	back.”	I	asked	him	if	he	did	not	miss	his	family	
in	 Afghanistan.	 “I	 can	 call	 them	 whenever	 I	 want!”	 he	 said,	 pulling	 out	 a	 new	
Samsung	Galaxy	smart	phone	to	show	me	a	picture	of	his	daughter.	“She	can	call	me	
on	Skype	whenever	wants,”	he	explained,	insinuating	he	was	wealthy	enough	to	be	
able	 to	 provide	his	 young	daughter	with	 a	 phone.	Khiyalay	 reiterated	 India	was	 a	
good	place	to	do	business,	and	I	asked	him	if	he	did	not	have	any	trouble	with	the	
government	or	the	police.	“The	police?”	he	laughed,	“sometimes	they	might	stop	you,	
but	just	hand	them	some	CDs	or	DVDs	from	your	car	and	that’s	that!	They’re	happy.”	
	
Amirkhel	 had	 been	 sitting	 in	 the	 corner,	 silently	 following	 the	 others’	 stories	 and	
commentary.	“I	don’t	like	India	at	all”	he	finally	blurted	out.	
“If	I’d	known	I’d	spend	this	much	time	here,	I	would	never	have	come.	Here	
we	 [Afghans]	endure	 so	much	harassment	 (aziyat)	 and	distress	 (perishani);	
we	have	no	future	(sarnawesht)	here.”	
																																																								
108	I	wondered	if	Khiyalay	might	have	some	connection	to	the	Afghan	Sikhs	or	Hindus.	It	is	common	
for	Afghan	Hindus	and	Sikhs	of	 lesser	 financial	means	to	have	come	to	India	via	Pakistan;	he	 is	 the	
only	Muslim	Afghan	 I	met	 in	Delhi	who	 claimed	 to	 have	 taken	 this	 route.	 Some	Pashtuns	 I	met	 in	
Bombay	suggested	Pakistani	Pashtuns	regularly	came	to	the	city	for	travel	and	even	marriage,	but	via	
Dubai	or	Kabul.	
	 143
Akhtar	 laughed,	 patronizingly	 telling	 Amirkhel	 that	 he	 had	 been	 stuck	 (bandi,	 lit.	
imprisoned)	 in	Delhi	 and	had	not	 seen	anything	of	 India	 (tu	heech	hindustan	ra	na	
didi).	This	was	true.	Unlike	his	brother,	Amirkhel	was	 financially	dependent	on	his	
father	and	though	he	managed	the	shop,	he	had	a	specified	allowance.	He	claimed	to	
have	not	seen	anything	in	Delhi	except	the	neighbourhoods	he	lived	and	worked	in,	
and	would	sometimes	spend	the	night	 in	his	shop	 to	save	money	by	not	having	 to	
pay	for	the	metro‐fare	home.	He	had	not	travelled	around	India	and	claimed	to	have	
no	 interest	 in	 doing	 so.	 He	 would	 listen	 patiently	 to	 stories	 visitors	 to	 the	 shop	
would	 recount	 of	 trips	 to	 Goa,	 Bombay,	 or	 Agra,	 stating	 at	 the	 end	 that	 he	would	
rather	wait	for	the	opportunity	to	go	to	the	USA	(amreeka).	
	
“In	Delhi	there	are	only	refugees,	so	nobody	respects	Afghans,”	Akhtar	expounded,	
“if	you	go	to	Assam	it’s	different.	Even	the	police	are	afraid	of	you	and	call	you	‘Khan	
Saheb’109…	Indians	really	have	a	lot	of	respect	(ehteram)	for	Afghans.”	Amirkhel	was	
unhappy	 and	 retorted:	 “You’ve	 eaten	 so	 much	 spicy	 food110	(murch‐masala)	 that	
you’ve	 become	 like	 them	 (hindi	ware	shodi)!	 I	 don’t	 like	 this	 food,	 I	 don’t	 like	 this	
heat,	 there’s	 no	 place	 as	 good	 as	 Afghanistan	 (Afghanistan	qadar	heech	 jaiy	nist)!”	
Aware	he	was	not	convincing	the	other	two,	Amirkhel	threw	his	hands	forward	and	
shrugged	his	 shoulders	as	 if	 to	 say	 “come	on!”	 and	exclaimed:	 “it’s	our	place!”	 (da	
zamung	 zai	 de!).	 The	 other	 two	 chuckled	 in	 agreement.	 Fresh	 cups	 of	 tea	 were	
poured,	and	the	topic	of	conversation	was	changed.	
	
In	presenting	their	views	on	how	they	belong	or	don’t	belong	in	Delhi	or	India,	the	
three	men	 invoke	different	 ideas	of	 their	selves	as	persons,	which	emphasize	their	
being	both	 individual	agents	as	well	as	dividuals	constituted	 through	other	people	
and	 places	 via	 material	 and	 affective	 substances.	 Both	 Khiyalay	 and	 Akhtar’s	
assertions	 that	one	can	belong	 in	 India	 through	doing	business	and	having	a	good	
life	echo	earlier	ethnographic	work	on	Pashtuns	that	suggests	individuals	rationally	
pursue	different	forms	of	belonging	based	on	considerations	of	economic	or	political	
benefit	 (Barth	 1959a,	 1959b,	 1969).	 Both	 men	 also	 recognize	 how	 they	 are	
																																																								
109	At	 this	point	Akhtar	recounted	a	story	of	how	he	had	gone	to	visit	a	cousin	 in	Calcutta	who	was	
responsible	for	collecting	debts.	They	had	gone	to	collect	money	from	a	policeman	who	was	harassing	
people	 in	 the	 street	 and	 seemed	 like	 a	 big	 shot.	When	 he	 saw	Akhtar	 and	 his	 cousin,	 he	 allegedly	
transformed	into	a	subservient	sycophant,	whimpering	and	begging	for	extra	time	to	return	his	debt	
after	Akhtar’s	cousin	had	slapped	him	in	the	middle	of	the	market.	
110	Incidentally,	 the	 three	men	were	eating	 lamb	dumplings	 (mantu)	with	naan	and	Kabuli	pulau	(a	
steamed	rice	dish)	delivered	from	a	nearby	restaurant	with	a	side	plate	of	green	chilies.	
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constructed	 as	 individuals	 in	 the	 eyes	of	 the	 state	 as	migrants,	where	 this	 kind	of	
individuality	is	at	odds	with	the	idea	of	belonging	through	doing	business.	Like	Musa	
Saheb	expressed	in	the	last	chapter,	however,	the	two	men	express	how	these	two	
different	ways	 they	 are	 constructed	 as	 individuals	 can	 be	mediated	 through	 their	
disregarding	 the	 law	 of	 the	 state	 through	 mobilising	 their	 financial	 resources	 as	
individuals	who	do	business.	
	
However,	the	two	men’s	understanding	of	what	enables	them	to	belong	in	India	also	
reflects	the	intersubjective	nature	of	belonging.	For	Akhtar,	like	the	image	presented	
in	 the	 Makhzan‐e	 Afghan,	 being	 Pashtun	 in	 India	 was	 part	 of	 being	 a	 historical	
community	of	India,	connected	to	India.	Like	several	of	the	Pashtuns	I	met	in	Delhi,	he	
was	fond	of	a	joke	relating	how	at	independence	the	Hindus	added	orange	to	the	flag,	
the	Muslims	added	green,	and	the	Christians	added	white;	somebody	asked	a	Pashtun	
“Where	are	you?	You	don’t	belong	here,”	and	the	Pashtun	responded:	“we	are	the	stick	
that	comes	to	all	of	you	from	behind111.”	The	joke	humorously	suggests	Afghans	have	
been	 a	 part	 of	 India	 for	 better	 or	worse.	 For	 Akhtar,	 these	 historical	 relations	 and	
presence	in	the	country	have	resulted	in	relationships	of	respect	that	connect	people	
of	India	and	Afghanistan	and	create	a	place	for	Afghans	in	India.	Khiyalay	similarly	felt	
that	 it	was	the	“humanity”	of	people	 in	India	toward	Afghans	that	connected	him	to	
people	 in	 India	 and	 afforded	 him	 acceptance	 in	 the	 country.	 Of	 course,	 as	 their	
reaction	 to	 Amirkhel’s	 reminder	 shows,	 neither	 man	 would	 deny	 they	 are	 also	
connected	 to	 Afghanistan	 through	 birth	 or	 ethnicity,	 but	 their	 views	 on	 how	 they	
belong	in	India	resonate	with	research	on	relatedness	from	South	and	East	Asia	that	
indicates	 individuals	 simultaneously	 hold	 views	 of	 personhood	 that	 are	 immutable	
through	 concepts	 like	 decent,	 but	 that	 they	 also	 produce	 feelings	 of	 belonging	 and	
relatedness	 to	 others	 via	 affective	 modes	 such	 as	 the	 work	 of	 human	 interaction	
(Stafford	 2000;	 Grima	 1992)	 and	 through	 shared	 locality	 (Lambert	 2000).	 It	 is	
perhaps	 understandable	 that	 Amirkhel’s	 lack	 of	 such	 interaction	 and	 experience	 of	
harassment	and	distress	exist	alongside	a	sense	of	not	belonging	in	Delhi.	
	
Over	the	course	of	discussing	how	they	belong	in	Delhi,	the	three	men	draw	several	
connections	 between	 the	 physical	 and	 emotional	 experiences	 of	 being	 in	 Delhi	 or	
																																																								
111	Shahrukh	was	also	fond	of	this	joke,	but	told	a	sanitized	version	that	afforded	Pashtuns	in	India	a	
greater	role	by	having	the	Pashtun	respond	with:	“We	are	the	stick	that	holds	you	all	together!”	
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India,	and	how	one’s	connection	to	others	is	formed	through	sharing	of	substance	or	
emotion.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 men	 illustrate	 how	 various	 forms	 of	 personhood	 are	
considered	 simultaneously	 in	 their	 conceptions	 of	 how	 they	 are	 constituted	 and	
connected	 to	others.	Amirkhel’s	 accusation	 that	Akhtar	had	become	 like	an	 Indian	
through	 developing	 a	 taste	 for	 Indian	 food	 reflects	 how	 sharing	 of	 substances	
integral	to	the	physical	creation	of	the	person	lead	can	transform	one’s	physical	and	
emotional	 being	 and	 create	 relatedness	 to	 others	 sharing	 the	 same	 constitutive	
substance	(see	Carsten	1995	and	Hutchinson	2000).	The	three	men’s	agreement	that	
Afghanistan	is	indeed	also	their	“place”	(zai/jaiy)	illustrates	how	place	itself	can	also	
be	considered	as	a	bodily	substance,	integral	to	the	person	through	creating	a	moral	
and	emotional	attachment	to	the	land	one	stems	from	and	the	others	connected	to	it	
(Daniel	 1984).	 Comparatively,	 Akhtar’s	 praise	 of	 Khiyalay’s	 ability	 to	 become	 a	
Delhiite,	 mirrored	 by	 the	 other	 interpreter’s	 criticism	 of	 this	 skill,	 presents	 how	
changing	 one’s	 nature	 as	 a	 person	 is	 not	 just	 a	 passive	 effect	 of	 interaction	 with	
others,	 but	 can	 also	 entail	 active	 production	 of	 similarity	 with	 strangers	 through	
practice	 (Kwon	2008)	and	modifying	one’s	own	comportment	 to	become	a	certain	
kind	of	person	connected	to	specific	places	and	people	(Astuti	1995).	
	
The	disparate	conceptions	of	what	it	means	to	belong	in	Delhi	as	Afghan	presented	
by	 the	 three	men,	 illustrate	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 how	 experience	 of	migration	 to	 the	
same	place	and	orientations	toward	countries	of	origin	and	residence	can	differ	even	
within	 the	 same	ethnic	group	and	 family.	While	ethnicity	was	 indeed	a	 factor	 that	
affected	the	men’s	migration	to	India,	given	their	facility	to	move	across	the	regional	
Pashtun	 network,	 their	 different	 feelings	 toward	 India	 and	 Delhi	 could	 relate	 to	
several	 factors	 such	 as	 different	 forms	 of	 migration	 or	 differences	 in	 living	
conditions	(Malkki	1995a;	Monsutti	et	al	2006).	This	fact	gives	pause	to	consider	the	
role	 of	 ethnic	 group	 or	 community	 as	 a	 lens	 for	 understanding	 Afghan	migrants’	
belonging	 in	 Delhi,	 to	 which	 I	 return	 to	 in	 the	 next	 chapter.	 It	 also	 connects	 to	
research	 on	 Afghan	 migrant	 networks	 that	 suggests	 migrants’	 experiences	 and	
ability	 to	 integrate	 in	 host	 countries	 is	 facilitated	with	 greater	 freedom	or	 ease	 of	
movement,	 which	 is	 often	 tied	 to	 access	 to	 financial	 resources	 (Harpviken	 2009).	
Unlike	Amirkhel,	Akhtar	and	Khiyalay	possessed	the	wherewithal	to	not	only	move	
freely	around	the	city	in	personal	transport,	but	also	across	the	country.	Their	ability	
	 146
to	 make	 a	 life,	 be	 financially	 independent	 and	 feel	 like	 they	 “have	 everything”	
undoubtedly	affects	their	feelings	toward	living	in	India.	
	
In	this	way,	the	conversation	in	Amirkhel’s	shop	also	points	to	the	affective112	nature	
of	belonging.	The	men	relate	how	their	bodily	experience	of	being	in	India	is	imbued	
with,	 generates,	 and	 is	 affected	 by	 emotions	 or	 emotional	 experience	 of	 interacting	
with	people	or	being	in	place.	This	points,	on	the	one	hand,	to	how	bodies	and	persons	
hold	 together	 as	 one	 while	 being	 multiple	 in	 their	 constitution	 as	 social	 objects	
(Scheper‐Hughes	and	Lock	1987;	Strathern	1988),	 as	well	 as	 subjects	of	experience	
(Csordas	 1990;	 Stoller	 1989)	 that	 exist	 relationally	 to	 the	 world	 around	 them	
(Lambert	 and	 McDonald	 2009;	 Mol	 and	 Law	 2004).	 Khiyalay	 speaks	 of	 how	 the	
instance	 of	 crossing	 the	 border	 into	 India	 was	 accompanied	 by	 a	 feeling	 of	 ease	
connected	 to	 India.	 Amirkhel	 expresses	 how	 his	 physical	 aversion	 to	 heat	 of	 the	
climate	and	the	taste	of	the	food	entrenches	his	dislike	of	Delhi;	while	Akhtar	suggests	
Amirkhel’s	 feelings	 can	 be	 transformed	 through	 new	 and	 different	 sensorial	 and	
emotional	experiences	of	travelling	outside	of	Delhi	and	interacting	with	others	who	
are	not	 refugees.	 Still,	 all	 three	men	agree	 that	Afghanistan	 is	 their	 “place”	and	 that	
they	 are	 also	 emotionally	 connected	 to	 Afghanistan,	 conveying	 how	 migrants	
articulate	 different	 kinds	 of	 belonging	 at	 different	 levels	 simultaneously	 (Levitt	 and	
Glick	Schiller	2004;	Urry	2000).	With	this	understanding	of	Afghan	migrants	in	Delhi	
as	relational	persons	constituted	through	multiple	processes,	the	next	section	turns	to	
consider	 the	 different	 linguistic	 and	 historical	 relationships	migrants	 have	 to	 Delhi	
that	afford	them	multiple	ways	of	belonging	as	Afghan	in	the	city.	
5.2 Language	and	History:	Afghan	Migrants’	Connections	to	Delhi	
As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 two	 and	 four,	 northern	 India	 and	 Afghanistan	 have	 been	
historically	 connected	 through	 a	 variety	 of	 languages	 tied	 to	 several	 identity	 and	
nation	building	projects	across	the	region.	It	is	such	connections	that	have	resulted	
in	 situations	 such	 as	 India’s	 last	 Prime	 Minister,	 Manmohan	 Singh,	 requiring	 his	
																																																								
112	While	 affect	 has	 taken	 several	 directions	 (Gregg	 and	 Seigworth	 2010),	 I	 find	 Massumi’s	
consideration	 of	 affect	 as	 a	 two‐way	 relationship	 between	 bodies	 and	 their	 environment,	 between	
intensities	 and	 their	 physical	 and	 semiotic	 qualification,	 that	 is	 not	 one	 of	 correspondence	 but	 of	
“resonation	 …	 interference,	 amplification	 or	 dampening”	 (2002:25)	 productive	 for	 following	
anthropological	 theory	 calling	 to	 bring	 together	 subject‐	 and	 object‐oriented	 approaches	 in	
ethnographic	analysis	(Mazzarella	2010;	Navaro‐Yashin	2009).	
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speeches	to	be	written	in	Perso‐Arabic	script113	(Baru	2014)	rather	than	Devanagari	
or	 Gurmukhi	 scripts,	 or	 the	 former	 Afghan	 King	 Nadir	 Shah	 possessing	 greater	
fluency	in	Urdu	than	in	Pashto	(Green	2011).	It	is	also	such	connections	that	allowed	
for	Ali	to	feel	at	home	in	Delhi.	As	he	related	to	me,	despite	not	understanding	Urdu	
or	Hindi,	from	the	first	day	he	came	to	Delhi	“I	didn’t	feel	even	for	a	second	that	I’m	a	
stranger	or	[that]	I’m	coming	from	the	outside.”	He	explained	how	at	the	beginning	
of	his	first	term	at	university,	
“some	 [of	my	 friends]	 told	me	 ‘foreigner,	 foreigner,’	…	 I	 became	 so	 angry	 I	
told	them	‘guys,	I’m	not	a	foreigner…	tell	me	why	you	call	this	biryani?...	why	
chicken	Afghani	and	not	Irani	or	Hindustani?...	why	you	say	‘naan’,	‘tandoori’,	
‘kabab’?	 ‘Ishq’,	 ‘muhabbat’114,	 all	 the	 beautiful	 words	 in	 your	 language	 are	
coming	from	my	language…	you	have	a	lot	of	monuments	all	around	yourself	
that	are	somehow	linked	to	us	[Afghans]…	Even	in	Afghanistan…	Hindustanis,	
Bangladeshis,	Uzbeks…	come	on,	they’re	not	foreigners	at	all!”	
	
It	is	not	surprising	that	Ali	began	his	argument	for	belonging	in	India	with	language	
and	words,	and	ended	with	places	and	peoples.	His	comments	to	his	 friends	relate	
how	language	is	not	just	fluid	as	a	semiotic	system	with	words	and	concepts	gliding	
across	 language	 structures,	 but	 also	 as	 a	 material	 medium	 which	 serves	 as	 an	
extension	of	the	body	into	the	world,	connecting	it	to	others	(Csordas	1994;	Mulder	
2006).	In	the	examples	below,	language	thus	shapes	Afghan	migrants’	perception	of	
Delhi	 as	 a	 place	 they	 belong	 to,	 while	 also	 allowing	 for	 them	 to	 be	 perceived	 as	
persons	who	belong	in	Delhi	through	language.	In	this	way,	Afghan	migrants	relate	
to	Delhi	as	a	place	of	belonging	not	 just	through	ideas	of	historical	connection,	but	
also	through	present	engagement	and	imagined	futures	in	the	city.	
Belonging	in	Delhi	through	Language	
For	Ali,	language	could	not	be	divorced	from	the	very	material	historical	connections	
between	 Delhi	 and	 Afghanistan.	 The	 linguistic	 bonds	 between	 Persian	 and	 Urdu‐
Hindi	 created	 not	 only	 objects	 that	 were	 familiar	 to	 him,	 but	 also	 reflected	 his	
perception	 of	 the	 broader	 historical	 connection	 of	 the	 city	 to	 Afghanistan.	 As	
																																																								
113		Manmohan	Singh	is	originally	from	a	part	of	Punjab	now	in	Pakistan.	It	is	not	unusual	for	Punjabi	
refugees	of	his	generation,	or	indeed	other	Hindu	and	Sikh	Delhiites	of	his	generation	and	older,	to	be	
more	fluent	in	reading	and	writing	in	Perso‐Arabic	script	than	in	Gurmukhi	or	Devanagari	scripts.	
114	`Ishq	and	Muhabbat	 are	 both	words	 used	 for	 ‘love’	 originating	 from	Arabic	 and	 used	 in	 several	
languages	including	Persian,	Urdu,	and	Hindi.	
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explained	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 Ali	 had	 been	 drawn	 to	 the	 city	 through	 its	
historical	monuments.	He	explained	that	when	he	would	feel	a	little	homesick	during	
his	first	year:	
	“I	would	 go	 to	 Sabz	Burj.	 I	 saw	 the	gumbad	(dome)	 and	 the	 tiles	 and	 said	
‘come	on,	I’m	home’.	[Delhi]	is	full	of	tiles	[and]	the	monuments	are	so	close	
to	me,	so	familiar.	The	inscriptions	in	Farsi…	I	said,	come	on!”	
	
The	Sabz	Burj,	which	means	green	tower,	 is	one	of	the	earliest	Mughal	monuments	
built	 in	Delhi	and,	unlike	 the	other	Mughal	buildings	 the	city	 is	renowned	 for,	 it	 is	
distinctly	Central	Asian	 in	 its	structure	and	composition.	Little	 is	known	about	 the	
original	 purpose	 of	 building,	which	 stands	 in	 the	middle	 of	 a	 busy	 roundabout	 on	
one	of	Delhi’s	primary	north‐south	roads.	It	served	briefly	as	a	police	station	under	
British	rule,	but	the	structure	was	a	forgotten	living	ruin	in	disrepair,	used	by	local	
street	dwellers	for	shelter	until	just	ahead	of	the	2010	Commonwealth	Games,	when	
it	was	cleaned,	 landscaped,	and	enclosed	within	a	high	metal	 fence.	The	turquoise‐
green	 tiles,	 from	which	 the	 tower	 received	 its	 name,	 have	now	almost	 completely	
vanished,	leaving	behind	patches	alluding	to	the	pattern	and	colour	that	would	have	
plastered	the	 tower.	The	structure	 is	almost	completely	bereft	of	colour,	excepting	
the	dome,	covered	in	bright	lapis	blue	tiles115.	The	colour	of	the	dome	and	of	the	few	
remaining	tiles	on	the	trunk	of	the	tower	are	like	those	as	those	covering	the	famous	
mosques	and	shrines	of	Mazar‐e	Sharif	(where	Ali	had	lived),	Herat,	and	other	places	
across	 Iran,	 Afghanistan,	 and	 Central	 Asia.	 Like	 the	 Persian	 inscriptions	 on	 other	
monuments	 and	 buildings	 across	 the	 city,	 the	 colour	 of	 these	 tiles	 stirred	 in	 Ali	 a	
feeling	of	home,	 connecting	Delhi	 to	 a	network	of	places	 and	memories	outside	of	
India,	bringing	them	 ‘close’	 to	him.	 In	 this	way,	 the	material	 reality	of	 the	city	was	
not	 something	 he	 perceived	 cognitively,	 but	 felt	 emotionally	 and	 physically.	
Language	was	thus	at	the	same	time	part	of	a	material	network	connecting	Delhi	to	
Afghanistan	 through	 colour	 and	 architecture,	 as	well	 as	 a	medium	 through	which	
familiar	words	and	concepts	shaped	Delhi	as	a	place	in	which	he	belonged.	
	 	
Where	the	linguistic	field	Ali	inhabited	connected	him	to	Delhi	via	words,	sentiments,	
and	the	 landscape	they	created,	Shahrukh	reported	how	the	substance	of	 language	
																																																								
115	In	 fact,	 perhaps	 for	 this	 reason,	 the	 Sabz	Burj	 is	 now	 becoming	more	 commonly	 known	 as	 the	
Neela	Gumbad	(blue	dome),	as	few	people	know	about	its	history	prior	to	the	2010	facelift.	
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as	 script	made	 space	 for	 him	 to	 belong	 as	 an	Afghan	 in	Delhi.	 After	 his	 expulsion	
from	Wazirabad	(discussed	in	chapter	six),	Shahrukh	experienced	great	difficulty	in	
finding	a	place	to	live	outside	the	Afghan	areas	of	the	city.	This	was	not	just	because	
he	 was	 a	 refugee,	 but	 also	 because	 he	 was	 an	 Afghan	 and	most	 Hindu	 landlords	
assumed	 he	was	Muslim	 and	would	 not	 rent	 to	 him.	 He	 eventually	 found	 a	 room	
owned	by	a	Muslim.	To	avoid	any	future	misunderstanding,	Shahrukh	immediately	
explained	he	was	from	Afghanistan	but	was	a	Christian.	Shahrukh	recounted	how	at	
this	first	meeting,	the	landlord	noticed	Shahrukh’s	Farsi	Bible	and	“was	very	happy,”	
telling	Shahrukh	that	“Muslims	…	have	a	lot	of	respect	for	the	Bible,	[and]	for	Arabic	
and	 Farsi	 writing	 (khate	 arabi	 wa	 farsi).”	 The	 landlord	 took	 the	 book	 from	
Shahrukh’s	hands	and	placed	 it	respectfully	on	a	high	shelf	 in	 the	room,	 indicating	
Shahrukh	was	welcome	to	stay.	I	suggested	to	Shahrukh	that	in	his	majority	Hindu	
neighbourhood,	 it	was	 perhaps	 normal	 that	 a	Muslim	would	 feel	 solidarity	with	 a	
Christian.	He	insisted,	however,	that	he	believed	it	was	because	of	the	Perso‐Arabic	
script	of	his	bible	that	the	landlord	didn’t	fully	understand	he	was	actually	Christian	
and	 continued	 to	 explain	 to	 Shahrukh,	 whom	 he	 had	 only	 just	 met,	 that	 “Indian	
Christians	 are	 like	Hindus;	 they	 commit	 idolatry	 (but	parast	astand)	 and	 are	 dirty	
(napak)	 but	 that	 [Shahrukh]	was	 like	 a	Muslim116.”	 In	 Shahrukh’s	 case,	 the	 actual	
Perso‐Arabic	script	served	as	a	substance	making	Shahrukh	a	certain	type	of	person	
his	 landlord	could	relate	to,	quite	 literally	allowing	Shahrukh	to	belong	in	Delhi	by	
affording	him	a	place	to	live.		
	
The	 examples	 of	 Shahrukh	 and	 Ali	 demonstrate	 how	 Afghan	 migrants	 can	
experience	 and	 perceive	Delhi	 as	 a	 place	 they	 belong	 through	 their	 accessing	 and	
engaging	 with	 regional	 linguistic	 connections,	 as	 well	 as	 how	 these	 same	
connections	create	them	as	persons	perceived	by	others	as	belonging	in	the	city.	The	
two	men’s	experiences	also	relate	how	engagement	with	the	world	around	them	is	
entwined	in	language	use.	Thus,	in	contrast	to	the	UNHCR	representative’s	assertion	
in	chapter	three	that	non‐Hindu	and	Sikh	Afghans	 lacked	linguistic	“affinity”	to	the	
city,	 echoing	 the	 state	 scale	 view	 of	 linguistic	 ties	 as	 coterminous	 with	 national	
belonging,	 Ali	 and	 Shahrukh’s	 accounts	 reveal	 how	 at	 the	 individual	 scale	 several	
forms	of	linguistic	belonging	in	Delhi	are	available	to	Afghan	migrants.	The	example	
																																																								
116	The	landlord’s	comment	also	reflects	Shahrukh’s	Muslim	way	of	being	Christian	mentioned	in	the	
previous	chapter.	
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of	 Musa	 Saheb,	 related	 below,	 further	 illustrates	 how	migrants’	 engagement	 with	
language	can	also	be	affected	by	their	experience	of	Delhi	as	a	place	they	belong.	
	
Some	months	after	arriving	in	Delhi,	Musa	Saheb	explained	that	he	took	his	family	to	
see	 the	historical	 sites	 of	 the	 city.	 Like	Ali,	 he	was	pleasantly	 surprised	 to	 see	 the	
Persian	language	inscriptions	on	the	ruins	dotted	across	the	city,	and	was	reminded	
of	 his	 readings	 on	 ancient	 history.	 Seeing	 the	 texts	 around	 the	 city	 jogged	 his	
memory	of	how	“the	roots	of	Afghan	history	are	here	[in	India]”,	alerting	him	to	how	
“India	was	not	a	country	for	me	to	see	(faqat	bare	gashtan	na	bud),	but	a	school	to	
learn!	...	as	long	as	I	am	here,	I	am	obliged	(majboor)	to	make	use	of	this	time.”	Musa	
Saheb	 took	 this	 sentiment	 to	 heart.	 An	 academic	 man,	 he	 would	 always	 be	 with	
paper	and	pen,	on	his	laptop,	or	on	his	phone	discussing	literature,	politics,	or	some	
research	 he	 was	 engaged	 in.	 When	 I	 first	 met	 him,	 he	 had	 discovered	 an	 Urdu	
translation	of	the	memoire	of	a	Mughal	princess,	and	was	trying	to	track	down	the	
original	Persian	text.	He	claimed	that	over	the	last	several	years,	he	had	read	all	the	
Urdu	 books	 and	 the	 lone	 Persian	 book	 in	 his	 local	 library.	 He	 was	 particularly	
impressed	with	 an	 Urdu	 book	 on	 Emperor	 Aurangzeb,	 considered	 staunchly	 anti‐
Hindu	by	many	historians,	that	provided	documentary	evidence	from	across	India	of	
the	Emperor’s	personal	decrees	granting	land	for	the	construction	of	Hindu	temples.	
Musa	 Saheb	 translated	 the	 book	 into	 Persian,	 as	 he	 felt	 it	 could	 contribute	 to	
religious	 discussions	 in	 Afghanistan.	 He	 also	 felt	 that	 amid	 rising	 anti‐Muslim	
sentiment	 in	 India,	 the	book	should	be	available	 in	Hindi	and	had	started	 teaching	
himself	the	Devanagari	script	through	the	internet	to	this	end.	
	
I	had	only	ever	spoken	in	Dari	with	Musa	Saheb	and	though	we	had	discussed	Urdu	
poetry	on	occasion,	 I	was	surprised	 that	he	also	 felt	comfortable	 in	Hindi,	perhaps	
betraying	my	own	conceptions	of	a	division	between	 the	 two	 languages.	 “Clearly	 I	
understand	 Hindi!”	 he	 exclaimed	 somewhat	 taken	 aback.	 His	 visceral	 reaction	
caught	 him	 by	 surprise	 and	 he	 paused,	 switched	 to	 a	more	 conciliatory	 tone	 and	
explained	 that	 he	 had	 been	 a	 fan	 of	 Bollywood	 movies	 even	 before	 fleeing	 to	
Pakistan,	and	that	he	particularly	enjoyed	the	lyrics	of	1970s	Indian	film	songs.	“Yes,	
they	differ	in	the	matter	of	some	words,”	he	conceded,	“but	the	primary	distinction	
(ikhtilafe	esasi)	[between	Urdu	and	Hindi]	is	in	the	writing.”	I	never	followed	up	with	
him	to	see	if	he	had	managed	to	learn	the	script,	but	he	had	expressed	determination	
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and	confidence	in	his	ability	to	do	so.	In	a	roundabout	way,	Musa	Saheb’s	connection	
to	the	Persian	language	inscribed	across	the	city	allowed	him	to	cultivate	a	feeling	of	
Delhi	as	a	particular	kind	of	historical	Afghan	place.	This	sense	of	belonging	 in	the	
city	resonated	with	him	in	the	present	 to	create	new	connections	to	 India	through	
language	by	learning	the	Devanagari	script.	
	
The	 experiences	 of	 the	 three	 men	 recounted	 above,	 present	 a	 range	 of	 linguistic	
connections,	enmeshed	in	the	shared	history	of	India	and	Afghanistan,	that	serve	to	
connect	 Afghan	 migrants	 to	 Delhi	 as	 a	 place	 they	 belong.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
examples	 illustrate	 how	 each	man’s	 understanding	 of	 how	 he	 belongs	 in	 Delhi	 is	
grounded	in	his	specific	migration	experience.	Delhi	thus	appears	not	as	a	singular	
kind	 of	 place	 where	 Afghans	 belong,	 but	 as	 different	 kinds	 of	 places	 to	 which	
Afghans	connect	 in	different	ways.	To	consider	this	multiplicity	of	place	in	relation	
to	 Afghan	 belonging	 in	 Delhi,	 I	 turn	 below	 to	 the	 tomb	 of	 poet	 Abdul	 Qadir	 Bedil	
(mentioned	 in	 chapter	 one).	 Bedil’s	 tomb	 features	 in	 both	 Musa	 Saheb	 and	 Ali’s	
accounts	 of	 belonging	 in	 the	 city	 as	 a	 “lieu	de	mémoire”	 (Nora	 1989)	 which	 they	
invest	with	significance,	and	which	also	shapes	their	practices	of	belonging	in	Delhi.	
Their	 reckoning	 of	 the	 place	 of	 the	 tomb,	 the	 poet,	 the	 language,	 and	 their	 selves	
within	 different	 scales	 of	 place	 and	 time	 underline	 the	 reciprocal	 relations	 of	
memory,	 society,	 and	 the	 self	 (Halbwachs	 1996;	 Lambek	 and	 Antze	 1996),	 in	
engendering	multiple	meanings	and	practices	of	belonging	to	a	place	(Simpson	2005;	
Simpson	and	Corbridge	2006).	
History	and	Afghan	Belonging	in	Delhi	
Bagh‐e	Bedil	 (Bedil’s	 Garden)117	lies	 a	 couple	 of	 kilometres	 north	 of	 the	Sabz	Burj,	
almost	hidden	from	the	main	road.	Partially	covered	by	brush,	a	small	sign	set	on	the	
boundary	 wall	 of	 the	 lot,	 at	 a	 distance	 from	 the	 entrance,	 indicates	 in	 Urdu	 and	
English	that	the	site	is	the	resting	place	of	the	Sufi	Saint,	Hazrat	Khwaja	Nooruddin	
and	 adds	 “&	 Khwaja	 Bedil”	 in	 smaller	 sized	 font.	 Though	 Bedil’s	 mystic	 poetry	
remains	popular	in	Tajikistan	and	in	Afghanistan,	his	popularity	has	faded	in	India,	
the	land	where	he	rose	to	prominence	(Abdulghani	1972;	Siddiqi	1989).	This	neglect	
hangs	 over	 the	 grounds	 surrounding	 the	 tomb.	 The	 tomb	 itself	 was	 not	
																																																								
117	I	 am	 grateful	 to	 both	 Ali	 and	 Mr.	 Sohail	 Hashmi	 for	 taking	 time	 to	 provide	 me	 historical	
background	on	the	tomb.	
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‘rediscovered’	until	the	1930s,	when	a	small	concrete	structure	was	built	over	it	 in	
Indo‐Islamic	 style	 with	 scalloped	 arches	 and	 overhanging	 eaves.	 Though	 the	
structure	 was	 renovated	 in	 2006,	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 small	 grounds	 around	 it	
remain	 unsurfaced,	 dusty	 and	 grassless,	 shaded	 under	 a	 canopy	 of	 trees	 to	 tall	 to	
trim.	Debris	from	renovation	works	strewn	along	the	length	of	the	boundary	wall	at	
the	far	end	of	the	plot,	half‐buried	in	the	earth,	suggest	the	authorities	have	not	paid	
attention	to	the	site	since	its	renovation.	This	does	not	prevent	Afghan	tourists	from	
visiting	the	site,	which	is	usually	the	second	stop	made	after	a	trip	to	the	shrine	of	
the	Sufi	saint	Nizamuddin	Auliya,	located	near	the	Sabz	Burj.	
	
Appalled	at	the	site’s	derelict	condition	when	he	first	visited	in	2005,	Ali	resolved	to	
address	the	situation.	After	unsuccessful	talks	with	the	offices	of	the	Archaeological	
Survey	of	India,	he	approached	the	Afghanistan	Embassy	and	the	Iran	Culture	House,	
the	 cultural	 arm	 of	 the	 Iranian	 Embassy	 in	 Delhi,	 with	 a	 proposal	 for	 a	 joint	
renovation	 project.	 “I	 did	 not	want	 to	 go	 [there]	 after	my	 experience	 in	 Iran,”	 Ali	
explained,	 “but	 I	 said	 ‘come	 on,	 [Bedil]	 belongs	 to	 all	 of	 us’,	 you	 know?”	 Ali	 had	
developed	a	pitch	he	felt	would	work.	He	explained	the	structure	had	not	been	taken	
care	of	since	the	1990s	when	some	Afghan	students	had	paid	for	whitewashing	and	
placed	a	marble	plaque	above	 the	head	of	 the	 tomb.	He	 suggested	 the	 two	parties	
along	with	the	municipality	could	undertake	a	modest	renovation	and	create	a	space	
for	 future	 cultural	 events	 to	 revive	 Persian	 language	 in	 the	 city.	 Representatives	
from	 both	 institutions	 declined	 the	 proposal,	 citing	 a	 lack	 of	 funding.	 Ali	 felt	 the	
officials	 at	 the	 Afghanistan	 embassy	 “just	 didn’t	 care”,	 but	 that	 those	 at	 the	 Iran	
Culture	House	did	not	want	to	cooperate	with	somebody	from	Afghanistan,	as	they	
had	spoken	to	him	condescendingly,	complementing	him	on	his	 fluency	in	Persian,	
which	is	his	first	language,	and	stating	that	they	were	already	engaged	in	significant	
promotion	of	Persian	language	in	Delhi.	
	
Sometime	after	the	meeting	at	the	Iran	Culture	House,	Ali	visited	the	tomb	to	find	a	
temporary	 sign	 in	 Persian	 had	 been	 hung	 over	 the	 marble	 plaque	 placed	 by	 the	
Afghan	students,	which	explained	the	role	of	Bedil	in	Persian	literature	and	his	role	
in	 connecting	 the	 cultures	 of	 Iran	 and	 India.	 Ali	 felt	 betrayed	 and	 organized	with	
some	 friends	 to	 have	 the	 plaque	 removed	 one	 night.	 Shortly	 after	 the	 incident,	 in	
2006,	 the	 tomb	was	renovated	and	repainted	at	 the	expense	of	 the	government	of	
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Tajikistan,	ahead	of	president	Rahmanov’s	visit	to	the	site	in	2006.	A	new	signboard	
commemorating	the	event	and	explaining	the	importance	of	Bedil	in	the	“poetry	of	
Persia	and	Tajikistan”	(Persian:	adabe	tajik	wa	fars)	was	placed	immediately	outside	
the	 structure.	 The	 inscription	 in	 Tajik	 Cyrillic	 was	 placed	 at	 the	 top,	 followed	 in	
descending	order	by	translations	in	Hindi,	English,	Persian,	and	Urdu.	
	
Wary	 of	 the	 politics	 between	 the	 embassies,	 Ali	 decided	 to	 shift	 his	 academic	 and	
professional	focus	to	the	history	of	Mughal	India.	He	felt	his	background	in	Persian	
and	Central	Asian	history,	and	the	resources	available	to	him	in	India	positioned	him	
to	 contribute	 to	 the	preservation	of	Mughal	 Indian	history,	which	he	believed	was	
endangered	 by	 increasing	 Hindu	 nationalism.	 When	 I	 left	 Delhi,	 he	 was	 already	
thinking	of	possible	PhD	topics.	He	indicated	that	over	years	of	conducting	research	
across	the	city,	he	had	documentary	evidence	on	the	systematic	erasure	of	Mughal	
history	 from	 Delhi’s	 landscape118 .	 Through	 his	 readings	 of	 original	 Mughal	
manuscripts	 in	 libraries	 in	Delhi,	 he	 also	 felt	 he	 could	 build	 an	 argument	 that	 the	
Mughal	 Empire	 had	 been	 developing	 a	 nascent	 nationalism	 and	 a	 form	 of	 state	
centralization	very	different	 from	that	of	 the	contemporary	 Indian	state.	However,	
he	conceded	that	both	were	sensitive	topics	in	the	current	political	climate	and	that	
perhaps	it	would	be	best	if	he	sought	funding	to	conduct	such	research	abroad.	Ali	
was	 adamant	 to	 continue	 working	 on	 historical	 preservation	 in	 India	 and	
Afghanistan	 at	 whatever	 cost.	 “You	 know,	 when	 I	 see	 these	 guys,”	 he	 said	 in	
reference	 to	his	university	 friends	 from	Ghazni	and	Kandahar,	 “I	 think	 ‘wow,	 their	
ancestors	were	coming	to	this	place	with	arrows	over	their	shoulders’,	and	now	they	
are	carrying	instead	books	and	pens…	this	 is	progress.”	Pressed	on	what	he	meant	
by	progress,	he	stated:	“in	Afghanistan	we	are	forgetting	our	identity	…	[we]	want	to	
be	 like	 the	Arabs119.”	 He	was	 concerned	 that	 if	 Delhi’s	Muslim	 history	were	 to	 be	
gradually	erased,	so	too	would	the	connections	that	maintain	Afghanistan’s	identity	
as	part	of	the	region	and,	I	imagine,	his	own	identity	as	well.	
	
For	Musa	Saheb,	however,	it	was	Afghanistan’s	connections	to	the	region	that	were	
problematic.	His	 experience	 in	Pakistan	had	 left	 him	with	 the	 impression	 that	 the	
																																																								
118	Taneja	 (2013)	 provides	 a	 recent	 anthropological	 overview	 of	 the	 erasure	 of	 Delhi’s	 Muslim	
landscape	in	the	post‐colonial	Indian	state.	
119	As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 Ali	 was	 concerned	 with	 what	 he	 saw	 as	 the	 growing	
influence	of	Saudi	Arabia’s	brand	of	“wahabbism”	or	“Salafism”	in	Afghanistan	as	well	as	India.	
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governments	 of	 Iran	 and	 Pakistan	 mobilized	 Afghan	 refugees	 via	 the	 creation	 of	
ethnic	based	‘national	groups	(milli	gruh‐ha)	that	then	engaged	in	fractional	politics	
(siyasate	tanzim	baazi)	both	abroad	and	in	Afghanistan.	As	explained	in	the	previous	
section,	Musa	Saheb	was	 interested	 in	 creating	a	broad‐based	 ‘national	 sentiment’	
(ehsase	milli)	among	Afghans	in	Delhi	that	could	then	be	spread	to	Afghanistan.	He	
initially	attempted	to	do	so	through	re‐establishing	the	RSC,	which	did	not	ultimately	
succeed.	Before	 I	 left,	 he	 explained	he	was	 in	 the	process	of	 forming	a	new	group	
with	 the	 same	 aim	 that	 would	 be	 called	 the	 Council	 of	 Elders	 (Shuraye	 Reesh	
Safedha),	 the	 inaugural	 meeting	 of	 which	 he	 wished	 to	 hold	 at	 Bagh‐e	 Bedil.	
According	to	Musa	Saheb,	Delhi	was	an	ideal	place	for	the	development	of	a	broad‐
based,	 pluralist	 Afghan	 national	 unity	 (wahdate	 milli),	 given	 the	 absence	 of	
organized	 political	 parties	 among	 the	 city’s	 Afghan	 population	 and	 the	 almost	
complete	 lack	 of	 interaction	 between	 the	 Afghanistan	 embassy	 and	 the	 refugee	
community.	 He	 saw	 the	 Bagh‐e	 Bedil	 as	 a	 site	 holding	 the	 memory	 of	 a	 past	
cosmopolitan	 Afghan	 identity	 that	 could	 be	 nurtured	 in	 the	 present	 to	 produce	 a	
new	Afghan	nationalism	 in	 the	 future.	 “The	 shared	poets	of	Afghanistan	and	 India	
[like]	Bedil…	represent	a	shared	culture	(farhange	moshtarak)…	that	can	shape	the	
mindset	(zehen)	of	refugee	youth	[toward	Afghanistan]”	he	explained.	The	Council	of	
Elders	 did	 not	 have	 its	 inaugural	 meeting	 before	 I	 left	 Delhi,	 and	 through	 recent	
conversations	 with	 Musa	 Saheb	 I	 suspect	 it	 has	 developed	 into	 more	 of	 a	 social	
group	of	his	close	friends.	However,	several	months	after	my	return	to	London,	Musa	
Saheb	 did	 report	 enthusiastically	 that	 he	 had	 organized	 an	 informal	meeting	with	
some	of	 the	 council	members	at	 the	Bagh‐e	Bedil	 to	pay	 their	 respects	 to	 the	poet	
through	offering	a	prayer	(fateha)	and	to	discuss	the	council’s	future	plans.	
	
Again,	Musa	Saheb	and	Ali’s	accounts	stand	in	contrast	to	the	state	scale	assumption	
that	 Afghan	 migrants’	 national	 origins	 preclude	 them	 from	 possessing	 historical	
connections	to	Delhi.	The	two	men’s	accounts	of	belonging	in	Delhi	as	Afghans	point,	
on	 the	one	hand,	 to	 the	material	presence	of	historical	 connections	 linking	Afghan	
migrants	 to	 the	 city	 through	 emotions,	 ideas,	 colours,	 etc.	 The	 examples	 also	
demonstrate	how	migrants	build	on	their	perceptions	of	these	links	in	the	present	to	
articulate	different	meanings	of	how	Afghans	belong	in	the	city.	The	two	men’s	ideas	
of	 Afghan	 belonging	 in	 Delhi	 echo	 those	 discussed	 with	 regard	 to	 the	Makhzan‐e	
Afghan	 in	 the	previous	chapter.	For	Ali,	 the	Bagh‐e	Bedil	 is	a	symbol	of	ecumenical	
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Afghan	belonging	to	the	region,	bringing	together	different	groups	of	people	through	
a	 pluralistic	 identity	 grounded	 in	 language	 and	 aesthetics.	 His	 account	 illustrates	
how	 this	 idea	 of	 Delhi	 as	 place	 allows	 him	 to	 cultivate	 a	 cosmopolitan	 way	 of	
belonging	 in	 Delhi	 in	 the	 present,	 while	 also	 revealing	 how	 this	 nature	 of	 Delhi	
makes	 it	 a	place	where	 regional	 rivalries	of	history	and	 language	endure	and	play	
out.	 In	 contrast,	 Musa	 Saheb	 sees	 the	 Bagh‐e	Bedil	as	 a	 particularly	 Afghan	 place	
within	the	context	of	Delhi.	Musa	Saheb’s	view	of	the	Bagh‐e	Bedil	encourages	him	to	
make	it	the	starting	point	of	a	project	to	articulate	a	particular	Afghan	identity	“from	
within	the	field	of	India”	(az	maidane	hind),	similar	to	Khan	Jahan	Lodhi’s	cultivation	
of	a	Pashtun	identity	through	commissioning	the	Makhzan‐e	Afghan.	
5.3 Bridge	over	Troubled	Waters:	Not	Belonging	in	Delhi	
The	 examples	 presented	 above	 have	 primarily	 focused	 on	 the	 different	 ways	
Afghans	 are	 constituted	 as	 persons	 and	 connected	 to	 Delhi	 through	 networks	 of	
movement,	memory,	and	language.	The	examples	might	appear	to	suggest	that	at	the	
individual	scale,	Afghan	belonging	in	Delhi	is	antithetical	to	conceptions	at	the	state	
scale,	which	breaks	these	networks	along	national	boundaries.	In	this	section,	I	use	
the	cases	of	Shahrukh	and	Jamshed	and	their	differing	experiences	of	estrangement	
from	Delhi,	exemplified	in	their	reactions	to	crossing	a	bridge	in	south	Delhi,	to	show	
Afghan	 migrants	 also	 feel	 they	 don’t	 belong	 in	 Delhi	 in	 different	 ways.	 The	
experiences	 of	 alienation	 that	 Jameshed	 and	 Shahrukh	 have	 in	 the	 city	 draw	
attention	to	how	individuals	are	constantly	faced	with	the	prospect	of	breaking	from	
the	various	networks	connecting	them	to	others	as	both	a	social	process	and	a	result	
of	individual	efforts	(Strathern	1996),	and	also	how	belonging	and	not	belonging	are	
not	always	mutually	exclusive.	
Jamshed’s	Frustrations:	Wanting	to	Not	Belong	
In	chapter	three,	I	explained	how	Jamshed	and	his	wife,	Rukhsana,	had	been	assisted	
in	 fleeing	 to	 India	 and	 eventually	 getting	 resettled	 in	 the	United	 States	 through	 the	
support	 and	 efforts	 of	 Jamshed’s	 former	 employer,	 a	 US‐based	NGO.	 I	met	 the	 two	
through	a	mutual	acquaintance,	Pragya,	who	knew	Jamshed	from	her	previous	work	
in	the	NGO’s	US	offices.	Pragya	had	moved	to	Delhi	to	work	with	a	UK‐based	charity	
and	 live	 with	 her	 partner,	 Arnab,	 who	 was	 based	 in	 the	 city.	 The	 NGO	 initially	
requested	her	to	assist	Jamshed	and	Rukhsana	with	settling	in	Delhi,	but	soon	asked	
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her	 to	come	on	board	with	 facilitating	 their	 resettlement	process	 to	 the	US.	Pragya,	
whom	I	knew	through	another	South	Asian	American	friend,	had	called	me	to	see	if	I	
might	be	 able	 to	help	 Jamshed.	 “My	main	 job,”	Pragya	 explained,	 “[is]	 to	keep	 their	
expectations	 realistic,”	 by	 which	 she	 meant	 she	 needed	 to	 make	 them	 aware	 that	
relocation	 could	potentially	 take	 several	 years.	As	 explained	 in	 the	 last	 chapter,	 the	
couple	was	 resettled	within	 a	 year	 through	 the	 support	 of	 the	 NGO	 and	 Jamshed’s	
initiative.	
	
Unlike	 the	 cases	 discussed	 above,	 Jamshed	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 feel	 a	 linguistic	 or	
historical	connection	to	Delhi.	“We	aren’t	going	to	stay	here,	so	what	need	do	I	have	
to	 try	 and	 learn	 [Urdu]?”	 Jamshed	 had	 once	 explained,	 adding	 “it	 is	 very	 difficult	
with	genders…	 like	Pashto,”	which	he	also	did	not	know.	He	and	Rukhsana	moved	
about	the	city	in	a	way	that	did	not	require	them	to	use	much	Urdu	or	Hindi.	They	
lived	 in	Bhogal,	 the	cheaper	Afghan	neighbourhood	next	 to	Lajpat	Nagar,	and	with	
their	 savings	 could	 afford	 to	 take	 auto	 rickshaws	 around	 the	 city,	 communicating	
with	 drivers	 in	 English.	 Jamshed	 and	 Rukhsana	 reported	 not	 leaving	 the	 house	
except	for	shopping	in	their	neighbourhood,	or	to	meet	with	Pragya	and	Arnab,	who	
provided	them	with	moral	support	and	would	often	take	them	out	to	lunch	or	dinner	
in	trendy	locales	like	Hauz	Khas	Village	or	west	Delhi	shopping	malls.	
	
Jamshed	appeared	to	be	unaware	of	Delhi’s	‘Afghan’	history,	which	I	would	point	out	
when	we	were	about	the	city,	and	he	did	not	show	interest	in	this	aspect	of	the	city.	
The	first	time	I	met	the	couple	alone,	I	suggested	we	go	to	Old	Delhi	to	see	the	Red	
Fort	or	Jama	Masjid.	“Forget	about	it!”	Jamshed	replied,	“old	things	aren’t	so	great…	
we	have	ruins	(kharabat)	in	Kabul	also!”	He	explained	they	had	already	seen	several	
tourist	sites	in	Delhi	with	Pragya	and	Arnab,	including	Lodhi	Gardens,	but	that	they	
were	all	“just	some	historical	place	(jaiye	tarikhi)…	It	was	nothing	so	interesting.”	I	
asked	if	they	had	seen	the	Persian	inscriptions	on	the	tombs	at	Lodhi	Gardens,	and	
Jamshed	explained	they	had	seen	some	tombs	but	had	not	gone	to	look	at	them	as	he	
would	rather	go	“somewhere	there	is	life	(zindagi),	where	there	is	happiness	(ke	dil	
khush	mesha).”	It	was	for	this	reason	that	I	invited	them	to	the	shrine	of	Nizamuddin	
Auliya,	 located	 between	 their	 neighbourhood	 and	 the	 Sabz	 Burj,	 on	 a	 Thursday	
evening	when	devotees	and	musicians	throng	together	to	sing	and	pray	in	a	lively,	if	
hectic,	atmosphere.	
	 157
	
We	had	agreed	to	meet	right	after	sunset	prayers,	but	Jamshed	was	nowhere	to	be	
found	and	was	not	answering	his	phone.	When	I	finally	received	a	call	from	him,	he	
explained	he	had	not	received	my	calls	and	was	waiting	to	meet	me	at	the	mosque	of	
the	 international	headquarters	of	 the	 tablighi	jamaat120,	 located	at	 the	 entrance	of	
the	neighbourhood.	The	tablighi	jamaat	is	an	international	movement	based	in	India,	
grounded	 in	 the	 deobandi	 spiritual	 tradition	 which	 discourages	 attending	 and	
participating	in	devotional	events	at	shrines	or	in	other	such	practices	deemed	to	be	
cultural	accretions	to	Islam.	I	looked	for	Jamshed	among	the	sea	of	people	wearing	
Arab	 thawbs	 topped	with	skullcaps	or	Tajik	dopas	or	West	African	patterned	kufis,	
but	could	not	spot	him	in	the	smoke	rising	from	the	kebab	stands,	thickened	by	the	
yellow	and	blue	haze	cast	by	the	lights	from	shops	and	restaurants	lining	the	narrow	
street.	Ultimately,	he	spotted	me,	and	stepped	out	of	the	sea	of	bodies,	clad	in	a	light	
blue,	 embroidered	 perahan‐tunban121	and	 a	 new	 skullcap.	 He	 explained	 Rukhsana	
had	not	wanted	 to	come,	as	 she	did	not	 like	crowds	or	going	 to	 shrines.	 I	 realized	
later	that	while	Jamshed	was	not	particularly	religiously	observant,	his	views	were	
more	aligned	with	the	deobandi	school	and	he	felt	more	comfortable	in	the	austere	
space	of	the	tablighi	jamaat	mosque	than	in	the	chaotic,	frenzied	atmosphere	of	the	
shrine.	He	had	politely	avoided	the	shrine	without	declining	to	meet	me.	
	 	
I	suggested	we	return	to	Bhogal	for	dinner,	which	was	a	fifteen‐minute	walk	away,	
over	 a	 bridge	 crossing	 a	 tributary	 to	 the	 Yamuna	 river.	 “Can	we	 really	walk	 from	
here?”	 Jamshed	 asked	 incredulously,	 “I	 thought	 this	 would	 be	 very	 dangerous.”	
Pragya	and	Arnab	had	told	him	that	Delhi	was	not	a	safe	city	in	general,	that	Bhogal	
in	particular	was	not	a	safe	neighbourhood,	and	that	he	should	avoid	moving	around	
the	 area	 alone,	 especially	 at	 night.	 Their	 advice	 was	 consistent	 with	 the	 general	
image	of	Bhogal	as	a	poorer,	Muslim	neighbourhood,	and	might	have	been	coloured	
by	an	event	from	just	a	few	months	earlier	when	an	Afghan	man	had	murdered	his	
Afghan‐American	 fiancée	 and	 tried	 to	 flee	 the	 country.	 The	 advice	 also	 reflected	
Pragya	and	Arnab’s	way	of	 living	Delhi,	where	they	drove	in	their	own	vehicle	and	
																																																								
120	The	 Delhi	 centre	 draws	 students	 from	 across	 the	 globe.	 The	 deobandi	 teachings	 the	 jamaat	
espouses	 were	 also	 influential	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Taliban	 movement	 in	 Afghanistan	 and	
Pakistan	(see	Maley	1998).	
121	Jamshed	usually	dressed	in	jeans	and	a	t‐shirt,	but	had	worn	traditional	clothing	perhaps	because	
we	were	meeting	in	a	religious	place.	
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rarely	 ventured	 out	 of	 the	 south	 Delhi	 elite	 neighbourhoods.	 Nevertheless,	 I	
convinced	Jamshed	to	walk	back	with	me.	
	
The	footpath	was	old.	In	some	places	the	interlocking	bricks	had	come	apart,	while	
in	 others	 they	were	missing	 altogether.	 A	 small	 indentation	 in	 the	 boundary	wall	
running	 along	 the	 road,	 just	 before	 the	 bridge,	 had	 been	 repeatedly	 used	 by	
pedestrians	to	relieve	themselves	and	gave	off	an	acrid	smell	that	added	to	the	heavy	
stench	 drifting	 off	 the	 sludgy	 remnants	 of	 the	 tributary	 flowing	 under	 the	 bridge.	
The	 humid	 summer	 air	 magnified	 the	 odours,	 making	 it	 impossible	 to	 ignore	 by	
merely	covering	our	faces	with	our	scarves.	Jamshed	was	not	impressed.		He	started	
discussing	his	 interactions	with	auto‐rickshaw	drivers	who	would	overcharge	him,	
dishonest	Afghan	interpreters	who	colluded	with	the	“Punjabis”	to	charge	him	extra	
rent,	and	remarked	how	people	in	Afghanistan	valued	cleanliness	(safaai	wa	paaki):	
a	comment	on	public	urination	in	India.	Jamshed	had	been	born	and	raised	in	Kabul	
and	 identified	 as	Kabuli.	 I	wondered	 if	 in	Kabul	 he	 had	 ever	 gone	 to	 the	Old	City,	
passed	 the	 landfills	 near	Tamim	Saheb	Ansar,	 or	 dodged	 the	 open	 sewers	 flowing	
near	 the	shrines	of	Asheqan	wa	Arefan?	Had	he	ever	stood	by	 the	Kabul	 river	on	a	
summer	 evening	 and	 had	 to	 turn	 away	 from	 the	 sight	 of	men	 crouching	 down	 to	
relieve	themselves?	While	I	did	not	mention	this	on	the	bridge,	on	another	occasion	
when	I	did,	he	suggested	these	facts	were	merely	results	of	the	social	breakdown	of	
war	and	of	illiteracy	(besawadi).	
	
As	we	approached	the	end	of	the	bridge,	he	became	increasingly	upset	talking	about	
the	possibility	of	having	to	stay	in	India	and	the	potential	of	not	being	resettled.	He	
stopped	suddenly	and	exclaimed:	 “They	say	 that	 India	has	advanced	more	 than	us	
(az	ma	qadar	peshraft	karda)!	Even	in	Afghanistan	you	would	not	see	this!”	He	held	
his	palm	out	toward	the	dried	riverbed	riddled	with	garbage	and	covered	in	shrub.	
We	resumed	walking.	With	a	furrowed	brow	he	asked:	“You	have	a	US	passport,	why	
are	you	here?	Why	don’t	you	go	back	and	enjoy	life?”	He	spoke	directly	and	tersely;	
his	 question	 was	 almost	 a	 verbal	 assault,	 a	 complaint	 that	 I	 was	 wasting	 an	
opportunity	 he	 was	 being	 denied	 despite	 his	 best	 efforts.	 Jamshed’s	 affective	
experience	of	the	bridge	was	not	just	one	of	fear	of	an	unknown	future,	but	also	of	a	
violence	 and	 estrangement	 experienced	 in	 his	 life	 in	 Delhi.	 I	 return	 to	 this	 issue	
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below	after	considering	a	similar	experience	I	had	crossing	the	same	bridge	 in	the	
opposite	direction	with	Shahrukh.	
Shahrukh’s	Disappointments	in	Trying	to	Belong	
Not	long	after	the	walk	with	Jamshed,	I	met	with	Shahrukh	for	an	afternoon	in	Lajpat	
Nagar.	 We	 decided	 to	 walk	 to	 Bhogal	 to	 get	 some	 food	 and	 then	 continue	 on	 to	
Nizamuddin,	 where	 we	 would	 eventually	 cross	 the	 same	 bridge	 in	 the	 opposite	
direction	 that	 I	 had	 taken	 with	 Jamshed.	 As	 we	 set	 out	 from	 Lajpat	 Nagar,	 we	
discussed	 Shahrukh’s	 travels	 across	 India	 through	 the	 Pashtun	 moneylender	
network.	Shahrukh	recently	had	bought	a	new	phone	and	discovered	Google	maps,	
which	proved	useful	for	him	in	navigating	the	city	for	his	job	of	pamphleteering	for	
the	church.	Google	maps	also	allowed	him	to	reminisce	about	places	he	had	been	in	
Afghanistan	and	India	and	he	would	sometimes	pull	out	his	phone	in	the	middle	of	a	
discussion	to	clarify	the	location	or	name	of	a	place.	The	sun	had	already	started	to	
set	as	we	walked	down	a	dark	dusty	road	between	Lajpat	Nagar	and	Bhogal,	and	the	
topic	 of	 discussion	 switched	 to	my	 recent	 trip	 to	 Bombay.	When	 I	mentioned	 not	
having	time	to	visit	Makane	Sharif,	Shahrukh	instinctively	reached	for	his	phone.		We	
were	surrounded	on	either	side	by	four‐storied	eyesores:	new	buildings	built	hastily	
by	private	individuals,	without	regard	to	structural	integrity	or	aesthetic	appeal,	for	
renting	out	at	exorbitant	prices	to	medical	tourists	from	Afghanistan	and	the	Middle	
East,	 students	 from	Nigeria,	 or	 anyone	willing	 to	 pay	 Rs	 700	 per	 night.	 Shahrukh	
stopped	under	a	streetlight	and	proclaimed	chirpily	“I	found	it!	Look!	Here	is	Akola!”		
	
Shahrukh	followed	the	road	from	the	train	station	on	his	screen,	scrolling	with	his	
forefinger,	pointing	out	various	landmarks,	lands	belonging	to	the	shrine,	and	even	
the	buildings	of	the	shrine	complex.	“It	looks	like	they’ve	built	a	roof	over	the	inner	
verandas,”	 he	 exclaimed,	 “it	 was	 torture	 to	 sit	 there	 in	 the	 summer	 on	 that	 hot	
marble!”		The	field‐lined	Maharashtrian	country	roads	of	Akola	could	not	have	been	
further	 from	 the	 road	 we	 were	 walking	 on.	 The	 only	 resemblance	 was	 the	 train	
tracks	we	were	walking	toward.	“You	don’t	understand	how	happy	I	am	right	now,”	
Shahrukh	exclaimed	as	he	walked	staring	at	his	phone	screen.	“Looking	at	this,	I	feel	
like	I’m	walking	down	the	road	in	Akola.	I	walked	down	this	road	every	day	when	I	
was	there…	it	was	my	place	(jaiye	ma	bud).”		Shahrukh	had	only	ever	referred	to	his	
village	in	Paktia	as	his	place	(jaiye	ma).	
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Shahrukh	began	telling	me	again	of	the	numerous	statues	he	had	built,	pulling	up	the	
pictures	 on	 his	 phone	 as	 we	 neared	 the	 bridge	 to	 Nizamuddin,	 but	 as	 he	
remembered,	his	tone	changed.	“I	don’t	know	if	I	can	go	back	[to	Akola]	now	that	I’m	
Christian,”	Shahrukh	sighed,	“	Agha	Saheb	and	his	brother	[the	leaders	of	the	shrine]	
would	not	mind	I’m	sure…	but	all	those	other	Pashtuns…	you	know	how	they	are.”	
He	briefly	recounted	the	story	of	his	expulsion	from	Wazirabad,	discussed	in	chapter	
six,	and	stopped	halfway	down	the	bridge.	“This	could	be	a	picture	from	Europe,”	he	
said,	looking	at	the	same	debris‐strewn	riverbed	Jamshed	had	mocked	with	disdain,	
“but	 there	 are	 too	 many	 people	 in	 this	 country	 and	 it	 stinks!”	 Europe	 was	
somewhere	 Shahrukh	 had	 suggested	 he	 could	 belong,	 as	 he	 felt	 he	 would	 be	
accepted	 on	 account	 of	 being	 Christian;	 he	 would	 sometimes	 go	 on	Wikipedia	 or	
YouTube	to	learn	more	about	different	countries	or	cultures	in	Europe	or	elsewhere,	
such	as	Canada	or	 Israel,	where	he	 felt	 he	might	be	 able	 to	 settle.	Delhi,	 however,	
which	only	minutes	before	had	reminded	him	of	“his	place”	had	suddenly	come	into	
focus	 as	 somewhere	he	 could	not	 belong.	 In	 contrast	 to	 his	 elation	 a	 few	minutes	
earlier,	his	mood	was	now	markedly	glum.	“I’m	immensely	aggrieved	(besiyar	khafa	
astum)”	he	said	after	a	short	silence.	He	reiterated	how	he	was	an	able‐bodied	young	
man	and	could	contribute	to	any	country	he	lived	in,	but	even	India	would	not	accept	
him	 (mara	 qabul	na	me	konad).	 “I’m	 losing	 hope	 day	 by	 day	 (roz	ba	roz	na‐omid	
meshum)”	he	lamented,	but	then	corrected	himself,	saying	that	“don’t	think	I’ve	lost	
faith	in	God.	I	know	God	put	me	here	for	a	purpose	(maqsad).”	
Belonging	and	Not	Belonging:	Analysis	
For	both	Shahrukh	and	Jamshed,	walking	across	the	bridge	is	an	affective	experience.	
The	depressing	and	desolate	 landscape	of	 the	dried	 riverbed	affects	 them	not	 just	
visually	 but	 through	 its	 very	 atmosphere,	 through	 the	 “unconscious	 olfactory”	
(Brennan	2004)	 that	 elicits	 a	 physical	 and	 verbal	 reaction	 of	 disgust	 (“it	 stinks!”).	
With	 both	 men,	 the	 scene	 represents	 and	 reflects	 a	 state	 where	 their	 feelings	 of	
alienation	 appear	 suspended	 in	 the	muck	 and	 brush	 below	 them.	 Shahrukh	 gives	
this	 state	 a	 name	 in	 indicating	 he	 is	 aggrieved	 (khafa).	 As	 Nichola	 Khan	 (2013)	
suggests	in	her	case	study	of	everyday	suffering	among	Afghan	asylum	seekers	and	
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refugees	in	Brighton,	khapgan122	expresses	personal	evaluation	of	past	events	or	of	
present	suffering	without	divorcing	social	and	individual	experience	from	that	of	the	
material	world.	Thus	even	though	Shahrukh	was	able	to	feel	belonging	in	India	and	
Delhi	 through	his	 experiences,	 the	 reality	of	being	a	 refugee	 that	barred	him	 from	
pursuing	 a	 life	 as	 he	 wished	 and	 the	 subsequent	 feelings	 of	 rejection	 and	 being	
unwanted	 were	 	 “embedded	 within	 a	 frayed	 everyday	 life	 so	 that	 guarantees	 of	
belonging…	[were]	not	capable	of	erasing	the	hurts	or	providing	means	of	repairing	
this	sense	of	being	betrayed	by	the	everyday”	(Das	2007:9).		
	
Unlike	Shahrukh,	Jamshed’s	feelings	of	not	belonging	in	Delhi	appear	as	a	labour	to	
avoid	 connection	 to	 the	 city.	 As	mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 Jamshed	 and	
Rukhsana	 had	 fled	 Afghanistan	 following	 Jamshed’s	 release	 from	 capture	 and	
torture	by	the	Taliban.	Afghanistan	was	a	place	to	which	they	could	not	return	and	
to	which	 they	did	not	wish	 to	return.	What	was	problematic	 for	 Jamshed	was	 that	
Delhi	was	not	different	 enough	 from	Afghanistan.	His	 constant	 evaluation	of	Delhi	
against	 Afghanistan	was	 not	 one	 of	 differentiation	 but	 of	 comparison:	 both	 places	
had	old	ruins,	were	equally	underdeveloped	in	his	opinion,	and	dangerous.	Jamshed	
thus	experienced	as	alienating	and	traumatic	the	very	landscape	and	networks	that	
afforded	Ali	and	Musa	Saheb	a	feeling	of	belonging	in	the	city.	
	
Trauma	is	of	course	not	just	the	product	of	an	event,	such	as	torture	in	Jamshed’s	case,	
but	 also	 includes	 the	 “ongoing	 psychic,	 emotional,	 embodied,	 interpersonal	 life”	
(Lester	2013:758)	connected	to	and	affected	by	the	traumatic	event,	where	emotions	
and	memories	of	trauma	persist	in	the	background	of	everyday	life,	shaping	personal	
experience	 and	 social	 relationships	 (Das	 1995;	 Kirmayer	 et	al	 2007).	 Jamshed	 had	
only	mentioned	his	 torture	 to	me	 in	passing,	but	would	 speak	directly	with	Pragya,	
who	indicated	she	had	“deleted	from	[her]	mind”	much	of	what	he	told	her,	but	that	he	
“was	 tortured	 for	 a	 good	 amount	 of	 time…and	 also	 humiliated.”	 Pragya	maintained	
that	“it	seemed	[Jamshed]	had	not	processed	what	had	happened	to	him…	just	saying	
whatever	came	in	his	mouth…[without	any]	time	to	think,	process,	reflect…	[he	was]	
very	 much	 in	 a	 state	 of	 ‘I’m	 still	 running’.”	 It	 is	 this	 state	 that	 shaped	 Jamshed’s	
																																																								
122	In	 different	 Pashto	 dialects	 the	 ‘p’	 and	 ‘f’	 sounds	 are	 interchanged.	 Shahrukh’s	 use	 of	 “khafa”	
instead	of	“khapa”	might	also	have	been	due	to	his	speaking	to	me	in	Dari	rather	than	Pashto.	Khan	
translates	khapgan	as	“feeling	down”.	In	both	Jamshed	and	Shahrukh’s	case,	the	feeling	is	not	just	of	
being	down,	but	also	of	being	cheated	out	of	a	chance	at	making	a	life.	This	aspect	is	also	present	in	
Khan’s	ethnography.	
	 162
perception	 of	 Delhi	 as	 dangerous,	 reconfirmed	 by	 events,	 such	 as	 the	 murder	 in	
Bhogal,	that	recalled	the	situation	in	Afghanistan.	The	suspicion	of	imminent	violence	
in	the	context	of	Delhi	caused	Jamshed	and	Rukhsana	to	avoid	other	Afghans	and	stay	
at	home	unless	they	were	meeting	with	Pragya.	
	
Compounding	 this	 fear	 of	 physical	 violence	 was	 a	 concern	 that	 the	 present,	
untenable	situation	would	not	come	to	an	end.	
“There	 are	 people	 who	 have	 been	 here	 waiting	 for	 eight	 or	 nine	 years	 …	
who…	sold	their	house,	car,	 land	to	come	here	 in	search	of	a	peaceful	 life	…	
and	 [here]	 their	 situation	 has	worsened	 and	 the	money	 gets	 eaten	 up	 and	
nothing	is	left.”	
Jamshed	had	only	 saved	enough	money	 to	 live	 in	Delhi	 for	 a	 year,	 and	was	aware	
that	 if	 they	 didn’t	 get	 resettled	 he	 had	 no	 other	 source	 of	 financial	 support.	 His	
everyday	life	was	thus	also	imbued	with	concerns	of	the	violence	of	possibly	having	
to	 return	 to	Afghanistan	or	endure	penury	 in	 India.	His	 coping	mechanism	was	 to	
retract	from	the	city	and	pore	over	websites	of	organizations	that	might	be	able	to	
help	him	and	Rukhsana.	After	six	months,	when	the	US	Embassy	accepted	his	case,	
he	 established	 a	 regular	 routine	 of	 meeting	 with	 Pragya	 to	 practice	 for	 various	
interviews	 with	 the	 Embassy,	 UNHCR,	 and	 IOM.	 Luckily,	 Jamshed	 was	 resettled	
before	he	reached	his	financial	limit.	
	
Shahrukh	 and	 Jamshed	 thus	 present	 two	 different	 forms	 of	 not	 belonging	 in	 Delhi.	
While	Shahrukh’s	alienation	is	the	result	of	a	structural	denial	of	his	ability	to	belong	
in	Delhi,	 Jamshed	labours	to	disassociate	himself	from	the	city.	Jamshed’s	feelings	of	
not	 belonging	 in	 Delhi	 are,	 in	 a	 way,	 a	 response	 to	 the	 undesired	 possibility	 of	
belonging.	 The	 two	 men’s	 experiences	 illustrate	 that	 Afghan	 migrants	 can	
simultaneously	feel	they	belong	in	Delhi	and	also	feel	excluded	or	estranged	from	the	
city.	The	stories	further	suggest	that	feelings	of	belonging	and	not	belonging	are	not	
necessarily	conversely	related	but	corollary	depending	on	context.	Compared	to	each	
other	and	to	the	accounts	preceding	them,	the	two	men’s	examples	also	highlight	the	
differing	degrees	to	which	individual	migrants	can	exercise	control	over	how	they	are	
connected	or	not	connected	to	Delhi,	and	point	to	different	degrees	of	impact	of	state	
scale	 understandings	 of	 Afghan	 belonging	 in	 the	 city	 on	 individual	 migrants’	
experience	of	belonging	in	the	city.	I	return	to	this	issue	in	the	conclusion	below.	
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5.4 Conclusion	
In	 late	2014	Ali	was	going	 through	a	 tough	 time.	A	miscalculation	by	 the	university	
bureaucracy	left	him	suddenly	without	a	visa	for	a	short	period,	during	which	he	had	
to	leave	the	country.	Without	a	valid	visa,	his	phone	was	disconnected	and	he	lost	his	
housing	spot.	Upon	his	return	to	Delhi,	he	was	in	temporary	lodging,	without	a	phone,	
and	 had	 limited	 internet	 access.	 His	 infrequent	 Facebook	 posts	 lamented	 current	
events	in	Afghanistan	and	India,	such	as	the	Indian	Prime	Minister’s	Hindu	nationalist	
speeches	 asserting	 ancient	 Indian	 knowledge	 of	 plastic	 surgery	 and	 aeroplanes,	 or	
Saudi	 Arabia’s	 funding	 of	 a	multimillion	mosque	 complex	 in	 Kabul.	 He	 also	 posted	
status	updates	of	encounters	with	the	Indian	bureaucracy.	After	an	incident	where	he	
was	made	to	feel	particularly	like	a	foreigner,	he	posted	the	following:	
It	is	so	difficult	when	others	impose	their	identity	on	you.	It	is	so	difficult	to	
be	recognized	with	a	term	which	does	not	have	any	relation	with	your	past.	It	
is	so	difficult	when	some	one	else	owns	something	belongs	[sic]	to	you…	will	
that	day	come	in	which	we	could	own	our	history,	our	true	identity	and	our	
true	position?	
The	post	drew	a	long	chain	of	comments	and	arguments	around	the	issue	of	what	it	
means	to	be	Afghan	and	the	shared	history	of	India,	Afghanistan,	and	Iran.	Indians,	
Afghans,	and	Iranians	living	in	different	parts	of	the	world	engaged	in	commenting	
on	 and	 discussing	 the	 post	 with	 Ali	 and	 with	 each	 other.	 His	 Indian	 friends	
commented	 on	 how	 he	was	 always	welcome	 and	 that	 Afghanistan	was	 an	 ally	 to	
India,	while	Afghans	and	Iranian	friends	of	his	argued	with	each	other	on	issues	of	
nationalism,	 shared	 history,	 and	 the	 place	 of	 the	 past	 in	 one’s	 identity.	 The	 chain	
ended	abruptly	and	inconclusively	as	people	lost	steam.	
	
Indeed,	the	multiple	opinions	on	how	Afghanistan	is	and	is	not	connected	to	India	or	
Iran	 that	 Ali’s	 friends	 present,	 reflect	 the	 reality	 conveyed	 in	 the	 narratives	 and	
stories	 presented	 in	 the	 sections	 above.	 In	 attending	 to	 experience	 at	 the	 scale	 of	
individuals,	this	chapter	argues	that	what	it	means	to	belong	in	Delhi	as	Afghan	must	
be	understood	as	a	multiple,	grounded	 in	 the	various	 trajectories	and	networks	of	
movement,	 language,	 and	 history	 that	 place	 Afghan	 migrants	 in	 Delhi	 and	 which	
migrants	 draw	on	 in	 relating	 to	 the	 city.	 It	 echoes	 research	 in	 urban	 settings	 that	
acknowledges	 the	 diversity	 of	 scales	 at	 which	 urban	 dwellers	 and	 migrants	
articulate	 belonging	 and	 at	which	 their	 relationship	 to	 the	 city	 is	mediated	 (Glick	
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Schiller	et	al	2006;	Hannerz	1992;	Harzig	and	Juteau	2006),	suggesting	a	condition	
of	“super‐diversity”	(Vertovec	2007)	 in	the	potential	 forms	of	 identity	and	ways	of	
belonging	 available	 to	 transnational	 migrants.	 Similar	 to	 Henkel’s	 (2007)	
description	of	the	complex	ways	of	inhabiting	Istanbul	in	a	Muslim	way,	the	accounts	
of	Afghan	belonging	in	Delhi	presented	above	relate	how	individual	Afghan	migrants	
recognize	 heterogeneous	 of	 forms	 of	 belonging	 in	 the	 city	 that	 they	 order	 or	
transcend	within	their	own	experience	of	belonging	in	Delhi.	
	
Acknowledging	the	multiplicity	of	what	it	means	to	be	and	belong	in	Delhi	as	Afghan	
does	 not	 however	 suggest	 a	 relativism	 “unable	 to	 say	 much	 except	 noting	 how	
complicated	and	interconnected	everything	is”	(Bloch	2005:13).	Against	the	panoply	
of	belonging	suggested	in	the	individual	stories,	the	context	within	which	Ali	wrote	
his	 post	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 scale	 as	 impact	 (Jiménez	 2005;	 Strathern	
1991,	1999)	as	discussed	in	chapter	two.		While	at	the	individual	scale	Ali	articulates	
his	belonging	in	Delhi	through	different	orderings	of	place	and	time	(will	a	present	
arrive	in	which	“we	could	own	our	history”?),	he	is	not	in	complete	control	of	how	
his	life	is	affected	by	the	state‐level	conception	of	where	he	belongs.	This	theme	runs	
throughout	 the	 stories	 presented	 in	 both	 this	 chapter	 and	 chapter	 four	 and	
illustrates	 what	 Massey	 (1993)	 has	 termed	 the	 “power‐geometry”	 of	 how	
transnational	flows	and	processes	affect	people	differently	and	unequally.	
	
The	argument	of	this	chapter	that	there	are	multiple	ways	in	which	Afghans	belong	
in	Delhi,	relates	to	a	more	general	argument	of	the	thesis	that	while	Afghan	migrants	
in	 Delhi	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 belong	 to	 the	 city	 in	 multiple	 ways	 articulated	 at	
different	epistemological	scales,	not	all	individuals	possess	equal	ability	to	belong	in	
the	city	as	they	desire	in	their	day‐to‐day	life.	As	briefly	mentioned	in	chapter	four,	
when	 the	 experiences	 of	 the	 different	men	discussed	 above	 are	 compared	 against	
each	 another,	 a	 gradient	 emerges	 that	 connects	 the	 access	 to	 financial	 and	 social	
resources	with	the	ability	each	man	has	to	belong	in	Delhi	in	the	way	he	desires.	
	
Ali,	Shahrukh,	and	Amirkhel	possess	 limited	agency	 in	asserting	 their	belonging	 in	
the	 city.	Even	 though	Ali,	who	has	 limited	 financial	 stability	 through	a	 scholarship	
and	some	savings,	considers	himself	at	home	in	Delhi,	he	is	obliged	to	leave	when	his	
visa	runs	out	and	the	state	deems	his	presence	in	Delhi	as	unlawful.	While	Shahrukh	
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might	feel	he	is	in	his	“place”	in	Delhi,	his	status	as	a	refugee	disallows	recognition	of	
this	 sentiment	 and	 prevents	 him	 from	 pursuing	 official	 avenues	 that	would	 allow	
him	 to	 live	a	 life	he	 sees	 as	worth	 living,	where	he	 could	earn	a	 living	and	have	a	
family.	 The	 state‐level	 understandings	 of	 being	 and	 belonging	 as	 Afghan	 in	 Delhi	
thus	 impact	 Ali	 and	 Shahrukh’s	 experience	 of	 belonging	 in	 the	 city	 with	 greater	
magnitude	than	the	perceptions	they	hold	as	individuals.	Similarly,	though	Amirkhel	
does	 not	 feel	 he	 belongs	 in	 Delhi	 and	 wishes	 to	 leave	 the	 city,	 as	 a	 young	 man	
without	 financial	 resources	 he	 is	 beholden	 to	 his	 family	 and	 the	Pashtun	network	
that	brought	him	to	the	city	and	must	thus	remain	in	Delhi.	
	
In	 contrast,	 Jamshed,	 Musa	 Saheb,	 Khiyalay,	 and	 Akhtar	 possess	 relatively	 more	
facility	 in	 living	 in	 the	 city	 as	 they	 desire.	 For	 Jamshed	 and	 Musa	 Saheb,	 it	 is	
primarily	through	their	access	to	social	resources	that	their	way	of	inhabiting	Delhi	
is	facilitated.	Had	Jamshed	not	had	the	support	of	the	NGO	and	Pragya,	it	is	unlikely	
he	would	have	been	able	to	move	around	the	city	in	the	way	he	did	or	be	resettled	so	
quickly.	In	the	absence	of	these	social	resources,	he	would	instead	have	had	to	face	
the	reality	of	making	a	life	in	Delhi	like	other	refugees	and	asylum	seekers.	Similarly,	
as	 an	 unregistered	 economic	 migrant,	 Musa	 Saheb	 would	 not	 have	 been	 able	 to	
maintain	his	lifestyle	or	undertake	his	political	efforts	without	the	financial	support	
of	his	son	and	connections	among	Afghan	intelligentsia	in	Delhi	and	abroad.	As	Musa	
Saheb,	 Khiyalay,	 and	 Akhtar	 all	 indicated	 in	 different	 ways,	 it	 is	 their	 financial	
resources	that	allow	them	to	maintain	their	lifestyles	outside	the	restrictions	of	the	
state	through	getting	 jobs,	doing	business,	and	bribing	police.	Perhaps,	while	there	
might	be	multiple	ways	to	belong	as	Afghan	in	Delhi,	to	be	able	to	belong	in	the	city	
might	 be,	 as	 Khiyalay	 suggested,	 contingent	 on	 access	 to	 social	 and	 financial	
resources	so	that	“If	you	have	money,	you	have	everything.”	
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Figure	5:	Ali’s	Hand	Drawn	Map	
The	map	covers	the	regions	Ali	studies	and	moves	through.	
Figure	4:	Ali’s	Door	Decoration	
The	plastic	cut	out	in	the	shape	of	Afghanistan	with	the	basmala	is	adorned	
with	glitter.	I	have	removed	Ali’s	name	from	the	centre	of	the	sign.	
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6. Afghan	Community	in	Delhi	
In	late	June,	I	set	out	to	Old	Delhi	on	a	mission	to	find	a	printing	press.	As	explained	
in	 chapter	 one,	 when	 I	 first	 arrived	 in	 the	 city,	 I	 struggled	 to	 find	 an	 Afghan	
‘community’	and	initially	tried	to	do	so	by	seeking	out	poets,	artists,	and	musicians.	
This	search	continued	alongside	the	other	streams	of	research	throughout	my	time	
in	Delhi.	Over	the	summer	I	had	learned	through	an	Afghan	living	in	Delhi	since	the	
1980s	that	a	publishing	press	in	the	Old	Delhi	neighbourhood	of	Ballimaran	used	to	
print	a	Persian	language	biweekly	for	the	city’s	Afghan	community	through	the	mid‐
1990s,	 and	 had	 also	 published	 works	 of	 several	 Delhi‐based	 Afghan	 poets	 and	
writers	at	the	time.	Armed	with	just	this	loose	description,	I	headed	to	Sharif	Manzil:	
an	old	building	 in	Ballimaran	 that	was	 the	 erstwhile	 centre	of	Afghan	 commercial	
activity	in	the	city	but	now	housed	only	a	smattering	of	half‐empty	Afghan	shops,	a	
one‐room	travel	agency,	and	a	spartan	Afghan	restaurant	that	claimed	to	be	Delhi’s	
first	 Afghan	 restaurant.	 As	 none	 of	 the	 traders	 at	 Sharif	 Manzil	 had	 heard	 of	 the	
publishing	 house,	 I	 decided	 to	 ask	 shopkeepers	 along	 Ballimaran’s	 main	 road.	
Hugging	the	sides	of	the	road	to	avoid	the	steady	stream	of	rickshaws,	motorcycles,	
and	 pedestrians	 struggling	 past	 each	 other	 through	 the	 din	 of	 bells,	 beeps,	 and	
shouting,	I	finally	came	across	a	newspaper	vendor	in	one	of	the	alleys	off	the	main	
road.	The	man	kindly	pointed	me	in	the	direction	of	a	bookseller	who	in	turn	led	me	
to	the	Sohrab	Press.	
	
The	whirring	and	clanking	of	 large	machinery	 filled	what	was	most	probably	once	
the	courtyard	of	a	small	haveli	off	the	main	artery	of	Ballimaran.	The	strong	fumes	of	
rubber	and	glue	indicated	the	existence	of	the	press.	In	one	corner	of	the	courtyard	
was	a	small	office	with	wood	panelling	and	tinted	glass	that	housed	two	desks	and	
several	shelves	filled	with	magazines,	books,	and	uneven	stacks	of	loose‐leaf	papers.	
A	 lone	calendar	with	a	mountain	scene	and	the	Sohrab	press	 logo	graced	the	bare,	
peeling	yellow	walls.	The	publisher,	Mirza	Saheb,	a	slight	man	with	a	greying	beard	
and	 full	 head	 of	 hair,	 was	 sitting	 at	 his	 desk	 and	 looked	 up	 apprehensively	 as	 I	
walked	 in	and	 introduced	myself.	 I	briefly	explained	 I	was	conducting	research	on	
Afghans	 living	 in	Delhi	and	that	I	wished	to	know	if	anyone	was	publishing	or	had	
been	publishing	in	Persian	or	Pashto	in	the	capital.	His	eyes	lit	up	at	the	mention	of	
	 168
Afghanistan.	 “The	people	of	Afghanistan	are	very	good	 (achchhe	log)…	We	used	 to	
work	with	 the	 Embassy	 of	 Afghanistan,”	 he	 explained.	Mirza	 Saheb	 called	 for	 two	
cups	of	tea,	indicating	we	would	talk	for	a	while.	
	
I	 met	 with	Mirza	 Saheb	 regularly	 over	 the	 next	 several	 months.	 He	 explained	 that	
Sohrab	Press	had	printed	many	materials	for	the	Afghanistan	Embassy	in	Delhi	until	
the	mid	1990s,	including	a	monthly	newsletter	for	the	city’s	Afghan	community.	Many	
of	the	embassy	staff	and	local	Afghan	residents	also	published	their	books	of	poetry	
and	short	stories	through	Sohrab,	though	Mirza	Saheb	regretted	they	did	not	have	any	
copies	left.	“I’m	sure	you	can	find	them	at	the	embassy,”	he	suggested,	“you	know,	they	
had	the	Indo‐Afghan	society,	where	they	would	get	together	and	have	poetry	nights	
(mushairas)	and	readings	(nashists)…	We	used	to	publish	in	Farsi,	but	there	is	nobody	
to	 read	 it	 anymore.”	 Mirza	 Saheb	 lamented	 how	 even	 readership	 in	 Urdu	 had	
dwindled	 over	 the	 last	 decade	 and	 with	 it	 so	 had	 an	 interest	 in	 Urdu	 poetry	 and	
literature,	with	the	result	that	Sohrab	now	mostly	only	published	works	in	English.	
	
On	one	occasion,	 I	 arrived	at	Mirza	Saheb’s	office	 just	as	a	 former	colleague	of	his	
was	 getting	 ready	 to	 leave.	 “This	 is	 Mr	 Ramprasad	 my	 esteemed	 teacher,”	 Mirza	
Saheb	 said	 introducing	 him	 deferentially,	 “he	 is	 a	 great	 master	 (ustad)	 of	 Farsi,	
Sanskrit,	and	Urdu.”	During	introductions	Mr	Ramprasad	explained	he	was	from	one	
of	 the	original	 (asli)	Hindu	 families	of	Old	Delhi	and	that	he	was	a	 little	boy	at	 the	
time	 of	 the	 partition	 of	 India	 and	 Pakistan.	 He	 lamented	 the	 decline	 of	 Urdu	 and	
Persian	in	Delhi	and	asserted	that	these	languages	had	been	integral	to	keeping	the	
community	 of	 Delhi	 together.	When	 he	 found	 out	 I	 was	working	with	 Afghans	 in	
Delhi,	Mr	Ramprasad	exclaimed	that	many	Afghans	used	to	live	in	Old	Delhi,	but	now	
it	 is	mostly	 just	 “these	business‐types”	(yeh	businesswaale)	one	came	across.	Mirza	
Saheb	voiced	 in	agreement	that	“those	Afghans”	of	earlier	 times	had	unfortunately	
left.	After	Mr	Ramprasad	excused	himself,	 I	asked	Mirza	Saheb	whom	he	meant	by	
‘those	Afghans’.	
“You	 know,	 the	 Afghan	 people	 who	 were	 here	 before	 were	 in	 dire	 straits	
(bure	halaat).	The	Communists	had	taken	their	country,	but	 they	were	very	
good	 (achche)	 and	 refined	 (shaista)	 people.	 They	 all	 ended	 up	 going	 to	
different	places.”	
	 169
I	asked	him	if	he	was	 in	touch	with	anyone,	and	his	eyes	went	misty.	“No,”	he	said	
with	a	contemplative	pause	and	wiped	away	a	tear	as	he	remembered	“there	was	an	
Abdulhamid	Saheb	at	the	embassy.	He	was	very	good	to	me.”	
	
Mirza	 Saheb	 recounted	 a	 story	 of	 Abdulhamid	 Saheb’s	 last	 day	 in	 Delhi	 before	
leaving	for	Canada.	Many	people	had	gathered	at	his	office	at	the	embassy,	and	they	
had	been	discussing	a	book	Sohrab	Press	had	just	published.	One	by	one,	people	left	
until	Mirza	Saheb	was	the	last	person	there.	Abdulhamid	Saheb	asked	him	if	he	had	
understood	 the	 discussion	 and,	 as	 he	 didn’t	 understand	 Dari,	 Abdulhamid	 Saheb	
explained	 it	was	a	story	about	a	red	ant	 that	had	gotten	separated	 from	its	colony	
and	found	its	way	into	a	colony	of	black	ants.	As	much	as	it	wanted	to	become	a	part	
of	 the	 colony,	 it	 never	 could.	 “You	 understand	what	 the	meaning	 (maane)	 [of	 the	
story]	 was,	 right?”	 Mirza	 Saheb	 asked,	 “about	 not	 being	 accepted	 (qabul)	 among	
strangers	 (ghairon	 ke	 beech).”	 Mirza	 Saheb	 regretted	 having	 lost	 touch	 with	
Abdulhamid	Saheb.	“He	was	very	good	to	me	and	helped	me	a	lot	with	the	press,”	he	
reminisced.	 The	 discussion	 had	 made	 him	 melancholy	 and	 as	 an	 afterthought	 he	
added,	 “Groups	 are	 made	 and	 broken	 when	 people	 leave	 (log	aate	hein	aur	 jaate	
hein,	groups	banti	hein,	phir	tooth	jaati	hein)…	[the	people	at	the	embassy]	gave	me	a	
lot	of	affection	(bahut	chaaha	unhu	ne	mujhe).”	
	
Near	the	end	of	the	summer,	I	found	out	that	Abdulhamid	Saheb	had	recently	returned	
to	work	at	the	Afghanistan	Embassy	in	Delhi,	and	I	arranged	to	meet	him.	He	was	keen	
to	meet	with	me	to	discuss	my	research,	explaining	how	he	had	studied	in	Delhi	and	
had	 even	 supervised	 Afghan	 doctoral	 students	 in	 the	 city.	 When	 we	 met	 at	 the	
embassy,	 he	 was	 surprised	 to	 learn	 I	 was	 not	 an	 Afghan	 national	 and	 was	
unimpressed	with	my	decision	to	work	with	refugees	in	Delhi.	“What	will	they	tell	you	
about	Afghan	culture?”	he	asked.	He	explained	that	 I	was	wasting	my	time	trying	to	
find	forms	of	community	among	Afghan	refugees	and	insisted	that	I	should	instead	go	
back	 to	working	 on	 the	Kharabati	musicians	 of	 Kabul.	When	 he	 realized	 I	was	 not	
going	to	change	my	research	focus,	he	became	disinterested	and	disengaged.	
	
To	save	 the	conversation,	 I	mentioned	Sohrab	press.	He	remembered	Mirza	Saheb	
and	asked	for	his	contact	details	as	he	had	something	to	publish.	I	asked	Abdulhamid	
Saheb	about	the	books	and	newsletters	from	the	80s	and	he	said	“yes,	they’re	all	in	
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the	library,	but	they	will	not	be	of	interest	to	you.	They	just	have	information	about	
daily	occurrences	(rawidadhaye	rozmarrah).”	I	tried	to	explain	the	documents’	value	
as	historical	snapshots	of	Delhi’s	Afghan	community	in	the	80s	and	90s,	but	he	was	
unimpressed	and	did	not	consider	it	a	relevant	academic	pursuit.	For	the	remainder	
of	my	time	in	Delhi,	Abdulhamid	Saheb	avoided	me,	cancelling	our	appointments	at	
the	last	minute,	and	I	never	got	to	visit	the	embassy	library.	He	did,	however	get	in	
touch	with	Mirza	Saheb,	who	called	me	 to	convey	his	 thanks	 for	 reconnecting	him	
with	his	old	friend.	The	last	time	I	met	Mirza	Saheb	he	explained	he	was	quite	busy	
and	 could	 not	 chat	 for	 too	 long.	 He	 recounted	 with	 joy	 how	 he	 had	 already	 met	
Abdulhamid	Saheb	twice	and	would	be	printing	several	items	for	him.	It	appeared	he	
had	perhaps	again	found	the	community	he	felt	was	lost.	
	
The	story	of	Mirza	Saheb	and	Abdulhamid	Saheb	provides	a	good	starting	point	 for	
this	 final	 ethnographic	 chapter	 on	 Afghan	 community	 in	 Delhi,	 illustrating	 several	
conceptions	of	community.	Where	the	previous	chapters	approached	what	it	means	to	
be	and	belong	in	Delhi	at	the	scale	of	the	individual,	this	chapter	attends	to	the	scale	of	
community	to	explore	how	Afghan	migrants	inhabit	the	city.	The	chapter	argues	that	
there	 are	 multiple	 forms	 of	 Afghan	 community	 in	 Delhi,	 shaped	 by	 the	 different	
processes	constituting	Afghan	migrants	as	persons	and	connecting	them	to	the	city.	In	
considering	 two	 particular	 forms	 of	 Afghan	 community,	 the	 Refugee	 Solidarity	
Committee	and	the	Pashtun	moneylender	network,	the	chapter	treats	the	concept	of	
community	 itself	 as	 multiple	 in	 order	 to	 appreciate	 the	 variability	 in	 forms	 and	
meanings	of	community	present	 in	 the	ethnographic	material,	and	to	consider	what	
this	variability	relates	of	the	broader	context	of	Afghan	migrants	in	Delhi	
	
As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 three,	 at	 the	 state	 scale,	 Afghan	 community	 in	 Delhi	 is	
thought	of	as	singular,	grounded	in	Afghan	migrants	feelings	of	commitment	to	one	
another	 through	 shared	 national	 belonging.	 Anthropological	 work	 on	 nationalism	
and	state‐building	 illustrates	how	this	abstract	 idea	of	persons	being	connected	by	
their	 mutual	 belonging	 to	 a	 state	 is	 cultivated	 through	 mobilization	 of	 media,	
educational	 systems,	 and	 state	 administration	 that	 shape	 individuals’	 ideas	 and	
experiences	of	 their	place	 in	 the	nation	 through	the	exclusion	of	others	(Anderson	
2006;	Messick	1993).	Abdulhamid	Saheb’s	sentiments	toward	the	Afghan	refugees	in	
Delhi,	 however,	 illustrate	 how,	 in	 one	 sense,	 community	 “is	 never	 simply	 the	
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recognition	of	cultural	similarity	of	social	contiguity	but	a	categorical	identity	that	is	
premised	on	various	forms	of	exclusion	and	construction	of	otherness”	(Gupta	and	
Ferguson	 1997:13).	 Thus,	 despite	 a	 shared	 national	 origin	 with	 Afghan	 refugees,	
Abdul	 Hamid	 Saheb	 did	 not	 consider	 them	 as	 part	 of	 his	 community	 and	 did	 not	
believe	 that	 I	 would	 find	 any	 sense	 of	 Afghan	 community	 through	 working	 with	
them.	As	discussed	in	chapter	three,	many	Afghans	in	Delhi	who	were	not	refugees	
suspected	 Afghan	 refugees	 in	 the	 city	 of	 having	 abandoned	 their	 country	 for	
economic	profit.	Abdulhamid	Saheb’s	feelings	toward	the	Afghan	refugees	illustrate	
the	 symbolic	 nature	 of	 community	 as	 based	 on	 variable	 logics	 of	 identity	 (Cohen	
1985),	showing	how	Afghan	community	in	Delhi	is	not	necessarily	coterminous	with	
shared	 national	 origin,	 but	 can	 also	 reflect	 distinctions	 based	 on	 identities	 of	
different	social	groups	and	individuals.	
	
While	Abdulhamid	Saheb	might	have	not	considered	Afghan	refugees	as	part	of	what	
he	 saw	as	Delhi’s	Afghan	 community,	 he	did	 see	 the	Mirza	 Saheb	 as	 a	part	 of	 this	
community	despite	Mirza	Saheb’s	not	being	an	Afghan	national	or	a	Persian	speaker.	
Mirza	 Saheb	 similarly	 considered	 himself	 part	 of	 the	 this	 community,	 not	 as	 an	
Afghan,	 but	 through	 his	 involvement	 in	 printing	 materials	 and	 in	 possessing	 the	
same	values	of	the	“good”	(achche)	and	“refined”	(shaista)	Afghans	who	shared	his	
sentiments	toward	language	and	culture.	One	might	thus	consider	the	Indo‐Afghan	
society	 as	 an	 Afghan	 “community	 of	 sentiment”	 (Appadurai	 1996:8)	 where	
individuals	from	a	range	of	social	backgrounds	and	contexts	come	together	through	
imagining	 and	 feeling	 together	 through	 “fields	 of	 shared	 belonging”	 (Olwig	
2002:124)	that	involve	both	imagination	and	experience.	Community	thus	does	not	
exist	 solely	 at	 a	 cognitive	 level.	 As	 Barth	 argues	 with	 regard	 to	 ethnic	 belonging,	
while	individuals	and	groups	develop	complex	reifications	of	social	categories	with	
social	consequences	on	organization	and	perception	of	self	and	other,	communities	
are	 not	 formed	 “by	 the	mere	 act	 of	 imagining”	 (1994:13)	 but	 also	 through	 social	
interaction.	That	is,	community	is	not	just	a	stable	reification	of	an	imagined	group	
identity,	 but	 a	 variable	 process	 dependent	 on	 the	 social	 interaction	of	 individuals.	
This	nature	of	community	comes	forth	in	the	Mirza	Saheb’s	reflection	on	how	groups	
coalesce	and	disperse	through	the	movement	of	people	and	is	expressed	in	his	sense	
of	 loss	 of	 community	 associated	 with	 Abdulhamid	 Saheb’s	 departure	 and	 his	
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subsequent	rejoicing	at	the	potential	revival	of	this	community	through	Abdulhamid	
Saheb’s	return.	
	
This	last	fact	raises	two	points	that	are	returned	to	in	the	chapter	below.	It	suggests	
rupture	 and	 division	 might	 equally	 be	 an	 aspect	 of	 community	 as	 much	 as	
integration	and	cooperation.	As	discussed	in	the	introduction	to	this	thesis,	research	
on	Afghanistan,	has	addressed	the	aspect	of	fracturing	of	community	among	Afghans	
in	 different	 ways.	 Edwards	 has	 suggested	 it	 is	 a	 result	 of	 a	 “moral	 incoherence”	
(1996:3)	of	Afghan	identity	stemming	from	the	multiple	frameworks	through	which	
notions	of	what	it	means	to	be	Afghan	are	imagined.	Barth	(1959a,	1959b)	points	to	
traditional	kinship	structures	and	 their	development	 in	a	context	where	corporate	
groups	 vie	 for	 limited	 natural	 resources.	 The	 story	 of	 Abdulhamid	 Saheb	 above	
suggests	 another	 factor	might	 be	 the	movement	 of	 people,	where,	 as	Mirza	 Saheb	
pointed	out,	groups	are	formed	and	broken	as	people	come	and	go.	This	observation	
relates	a	second	point	regarding	the	nature	of	community	and	how	different	forms	
of	 community	overlap.	The	 Indo‐Afghan	society	might	be	considered	a	 community	
based	on	a	 social	 group	of	 individuals	with	 shared	relationships	 to	Afghanistan	or	
literary	 culture,	 but	 it	 also	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 part	 of	 Abdulhamid	 Saheb’s	
personal	network	that	drifted	apart	following	his	departure.	
	
The	example	of	Abdulhamid	Saheb	and	Mirza	Saheb	presents	several	considerations	
of	 Afghan	 community	 in	 Delhi	 as	 built	 on	 social	 categories,	 groups,	 or	 personal	
networks.	Some	have	suggested	this	multiplicity	of	what	community	is	and	means	in	
different	contexts	renders	the	term	too	ambiguous	for	use	as	an	analytic	concept	(see	
Creed	2006).	As	Barth’s	 (1983)	study	of	society	 in	 the	Omani	coastal	 town	of	Sohar	
depicts,	however,	the	existence	of	multiple	forms	of	community	premised	on	differing	
grounds	of	association	is	a	feature	of	complex	society,	and	recognizing	this	complexity	
affords	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 social	 context	 within	 which	 the	 differing	 forms	 of	
communities	exist.	In	a	broader	theoretical	consideration,	Amit	and	Rappaport	(2002,	
2012)	have	suggested	that	rather	than	eschewing	the	variety	of	ways	in	which	ideas	of	
community	are	created	or	invoked,	the	very	notion	of	community	can	be	treated	as	a	
polythetic	concept	to	productively	examine	and	compare	conditions	for	and	concepts	
of	consociation	across	various	forms	of	community.	The	three	sections	in	the	chapter	
below	turn	to	ideas	of	community	with	this	aim.	
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Instead	of	delineating	a	singular	concept	of	Afghan	community	in	Delhi,	the	sections	
below	consider	two	different	kinds	of	Afghan	community	in	the	city	and	the	forms	of	
association	they	present.	The	first	section	examines	the	rise	and	fall	of	the	Refugee	
Solidarity	Committee	and	how	this	community,	premised	on	a	category	envisioned	
at	 the	 state	 scale,	 is	 shaped	 and	 affected	 by	 the	 emotional	 context	 of	 fear	 and	
suspicion.	The	second	section	attends	to	the	Pashtun	moneylender	network	and	how	
it	presents	a	form	of	community	built	around	trade	and	trust.	The	chapter	concludes	
with	reflecting	on	what	the	differences	between	these	forms	of	Afghan	community	in	
Delhi	might	reveal	more	generally.	
6.1 Lajpat	Nagar	Refugees:	W(h)ither	the	Afghan	Community?	
Two	weeks	into	my	fieldwork,	hoping	to	perhaps	make	contacts	or	find	out	if	there	
were	Afghan	students	I	could	liaise	with,	I	had	arranged	to	meet	with	a	prominent	
Indian	sociologist	based	at	Ali’s	university.	The	Sociologist	regretted	not	being	able	
to	 provide	 any	 information,	 but	 offered	 me	 moral	 support.	 “I	 know	 you	
anthropologists	 like	 participant	 observation,”	 the	 Sociologist	 tried	 to	 console	 me,	
“but	the	best	thing	to	do	is	simply	go	to	Lajpat	Nagar	market	and	do	a	survey	of	the	
Afghan	community.”	Named	after	Lala	Lajpat	Rai,	the	Punjabi	freedom	fighter,	Lajpat	
Nagar	was	one	of	several	areas	of	Delhi	specifically	planned	and	developed	in	post‐
partition	 Delhi	 to	 house	 Sindhi	 and	 Punjabi	 refugees	 arriving	 from	 what	 is	 now	
Pakistan.	 Initially	 considered	 a	 poorer	 part	 of	 town,	 Lajpat	 Nagar’s	 fortune	 has	
changed	 considerably	 over	 the	 last	 decades	 and	 the	 neighbourhood	 has	 come	 to	
emblematize	the	nouveau	riche,	mercantile	Punjabi	class123.	Since	the	1980s,	Lajpat	
Nagar	and	the	adjoining	lower‐class	neighbourhood	of	Bhogal	have	become	known	
																																																								
123	The	 2013	 Bollywood	 blockbuster	Vicky	Donor	 celebrated	 this	 image	 through	 the	 rags	 to	 riches	
story	of	 the	protagonist,	 Vicky,	who	made	 it	 quick	 and	big	 through	 sperm	donation.	 Though	Vicky	
might	not	have	had	‘class’,	he	is	shown	as	capitalizing	on	his	virile,	Punjabi	manliness	to	transform	his	
lower‐middle	class	Lajpat	Nagar	house	into	a	little	mansion,	buying	appliances	like	a	flat	screen	TV,	
modernising	his	mother’s	modest	ground‐floor	beauty	parlour,	and	marrying	a	sophisticated	upper‐
class	Bengali	woman	from	the	upscale	Chittaranjan	Park	area	of	Delhi.	Like	Vicky,	there	is	a	part	of	
central	market	that	still	caters	to	middle	class	tastes,	but	also	a	part	that	is	accessible	only	to	upper	
class	clientele.	
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as	a	centre	of	the	Afghan	population	in	Delhi,	and	the	UNHCR	would	mostly	hold	its	
open	meetings	with	the	Afghan	community	in	Lajpat	Nagar124.	
	
Afghans	are,	in	fact,	present	throughout	the	city,	and	during	the	cooler	months	from	
September	 through	 April	 one	 can	 hear	 Pashto	 and	 Dari	 spoken	 on	 the	 streets	 of	
almost	 any	 of	 the	 central	 Delhi	 neighbourhoods.	 Unlike	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 city,	
however,	 Lajpat	 Nagar	 and	 Bhogal	 have	 come	 to	 possess	 a	 particular	 material	
Afghan	presence.		Many	shops	have	put	up	signs	in	Dari,	written	by	painters	who	do	
not	know	the	meaning	of	 the	words	or	understand	the	Perso‐Arabic	script125.	 “For	
me	it’s	a	like	a	design.	They	just	show	me	the	drawing	and	I	copy	it,”	a	painter	once	
explained	to	me	while	working	on	a	sign	from	left	to	right126	(Figure	7).	A	number	of	
Afghan	 naanwais	 (bakers)	 have	 opened	 up	 shop	 throughout	 the	 neighbourhoods	
and	there	are	five	Afghan	restaurants	within	the	2	km2	area,	one	of	which	has	now	
become	 a	 chain	 with	 sister	 restaurants	 in	 Old	 Delhi	 and	 Malviya	 Nagar	 (areas	
frequented	and	inhabited	by	Afghans	in	Delhi).	The	entire	area	of	Kasturba	Niketan,	
a	neighbourhood	within	Lajpat	Nagar	 located	 two	blocks	 from	 the	 central	market,	
has	 come	 to	 be	 completely	 rented	 out	 to	mostly	Afghans	 at	 exorbitant	 rates,	with	
single	 rooms	 starting	 at	 Rs	 700‐1500	 per	 night.	 Almost	 every	 house	 has	 a	 sign	
outside	 advertising	 available	 rooms,	 and	 the	 boundary	 walls	 are	 plastered	 with	
posters	 in	 Dari	 and	 English	 advertising	 companies	with	 properties	 for	 rent.	 Even	
signs	indicating	fines	for	littering	are	in	Dari,	English,	and	Hindi.	
	
Aside	from	signs	and	shops,	Afghan	presence	is	felt	in	Lajpat	Nagar	through	the	very	
bodies	 of	 Afghans	 that	 move	 through	 the	 market	 and	 the	 local	 economies	 they	
produce	through	this	movement.	The	people	most	easily	recognisable	as	Afghan	are	
the	men	dressed	in	perahan‐tunban127	and	women	in	headscarves	and	dark	coloured	
dresses	with	a	light	coat.	Generally,	the	people	wearing	‘traditional’	Afghan	dress	are	
middle‐aged	 or	 older,	 either	 Pashtuns	 or	 people	 from	 Mazar‐e‐Sharif,	 and	 quite	
often	medical	 tourists.	During	my	 fieldwork,	Afghan	men’s	 “Pathani”	 suits	 became	
																																																								
124	This	 is	 not	 an	 entirely	 random	 choice.	 As	 a	 UNHCR	 representative	 explained	 to	 me,	 it	 is	 a	
neighbourhood	 where	many	 Afghan	 and	 Somali	 refugees	 reside,	 which	 is	 easily	 accessible	 by	 the	
metro	and	bus	system,	and	where	a	large	meeting	space	is	available	through	the	Lal	Sai	Temple.	
125	This	 is,	 unfortunately,	 the	 same	 for	 many	 official	 signs	 in	 Urdu	 across	 the	 city,	 which	 are	
practically	illegible.	The	Dari	signs	in	the	Muslim	area	of	Hauz	Rani	in	Malviya	Nagar	are	beautifully	
written,	but	I	never	met	with	a	sign	maker	there.	
126	Rather	than	the	direction	Dari	is	written	in:	right	to	left.	
127	Afghan	tunic	and	trousers.	
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quite	popular	 in	 the	area.	Once,	dressed	 in	perahan‐tunban	myself,	 I	 got	 caught	 in	
the	 rain	 under	 a	 shop	 awning	with	 a	 tailor’s	 assistant	 at	 one	 of	 the	many	 suiting	
shops	in	the	market.	The	man	asked	where	I	had	bought	my	‘suit’,	and	I	told	him	it	
was	from	Kabul.	“It	was	probably	made	here,”	he	said	blandly,	“many	of	your	people	
commission	suits	here	and	then	we	have	to	send	them	to	Afghanistan.”	He	explained	
his	 shop	would	 regularly	 courier	boxes	of	 clothes	 to	Afghanistan	 and	Pakistan	 for	
“private”	 people	 (private	 log)	 who	 would	 come	 to	 Delhi	 to	 buy	 things	 wholesale.	
“Here	as	well,	young	people	like	you	like	to	get	Pathani	suits	made,”	he	added	“It	is	
the	 new	 fashion.”	 In	 general,	 except	 perhaps	 on	 religious	 holidays,	most	 refugees	
and	 young	 Afghan	 tourists	 in	 Lajpat	 Nagar	 would	 dress	 in	 the	 same	 hip,	 trendy	
clothes	 as	 other	 young	 people,	 following	 global	 fashion	 trends.	 Particularly	 in	 the	
cooler	months,	the	market	would	be	full	of	young	Afghan	men	down	from	Kabul	or	
Kandahar	on	their	way	to	a	boozy	holiday	in	Goa	or	Kerala.	They	could	often	be	seen	
checking	 out	 knock‐off	 Ray‐Bans,	 daring	 each	 other	 to	 eat	 spicy	 street	 food,	 and	
generally	having	a	good	time.	
	
After	returning	from	fieldwork,	I	was	listening	to	a	recording	of	a	conversation	I	had	
with	 Musa	 Saheb	 in	 a	 Lajpat	 Nagar	 park;	 audible	 in	 the	 background	 was	 a	
conversation	of	two	men	sitting	near	us.	During	a	lull	in	our	conversation	one	of	the	
men	could	be	heard	remarking	how	“There	are	many	Afghans	here	now…	this	whole	
area	 has	 become	 an	 Afghan	 settlement	 (basti).”	 The	 local	 economies	 of	 property	
rentals,	prostitution,	retail,	 food,	and	even	fashion	created	by	the	large	presence	of	
Afghan	migrants	 in	 Lajpat	 Nagar	 can	 give	 the	 impression	 of	 a	 tightly	 knit	 Afghan	
community.	Afghans	can	be	seen	in	the	market,	in	shops	and	cafes,	and	standing	in	
line	at	the	many	naanwais.	Yet,	as	related	in	chapter	one	through	my	encounter	with	
a	 Lajpat	 Nagar	 naanwai,	 Afghans	 in	 Lajpat	 Nagar	 and	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 city	 were	
adamant	that	not	only	did	Afghans	in	Delhi	not	live	as	a	community,	but	that	it	was	
not	 possible	 given	 the	 lack	 of	 empathy	 (hamdardi)	 and	 cooperation	 (hamkari)	
among	Afghans	 in	 the	 city.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 first	 explore	what	 this	 alleged	 lack	 of	
community	 feeling	 might	 suggest,	 using	 the	 example	 of	 the	 establishment	 and	
dissolution	of	the	Refugee	Solidarity	Committee	(RSC)	in	the	neighbourhood.	
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Hamdardi	and	Afghan	Community:	What’s	Emotion	Got	to	Do	with	It?	
In	 chapter	 one,	 I	 describe	 how	 Afghan	 migrants’	 consistent	 disavowal	 of	 the	
existence	of	an	Afghan	community	or	of	hamdardi	between	Afghans	in	Delhi	led	me	
to	 realize	 how	my	 own	 fixation	 on	 these	 terms	was	 grounded	 in	my	 own	 flawed	
conception	of	what	it	meant	to	be	or	feel	a	part	of	a	community.	I	began	to	explore	
what	 it	 meant	 that	 there	 was	 no	 hamdardi	 among	 Afghans	 in	 Delhi,	 and	 started	
paying	attention	to	how	Afghan	migrants	talked	about	community.	It	struck	me	that	
most	people	did	not	generally	refer	to	an	“Afghan	community”	(jam`eh	afghan),	but	
rather	 spoke	more	 broadly	 about	 “Afghans”	 (afghan‐ha),	 which	 could	 refer	 at	 the	
same	time	to	all	Afghans	in	Delhi	(or	even	beyond),	or	be	qualified	to	refer	to	groups	
based	 on	 neighbourhood,	 ethno‐religious	 background,	 refugee	 generation,	 and	 so	
on.	“Jam`eh	afghan”	and	the	English	equivalent	“Afghan	community”	was	used	only	
by	the	UNHCR	in	distinction	to	other	refugee	communities.	Through	its	activities,	the	
UNHCR	created	spaces	and	events	aimed	at	an	“Afghan	community”,	but	it	appeared	
this	“Afghan	community”	existed	only	as	a	category	imagined	at	the	state	level.	Yet	
even	a	refugee	caseworker	once	related	to	me:		
“Afghans	 will	 also	 help	 each	 other...	 [from]	 their	 own	 tribes	 or	
[ethnic/religious]	community,	but	only	up	to	a	point	(lekin	ek	had	tak)	…	after	
that	they	will	begin	undermining	each	other	(ek	dusrey	ka	jad	katna	shuru	kar	
deingey,	lit.	they	will	start	cutting	each	other’s	roots).”	
	
Afghan	migrants	I	met	in	Delhi	would	not	just	deny	the	existence	of	social	ideals	of	
empathy	 (hamdardi),	 cooperation	 (hamkari),	 or	 humanity	 (bashar	 dosti)	 among	
Afghans	 in	 the	 city,	 but	 averred	 that	 Afghans	 instead	 lied	 to	 one	 another	 (drogh	
megand),	 treated	each	other	with	suspicion	(badgumani),	and	cheated	one	another	
(duzdi	mikonand).	 It	 was	 considered	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 these	 more	 antisocial	
modes	of	behaviour	and	absence	of	 the	more	positive	emotions	mentioned	earlier	
resulted	in	a	lack	of	social	bonds	and	in	disunity	(ma	Afghanha	yekja	nistem).	There	
were	several	reasons	people	gave	for	the	situation.	Some	Afghans,	particularly	non‐
refugees	 and	 those	 from	 older	 refugee	 generations,	 suggested	 that	 these	 were	
Pakistani	cultural	influences	(aadathaye	pakistani)	particular	to	newer	refugees	who	
had	previously	been	displaced	in	Pakistan.	Musa	Saheb	believed	it	was	due	to	a	lack	
of	 national	 sentiment	 among	Afghans	 (hiss	milli),	 and	 others	 proffered	 that	 it	was	
just	the	nature	of	Afghans	(hemin	tor	astan)	to	behave	this	way	wherever	they	are.	
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The	 majority	 of	 responses	 I	 received	 from	 refugees,	 however,	 were	 very	
straightforward	and	realistic	in	relating	that	it	was	the	nature	of	being	a	refugee	in	
India	that	disallowed	Afghans	from	being	able	to	feel	connected	to	one	another.	As	
discussed	in	chapter	three,	to	be	accepted	as	refugees,	asylum	seekers	must	recount	
a	story	of	migration	that	fits	the	narrative	expected	by	the	UNHCR.	This	fact	not	only	
resulted	in	many	Afghan	asylum	seekers	having	to	create	or	alter	their	stories,	but	
also	 produced	 an	 economy	 of	 advice	 on	 not	 sharing	 one’s	 story	 with	 others.	 As	
Jamshed	 expressed	 in	 chapter	 three,	 this	 process	 created	 refugees	 as	 objects	 of	
suspicion.	 The	 perception	 that	 migrants	 “misuse”	 (su	 istefada	mi	konand)	 refugee	
status	as	a	 ticket	 to	 the	west	was	 seen	 to	 justify	 the	UNHCR’s	 suspicion	of	Afghan	
refugees	and	asylum	seekers.	It	also	created	an	environment	where	Afghan	refugees	
would	accuse	others	of	having	fabricated	cases	(case‐haye	sakhtagi).	In	this	context,	
where	everyone’s	story	might	have	been	altered,	there	was	a	sentiment	that	it	was	
better	to	avoid	sustained	contact	with	other	Afghans	one	did	not	know,	lest	they	find	
out	about	the	particularities	of	one’s	case.	
	
Of	course,	as	suggested	by	the	ethnographic	accounts	in	the	other	chapters,	refugees	
did	 not	 generally	 hang	 out	 or	 congregate	 in	 public	 places,	 but	 did	 rely	 on	 small	
circles	 of	 friends	 or	 family	 for	 support.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 this	 was	 because	 of	 the	
context	 of	 distrust	 and	 suspicion	 in	 which	 refugees	 encountered	 others	 in	 public	
places.	However,	after	having	spent	a	harrowing	first	six	months	in	Delhi,	 Jamshed	
suggested	another	reason	Afghans	in	Lajpat	Nagar	and	Bhogal	did	not	congregate	or	
get	to	know	each	other	was	because	of	the	sense	of	incapacity	that	permeated	their	
daily	 lives.	 Without	 the	 right	 to	 work	 or	 pursue	 higher	 education,	 most	 refugees	
were	 either	 working	 illegally	 or	 unemployed	 and	 dependent	 on	 support	 from	
relatives,	 friends,	 or	 other	 connections	 abroad.	 Jamshed	 suggested	 that	 in	 this	
context,	which	individuals	found	deeply	depressing,	meeting	with	others	in	the	same	
situation	only	entrenched	one’s	own	feelings	of	unhappiness.	
“What	benefit	does	[meeting	with	others]	have?	...	one	does	these	things	out	
of	 joy	(az	dil‐khushi	mesha).	 If	you	are	always	 free	(bekar),	what	meaning	 is	
there	 to	 going	 on	 outings	 (chakkar	raftan)?	 ...	 everyone	 is	 [always]	 sitting	
around	outside	talking,	they	get	bored	[of	just	talking].”	
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The	 reasons	 raised	 by	 refugees	 for	 a	 lack	 of	 community	 in	Delhi	 demonstrate	 the	
relational	 aspect	 of	 emotion.	 As	 referenced	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 research	 on	
emotion	 has	 considered	 how	 emotional	 experience	 arises	 from	 the	 interplay	 of	
cognition,	embodiment,	and	social	context	(Abu‐Lughod	and	Lutz	1990;	Elster	2000;	
Lutz	and	White	1986).	Ahmed	(2004)	pushes	these	considerations	further	to	suggest	
bodies	 and	 persons	 exist	 in	 affective	 economies	 where	 emotions,	 as	 material	
rhetoric,	shape	and	align	them	with	or	apart	from	others.	That	is,	emotions	are	not	
just	something	felt	from	within	or	incited	from	without,	but	are	also	palpably	extant	
between	and	among	persons	while	also	working	within	and	through	them.	Thinking	
in	these	terms,	one	can	consider	how	at	the	state	scale,	Afghan	migrants	are	created	
as	persons	within	a	context	of	suspicion	that	shapes	how	they	perceive	others	and	
also	 affects	 how	 they	 understand	 others	 perceive	 them.	 Paradoxically,	 it	 is	 in	 this	
context	 of	 suspicion	 of	 each	 other	 at	 this	 scale	 that	 the	 category	 of	 Afghan	
Community	is	imagined	as	a	way	to	bring	individuals	together.		
	
It	 would	 be	 erroneous	 to	 consider,	 however,	 that	 Afghans	 did	 not	 or	 could	 not	
conceive	of	belonging	together	at	the	state	scale,	as	the	case	of	the	RSC	related	below	
indicates.	 Interestingly,	 the	emotions	 refugees	 cited	as	 creating	an	atmosphere	 for	
actions	(or	lack	of	actions)	preventing	Afghans	from	coming	together,	e.g.	fear	(tars),	
distress	(parishani,	na‐aaraami),	or	anxiety	(aasebe	kharab,	narahati),	could	also	in	
some	 instances	 allow	 for	 moments	 of	 coming	 together	 through	 recognition	 that	
these	were	shared	emotions	among	Afghan	refugees.	At	the	most	transient	level,	one	
might	consider	a	chance	discussion	in	a	waiting	room	or	shop	where	two	refugees	
would	 lament	 the	 predicament	 of	 the	 state	 of	 being	 a	 refugee,	 only	 to	 part	 ways	
politely	 before	 the	 discussion	 got	 too	 personal.	 For	 newcomers,	 this	 was	 seen	
initially	as	a	sign	of	Delhi’s	Afghan	refugees	being	cold‐hearted	(dilsard)	or	unfeeling	
(behiss),	and	then	later	as	a	necessary	technique	for	self‐preservation.	That	is,	while	
one	could	identify	with	another	refugee’s	capacity	to	feel	the	same	fear,	suspicion,	or	
anxiety	that	one	felt,	the	context	of	these	emotions	also	presented	the	other	refugee	
as	a	potential	object	of	these	very	emotions.	To	examine	how	this	process	played	out	
at	the	scale	understanding	of	Afghan	community,	I	now	turn	to	the	story	of	the	RSC.	
	
	
	
	 179
The	Rise	and	Fall	of	the	Refugee	Solidarity	Committee	
As	discussed	in	chapter	four,	the	RSC	began	as	a	personal	project	of	Musa	Saheb	and	
some	of	his	colleagues,	and	 it	was	 through	attending	RSC	meetings	 that	 I	 first	met	
Musa	Saheb.	He	would	 later	explain	how	he	had	started	the	organization	with	two	
aims:	 (1)	 to	 cultivate	 a	 ‘national	 sentiment’	 among	 Afghans	 in	 Delhi,	 through	 (2)	
bringing	together	in	one	group	those	whose	cases,	like	his,	had	been	rejected	by	the	
UNHCR,	 and	 those	 recognized	 refugees	who	did	not	 receive	 the	proper	protection	
and	aid	due	to	them.	I	had	heard	of	the	RSC	from	a	poster	at	a	naanwai	printed	on	an	
A4	sheet	of	paper.	Musa	Saheb	and	his	circle	of	acquaintances	had	been	distributing	
the	flyers	to	shops	and	individuals	in	Lajpat	Nagar	and	other	Afghan	areas	of	the	city.	
The	signs	were	in	Dari	and	stated	the	following:	
	
Communiqué	
All	 Afghan	 migrants	 (muhajireen)	 residing	 in	 Delhi	 are	 informed	 that	 the	
UNHCR,	with	the	Afghan	Refugee	Solidarity	Committee,	has	set	a	date	for	an	
open	meeting	aimed	at	assessing	the	problems	faced	by	Afghan	migrants	and	
possible	 solutions	 for	 the	 7th	 of	 May	 2012.	 We	 thus	 earnestly	 request	 all	
Afghan	migrants	residing	in	Delhi	to	write	down	all	their	problems	on	a	piece	
of	 paper	 and	 submit	 it	 to	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Afghan	 Refugee	 Solidarity	
Committee	 on	 Sunday,	 29th	 April,	 2012	 at	 3:00PM	 at	 the	 Defence	 Colony	
mosque128.	
With	respect,	 	
	 Head	of	the	Afghan	Refugee	Solidarity	Committee	
	
Note:	 For	 more	 information	 kindly	 contact	 the	 numbers	 below.	 [Four	
telephone	numbers	had	been	written	by	hand	at	the	bottom	of	each	flyer.]		
	
Initially,	people	 I	 spoke	 to	about	 the	RSC	did	not	pay	much	heed	 to	 the	 circulated	
announcements.	Many	 I	 spoke	with	about	 the	RSC	expressed	scepticism	 indicating	
variously	 that	 “they	 say	 they	 want	 to	 help	 people,	 but	 they	 just	 want	 to	 get	
themselves	 to	 the	west.”	Other	 refugees	 suggested	 the	 association	was	doomed	 to	
failure	like	others	that	had	come	before	it.	They	alluded	to	a	predecessor	committee	
																																																								
128	The	Defence	Colony	mosque	was	the	main	mosque	serving	Lajpat	Nagar	residents	and	frequented	
by	many	Afghans	in	Lajpat	Nagar.	
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founded	by	a	Qizilbash	Saheb	that	also	aimed	to	engage	with	the	UNHCR	on	behalf	of	
Afghan	 refugees.	 It	 was	 rumoured	 Qizilbash	 Saheb	 disbanded	 the	 original	
association	either	because	he	had	been	duped	by	the	UNHCR	into	believing	he	would	
be	 resettled	 in	 Canada	 or	 because	 goons	 allayed	with	 the	 UNHCR	 had	 threatened	
him	to	shut	down	the	committee.	One	refugee	suggested	that	there	had	been	an	even	
earlier	 iteration	of	the	RSC	before	Qizilbash	Saheb’s	efforts,	but	that	there	were	no	
longer	any	refugees	from	that	time	left	to	remember	it	and	learn	from	its	failure.	
	
Over	 several	months,	 the	 committee	 held	 a	 number	 of	meetings	 and	more	 people	
started	 to	 attend.	 Negotiations	 began	 to	 take	 place	 with	 the	 UNHCR	 to	 have	 it	
recognized	 as	 an	 official	 Afghan	 refugee	 organization.	 The	 meetings	 I	 attended	
largely	focused	on	the	dishonesty	and	lack	of	transparency	of	the	UNHCR	in	dealing	
with	Afghans.	 Committee	members	 and	 attendees	 aired	 concerns	 that	 the	UNHCR	
was	underhandedly	trying	to	weaken	and	quash	the	RSC.	Examples	were	presented	
of	how	the	UNHCR	was	lying	to	committee	members,	and	stories	were	exchanged	of	
goons	 (gundaha)	 who	 had	 threatened	 committee	 members	 and	 others	 attending	
meetings.	Several	months	later,	some	people	suggested	the	stories	were	fabrications	
used	to	rile	up	attendees’	feelings.	In	the	moment,	however,	the	allegations	were	real	
and	provided	proof	of	how	the	UNHCR	could	not	be	trusted.	
	
The	meetings	 also	 took	 the	 form	 of	 people	 coming	 to	 give	 testimony	 or	 tell	 their	
story	to	the	committee.	The	majority	of	the	stories	rested	upon	the	unwillingness	of	
the	UNHCR	to	aid	individuals.	The	meetings	thus	had	a	specific	emotional	function	of	
expressing	the	dissatisfaction,	anger,	and	frustration	felt	by	attendees	as	a	result	of	
not	 being	 recognized	 or	 not	 having	 one’s	 problems	 acknowledged	 by	 the	 UNHCR.	
The	blame	was	almost	always	placed	on	the	UNHCR	and	its	blindness	to,	or	worse,	
distrust	of	refugees’	claims	and	problems.	“My	case	was	rejected	and	every	day	I	go	
to	the	UNHCR	[to	petition	them],”	one	man	related	to	me	at	the	meeting	
“I	have	problems	there!	At	home	there’s	no	money	and	the	landlord	is	always	
knocking	at	the	door!	My	child	is	sick	and	doesn’t	eat	anything!	I’m	standing,	
watching	 over	 it	 all	 night	 long	 and	 I	 can’t	 get	 the	medicine	 it	 needs!	 How	
could	I	not	lose	my	mind	(aasebe	ma	chetor	kharab	na	mesha)?!”	
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He	counted	out	his	problems	on	his	fingers,	opening	them	from	a	fist,	slamming	his	
fist	 into	his	other	hand	as	others	standing	around	us	nodding	to	the	cadence	of	his	
fist,	gasping	or	voicing	their	acknowledgement	and	agreement.	
	
These	meetings	were	in	essence	examples	of	hamdardi,	where	people	were	coming	
together	 to	 share	 each	 other’s	 feelings	 of	 anger	 and	 frustration	 and	 address	 them	
together.	Unfortunately,	as	somebody	who	could	not	be	seen	to	share	 the	sense	of	
resentment	in	the	same	way,	I	was	eventually	ejected	from	a	meeting	by	one	of	the	
committee	members.	 “Do	you	have	any	problems	yourself	 [like	 the	people	here]?”	
the	 committee	 member	 had	 asked	 me	 publically,	 “can	 you	 solve	 these	 peoples’	
problems?”	Before	giving	me	a	chance	to	respond,	he	stated	sternly	that	“You	have	
no	business	being	here	and	you	have	no	need	to	come	here.	 I’m	requesting	you	to	
kindly	 never	 bring	 your	 presence	 to	 any	 future	 meetings;	 this	 is	 a	 very	 serious	
(besiyar	 jiddi)	 request!”	 Musa	 Saheb	 tried	 to	 reason	 with	 the	 committee	 member	
who	insisted	“we	have	no	need	for	outsiders	(kharijiha)	…	it’s	at	their	hands	that	we	
have	been	divided	(tikka	shodem)…	[and]	our	country	blown	to	smithereens	(tota‐
tota	shoda	ast).”	
	
However,	even	among	those	who	could	participate	 in	 the	emotional	context	of	 the	
RSC,	not	everyone	felt	comfortable.	One	man	from	Old	Delhi	who	travelled	to	several	
meetings,	related	to	me	at	my	first	RSC	meeting	how	it	felt	good	to	be	among	one’s	
own	 people	 (dar	 bayne	mardome	ma).	 	 Soon	 after	 I	 was	 ejected	 from	 the	 RSC	
meeting,	I	met	with	him	at	his	shop	in	Old	Delhi.	He	claimed	to	not	be	a	Pashtun	and	
identified	as	a	Persian	speaker	(farsiwan/farszaban).	During	his	years	as	a	refugee	in	
Delhi,	he	had	developed	strong	connections	with	the	Pashtun	shop	owners	of	Sharif	
Manzil	and	had	managed	to	set	up	his	own	shop	there.	I	would	see	him	on	occasion	
when	I	was	in	the	neighbourhood,	and	he	informed	me	on	one	occasion	that	he	had	
stopped	going	to	RSC	meetings	in	Lajpat	Nagar.	He	explained	that	while	it	felt	good	
to	 be	 in	 the	 same	place	 (yekja	nashistan),	 he	 indicated	he	preferred	 to	 stay	 in	 the	
quiet	(aaraam)	of	his	house	in	West	Delhi	or	at	his	shop	in	Sharif	Manzil,	rather	than	
getting	 involved	in	the	messiness	(janjaal)	of	 the	social	 life	of	committee	members	
and	other	Afghans	in	Lajpat	Nagar.	“I	already	have	enough	problems,”	he	explained.	
Another	refugee	who	was	ardently	seeking	help	from	organizations	outside	of	India	
to	be	resettled	derided	the	therapeutic	nature	of	the	meetings,	saying:	“They	sit	and	
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discuss…	 [but]	 they’re	 just	 interested	 in	 themselves	 [and]	 talk	 about	 their	 own	
problems.”	For	him,	the	RSC	would	not	be	able	to	settle	his	desire	for	resettlement	
and	cooperating	with	them	could	in	fact	impede	his	efforts.	
	
The	RSC	would	eventually	be	disbanded.	Though	this	happened	much	after	I	left	the	
field,	the	process	of	its	dissolution	began	while	I	was	still	in	Delhi.	During	a	meeting	
between	representatives	of	the	RSC	and	the	UNHCR,	Musa	Saheb	stated	that	Afghan	
widows	who	had	no	means	 to	 support	 themselves	or	 their	dependents	 (bewahaye	
bechara)	were	 being	 forced	 into	prostitution129	for	want	 of	 financial	 support	 from	
the	UNHCR.	For	Musa	Saheb,	this	was	an	example	of	the	duress	under	which	Afghans	
were	 living	 in	 Delhi.	 Representatives	 of	 the	 UNHCR	 and	 SLIC	 I	 had	 interviewed	
conceded	 they	 suspected	 there	 were	 many	 cases	 of	 female	 registered	 refugees	
turning	 to	prostitution,	but	 the	 subject	 remained	something	 that	 could	 still	not	be	
broached	 even	 in	 the	 all‐female	 gatherings	 they	 organised	 with	 Afghan	 refugees.	
Musa	 Saheb	 explained	 that	 while	 Afghans	 discussed	 and	 lamented	 the	 rise	 in	
prostitution	within	their	communities,	there	was	an	acknowledgement	that	for	some	
women	there	was	no	other	option	(charaye	diger	nist).	He	intimated	that	as	long	as	it	
was	done	discretely,	people	would	ignore	it	(nazarandazi	mi	konand),	and	there	was	
even	 a	 woman	 who	 had	 done	 very	 well	 for	 herself	 as	 a	 prostitute	 who	 attended	
several	RSC	meetings.	
	
Musa	Saheb	later	maintained,	however,	that	he	should	have	perhaps	not	raised	the	
issue	 in	 the	meeting.	 “Most	Afghans	here	 [in	Delhi]	 are	 from	a	 lower	 class	 (sathye	
paayeen)”	he	explained,	“for	them	it	is	a	dishonour	(sharm)	to	discuss	these	matters	
in	 front	 of	 foreigners	 (kharijiha,	 lit.	 those	 outside	 the	 group).”	 Indeed,	 other	
committee	members	present	at	the	meeting	considered	Musa	Saheb’s	comments	as	a	
demonstration	of	weakness	in	front	of	the	UNHCR.	Soon	after	the	meeting,	rumours	
began	 to	 spread	 that	 Musa	 Saheb	 was	 speaking	 disparagingly	 of	 the	 RSC	 and	 of	
																																																								
129	While	Musa	Saheb	only	ever	spoke	of	prostitution	 in	the	context	of	widows,	many	Afghan	men	I	
knew	believed	young	women	working	as	interpreters	for	Afghan	tourists	were	also	probably	engaged	
in	prostitution.	“Just	open	any	newspaper,”	Sharif	the	Afghan	pastor	explained,	“and	you	will	see	ads	
for	 Afghan	 girls	 (dukhtaran).”	 I	 only	 ever	 saw	 a	 couple	 of	 professional	 advertisements	 by	 private	
companies	 for	 Afghan	 female	 interpreters	 or	 guides	 aimed	 at	 tourists	 from	 Afghanistan.	 In	 some	
cases,	 accusations	 of	 prostitution	might	 indicate	 a	 sentiment	 that	women	 should	 not	 pursue	work	
outside	the	house.	However,	in	my	experience	it	is	more	likely	that,	as	Chakraborty	(2013)	suggests,	
for	some	men	slighting	female	interpreters’	personal	character	might	reflect	an	envy	of	these	women	
and	perhaps	even	an	embarrassment	grounded	in	personal	financial	frustrations.	
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committee	members	 behind	 their	 backs,	 that	 he	was	working	with	 the	UNHCR	 to	
secure	his	own	position	to	be	accepted	as	a	refugee,	and	so	forth.	At	the	same	time,	
the	 UNHCR	 informed	 the	 RSC	 that	 it	 would	 not	 cooperate	with	 non‐refugees	 like	
Musa	 Saheb	 and	 would	 therefore	 not	 officially	 recognize	 the	 group.	 Musa	 Saheb	
withdrew	 from	 his	 position	 as	 leader	 of	 the	 RSC	 to	 become	 an	 external	 adviser	
(moshawer),	 but	 he	 eventually	 resigned	 amidst	 infighting	 and	 allegations	 and	
counter‐allegations	 of	 treachery	 and	 subversion	 among	 the	 remaining	 committee	
members.	
	
The	rise	and	fall	of	the	RSC	can	be	seen	as	an	iteration	at	the	community	level	of	the	
brief	encounter	between	two	individuals	in	the	waiting	room	mentioned	above.	The	
story	of	the	RSC	illustrates	how	even	emotions	one	might	consider	to	work	against	
building	 community,	 like	 fear	 and	 suspicion,	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 basis	 of	 consociation.	
However,	if	such	negative	emotions	are	considered	not	as	objects	emanating	from	or	
directed	toward	individuals	within	the	community	of	the	RSC,	but	rather	as	shaping	
the	space	within	which	attendees	were	forming	and	maintaining	relationships,	one	
can	appreciate	the	fragility	of	the	community	that	was	formed	through	the	RSC.	That	
is,	 the	 very	 emotions	 that	 served	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 construction	 also	 shaped	 its	
members	as	potential	objects	of	fear	or	suspicion	for	each	other,	thereby	facilitating	
the	 RSC’s	 eventual	 collapse.	 Thus	 while	 the	 idea	 of	 an	 “Afghan	 Community”	 was	
created	as	a	category	at	the	scale	of	the	state,	the	emotional	context	resulting	from	
the	understanding	of	what	it	meant	to	be	Afghan	in	Delhi	at	this	scale	meant	that	the	
form	of	Afghan	community	envisioned	was	difficult	 for	 individuals	to	cultivate	and	
could	be	easily	broken.	
	
The	example	of	the	RSC	and	the	fact	it	was	preceded	by	other	similar	organizations	
with	the	same	fate	raises	another	issue	around	the	process	of	fracturing,	suggesting	
it	 might	 be	 as	 much	 a	 part	 of	 feeling	 community	 as	 consociation.	 Research	 on	
Afghans	and	social	fragmentation	referenced	in	chapter	one	and	in	the	introduction	
to	 this	 chapter	 has	 discussed	 various	 economic,	 political,	 or	metaphysical	 reasons	
for	 this	 occurrence,	 positing	 a	 “moral	 incoherence”	 (Edwards	 1996)	 of	 Afghan	
identity	as	a	reason	for	the	inability	for	Afghans	to	work	together	at	the	state	scale.	
The	 ethnographic	 material	 from	 Delhi	 presented	 here,	 however,	 suggests	 a	 more	
contextual	explanation.	
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In	discussing	the	Swedish	queer	leather	community	in	the	early	1990s,	Mark	Graham	
discusses	 the	 same	 tendency	 of	 cyclical	 fusion	 and	 fragmentation	 within	 the	
community	and	how	it	reflected	a	more	general	aspect	of	gay	life	in	Sweden	as	being	
“spatially	and	socially	fragmented	to	the	point	of	invisibility	…	for	the	most	part	out	of	
sight”	(1998:180).	Graham	asserts	that	this	process	was	related	to	the	fact	gay	identity	
did	not	have	a	space	to	belong	legally,	and	subsequently	spatially,	in	the	country,	and	
could	thus	only	exist	ephemerally	in	certain	places	and	for	certain	times.	The	situation	
with	Afghan	migrants	in	Delhi,	and	refugees	in	particular,	is	comparable.	As	discussed	
in	chapter	three,	Afghan	migrants	are	not	considered	to	belong	in	Delhi	or	India	at	the	
state	 scale,	 and	 refugees	 specifically	 are	 not	 legally	 recognized	 in	 the	 country.	 The	
state	scale	sense	of	Afghan	Community	would	thus	materialize	in	certain	places,	such	
as	Bosco	centres	or	other	UNHCR	venues,	and	on	certain	occasions,	such	as	meetings	
with	 the	 UNHCR	 or	 youth	 and	 cultural	 events	 geared	 toward	 refugees.	 Outside	 of	
these	 times	 and	 places,	 there	 was	 no	 space	 in	 which	 the	 state	 scale	 conception	 of	
Afghan	Community	could	belong	in	Delhi	more	permanently.	Understanding	this	point	
gives	 a	 new	 perspective	 to	 the	 claim	many	 refugees	would	make	 about	 how	many	
people	speak	of	community,	but	that	it	doesn’t	exist.	As	Jamshed	had	mentioned,	this	
lack	 of	 recognition	 of	 community	 also	 affected	 individuals	 by	 contributing	 to	 their	
feelings	of	incapacity.	Musa	Saheb	described	this	state	to	me	once	when	the	RSC	was	
at	its	zenith.	Sitting	in	a	park,	he	asked	me:	
“Do	you	know	what	is	the	worst	kind	of	gaze	(deedan)?	Every	seeing	has	an	
emotion	attached	to	it,	but	which	is	the	worst?	I	 forget	who	said	 it,	but	you	
know	what	they	say?	 ‘The	worst	glance	(nigah)	 is	that	which	falls	on	a	wall	
and	‘looks’	at	it,	but	does	not	see	anything’.”	
	
As	alluded	to	in	previous	chapters,	there	are,	however,	other	forms	of	community	in	
which	 Afghans	 participate	 that	 are	 constructed	 outside	 the	 state	 scale	
understanding	of	‘Afghan	Community’.	The	Afghan	Sikh	community	was	discussed	in	
chapter	three	as	one	example.	In	the	next	section,	in	contrast	to	the	RSC,	I	consider	
the	 situation	 of	 the	 Pashtun	 moneylending	 community	 based	 in	 the	 North	 Delhi	
neighbourhood	of	Wazirabad.	
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6.2 The	Afghans	of	Wazirabad	
Wazirabad	village,	located	on	the	northern	fringes	of	the	city,	is	one	of	the	few	areas	
within	 the	National	 Capital	 Territory	where	 the	 Yamuna	 still	 flows	 as	 a	 river	 and	
water	buffalo	roam	on	tracts	of	agricultural	land.	Unlike	most	of	the	city,	Wazirabad	
has	managed	to	fend	off	the	unbridled	construction	boom	and	retain	its	character	as	
an	urban	village	in	part	due	to	the	457	acre	biodiversity	park	the	Delhi	Development	
Authority	(DDA)	built	in	2002	on	the	west	bank	of	the	river.	The	DDA’s	decision	was	
acclaimed	for	saving	many	local	plant	and	animal	species	and	creating	an	important	
urban	 resource.	 While	 I	 was	 conducting	 fieldwork,	 however,	 the	 DDA	 had	 begun	
construction	 of	 the	 eight‐lane	 Delhi	 Signature	 Bridge,	 designed	 both	 as	 a	 major	
transport	 link	 and	 a	 tourist	 attraction.	 The	 move	 drew	 criticism	 not	 just	 for	 the	
unsightly	mess	and	havoc	on	local	transportation	it	had	caused,	but	also	because	it	
flaunted	 the	 Archaeological	 Association	 of	 India’s	 hundred	 meter	 restricted	 zone	
limit,	 and	 endangered	 one	 of	 the	 few	 remaining	 fourteenth	 century	 Tughlaq	 era	
buildings	in	Delhi:	the	tomb	and	mosque	of	the	saint	Shah	Aalam.	The	little	complex	
stands	at	the	intersection	of	a	main	road	and	the	road	heading	north	to	Wazirabad	
village.	 Compared	 to	 other	 ruins	 in	 the	 city,	 the	 complex	 is	 surprisingly	 well	
maintained;	 the	 road	 to	 Wazirabad,	 however,	 is	 less	 impressive.	 Hidden	 under	 a	
maze	of	cart	vendors	at	the	intersection	selling	fruit	and	vegetables,	snacks,	plastic	
toys,	and	stationary,	one	can	make	out	the	remains	of	a	road	that	is	now	islands	of	
broken	 bitumen,	 scattered	 across	 potholes	 and	 craters	 smeared	 with	 the	 grimy	
remains	of	husks	and	peels	ground	by	the	weight	of	traffic	and	sprinkled	with	fading	
remnants	of	sheeny	toffee	wrappers	and	crisps	packets.	
	
A	 lone	 rickshaw	 stood	 in	 the	market	 and	 I	 approached	 it	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 an	
elderly	gentleman	wearing	a	dhoti	and	sporting	a	tilak130.		I	motioned	for	him	to	take	
the	rickshaw,	but	having	heard	me	tell	the	driver	where	I	wanted	to	go,	he	suggested	
we	ride	together	as	he	was	heading	in	the	same	direction.		After	passing	a	residential	
area	that	had	mushroomed	around	the	Wazirabad	water	treatment	plant,	 the	road	
ran	along	the	perimeter	of	Wazirabad	village.	The	din	of	the	main	road	disappeared	
and	we	rode	along	a	picturesque	path	with	a	large	bayou	to	our	right.	“So	you	are	a	
																																																								
130	A	tilak	is	a	mark	on	the	forehead	worn	by	Hindus	to	indicate	a	range	of	things	including	caste	or	
status.	Both	his	attire	and	the	tilak,	indicated	he	was	Hindu.	
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Mohamdan131?”	 the	older	gentleman	asked	once	the	rickshaw	took	off.	 “I	could	tell	
when	you	were	 speaking	 to	 the	 rickshaw	driver	…	Many	of	 you	Mohamdans	have	
moved	…	to	settle	here	…	But	they	are	good,	like	you…	friendly	people.”	To	gauge	his	
reaction,	 I	mentioned	 that	 I	had	heard	 there	were	many	 refugees	 in	Wazirabad	as	
well.	He	replied	nonchalantly,	saying	“Yes,	I	think	there	are	some.	I	do	not	see	them…	
They	are	peaceful	(shant)	people…	[and]	Mohamdans	like	you.”	
	
We	arrived	at	 the	entrance	 to	the	Muslim	area	of	 the	village	where	 the	Wazirabad	
Bosco	centre	was	 located.	Like	most	of	Delhi’s	urban	villages,	what	may	have	once	
been	 a	 village	 was	 now	 a	 checkerboard	 of	 plots	 of	 multiple‐storied	 houses	 with	
pastel	 scalloped	 concrete	 walls	 or	 exposed	 brick	 skeletons	 of	 homes	 under	
construction.	 I	 had	 only	 been	 given	 a	 lane	 number	 and	 told	 to	 ask	 passers‐by	 for	
directions.	However,	not	a	person	 in	sight	as	 I	waded	 through	 the	bleak	dirt	 lanes	
and	alleys	where	recent	rainwater	had	collected	in	the	deep	grooves	created	by	cars	
and	scooters,	swirling	with	sand,	concrete	and	iridescent	oil.	I	came	to	a	lane	where	
a	 faded	cloth	banner	hung	between	two	balconies	across	the	street,	congratulating	
residents	 in	 Urdu	 on	 the	 occasion	 of	 Eid,	 and	 alerting	 me	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 a	
mosque	where	I	was	able	to	get	directions	to	the	Bosco	centre.	
	
In	contrast	to	Lajpat	Nagar	and	Bhogal,	Wazirabad	 is	a	purely	residential	area	and	
the	Afghans	living	in	the	neighbourhood	mostly	worked	in	Old	Delhi	or	travelled	to	
and	 from	 other	 parts	 of	 India,	maintaining	 private	 residences	 alongside	 the	 other	
Indian	Muslims	 in	 their	neighbourhood.	There	were	no	 signs	 in	Dari	or	Pashto,	or	
businesses	catering	to	Afghans	living	in	Wazirabad.	Instead,	as	I	found	out	from	my	
friend	Mirzal,	a	more	recent	Afghan	Pashtun	refugee	in	Wazirabad	whom	I	had	met	
through	 the	 Afghan	 church,	 Afghans	 rented	 out	 many	 of	 the	 shops	 in	 the	
neighbourhood	to	Indian	shopkeepers.	Unlike	the	Afghans	living	in	Lajpat	Nagar,	the	
Afghans	in	Wazirabad	appeared	more	integrated	in	the	local	neighbourhood,	and	as	
the	gentleman	in	the	rickshaw	had	suggested,	the	Afghans	in	Wazirabad	seemed	to	
blend	in	with	the	local	Muslim	population.	“There’s	no	difference	between	the	Indian	
and	Afghan	children	here,”	a	Bosco	employee	had	boasted	 to	me,	 “if	 I	didn’t	know	
																																																								
131	Many	 non‐Muslims	 in	 India	 still	 refer	 to	 Muslims	 with	 the	 English	 term	 “Mohammedan”,	
pronouncing	 it	 as	 ‘mohamdan’.	 	 Sometimes	 this	 can	 indicate	 a	 refusal	 to	 use	 the	 Hindustani	
“musulman”.	In	the	case	of	the	old	man,	it	probably	reflected	his	age	and	British	colonial	 influenced	
education.	
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their	parents	came	from	[Afghanistan],	I	would	think	they’re	Indian.”	The	employee	
was	not	just	commenting	on	the	way	the	children	looked	and	interacted	with	other	
children	in	the	neighbourhood,	but	also	on	their	fluency	in	Hindi.	Most	of	the	young	
refugee	children	I	met	in	Wazirabad	could	not	speak	Dari,	but	spoke	fluent	Hindi	and	
Pashto.	The	latter	they	spoke	at	home	and	the	former	was	taught	to	them	alongside	
English	in	school	and	at	the	Bosco	centre.		The	centre	also	held	evening	language	and	
computer	 classes	 for	 adults,	 and	 income	 generation	 activities	 (like	 making	 paper	
plates)	during	the	day.	
	
The	UNHCR	 representatives	 I	 spoke	with	 agreed	 that	 there	might	be	 some	 rejected	
asylum	seekers	in	the	neighbourhood,	but	that	the	community	was	mostly	comprised	
of	Afghan	 refugees	who	moved	 to	 the	area	over	 the	 last	 six	 to	 ten	years	due	 to	 the	
area’s	low	cost	of	living.	This	was	also	the	story	repeated	to	me	by	the	Pashtun	shop	
owners	 in	Old	Delhi	who	 lived	 in	Wazirabad.	However,	most	other	Afghan	refugees	
who	did	not	live	in	the	neighbourhood	thought	otherwise.	As	described	in	chapter	five	
and	below,	the	Pashtuns	of	Wazirabad	were	considered	to	be	a	long‐term,	entrenched	
community	 who	 were	 now	 using	 refugee	 status	 as	 part	 of	 their	 business	 strategy.	
Throughout	 the	 thesis,	 I	 have	 referred	 to	 the	Wazirabad	 Afghans	 as	members	 of	 a	
Pashtun	moneylender	 network,	 though	when	 speaking	 about	 their	 own	 community	
they	would	merely	refer	 to	 “us	Afghans”	or	 “us	Pashtuns	 (ma	afghanha/pashtunha).	
Those	refugees	who	disapproved	of	the	Wazirabad	Pashtuns	referred	to	them	as	the	
“people	 from	 Katawaz”132	(kawatazai‐ha)	 or	 just	 as	 the	 “Wazirabad	 Pashtuns”	
(pashtunhaye	 Wazirabad),	 and	 generally	 held	 a	 negative	 opinion	 of	 them	 as	
moneylending	 loan	 sharks	 (soodkhwor133,	 lit.	 ‘eaters	 of	 interest’),	 though	 this	might	
have	indicated	an	envy	of	the	community’s	financial	success.	
	
The	 Pashtun	 moneylender	 community,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 chapter	 one,	 was	 mostly	
inaccessible	 to	me	during	my	 time	 in	Delhi	 for	a	number	of	 reasons,	 including	 the	
																																																								
132	Katawazai	 is	 a	 patronymic	 indicating	 one’s	 place	 of	 origin	 in	 Katawaz,	 in	 eastern	 Afghanistan.		
Though	not	all	the	Pashtuns	in	Wazirabad	are	from	Katawaz,	the	Katawazai	have	conducted	trade	and	
money	lending	in	India	for	many	generations.	
133	The	term	is	very	offensive	and	would	not	be	used	in	front	of	any	of	the	Pashtuns	from	Wazirabad.	
To	 call	 somebody	 a	 soodkhwor	 is	 to	 accuse	 them	 of	 charging	 interest,	 which	 against	 the	 tenets	 of	
Islam	and	thus	casts	doubt	on	their	moral	character	and	honour.	Of	course,	to	say	that	the	Pashtuns	of	
Wazirabad	were	engaged	in	moneylending	is	to	cover	a	vast	range	of	financial	practices	to	that	I	was	
not	privy	 to.	Though	 it	 is	possible	 individuals	do	charge	 interest,	none	of	 the	moneylenders	would	
ever	describe	it	as	such;	rather	business	is	discussed	in	terms	of	the	sharing	of	loss	and	profit,	i.e.	in	
terms	more	acceptable	with	regard	to	Muslim	practice.	
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fact	 it	 is	 a	 relatively	 closed	 community.	 I	 did	 become	 friendly	with	 several	 of	 the	
Wazirabad	 Afghans	 who	 owned	 shops	 in	 Old	 Delhi	 and	 Lajpat	 Nagar,	 but	 our	
relationship	 never	 went	 further	 than	 the	 shop.	 Most	 of	 what	 I	 learned	 about	 the	
moneylending	 community	 came	 from	my	discussions	 and	observations	with	 these	
shopkeepers	 (including	 Amirkhel	 and	 Akhtar	 in	 Lajpat	 Nagar),	 from	 discussions	
with	Shahrukh	and	Mirzal,	and	rumours	and	observations	of	other	Afghan	refugees.	
These	discussions	revealed	the	Pashtun	moneylender	network	as	a	different	kind	of	
Afghan	 community	 in	 Delhi	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 RSC.	 The	 network	 operated	 on	
historical	patterns	of	movement	of	people	and	goods	across	the	region,	outside	the	
functioning	 of	 the	 state.	 For	 those	 associated	 with	 the	 network,	 the	 trading	
community	was	part	of	India’s	social	fabric.	What	it	meant	to	be	part	of	the	network	
was	 thus	 not	 premised	 on	 national	 belonging	 to	 Afghanistan,	 but	 rather	 to	 a	
commitment	 to	 sustaining	 the	 operations	 of	 the	 network	 and	 the	 principles	 that	
allowed	it	to	exist.	The	material	presented	below	relates	how	this	situation	and	the	
need	 to	maintain	 the	 community	 outside	 state	 involvement	meant	 that	 those	who	
were	 part	 of	 the	 Pashtun	moneylender	 community	 came	 together	 in	 a	 context	 of	
trust	and	cooperation,	rather	than	suspicion	and	distrust	as	in	the	case	of	the	RSC.		
Standing	Up	and	Sitting	Down	Together:	Trust	and	Network	Membership	
In	describing	 the	transnational	Armenian	and	Sindhi	 trader	communities,	Aslanian	
(2011)	 and	 Markovits	 (2000)	 respectively	 describe	 how	 within	 such	 circulation	
societies	 kinship	 and	 ethnicity	 often	 play	 a	 minimal	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	
relationships	 among	 traders	 and	 others.	 They	 suggest	 instead	 that	 since	 such	
networks	 are	 sustained	 and	 augmented	 through	 the	 large‐scale	 flows	 of	 goods,	
people,	 credit,	 and	 information,	 the	 need	 to	 facilitate	 and	 maintain	 such	 flows	
requires	 that	 members	 of	 the	 community	 strive	 to	 prevent	 any	 action	 that	 could	
potentially	weaken	or	endanger	the	network.	This	need,	they	demonstrate,	is	met	by	
maintaining	a	 closed	network	 in	which	 relationships	between	members	 are	dense	
and	 multiplied	 across	 social	 fields,	 and	 in	 which	 strong	 value	 is	 placed	 on	
individuals’	 reputations	 of	 being	 trustworthy	 so	 as	 to	 increase	 the	 negative	
consequences	of	losing	this	reputation.	This	description	of	a	circulation	society	also	
applies	to	the	Pashtun	moneylender	community	in	Delhi.	
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As	suggested	in	the	discussion	in	Amirkhel’s	shop	related	in	the	last	chapter,	Delhi	
was	 not	 a	 place	 where	 the	 moneylenders	 carried	 out	 the	 bulk	 of	 their	 financial	
activities.	 Rather	 it	 was	 a	 “nodal	 centre”	 (Aslanian	 2011:13)	 connected	 to	 other	
smaller	nodes	across	 India,	 through	which	capital	and	people	 flowed	 in	and	out	of	
the	 country.	 Delhi	 was	 also	 not	 just	 a	 regional	 conduit	 between	 Afghanistan	 and	
India,	but	was	connected	to	Pashtun	trader	communities	much	further	afield.	Once,	
when	I	was	at	the	airport	observing	flights	arriving	from	Kabul,	an	old	man	with	a	
walking	 stick	 walked	 by	 yelling	 at	 his	 teenage	 grandson	 in	 Pashto.	 “You	 were	
supposed	to	find	where	they	are!	We’ve	been	here	since	morning!	How	can	they	do	
this	 to	us?	Nobody	 in	 this	damn	place	knows	what’s	going	on!”	 	 I	approached	him	
and	asked	in	Pashto	if	I	could	help	him.	He	explained	he	was	expecting	two	boxes	of	
goods	(maal)	from	Darussalam	via	Dubai	and	the	shipping	company	told	him	to	go	
to	 the	airport,	but	nobody	could	 tell	him	where	 the	office	was.	 I	 looked	at	his	bill,	
written	 in	English,	 for	what	 seemed	 to	be	 large	 trunks	arriving	 from	Brunei134	via	
Singapore.	With	a	quick	call	 to	a	 friend	with	internet	access,	 I	 located	the	shipping	
centre	near	the	airport	terminal.	
	
As	my	Pashto	was	not	very	good,	I	had	switched	to	Dari	during	our	conversation	and	
the	man	seemed	confused.	He	thanked	me	warily	and	asked	if	it	would	be	possible	
for	 him	 to	walk	 to	 the	 centre.	 I	 explained	 he	would	 have	 to	 take	 a	 taxi,	 given	 the	
distance,	and	that	it	would	cost	at	least	Rs	110.	“That’s	too	much!	I’m	a	poor	man!	I	
can’t	afford	 that!”	he	exclaimed.	He	shook	my	hand,	 thanking	me	 for	my	help,	and	
took	down	my	name	and	number	and	asking	me	to	come	and	visit	him	in	Wazirabad	
anytime.	Several	minutes	later,	without	realizing	I	was	still	there,	he	walked	past	me	
and	approached	one	of	 the	Afghan	taxi	drivers.	 	After	brief	conversation	to	set	the	
price,	he	took	out	some	money	from	his	wallet,	got	in	the	taxi,	and	left.	From	where	I	
stood,	 I	 could	not	 tell	how	much	money	he	had,	but	 could	make	out	 that	he	had	a	
stack	of	one‐hundred	rupee	notes.	
	
Hearing	the	story	several	weeks	later,	Shahrukh	laughed	and	exclaimed	“this	is	how	
these	Pashtuns	live	in	India!	When	they	come	here,	they	wear	bad	clothes	and	look	
poor	but	 they	have	 lots	of	money.”	 In	 response	 to	my	 complaining	about	 the	man	
avoiding	me	when	 I	would	 come	 to	Wazirabad,	 Shahrukh	 responded	 frankly	with	
																																																								
134	It	is	possible	the	man	actually	meant	Brunei	as	the	country	is	also	known	as	Darussalam.	
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“Look,	 he	 doesn’t	 know	who	 you	 are…	What	 can	 you	 benefit	 him?	 (barayash	che	
faida	dari?)”	Shahrukh	apparently	knew	the	man	well	and	suggested	jokingly	that	he	
might	 be	 afraid	 I	would	 find	 out	 how	much	money	 he	 has	 and	 report	 him	 to	 the	
UNHCR.		Though	speaking	in	jest,	Shahrukh’s	comments	reiterate	the	importance	of	
trust	 and	 reputation	 in	 the	 Pashtun	 moneylender	 community	 and	 how	 it	 is	
connected	to	safeguarding	information	relating	to	money	and	business.	In	particular,	
his	comments	express	the	importance	within	the	Pashtun	moneylender	community	
of	 ensuring	 operation	 continue	 outside	 the	 involvement	 or	 purview	 of	 the	 state,	
which	viewed	their	business	as	illegal.	
	
There	was	only	one	occasion	where	 I	was	able	 to	glimpse	 the	scale	of	money	 that	
moved	through	the	moneylender	network.	On	one	of	my	excursions	with	Shahrukh,	I	
went	 to	 an	Old	Delhi	 restaurant	where	 Shahrukh	 had	 been	 good	 friends	with	 the	
owner	before	being	ejected	from	Wazirabad.	Since	he	did	not	want	to	introduce	me	
to	 the	owner	himself,	he	arranged	a	meeting	 for	me	 through	one	of	 the	wait	 staff.	
The	owner	was	a	squat,	bespectacled	man	in	his	mid	to	late	thirties	who	wore	tired	
trousers	 with	 an	 un‐tucked	 faded	 shirt,	 and	 was	 speaking	 to	 clients	 and	 staff	 in	
fluent	 Urdu,	 Dari,	 and	 Pashto.	 He	 quizzed	 me	 on	 my	 background	 and	 why	 I	 was	
doing	research,	and	when	he	was	convinced	 I	was	not	working	 for	 the	UNHCR,	he	
started	telling	me	about	how	the	Afghans	in	Wazirabad	were	poor	and	unfortunate	
(becharaha).	As	he	spoke	with	me,	seated	on	a	plush	toshak	on	the	carpet‐laden	floor	
of	his	sizeable	office,	he	counted	stacks	of	money	to	put	in	a	safe	behind	him.	There	
were	 green	 stacks	 of	US$	100	bills	 next	 to	multi‐coloured	 stacks	of	 blue,	 red,	 and	
purple	 Afghanis	 and	 Indian	 Rupees,	 which	 he	 was	 separating	 into	 different	 bags.	
Three	young	men	sat	to	one	side	of	him	and	each	was	given	different	bags	of	money.	
Some	were	put	in	a	safe	in	the	room	and	others	were	taken	away	by	the	boys	who	
returned	promptly	with	receipts.		
	
The	 boys	 seemed	 to	 be	 following	 our	 conversation	 on	 the	 sorry	 state	 of	 Afghan	
refugees	with	interest	and	I	assumed	they	were	Bengali	wait	staff	who	had	learned	
Dari.	 As	 the	 conversation	 started	 to	 draw	 to	 a	 close,	 the	 owner	 began	 to	 distance	
himself	 from	 the	 refugees	 he	 was	 speaking	 about.	 Where	 his	 descriptions	 of	 the	
financial	 hardship	 of	 being	 Afghan	 in	 Delhi	 had	 implied	 personal	 experience,	 the	
owner	changed	his	tone	and	explained	his	family	were	among	a	select	few	that	had	
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become	Indian	citizens	very	early,	and	thus	while	he	was	aware	of	the	situation	of	
refugees,	 he	 did	 not	 have	 much	 connection	 to	 them.	 Shahrukh	 and	 Mirzal	 would	
later	both	deny	this,	reiterating	that	he	was	a	registered	refugee,	though	his	family	
had	been	in	India	for	multiple	generations.	
	
Once	 all	 the	 boys	 had	 returned,	 the	 owner	pointed	 around	 the	 room	at	 several	 of	
them	saying	“They	are	children	of	Afghans,	but	are	now	‘fully	Indian’	(kaamil	Hindi	
shodand)	and	don’t	speak	Dari.”	He	abruptly	turned	to	one	of	the	boys	and	asked	him	
in	Hindi	what	his	name	was	and	where	his	father	was	from.	The	boy	replied	saying	
his	 father	 was	 from	 Afghanistan.	 “You	 see,”	 he	 said	 turning	 to	 me	 “he	 can	 only	
understand	Hindi.	He	doesn’t	 know	anything	about	Afghanistan.”	The	owner	went	
on	to	explain	that	as	the	boys	didn’t	have	citizenship	or	the	right	to	work,	they	had	to	
rely	on	other	Afghans	like	him	to	give	them	jobs.	He	then	asked	permission	to	excuse	
himself,	which	was	my	cue	to	leave.	As	I	walked	out	the	restaurant	door,	two	of	the	
boys	 who	 had	 been	 in	 the	 room	 earlier	 were	 now	 sitting	 at	 the	 counter	 giggling	
about	something	they	were	watching	on	a	mobile	phone,	and	speaking	to	each	other	
in	rapid	Bangla.	
	
Whether	or	not	 the	boys	were	of	Afghan	background	 is	not	necessarily	 important,	
and	 it	 is	 probable	 the	 restaurant	 owner	 would	 not	 have	 considered	 the	 boys	 as	
‘Afghan’	 in	 a	 different	 context.	 For	 example,	 one	 of	 the	 Bosco	 employees	 in	
Wazirabad	was	an	Indian	who	claimed	Afghan	ancestry	and	had	apparently	tried	to	
ingratiate	 himself	 with	 some	 of	 the	 moneylenders	 in	 the	 neighbourhood.	 The	
shopkeepers	 in	 Sharif	 Manzil	 derided	 him	 for	 trying	 to	 be	 something	 he	 wasn’t,	
saying	“He	says	‘I	am	Khan	like	you’,	but	he	is	just	an	Indian.”	What	the	story	of	the	
restaurant	owner	and	the	boys	suggests	 is	 that	by	nature	of	 their	 trustworthiness,	
exemplified	 by	 their	 being	 charged	 with	 transporting	 the	 money,	 the	 boys	 were	
considered	as	part	of	the	network	and	thus	treated	as	Afghan.	To	be	Afghan	in	the	
context	of	this	moneylender	community,	it	would	appear,	was	not	directly	linked	to	
ethnic	or	national	 identity	or	 language	but	to	being	a	kind	of	person	who	could	be	
trusted	and	 integrated	 into	 the	network,	and	also	perhaps	 it	was	 this	ability	 to	be	
depended	on	in	business	that	made	them	Afghan	or	at	least	Afghan‐like.	
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This	idea	is	reiterated	by	the	story	of	another	man	from	Bengal,	Yusuf,	who	worked	
in	the	restaurant	in	Sharif	Manzil.	The	owner	of	the	Sharif	Manzil	restaurant	lived	in	
Canada	and	would	spend	most	of	his	time	between	Canada	and	Afghanistan,	coming	
to	Delhi	for	only	a	couple	of	weeks	a	year.	I	met	the	owner	once	while	he	was	in	the	
city.	He	expressed	how	Sharif	Manzil	had	gone	through	many	changes	and	internal	
politics	 since	 the	 1980s	 when	 he	 had	 first	 arrived	 as	 a	 refugee,	 and	 that	 he	 had	
known	Yusuf	 for	a	 long	 time	and	 thus	entrusted	management	of	 the	 restaurant	 to	
him.	 The	 Afghan	 shopkeepers	 in	 Sharif	 Manzil	 who	 would	 order	 lunch	 from	 the	
restaurant	treated	Yusuf	with	the	same	respect	they	extended	to	each	other,	unlike	
the	way	they	treated	the	other	Bengali	wait	staff.	Yusuf	spoke	Dari	and	some	Pashto	
with	a	Bengali	accent.	We	became	friends	as	I	would	often	drink	tea	at	the	restaurant	
after	interviews	and	he	seemed	intrigued	by	my	research.	One	of	the	last	times	we	
met,	 I	 asked	 him	 how	he	 came	 to	work	 at	 the	 restaurant.	 He	 explained	 that	 after	
working	with	Afghans	in	Bengal,	he	was	invited	by	the	restaurant	owner	to	come	to	
Delhi,	where	 he	 had	 now	 remained	 for	 almost	 a	 decade.	 “After	 spending	 so	much	
time	with	Afghan	people	(unke	saath	utthna	baithna,	Lit:	getting	up	and	sitting	down	
with	 them),	 I	 became	 like	 them…	 they	know	who	and	what	 I	 am	 (woh	jaante	hein	
mein	kaun	hoon	aur	kaisa	hoon).”	It	was	his	reputation	that	afforded	him	the	respect	
and	trust	to	work	with	the	moneylenders.	
	
The	 network	 was	 not	 just	 open	 to	 anyone,	 however,	 and	 the	 mere	 fact	 of	 being	
Pashtun	 or	 from	Afghanistan	 did	 not	 provide	 a	 basis	 for	 cooperation.	Mirzal,	who	
was	 also	 a	 Pashtun	 from	 eastern	 Afghanistan,	 felt	 betrayed	 by	 the	 Afghans	 in	
Wazirabad.	He	was	unemployed	with	a	wife	and	 five	children,	and	was	 in	extreme	
financial	 need.	 He	 had	 twice	 unsuccessfully	 turned	 to	 the	 Wazirabad	 Pashtun	
community	 for	 financial	 help.	 Once	 when	 his	 son	was	 severely	 ill	 and	 he	 needed	
money	for	hospital	fees,	and	he	was	told	to	“just	be	patient.”	On	another	occasion,	he	
had	asked	if	the	moneylenders	would	help	him	start	a	business.	“I	wanted	to	start	a	
little	 shop…	 I	 told	 them	 I	 could	 do	 something	 with	 Rs	 3000…[but]	 they	 said	 you	
don’t	have	a	visa,	you	don’t	have	money,	or	a	license…	you	won’t	be	able	to	pay	rent	
or	get	sufficient	items	to	sell.”	Mirzal	expressed	how	that	“for	them	a	lakh	rupees	is	
nothing,”	but	they	still	refused	to	help	him.	He	complained	that	
“These	Katawazais	 are	 living	 here	 for	 twenty	 to	 thirty	 years…	 they	make	 a	
business	 of	 interest	 (kare	 sood)…	 [they]	 understand	 languages…	 English,	
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Hindi,	 Pashto,	 and	 some	 Farsi…	 their	 work	 is	 set.	 Money	 comes	 from	
outside…	They	don’t	care	about	others.”	
While	Mirzal’s	emotional	reaction	 is	understandable,	 the	response	of	 the	Wazirabad	
Pashtuns	to	his	requests	suggests	more	that	he	was	rejected	for	being	a	liability	as	he	
could	not	guarantee	that	he	would	be	able	to	repay	any	money	they	might	loan	to	him.	
	
The	examples	above	present	the	Pashtun	moneylender	network	as	a	different	kind	
of	Afghan	community	in	Delhi.	Unlike	the	RSC,	where	members	came	together	within	
a	context	of	 fear	and	suspicion,	 the	Pashtun	moneylender	network	was	closed	and	
participation	 controlled	 so	 that	 only	 those	 who	 could	 be	 trusted	 and	 cooperated	
with	could	be	part	of	the	community.	As	Mirzal	experienced,	entry	and	membership	
into	 the	 network	 is	 monitored	 to	 ensure	 financial	 viability	 of	 members	 of	 the	
network.	 By	 the	 same	 token,	 as	 the	 case	 of	 Yusuf	 and	 the	 boys	 in	 the	 other	
restaurant	 demonstrate,	 members	 of	 the	 network	 share	 responsibility	 to	 support	
and	 assist	 each	 other	 to	 ensure	 the	 continued	 viability	 of	 business.	 	 In	 this	 way,	
rather	 than	 coming	 together	 through	 a	 sense	 of	 belonging	 together,	 the	 Pashtun	
moneylender	 network	 appears	 to	 operate	 on	 a	 more	 practical	 interdependence	
between	members	and	within	an	emotional	context	of	trust135.	There	were	of	course	
disagreements	and	breaches	of	trust.	As	alluded	to	in	chapter	five,	Amirkhel’s	family	
had	 had	 a	 falling	 out	 with	 other	 moneylenders	 and	 moved	 to	 east	 Delhi	 from	
Wazirabad	 along	 with	 some	 other	 families	 because	 of	 power	 politics	 in	 the	
community.	Trust	was,	however,	not	premised	only	on	business	dealings,	but	also	on	
maintaining	the	social	relationships	that	constituted	members	as	particular	kinds	of	
people	who	could	be	trusted	and	included	in	the	network.	This	fact	comes	out	in	the	
story	of	Shahrukh’s	conversion	and	ejection	from	Wazirabad.	
Shahrukh’s	Conversion	
It	was	 through	 the	Pashtun	moneylender	network	 that	Shahrukh	was	able	 to	 travel	
across	 India	 and	 cultivate	 his	 sense	 of	 belonging	 in	 the	 country	 and	 in	Delhi	 as	 an	
Afghan.	When	he	first	arrived	in	Delhi	as	a	refugee,	it	was	through	his	connection	to	
the	network	that	he	was	able	 to	 find	a	room	on	credit	even	though	he	did	not	have	
money	 for	 rent.	 However,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 after	 converting	 to	
																																																								
135	Edwina	 Thompson	 (2011)	 provides	 an	 in‐depth	 analysis	 of	 this	 role	 of	 trust	 among	 traders	 in	
Afghanistan	and	the	broader	region.	
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Christianity	 he	 was	 cast	 out	 of	 Wazirabad	 by	 the	 other	 Pashtuns,	 which	 left	 him	
emotionally	and	physically	unmoored.	Though	Shahrukh	was	not	somebody	to	wish	ill	
on	 others,	 he	 would	 speak	with	 resentment	 about	 the	 Pashtuns	 of	Wazirabad	 and	
those	 involved	 in	 the	moneylender	 network.	 Even	 Amirkhel,	 with	 whom	 Shahrukh	
was	 close,	 was	 not	 spared	 criticism	 for	 being	 part	 of	 the	 community	 loan	 sharks	
(soodkhwor).	 Shahrukh	 expressed	 that	 he	 did	 not	 understand	why	 the	 Pashtuns	 of	
Wazirabad	treated	him	so	poorly,	but	from	the	story	he	recounted	of	his	conversion,	it	
appears	the	problem	was	not	uniquely	that	he	had	converted,	but	the	ambiguity	this	
created	regarding	his	 status	as	 somebody	who	could	be	 trusted.	 I	 consider	 this	 fact	
below	 through	 a	 comparison	 of	 Shahrukh’s	 story	 of	 conversion	 and	 ejection	 from	
Wazirabad	with	the	situation	of	Mirzal	who	continues	to	live	in	the	neighbourhood.	
	
After	 Shahrukh	 was	 accepted	 as	 a	 refugee,	 he	 had	 started	 to	 take	 up	 jobs	 as	 an	
interpreter	 for	 Afghans	 visiting	 Delhi.	 One	 of	 his	 clients	 had	 left	 him	 a	 stack	 of	
informational	 materials	 among	 which	 was	 a	 pamphlet	 distributed	 by	 the	 Afghan	
Dari	 Congregation	 that	 contained	 information	 pertinent	 to	 Afghan	 tourists	 and	
refugees,	 some	quotations	 from	 the	 bible,	 and	 contact	 information	 for	 the	 church.	
Shahrukh’s	 experiences	with	 development	workers	 in	 Afghanistan	 had	 piqued	 his	
interest	in	Christianity,	but	he	was	uncomfortable	contacting	the	church	as	he	wasn’t	
sure	 if	 it	 would	 affect	 his	 status	 with	 the	 UNHCR.	 After	 several	 months	 and	 the	
encouragement	of	 an	 Iranian	Christian	he	had	met,	 he	decided	 to	 call	 the	number	
and	was	put	in	touch	with	the	Afghan	pastor,	Sharif.	
	
The	 two	 arranged	 to	 meet	 in	 Lajpat	 Nagar,	 and	 following	 this	 meeting	 Shahrukh	
started	 to	 attend	 Bible	 study	 more	 regularly	 and	 frequently	 over	 a	 period	 of	 six	
months	 before	 he	 “arrived	 at	 faith”	 (imaan	 awardan,	 Lit:	 to	 bring	 faith).	 The	
Pashtuns	 in	 Wazirabad	 noticed	 that	 he	 had	 stopped	 attending	 congregational	
prayers	(namaz)	and	that	he	would	be	away	all	day	on	Saturdays	and	Sundays	when	
the	men	would	 hang	 out	 at	 the	 Bosco	 centre.	 Sitting	 together	 at	 the	Bosco	 centre	
appeared	to	be	an	important	social	event	among	the	Wazirabad	Pashtuns.	“Nothing	
happens,”	Shahrukh	had	complained,	“they	just	sit	and	talk	all	day.”	His	descriptions	
of	 the	 whole	 affair	 was	 that	 the	men	 sat	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 a	 room	making	 paper	
plates	 while	 gossiping	 and	 watching	 television.	 Shahrukh	 indicated	 that	 after	 his	
conversion,	he	found	the	men’s	conversations	at	the	Bosco	centre	upsetting	as	they	
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often	revolved	around	political	support	of	the	Taliban,	which	he	did	not	support,	or	
the	superiority	of	Islam,	which	he	no	longer	believed	in.	
	
One	day,	when	he	was	at	the	Bosco	centre,	one	of	the	men	asked	him	directly	if	he	
had	 abandoned	 his	 religion	 (deen	ra	ela	kardi?).	 He	 felt	 he	 could	 not	 lie	 and	 told	
them	he	had	become	a	Christian.	 	According	to	Shahrukh,	since	they	could	not	kick	
him	 out	 for	 changing	 his	 religion	 without	 drawing	 the	 ire	 of	 the	 UNHCR,	 they	
devised	a	plan	to	get	the	local	Indian	Muslims	to	expel	him	from	the	neighbourhood.		
One	 afternoon,	 somebody	 came	 and	 knocked	 on	 his	 door	 and	 told	 him	 people	
wanted	to	talk	to	him	outside.		When	he	stepped	outside,	a	group	of	people	from	the	
mosque,	Indian	and	Afghan,	had	gathered	and	informed	him	he	had	been	accused	of	
burning	the	Quran.		He	protested	saying	he	had	never	done	such	a	thing.		He	asked	
who	had	accused	him	and	was	told	it	was	“an	African,”	but	when	he	pressed	them	for	
a	name	 so	 that	 he	 could	 confront	 the	person,	 one	of	 the	Pashtuns	 threatened	him	
with	 a	 knife,	 telling	 him	 not	 to	 run	 his	 mouth	 (ziyad	gap	na	bezan),	 to	 pack	 his	
belongings,	and	leave	that	night.		They	told	him	never	to	tell	anyone	that	he	had	been	
Pashtun	 before	 converting.	 That	 instead	 he	 should	 tell	 them	 he	 was	 “a	 kafir,	 an	
Indian,	or	whatever	[he]	wanted,	because	no	Pashtun	had	ever	changed	religion	up	
till	now	and	it	was	a	dishonour	(sharm	ast).”	
	
The	experience	was	naturally	 traumatic	 for	Shahrukh.	That	night	he	stayed	with	a	
Hindu	 friend	 in	Wazirabad	 and	moved	 from	 place	 to	 place	 over	 the	 next	 several	
months	before	 finding	a	 flat	he	could	 rent	 in	 south	Delhi.	The	psychological	 stress	
left	him	afraid	of	enemies	(dushmanha)	who	might	seek	him	out	and	the	anxiety	left	
him	in	a	state	where	he	could	not	keep	down	any	food,	could	not	sleep,	and	rapidly	
lost	weight.	The	doctors	at	 the	public	hospital	 told	him	his	symptoms	were	due	 to	
stress	(ghabrahat),	but	he	was	worried	that	
“Maybe	somebody	[in	Wazirabad]	gave	me	something	[poisonous]	to	eat	and	
I	didn’t	die…	Maybe	it	was	just	the	fear	that	had	developed	in	me	after	leaving	
there…	I	was	so	scared	that	even	in	the	summer	heat	I	would	keep	my	door	
closed	in	case	somebody	might	come	to	attack	me.”	
	
He	 recounted	how	during	 this	 period	he	met	 one	of	 the	Wazirabad	Pashtuns	who	
reprimanded	 him	 for	 converting,	 saying	 “When	 you	 became	 Christian	 your	 face	
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became	 like	 a	 dog’s	 (sag‐ware)…	 You	 were	 beautiful	 when	 you	 were	 Muslim.”	
Shahrukh	recounted	how	
“I	 told	 them	 ‘Yes,	 I’ve	 changed.	 My	 colour	 [has	 darkened],	 my	 body	 [has	
thinned],	but	it	is	not	because	I’m	Christian.	It	is	because	of	fear	of	you!	You	
[Pashtuns]	 are	 always	 treating	 people	 poorly,	 saying	 bad	 things,	
embarrassing	 and	 teasing	 them	 everyday	 and	 this	 blackens	 their	 hearts	
toward	 everyone!	 If	 I’m	 now	 in	 this	 state	 it	 is	 because	 of	 illness	 at	 your	
hands…	Why	did	you	treat	me	this	way?”	
Throughout	 the	 time	 I	have	known	Shahrukh,	he	professes	 to	not	understand	why	
he	was	ejected	from	Wazirabad	and	abandoned	by	many	of	his	friends	in	this	way.	
He	pins	it	on	their	hatred	of	Christianity	and	on	their	fanaticism	(shiddat).	However,	
comparing	 Shahrukh’s	 story	 to	 the	 case	 of	 Mirzal	 presents	 another	 possible	
explanation.	
	
Descriptions	 of	 Pashtun	 social	 organization	 and	 conceptions	 of	 personhood	 have	
emphasized	 the	 entwined	 nature	 of	 practices	 being	 a	 Pashtun	 (pashto	kawal,	 Lit:	
doing	 Pashto)	 and	 being	 Muslim	 (Anderson	 1985;	 Glatzer	 1998;	 Steul	 1981),	 for	
many	 Pashtuns.	 Shahrukh’s	 story	 would	 seem	 to	 confirm	 this	 view	 that	 by	
converting	he	had	lost	his	“honour”	and	was	no	longer	a	Pashtun,	and	could	thus	not	
be	a	part	of	 the	network.	While	religious	 identity	was	 indeed	an	 important	part	of	
the	 lives	of	many	refugees	 I	worked	with,	and	religious	markers	such	as	attending	
Friday	prayers	(namaze	juma)	or	fasting	(roza)	were	activities	that	brought	Afghans	
together,	 it	 would	 be	 facile	 and	 simplistic	 to	 reduce	 the	 Wazirabad	 Pashtun’s	
reaction	to	Shahrukh	as	an	expression	of	Afghan	or	Muslim	religious	fanaticism.		
	
To	approach	Shahrukh’s	 case	with	more	nuance,	one	 can	consider	 the	 situation	of	
Mirzal,	who	had	also	converted	to	Christianity,	stopped	praying	in	congregation,	and	
had	 started	 spending	 less	 time	 with	 the	 other	 Wazirabad	 Pashtuns	 at	 the	 Bosco	
centre.	Mirzal	 explained	 how	 the	men	 in	Wazirabad	 had	 also	 asked	 him	 if	 he	 had	
converted.	 Given	 Shahrukh’s	 experience,	 Mirzal	 reported	 that	 he	 evaded	 the	
question	and	Shahrukh	 later	 alleged	he	had	denied	his	 conversion.	Mirzal	 told	me	
how	he	 had	managed	 to	 keep	 his	 conversion	 a	 secret	 by	 continuing	 to	 attend	 the	
Bosco	centre	and	telling	the	men	he	had	a	job	in	south	Delhi	on	the	weekends	as	an	
alibi	 for	 attending	 the	 church.	 Shahrukh	 explained	 that	 Mirzal’s	 young	 son,	 who	
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accompanied	him	to	church,	had	told	all	the	children	where	they	went	on	Sundays,	
but	 because	 Mirzal	 had	 not	 publically	 confessed	 his	 conversion,	 the	 Wazirabad	
Pashtuns	had	no	reason	to	expel	him	from	the	neighbourhood.	
	
From	 what	 I	 knew	 of	 Shahrukh	 and	 Mirzal’s	 connections	 to	 the	 Wazirabad	
Pashtuns,	I	believe	there	was	another	issue	at	stake.	As	Aslanian	(2011)	describes,	
it	 is	through	the	sedimentation	of	multiple	social	relationships	that	members	of	a	
network	 build	 reputations	 and	 reciprocal	 connections	 of	 trust	 over	 time.	 Unlike	
Shahrukh,	Mirzal	had	not	built	 these	connections,	nor	had	he	been	invested	in	by	
the	Wazirabad	Pashtuns	or	accepted	as	part	of	 the	network,	 and	 thus	had	no	 in‐
depth	 experience	 or	 knowledge	 of	 its	 operation	 beyond	 Delhi.	 Shahrukh,	 on	 the	
other	hand,	had	been	deeply	integrated	into	the	network	before	his	conversion	and	
had	 to	 work	 over	 time	 to	 cement	 his	 place	 in	 the	 network.	 In	 ceasing	 his	
involvement	 in	 the	 social	engagements	of	 the	network,	 i.e.	 congregational	prayer	
and	 gathering	 at	 the	 Bosco	 centre,	 Shahrukh	 had	 managed	 to	 work,	 perhaps	
unwittingly,	 to	 undo	 those	 relationships	 that	 constituted	 him	 as	 a	 person	 who	
could	be	trusted	as	part	of	the	network.	
	
Shahrukh’s	public	admission	of	having	converted	undoubtedly	reinforced	questions	
around	his	trustworthiness	as	a	member	of	the	network.	Research	from	South	and	
Southeast	Asia	depicts	how,	among	Muslim	communities,	conversion	 from	Islam	is	
seen	as	 something	 that	 should	not	happen	 (Marsden	2005),	 and	while	 it	 does	not	
necessarily	 entail	 an	 individual’s	 abandoning	 of	 former	 belief	 (S	 Bayly	 1989),	 it	
presents	a	person’s	reconfiguring	of	relationships	with	others	around	them	(Beatty	
2002)	 that	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 a	political	 act	 of	 separating	 oneself	 from	others	 to	
whom	 one	 was	 formerly	 connected	 (Viswanathan	 1998).	 It	 is	 thus	 likely	 the	
combination	 of	 Shahrukh’s	 conversion	 with	 his	 social	 withdrawal	 indicated	 a	
breaking	of	social	ties	to	the	Wazirabad	Pashtun	community,	which	meant	he	would	
not	be	equally	concerned	about	his	reputation	in	the	same	way	as	other	members	of	
the	community.	Shahrukh	indicated	as	much	when	he	would	express	how	he	didn’t	
care	 for	 the	 way	 the	 Wazirabad	 Pashtuns	 “think	 they	 are	 better	 (beshtar)	 than	
everyone…	the	bible	says,	right,	what	is	important	is	in	your	heart,	not	that	you	are	
Pashtun	or	Tajik.”	Shahrukh’s	actions	would	have	called	his	reliability	into	question,	
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rendering	 him	 a	 liability	 and	 potential	 leak	 in	 the	 operations	 of	 the	 network,	
requiring	in	his	expulsion	from	the	community	and	from	the	neighbourhood.	
6.3 Conclusion	
Several	months	after	returning	from	fieldwork,	I	was	invited	to	a	dinner	party	at	the	
home	 of	 an	 Afghan	 anthropologist	 doing	 research	 in	 London.	 As	 a	 joke,	 the	
Anthropologist	 introduced	 me	 to	 her	 friends	 as	 an	 acquaintance	 from	 Daikundi	
province	 in	 central	 Afghanistan,	 which	 nobody	 had	 initially	 questioned.	 Over	 the	
course	of	 the	meal,	 the	charade	became	 increasingly	difficult	 to	maintain	and	both	
the	Anthropologist	and	 I	 revealed	 the	 truth	 to	much	 laughter	and	teasing.	When	 it	
came	out	that	I	had	recently	returned	from	fieldwork	in	Delhi,	conversation	took	an	
interesting	turn.	I	had	mentioned	some	of	the	stories	related	above	and	the	general	
obstacles	I	was	facing	in	trying	to	describe	what	Afghan	community	in	Delhi	might	
mean.	During	this	conversation,	two	of	the	guests	had	a	disagreement	on	the	nature	
of	Afghan	community	in	Delhi.	
		
Azizeh	and	Farzaneh	had	both	grown	up	primarily	in	Iran	as	refugees,	but	returned	
to	Afghanistan	in	the	early	2000s.	Both	women	had	eventually	left	Afghanistan	and	
settled	 in	London,	and	had	also	spent	a	significant	amount	of	 time	 in	Delhi.	Azizeh	
had	family	living	in	the	affluent	Defence	Colony	neighbourhood	next	to	Lajpat	Nagar,	
and	had	recently	returned	from	accompanying	her	mother,	who	lived	in	Afghanistan,	
on	a	trip	to	Delhi	for	medical	purposes.	Farzaneh	had	spent	some	time	in	Delhi	with	
her	mother	as	well	several	years	earlier,	when	she	had	left	Afghanistan	to	work	in	
Delhi	as	a	professional	in	the	arts	and	music	industry.	During	her	time	in	Delhi,	she	
lived	in	one	of	the	many	deluxe	skyscraper	apartment	buildings	on	the	outskirts	of	
the	city,	in	the	posh	industrial	and	financial	suburb	of	Gurgaon.	
		
Farzaneh	empathized	with	the	difficulty	I	professed	in	getting	to	know	people.	She	
expressed	 how	 she	 found	 Delhi	 to	 be	 a	 boring	 (khasta	kon)	 city	 where	 not	 just	
Afghans	but	Delhiites	in	general	were	only	interested	in	making	money,	and	where	
nobody	made	 an	 effort	 to	 know	 one	 another	 unless	 they	 stood	 to	 profit	 from	 the	
relationship.	She	explained	that	while	she	was	living	there	she	had	collected	a	group	
of	Afghan	friends	who,	like	her,	didn’t	generally	associate	with	other	Afghans.		As	a	
group,	they	felt	Afghans	in	the	city	were	critical	of	them	and	would	talk	about	them	
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behind	 their	 backs,	 and	 they	 felt	 ideologically	 displaced	 among	 the	more	 socially	
conservative	Afghans	who	lived	in	Delhi.	While	they	had	a	fun	time	together,	holding	
parties	in	farmhouses	in	the	suburbs	or	going	out	in	the	city,	they	all	eventually	left	
Delhi	and	Farzaneh	saw	no	reason	to	ever	return.	
	
Azizeh,	a	mild	mannered	woman,	who	was	good	friends	with	Farzaneh,	did	not	agree	
with	the	stream	of	conversation.	“Farzaneh	dear,”	she	said	measuring	her	words,	“I	
don’t	mean	to	say	you’re	wrong,	but	my	experience	of	Delhi	was	completely	different	
(bekhi	diger	bud).”	Azizeh	described	how	she	regularly	visited	Delhi,	how	her	family	
there	 had	 feted	 her	 and	 her	mother	 and	 took	 them	 to	many	 beautiful	 places	 and	
restaurants	around	the	city,	and	how	the	Afghans	she	knew	in	Delhi	were	a	warm,	
tight	knit	community.	“The	women	visit	each	other	from	house	to	house…	when	we	
were	there	we	didn’t	have	blankets	and	several	people	brought	us	blankets…[and]	
many	 people	 came	 to	 visit	 my	 mother	 in	 hospital.”	 Azizeh	 expressed	 how	 she	
enjoyed	going	to	Delhi,	especially	during	London	winters,	and	that	the	Afghans	she	
knew	 there	made	 it	 feel	 like	 home	 (hech	beganagi	ehsas	na	meshe).	 She	 suggested	
that	“maybe	because	[Farzaneh]	did	not	actually	live	in	Lajpat	Nagar	itself,	that	[she]	
did	not	see	this	side	of	people	there.”	Both	women	agreed,	however,	that	Delhi	was	a	
good	place	for	buying	or	tailoring	Afghan,	Indian,	or	western	style	clothing	and	while	
they	disagreed	on	the	aesthetics	of	Bollywood	films,	 they	agreed	that	they	enjoyed	
watching	movies	in	the	central	and	south	Delhi	theatres.	
	
On	the	one	hand,	Farzaneh	and	Azizeh’s	stories	point	to	forms	of	Afghan	community	
in	the	city	that	were	unavailable	to	me	as	a	researcher.	I	had	little	or	no	exposure	to	
the	lives	of	Afghan	women,	to	Afghan	families	and	family	networks,	or	to	the	lifestyle	
of	affluent	upper	class	Afghans	in	the	city.	On	the	other	hand,	against	the	state	scale	
understanding	 of	 Delhi’s	 Afghan	 community	 as	 a	 unitary	 category	 grounded	 in	 a	
shared	 national	 belonging,	 the	 two	 women’s	 experiences	 and	 the	 ethnographic	
material	presented	 in	the	chapter	above	 illustrate	how	there	are	multiple	 forms	of	
Afghan	community	in	the	city.	Attending	to	analysis	at	the	level	of	community,	this	
chapter	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 various	 forms	 of	 Afghan	 community	 in	 Delhi	 are	
linked	 to	 the	 multiple	 ways	 Afghan	 migrants	 are	 constituted	 as	 persons	 and	
connected	to	the	city,	and	shaped	by	the	different	emotional	contexts	within	which	
Afghan	migrants	are	considered	at	different	scales.	
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Recognizing	 there	 are	 many	 forms	 of	 Afghan	 community	 in	 the	 city	 does	 not,	
however,	assume	a	flat	‘superdiversity’	of	Afghan	consociation	within	the	context	of	
Delhi.	Rather,	 the	 stories	 and	material	presented	above	encourage	 considering	 for	
whom	these	various	Afghan	communities	exist	and	why?	Research	on	transnational	
migration	 asserts	 that	 (i)	 that	 observing	 migration	 is	 to	 observe	 the	 particular	
structural	conditions,	power	relations,	and	socio‐economic	contexts	within	which	it	
takes	place	(Levitt	2011),	and	(ii)	 that	 transnational	migrants	can	be	seen	as	scale	
makers	whose	 experiences	 of	 the	 city	 at	 once	 shape	 and	 reflect	 its	 social	 context	
(Glick	 Schiller	 and	 Çağlar	 2011).	 This	 last	 point	 can	 be	 considered	 at	 the	 level	 of	
neighbourhood	with	regard	to	the	different	kinds	of	transnational	flows	represented	
by	the	communities	of	Lajpat	Nagar	and	Wazirabad.	
	
Both	Lajpat	Nagar	and	Wazirabad	serve	as	conduits	 for	 flows	of	people	and	things	
between	India	and	Afghanistan,	yet	only	the	former	was	considered	an	Afghan	part	
of	the	city.	This	recognition	was	due	to	the	visible	economies	of	bodies,	fashion,	food,	
etc.	 that	 reinforced	 the	 state	 scale	 understanding	 of	 foreignness	 and	 exclusion	 of	
Afghans	from	belonging	in	Delhi	or	India.	The	emotional	atmosphere	created	by	this	
exclusion	within	the	context	of	the	Indian	state,	however,	prevented	Afghan	refugees	
in	 Lajpat	 Nagar	 from	 cultivating	 a	 community	 of	 cooperation.	 The	 Pashtun	
community	 in	Wazirabad,	 conversely,	 considered	 themselves	 as	 part	 of	 Delhi	 and	
India	more	 broadly,	 beyond	 the	 limited	 perception	 of	 the	 state	 scale.	While	 there	
was	 not	 a	 visible	 Afghan	 economy	 in	Wazirabad	 as	 there	 as	 in	 Lajpat	 Nagar,	 the	
Pashtun	moneylenders	 held	 power	 in	 the	 local	 economy	 through	 their	 control	 of	
property	and	business,	and	operated	not	so	much	against	 the	state	than	around	 it,	
avoiding	 state	 interaction	 in	 their	 affairs.	 They	 were	 able	 to	 do	 so	 not	 only	 by	
mobilizing	their	extensive	financial	resources,	but	also	through	maintaining	a	closed	
social	network	to	ensure	the	viability	of	their	operations.	
	
When	 compared	 to	 the	 communities	 briefly	 described	 by	 Farzaneh	 and	Azizeh,	 the	
differences	between	 the	 communities	 of	 Lajpat	Nagar	 and	Wazirabad	 also	highlight	
the	issue	of	scale	as	impact,	discussed	in	chapter	five.		There	is	a	qualitative	difference	
between	Farzaneh	and	Azizeh’s	experience	of	community	in	Delhi,	the	experience	of	
the	Pashtuns	 of	Wazirabad,	 and	 that	 of	 the	 refugees	 of	 Lajpat	Nagar.	 Farzaneh	 and	
	 201
Azizeh,	 like	 Ong’s	 (1999)	 Chinese	 businessmen,	 display	 forms	 of	 belonging	 “finely	
tuned	 to	 the	 turbulence	 of	 late	 capitalism”	 (136),	 where	 they	 possess	 the	 financial	
resources	 and	 citizenship	 status	 (first	 as	 citizens	of	Afghanistan	and	now	as	British	
citizens)	 to	 travel	 between	 Afghanistan,	 India,	 and	 elsewhere,	 choosing	 or	 not	
choosing	 to	 cultivate	 a	 sense	 of	 community	 or	 belonging	 in	 Delhi.	 The	 Pashtun	
moneylenders	 are	 similarly	 in	 a	 financial	 position	 to	 circumvent	 state	 scale	
understandings	 of	 the	 place	 of	 Afghan	 community	 in	 India,	 though	 as	 the	 case	 of	
Shahrukh	illustrates,	this	ability	is	tempered	but	the	constant	threat	of	legal	intrusion	
by	the	state,	so	that	membership	is	tightly	controlled	within	this	closed	network.		
	
As	in	the	last	chapter,	Shahrukh’s	case	is	particularly	instructive	in	illustrating	how	
even	 though	 individuals	 can	 ‘sense’	 community	 in	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 ways,	 the	
structural	conditions	within	which	Afghan	migrants	find	themselves	in	Delhi	means	
that	not	all	migrants	can	choose	to	which	community	they	belong	or	are	perceived	to	
belong	to.	Again,	the	example	of	Shahrukh	suggests	that	the	absence	of	financial	or	
social	resources	increases	the	impact	of	state	scale	conceptions	of	what	community	
migrants	belong	to	in	their	day‐to‐day	experience	of	the	city,	limiting	the	space	for	
them	 to	 belong	 in	 the	 city.	 	 This	 situation	 is	 not,	 however,	 particular	 to	 Afghan	
migrants,	and	in	the	next	and	final	section	of	this	thesis	I	consider	how	the	material	
presented	 above	 connects	 to	 arguments	 presented	 in	 previous	 chapters	 and	 to	
wider	research	on	issues	of	citizenship	and	the	city	in	South	Asia.	
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Figure	6:	Street	Scene	Outside	the	Sohrab	Press	Offices	
Above	the	busy	main	artery	of	Ballimaran,	a	sign	advertises	the	nearby	
“Kabul	Zaeqah”	restaurant,	a	competitor	to	Yusuf’s	restaurant.	
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Figure	7:	Lajpat	Nagar	Shops	Catering	to	Afghans	
Shops	owned	by	Afghan	Sikhs	catering	to	the	needs	of	Afghans	in	the	area	
(visa	extension	registration,	money	change,	chemists,	and	mobile	phones).	
Figure	8:	Sign	Painting	in	Lajpat	Nagar	
An	artist	paints	a	sign	in	Persian	from	left	to	right.
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Figure	9:	Rental	Properties	in	Kasturba	Niketan	
An	empty	street	in	Kasturba	Niketan	(Lajpat	Nagar)	with	a	“for	rent”	sign	in	
English,	Dari,	and	Arabic.	
Figure	10:	Street	Advertising	in	Kasturba	Niketan	
Strategic	advertising	for	a	property	rental	agency.	
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7. Conclusion	
As	discussed	in	the	introduction,	the	research	question	driving	this	thesis	arose	from	
the	context	of	my	fieldwork	in	which	I	could	identify	no	single	generalizable	trend	or	
form	 of	 Afghan	 community,	 neighbourhood,	 or	 migrant	 experience.	 Given	 the	
diversity	of	themes	in	the	ethnographic	material	I	collected,	I	might	have	written	a	
very	different	thesis,	and	indeed	had	initially	planned	to	do	so	focusing	on	the	role	of	
suspicion	 and	 distrust	 among	 Afghan	 migrants	 in	 Delhi.	 However,	 in	 deciding	
instead	to	attend	to	the	plurality	of	what	it	means	to	be	and	belong	as	an	Afghan	in	
Delhi,	 I	 have	 endeavoured	 to	 portray	 more	 fully	 the	 ethnographic	 material	 I	
collected.	 In	 this	way,	 the	 accounts	 and	 analysis	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 not	 only	
address	a	gap	in	research	on	Afghans	an	Afghan	migration,	but	also	speak	directly	to	
themes	in	the	study	of	urban	life	in	Delhi.	Below	I	briefly	summarize	the	arguments	
and	 issues	presented	 in	 the	preceding	 chapters	 and	 consider	how	 they	 connect	 to	
these	areas	of	research,	and	anthropological	thought	more	broadly.	
	
The	argument	of	 this	 thesis	has	been	 two‐fold.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	 study	argues	
that	what	 it	means	 to	 be	 and	 belong	 as	 Afghan	 in	 Delhi	must	 be	 considered	 as	 a	
multiple,	 reflecting	 different	 scales	 at	 which	 Afghan	 migrants	 in	 the	 city	 are	
considered	and	constituted	as	persons.	The	ethnographic	chapters	thus	demonstrate	
a	variety	of	conceptions	of	Afghan	belonging	in	the	city	as	articulated	at	the	scales	of	
the	 state,	 the	 individual,	 and	 the	 community.	 The	 thesis	 extends	 a	 second	 central	
argument	 regarding	 this	 multiplicity	 of	 Afghan	 belonging	 in	 Delhi	 with	 regard	 to	
ideas	of	 scale	 as	magnitude,	 as	discussed	 in	 chapter	 two.	The	 study	 contends	 that	
rather	 than	 presenting	 an	 incalculable	 complexity,	 the	 multiple	 forms	 of	 Afghan	
belonging	in	Delhi	can	be	productively	brought	into	focus	through	considering	how	
the	various	scales	at	which	Afghan	belonging	 in	Delhi	 is	envisioned,	hold	different	
degrees	of	influence	in	individual	migrants’	lives.	Seen	in	this	light,	the	ethnography	
suggests	 that	 while	 individual	 Afghan	migrants	 possess	 the	 capacity	 to	 belong	 in	
Delhi	 in	multiple	ways,	not	all	migrants	are	able	 to	belong	 in	 the	city	according	 to	
their	understanding	or	desire.	The	trend	emerging	across	the	chapters	points	to	how	
the	state	scale	conception	of	Afghan	migrants’	place	in	the	city	holds	greater	salience	
in	structuring	migrant	experience,	and	it	is	those	migrants	with	access	to	financial	or	
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social	 resources	who	are	 able	 to	 cultivate	ways	of	 being	 and	belonging	 in	 the	 city	
outside	that	envisioned	at	the	state	scale.	
	
To	 frame	 the	 argument,	 the	 first	 ethnographic	 chapter	 examined	 how	 Afghan	
migrants’	presence	in	Delhi	is	considered	at	the	state	scale,	exploring	the	category	of	
the	 Afghan	 refugee,	 against	 which	 other	 forms	 of	 Afghan	 identity	 in	 Delhi	 are	
measured.	Afghan	belonging	was	shown	at	this	scale	to	be	thought	of	as	contiguous	
with	 national	 borders,	 so	 that	 Afghan	 migrants	 were	 seen	 to	 not	 possess	 any	
connection,	 figurative	 or	 otherwise,	 to	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 Indian	 state	 or	
subsequently	to	Delhi.	Thus,	to	be	Afghan	in	Delhi	at	this	scale	was	revealed	to	be	a	
body	out	of	place	at	the	end‐point	of	a	vector	of	movement	from	Afghanistan	to	Delhi,	
where	the	nature	of	one’s	story	of	movement	determined,	for	the	state,	the	licitness	
of	one’s	presence	in	Delhi.	While	Afghan	migrants	were	not	seen	to	belong	in	Delhi,	
they	were	understood	 as	 having	 affective	 ties	 to	 an	Afghan	 community	 present	 in	
Delhi	but	emotionally	oriented	toward	the	state	of	Afghanistan.	
	
The	 subsequent	 three	 chapters	 attended	 to	 the	 scales	 of	 the	 individual	 and	of	 the	
community	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 state	 scale	 conception	 of	 what	 it	 meant	 to	 be	 and	
belong	as	Afghan	in	Delhi	was	one	among	a	plurality	of	understandings	that	Afghan	
migrants	in	the	city	engaged	with.	Building	on	anthropological	work	on	ontology	and	
on	ethics	and	morality,	chapters	four	and	five	drew	on	Afghan	migrants’	narratives	
to	 illustrate	 how	 they	 are	 constituted	 as	 persons	 through	 multiple	 processes	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 world	 around	 them.	 Chapter	 four	 followed	 the	 paths	 bringing	
migrants	 to	 Delhi,	 demonstrating	 how	 rather	 than	 being	 at	 the	 end	 point	 of	 a	
trajectory	 of	 movement,	 Afghan	 migrants	 are	 people	 in	 movement,	 where	 their	
patterns	of	movement	are	multidirectional,	recurrent	over	time,	affected	by	a	variety	
of	social	processes	that	prevent	their	being	reduced	to	singular	economic	or	political	
logics,	 and	 reveal	 a	 moral	 character	 of	 migrants’	 movement	 as	 being	 driven	 by	
aspirations	 to	 become	 particular	 kinds	 of	 persons.	 Chapter	 five	 delved	 into	 this	
moral	aspect	by	considering	how	individual	migrants	cultivated	belonging	in	Delhi.	
The	 chapter	 focused	 on	 the	 material	 and	 affective	 ways	 linguistic	 and	 historical	
connections	between	Afghanistan	and	India	can	both	serve	to	provide	migrants	with	
a	 sense	of	belonging	 in	Delhi	 or	 also	make	 them	 feel	 alienated	 from	 it,	 suggesting	
that	feelings	of	belonging	and	not	belonging	are	not	necessarily	mutually	exclusive,	
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but	dependant	on	the	dynamics	of	individual	migrants’	situations	and	conditions	in	
the	 city.	 The	 final	 ethnographic	 chapter	 similarly	 attended	 to	 the	 material	 and	
affective	 conditions	 of	 two	 kinds	 of	 Afghan	 community	 in	 Delhi	 to	 illustrate	 how	
multiple	 forms	of	Afghan	community	exist	 in	the	city,	and	how	they	are	shaped	by	
the	varying	emotional	contexts	afforded	by	 the	different	understandings	of	Afghan	
belonging	in	Delhi	at	different	scales.	
	
While	 the	 three	 scales	 of	 the	 state,	 the	 individual,	 and	 community	 arose	 from	 the	
ethnographic	 material	 collected	 during	 fieldwork,	 the	 thesis	 could	 also	 have	
considered	 other	 epistemological	 scales	 such	 as	 gender,	 which	 has	 not	 been	 a	
primary	 focus	 of	 analysis	 but	 to	 which	 much	 of	 the	 ethnographic	 material	 also	
speaks.	 Echoing	 literature	 on	 South	 Asian	 masculinities	 (Osella	 and	 Osella	 2006;	
Srivastava	 2004),	 the	 different	 cases	 presented	 in	 the	 ethnographic	 chapters	
illustrate	a	plurality	of	masculinities	ascribed	to	and	enacted	by	Afghan	migrants	in	
Delhi.	Shahrukh,	Musa	Saheb,	and	Ali	in	particular	present	different	masculine	styles	
in	endeavouring	to	live	meaningful	lives.	They	do	so	sometimes	in	accordance	with	
and	 sometimes	 against	 multiple	 and	 conflicting	 social	 understandings	 of	 what	 it	
means	to	be	an	Afghan	man,	e.g.	religiously	observant,	sexually	aggressive,	wealthy	
and	 generous,	 a	 poor	 refugee,	 etc.	 However,	 as	 is	 particularly	 striking	 in	 Musa	
Saheb’s	 experience	 with	 the	 RSC,	 this	 plurality	 of	 masculinities	 is	 not	 apolitical.	
Rather,	 as	 social	 relations,	 these	 masculinities	 inherently	 signify	 power	 relations	
(Dasgupta	and	Gokulsing	2014;	Scott	1988;	Sinha	1995,	1999)	that	play	out	through	
people’s	lived	experience.	To	attend	to	this	underlying	issue	of	power	traversing	the	
different	 scales	 considered	 in	 the	 ethnographic	 chapters,	 the	 thesis	 has	 employed	
the	 second	 concept	 of	 scale	 as	 magnitude	 to	 illustrate	 how	 Afghan	 migrants’	
asymmetrical	experience	and	engagement	with	the	multiple	meanings	of	being	and	
belonging	in	the	city	is	shaped	by	their	unequal	access	to	financial	and	social	capital	
in	the	form	of	cash,	respect,	both,	or	neither.	
	
The	ethnographic	material	presented	and	analysed	 in	 the	 chapters	both	 resonates	
with	and	contributes	to	anthropological	research	on	Afghan	migration.	In	presenting	
the	multiple	 and	 connected	 forms	 of	 Afghan	migration	 to	 Delhi,	 the	 thesis	 echoes	
research	 with	 Afghan	 migrants	 elsewhere	 that	 demonstrates	 (i)	 how	 multiple	
migration	strategies	are	used	by	individuals	and	groups	in	response	to	conditions	in	
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Afghanistan	and	as	part	of	moral	and	ethical	considerations	of	being	or	becoming	a	
certain	kind	of	person	(Monsutti	2005c;	Marsden	2013);	(ii)	that	migration	patterns	
are	 determined	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 factors	 including	 but	 not	 limited	 to	 ethnicity	 and	
social	 class	 (Gehrig	 and	 Monsutti	 2003;	 Monsutti	 2009)	 and	 that	 experience	 of	
migration	is	unique	to	individuals	as	they	engage	with	a	simultaneity	of	overlapping	
place‐making	projects	(Novak	2007a);	and	(iii)	distinctions	between	voluntary	and	
involuntary	migration	or	between	categories	such	as	economic	migrant	and	refugee	
are	analytically	 inappropriate	(Monsutti	2005a;	Marsden	2014)	and	 fail	 to	capture	
the	reality	and	historicity	of	migrant	movements.	
	
The	thesis	has	added	to	this	literature	on	Afghan	migration	in	two	ways.	First,	there	
have	 hitherto	 been	 no	 detailed	 ethnographic	 studies	 of	 contemporary	 Afghan	
migration	 to	 India,	 and	 this	 thesis	 has	 sought	 to	 fill	 this	 significant	 gap	 in	 the	
literature.	 The	 accounts	 of	 the	 Afghan	 Hindu	 and	 Sikh	 community	 presented	 in	
chapter	 three	and	on	 the	Pashtun	moneylender	 community	 in	 chapter	 six	provide	
descriptions	 of	 historic	Afghan	 communities	 connected	 to	 India	 that	 have	 till	 now	
not	 been	 the	 focus	 of	 sustained	 research	 by	 anthropologists.	 The	work	 on	Afghan	
Sikhs	living	in	India	in	particular	contributes	to	the	study	of	broader	Sikh	migration.	
As	discussed	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 the	 thesis,	while	 there	 is	an	expanding	body	of	
literature	 on	 Sikh	 diasporic	 networks,	 the	 Afghan	 Sikh	 community	 has	 not	 been	
addressed	in	this	research	that	tends	to	focus	on	Sikh	migration	from	India	to	other	
parts	 of	 the	 world.	 Secondly,	 where	 other	 studies	 of	 Afghan	 migration	 have	
illustrated	 the	 strong	 role	 of	 ethnic,	 regional,	 and	 national	 belonging	 in	 shaping	
experience	of	migration	(Monsutti	2004a;	Olszewska	2013;	Rostami‐Povey	2007b),	
this	thesis	has	emphasized	that	while	national	and	ethnic	belonging	do	undoubtedly	
play	 a	 role	 in	 Afghan	 experience	 of	 migration	 to	 Delhi,	 Afghan	 migrants	 also	
articulate	belonging	in	the	city	at	different	scales	beyond	ideas	of	national	or	ethnic	
belonging	 that	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 historic	 and	 continuous	 movement	 of	 people	
through	the	region.	Through	demonstrating	how	this	is	the	case,	the	thesis,	as	I	now	
suggest,	has	also	contributed	to	wider	anthropological	discussions.	
	
While	the	focus	of	the	thesis	has	been	on	the	experience	of	Afghan	migrants	in	Delhi,	
the	 arguments	 around	 how	 they	 are	 considered	 to	 belong	 in	 the	 city	 have	 also	
contributed	 more	 broadly	 to	 anthropological	 discussions	 of	 personhood	 and	
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relatedness	 and	 to	bringing	 together	 anthropological	work	on	ontology	and	ethics	
and	 morality	 (discussed	 further	 below).	 Following	 Janet	 Carsten’s	 (2004)	 call	 to	
understand	 what	 it	 means	 to	 be	 a	 person	 through	 descriptions	 “from	 the	 inside”	
(45),	this	thesis	has	engaged	with	the	ethnographic	material	presented	to	argue	that	
the	various	forms	of	personhood	identified	in	studies	within	and	beyond	South	Asia	
can	 be	 considered	 as	 general	 forms	 of	 human	 relatedness	 that	 operate	
contemporaneously	in	constituting	persons	as	complex	beings,	rather	than	ways	of	
relatedness	specific	only	to	certain	peoples	or	places.	This	assertion	 is	 in	 line	with	
research	on	how	personhood	is	an	on‐going	processes	contingent	on	broader	social	
developments	(Haraway	1991,	Strathern	1992,	1996).	In	bringing	the	literature	on	
personhood	 and	 relatedness	 to	 bear	 in	 a	 novel	 way	 on	 the	 study	 of	 Afghans	 and	
Afghanistan,	 this	thesis	has	addressed	assertions	that	there	is	a	moral	 incoherence	
of	 Afghan	 identity	 that	 results	 from	 and	 is	 productive	 of	 social	 fragmentation	 in	
Afghan	society	 (see	Barfield	2005;	Giustozzi	2007b;	Edwards	1996).	 In	presenting	
how	 individuals	 engage	with	 the	multiple	meanings	 of	 being	Afghan	 in	Delhi,	 this	
thesis	 has	 instead	 contributed	 to	 a	 growing	body	 of	 literature	 that	 recognizes	 the	
different	ways	 of	 being	 Afghan	 as	 reflective	 of	 the	 diverse	 processes	 operating	 at	
different	 scales	 that	 situate	people	 in	 the	world	 around	 them	 (see	 also	Green	 and	
Arabzadah	2013;	Marsden	and	Hopkins	2011;	Oeppen	2010).	
	
By	endeavoring	to	productively	think	through	the	multiplicity	of	what	it	means	to	be	
Afghan	 in	 Delhi,	 the	 thesis	 has	 also	 contributed	 to	 anthropological	 thought	 by	
bringing	 together	 research	within	what	have	come	 to	be	known	as	 the	ontological	
and	 ethical	 turns	within	 anthropology.	 This	 is	 important	 analytically	 as	 these	 two	
bodies	of	literature	are	often	thought	to	be	incompatible	with	one	another.	However,	
they	can	be	brought	into	conversation	to	think	through	questions	of	multiplicity	and	
personhood	 as	 I	 discuss	 below.	 While	 analysis	 of	 the	 material	 presented	 in	 the	
preceding	 chapters	 draws	 on	 considerations	 from	 both	 areas	 of	 research,	 the	
discussion	 in	Amirkhel’s	 shop	described	 in	 chapter	 five	 is	 a	 clear	 example	 of	 how	
methodological	insights	from	research	on	morality	and	ethics,	which	draw	attention	
to	 individuals’	 practices	 of	 reflection	 on	 the	 self,	 can	 be	 used	 to	 apprehend	 the	
different	ontological	systems	constituting	 individuals	 in	multiple	material	ways.	As	
discussed	 in	 chapter	 two,	 the	 assertion	 of	 ontological	multiplicity	 is	 productive	 in	
emphasizing	 how	 persons	 and	 things	 are	 complex,	 multiply	 constituted	 material	
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objects	that	exist	across	concepts,	times,	etc.	This	study	has	distanced	itself,	however,	
from	the	move	within	the	ontological	turn	to	typologize	different	ontologies	via	the	
concept	of	radical	alterity,	which	negates	this	complexity	by	suggesting	a	coherence	
of	people’s	way	of	being	in	the	world	at	the	level	of	corporate	groups136.	It	is	possible	
the	positing	of	radical	alterity	is	a	product	of	individual	researchers’	efforts	to	assert	
the	legitimacy	and	theoretical	viability	of	the	indigenous	peoples’	views	with	whom	
they	work	 (see	 Viveiros	 de	 Castro	 2012)	 in	 “out‐of‐the‐way”	 (Tsing	 1993)	 places.	
However,	 in	order	 to	 think	 through	 the	various	ways	persons	are	 constituted	 in	 a	
complex	urban	environment	and	reflect	more	completely	the	ethnographic	material	
collected	during	fieldwork,	this	thesis	has	endeavoured	to	maintain	the	complexity	
presented	 by	 ideas	 of	 ontological	 multiplicity.	 To	 do	 so,	 the	 study	 has	 brought	
theoretical	 considerations	within	 the	 ontological	 turn	 on	 how	 individuals	 exist	 in	
“ontological	 openness”	 (Candea	 2010)	 in	 contexts	 of	 “poly‐ontology”	 (Scott	 2007)	
where	ontological	orderings	exist	in	tandem	(Fontein	2011)	into	conversation	with	
anthropological	 research	on	 ethics	 and	morality,	which	provides	 a	methodological	
approach	to	examining	how	individuals	navigate	this	complexity	of	being	the	world	
by	attending	 to	 their	 accounting	 for	 their	 selves	 and	others	 (Keane	2014;	Lambek	
2010;	 Schielke	 2015;	 Zigon	 2010).	 It	 is	 through	 bringing	 these	 two	 theoretical	
strands	 in	conversation	with	each	other	 that	 the	 thesis	has	put	 forward	 its	second	
argument	to	treat	the	multiple	ways	of	being	Afghan	in	Delhi	as	not	just	indicative	of	
a	‘superdiversity’	(Vertovec	2007)	of	ways	of	belonging	in	the	city,	but	as	reflective	
of	the	social	context	of	the	city	and	indicative	of	broader	issues	of	urban	life	in	Delhi.	
	
Across	 all	 four	 ethnographic	 chapters,	 the	 state	 scale	 of	 belonging,	 where	 Afghan	
migrants’	 status	 is	 categorized	 as	 either	 legal	 or	 illegal,	 appears	 to	 structure	 and	
affect	other	ways	of	being	and	belonging	in	Delhi	at	both	the	level	of	the	individual	
and	of	the	community.	Thus,	while	individuals	illustrate	the	capacity	to	cultivate	and	
sense	 a	 plurality	 of	 connections	 to	 the	 city	 and	 forms	 of	 belonging	 in	 it,	 either	
individually	or	as	a	group,	 they	are	consistently	 faced	with	 the	need	to	address	an	
official	 denial	 of	 these	 forms	 of	 belonging	 or	 association.	 As	 reiterated	 in	 each	
chapter,	this	fact	was	reflected	in	migrants’	day‐to‐day	ability	to	inhabit	the	city,	to	
secure	housing,	to	remain	in	the	country,	pursue	employment,	or	form	community	in	
																																																								
136	This	assumption	undergirds	the	argument	of	moral	incoherence	of	Afghan	identity	against	which	
this	thesis	argues.	
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the	 ways	 that	 they	 desired.	 One	 ethnographic	 fact	 comes	 across	 as	 being	 stable	
across	the	different	chapters:	a	person’s	ability	to	create	and	live	according	to	how	
they	feel	they	belong	in	the	city	is	premised	on	access	to	financial	or	social	resources	
that	allow	them	to	operate	outside	the	parameters	and	 limitations	 imposed	by	the	
state	 scale	conception	of	Afghan	migrants’	place	 in	Delhi.	 It	 is	 through	 this	 second	
stream	of	argument	that	the	ethnographic	material	presented	in	this	thesis	connects	
with	discussions	of	urban	life	in	Delhi.	
	
Studies	 of	 transnational	 migration	 have	 documented	 how	 state	 level	 legal	
categorization	 of	 migrants	 is	 carried	 out	 against	 ideas	 of	 citizenship,	 and	 that	
migrants’	practices	of	belonging	in	countries	of	destination	in	turn	reflect	practices	
of	 citizenship	 (McNevin	 2011;	 Sadiq	 2010;	 Vora	 2013).	 The	 accounts	 and	
experiences	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 thus	 not	 only	 contribute	 new	 ethnographic	
material	on	Afghan	migration,	but	also	add	to	the	study	of	urban	life	in	India	through	
the	 lens	of	migration.	That	 is,	 to	ask	what	 it	means	 to	be	and	belong	as	Afghan	 in	
Delhi	is	to	also	enquire	into	belonging	in	the	city	more	generally.	Research	interest	
in	 Indian	 cities	 has	 risen	 following	 the	 country’s	 economic	 liberalization	 and	
integration	 into	 global	 markets	 in	 the	 1990s	 (Lama‐Rewal	 and	 Zérah	 2011),	 and	
particular	interest	has	been	given	to	questions	of	urban	citizenship	and	access	to	the	
city137.	Given	literature	on	the	relationship	between	economic	liberalization,	the	rise	
of	the	Hindutva	movement,	and	urban	marginalization	of	Muslims	(Gopalakrishnan	
2006;	Oza	2006;	Gayer	and	Jaffrelot	2012),	it	might	be	tempting	to	consider	Afghan	
migrants’	experience	in	Delhi	through	a	religious	lens.	However,	while	questions	of	
religious	identity	do	figure	in	state	scale	considerations	of	Afghan	migrants’	place	in	
the	city,	it	is	not	integral	in	informing	migrants’	experience	of	belonging	in	Delhi.	As	
reiterated	in	the	ethnographic	chapters,	Afghan	migrants’	ability	to	live	and	belong	
in	Delhi	 outside	 of	 the	 strictures	 imposed	 at	 the	 state	 scale	 is	 dependent	 on	 their	
access	to	financial	and	social	resources.	Resultantly,	while	Afghan	migrants	are	able	
to	conceive	of	multiple	ways	of	belonging	in	the	city,	 it	 is	only	those	with	financial	
prowess	or	social	connections	who	can	belong	in	the	city	as	they	desire.	
	
																																																								
137	See	Desai	and	Sanyal	(2012)	for	a	recent	overview	of	critical	approaches	to	the	question	of	urban	
citizenship	in	India.	
	 212
In	 arguing	 that	 access	 to	 financial	 and	 social	 resources	 can	 allow	 for	 Afghan	
migrants	to	procure	rights	to	the	city,	the	thesis	contributes	to	current	research	on	
citizenship	and	urban	 life	 in	 India,	 and	adds	 to	 the	 recent	 scholarship	highlighting	
how	 refugees’	 experiences	 in	 the	 city	 are	 paralleled	 in	 the	 situation	 of	 the	 urban	
poor	 (Sanyal	 2012).	 Despite	 research	 illustrating	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 “deep	 democracy”	
(Appadurai	 2013:153‐77)	 in	 India’s	 urban	 centres,	 where	 global	 processes	 of	
deterritorialization	allow	the	poor	to	mobilize	and	claim	citizenship	rights	in	the	city,	
studies	 of	 urban	 citizenship	 across	 India	 illustrate	 how	 recent	 market‐driven	
policies	have	resulted	in	disempowering	and	excluding	the	urban	poor	from	the	city	
(Chatterjee	 2009;	 Doshi	 2012;	 Ranganathan	 2012).	 Research	 on	 Delhi	 has	
specifically	documented	the	 influence	of	the	business	classes	 in	controlling	politics	
and	urban	policy	 (Jaffrelot	2000),	 that	has	 resulted	 in	 citizenship	 in	 the	 city	being	
tied	 to	 the	 ability	 to	 participate	 in	 society	 as	 a	middle‐class	 consumer	 (see	 Gupta	
2009	 for	a	broader,	national	view).	Those	who	 lack	 the	resources	 to	participate	 in	
this	 consumer	class,	 i.e.	 the	urban	poor,	 are	made	 legally	and	 spatially	 invisible	 in	
the	 city,	 and	 denied	 access	 to	 citizenship	 and	 rights	 to	 belong	 in	 the	 Delhi	 (Bhan	
2014;	Bhan	et	al	2014).	This	fact	is	reflected	throughout	the	ethnographic	chapters	
at	different	levels,	in	the	UNHCR	Chief	of	Mission’s	exhortation	that	refugees	must	be	
willing	 to	 “capitalize	 on”	 any	 opportunity	 to	 remain	 in	 the	 city,	 in	 Shahrukh’s	
frustrations	 at	 not	 being	 able	 to	 belong	 in	 Delhi	 as	 he	 felt,	 or	 in	 the	 Pashtun	
moneylender	network’s	ability	to	maintain	operation	in	India	through	maintaining	a	
tightly	 controlled,	 closed	 financial	 network,	 and	 can	be	 encapsulated	 in	Khiyalay’s	
statement	that	in	Delhi	“If	you	have	money,	you	have	everything.”	
	
In	 this	way,	 returning	 to	Mirza	Ghalib’s	 couplet	quoted	 in	 the	 introduction138,	 this	
thesis	is	not	just	about	Afghans	in	the	city,	but	also	about	how	their	experiences	in	
Delhi	reveal	a	wider	social	context.	Of	course,	the	accounts	and	contexts	discussed	in	
this	thesis	describe	only	a	segment	of	a	variegated	and	diverse	set	of	people	living	in	
the	 city.	 As	 already	 discussed	 in	 chapters	 one	 and	 six,	 there	 were	 groups	 and	
individuals	 from	Afghanistan	 residing	 in	Delhi	 to	whom	 I	had	 limited	access	as	an	
outsider,	such	as	the	Afghan	Sikh	and	Pashtun	moneylender	communities,	or	groups	
to	which	I	had	no	access	at	all	as	a	single	middle‐class	man,	like	the	family	networks	
																																																								
138	Bring	forward	those	who	understand	language,	if	they	exist!	/	The	stranger	in	the	city	has	much	to	
say	
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or	 elite	 upper‐class	 circles	 referenced	 in	 chapter	 six.	 This	 fact	 does	 not,	 however,	
detract	 from	 the	 ethnographic	 material	 and	 analysis	 presented	 here,	 but	 does	
provide	impetus	for	future	research.	
	
As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 one,	 time	 constraints	 on	 conducting	 fieldwork	 and	 the	
inability	 to	 return	 to	 the	 field	 impacted	 my	 ability	 to	 make	 inroads	 with	 the	
moneylender	and	Afghan	Sikh	communities.	As	I	have	now	built	relationships	with	
members	of	both	communities,	the	opportunity	to	return	to	the	field	would	allow	for	
deepening	my	relationships	to	the	community	and	could	potentially	grant	me	access	
I	 did	 not	 have	 during	 my	 initial	 fieldwork.	 Rather	 than	 casting	 a	 wide	 net	 and	
narrowing	down,	as	I	had	done	when	I	first	arrived	in	Delhi,	I	would	now	be	able	to	
focus	 on	 specific	 groups	 and	 on	 a	 set	 of	 questions	 that	 have	 risen	 from	 the	
ethnographic	material.	
	
In	 particular,	while	 the	 thesis	 only	 dealt	 obliquely	with	 the	 question	 of	 emotions,	
there	is	significant	space	to	focus	and	develop	an	understanding	of	the	role	of	hope	
in	 Afghan	 migrants’	 experience	 in	 Delhi,	 particularly	 those	 without	 access	 to	
financial	 or	 social	 resources.	 Two	 terms	 relating	 to	 hope	 appear	 with	 some	
frequency	 in	 the	 interviews	and	accounts	 I	collected	during	 fieldwork:	omid	which	
entails	a	degree	of	expectation,	and	arzu	 suggesting	a	desire	without	such	a	sense.	
This	was	an	issue	I	recognized	only	after	returning	from	the	field,	and	could	serve	as	
the	 basis	 for	 future	 enquiry.	 Focusing	 on	 these	 emotional	 aspects	 of	 Afghan	
experience	in	Delhi	could	allow	for	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	how	migrants	
identify	 and	 engage	 with	 the	 structural	 inequalities	 outlined	 above,	 for	 while	 the	
ethnographic	 material	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 relates	 this	 rather	 bleak	 aspect	 of	
urban	 life	 in	 Delhi,	 it	 is	 also	 true	 that	 the	 individuals	 with	 whom	 I	 conducted	
fieldwork	 were	 remarkably	 resilient	 and	 framed	 their	 experiences	 realistically,	
identifying	both	despair	and	hope	for	a	better	future.	As	Mirzal	said	to	me	in	our	last	
meeting,	 he	 had	 become	 hopeless	 (na‐omid)	 after	 petitioning	 the	 UNHCR,	 the	
moneylenders,	and	the	church	to	no	avail.	 In	discussing	his	 inability	to	provide	for	
his	 family	 and	 his	 consternation	 at	 being	 a	 refugee,	 he	 explained	 that	 he	 kept	 on	
going	as	even	though	
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“My	heart	is	angry	(khapa),	It	has	become	hard,	there	is	nobody	to	whom	I	can	
tell	my	problems	[and]	I	don’t	know	if	saying	this	to	you	will	help	me	or	not.	
But	I	have	a	desire	(arzu)	that	my	life	should	get	better.”	
Mirzal’s	sentiments	are	not	particular	 to	being	Afghan	or	being	a	refugee,	but	 they	
do	illumine	his	reality	of	living	in	Delhi.	It	would	appear,	as	Ghalib	indicated,	that	the	
strangers	in	the	city	still	have	much	to	say.	
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